



Africa since Decolonization

Welz, Martin

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

AFRICA SINCE **DECOLONIZATION**

The History and Politics of a Diverse Continent

Martin Welz



Africa since Decolonization

Home to more than 1.2 billion people, living in 54 recognized states, speaking around 3,000 languages, Africa is a diverse and complex continent made up of states, which differ in regard to their colonial history, political system, socioeconomic development, economic policies, and their experience with crises and conflicts. This introduction and overview of African history and politics since decolonization emphasises throughout, the diversity of the continent. Organized thematically to include chapters on decolonization and its legacies, external influences, economics, political systems, inter-African relations, crises, conflicts and conflict management, and Africa's external relations, Martin Welz strikes a fine balance between the use of contextual information, analysis, case studies, and examples with theoretical debates in development, politics, and global policy. Accessible to students at all levels, it counters histories that offer reductive explanations of complex issues, and offers new insights into the role African actors have played in influencing international affairs beyond the continent.

Martin Welz is Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Hamburg. He is the author of *Integrating Africa: Decolonization's Legacies, Sovereignty and the African Union* (2012) and numerous articles on conflict management in Africa, the relations between the African Union and the United Nations, Africa's role in the world, and on the impact of former liberation fighters.

Africa since Decolonization

The History and Politics of a Diverse Continent

Martin Welz

University of Hamburg



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS



University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314-321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New
Delhi - 110025, India

79 Anson Road, #06-04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the
pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international
levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108474887

DOI: [10.1017/9781108599566](https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108599566)

© Martin Welz 2021

Originally published in German as *Afrika seit der Dekolonisation: Geschichte
und Politik eines Kontinents* by Martin Welz. Published by W. Kohlhammer
(2020) Stuttgart, Germany.

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the
provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any
part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University
Press.

First published 2021

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Welz, Martin, Dr., author.

Title: Africa since decolonization : the history and politics of a diverse continent / Martin Welz.

Description: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020027594 (print) | LCCN 2020027595 (ebook) | ISBN 9781108474887 (hardback) | ISBN 9781108465564 (paperback) | ISBN 9781108599566 (epub)

Subjects: LCSH: Decolonization--Africa. | Africa--History--1960- | Africa--Politics and government--1960- | Africa--Foreign relations--1960-

Classification: LCC DT30.5 .W465 2021 (print) | LCC DT30.5 (ebook) | DDC 960.32--dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2020027594>

LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2020027595>

ISBN 978-1-108-47488-7 Hardback

ISBN 978-1-108-46556-4 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

In memory of my grandma Hedwig

Contents

List of Illustrations

Acknowledgments

Prologue

1 From the Golden Age to Conquest and Colonization

2 Decolonization and Liberation

3 Decolonization's Legacies

4 External Influences

5 Africa's Economy, 1960–2000

6 Economy, Socioeconomic Development, and Development Cooperation

7 States, Political Systems, and Actors

8 Intra-African Cooperation and Integration

9 Political Crises

10 Large-Scale Conflicts

11 International Conflict Management

12 African Actors' Role in International Politics

Epilogue

Notes

Index

Illustrations

Figures

0.1 The world as mentioned in *The New York Times* (international edition) in 2018

7.1 Presidential term limits in Africa

8.1 Overlapping regional economic community membership

9.1 Coups in Africa, 1950–2019

Map

0.1 Map of Africa

Tables

5.1 Trade with five largest individual trading partners, Africa and the world, 1950–2000 (in US\$ million)

5.2 Total net official development assistance, 1971–1990 (in US\$ million)

6.1 Trade with five largest individual trading partners, Africa and the world, 2000–2017 (in US\$ million)

6.2 Total net receipts from OECD countries, 2017 (in US\$ million)

6.3 Economic and socioeconomic development

11.1 Neopatrimonial Index Score at conflicts' beginning, end, and five years thereafter

Acknowledgments

On 18 March 2016, I received an email out of the blue. It came from Daniel Kuhn, an editor at the German publisher Kohlhammer, asking me whether I could imagine writing a book on African history and politics since decolonization. His request fell on fertile ground, for I had been thinking about writing such a book for a couple of years but had thought I would do so at a later stage of my career. Now, with the window of opportunity opened and Cambridge University Press indicating that it was interested in an English version of the book, I felt the time had come to write it.

The reason I thought I should write such a book was straightforward: based on my engagement with African history and politics, I did not agree with the image of the continent that was and still is presented – not necessarily in academia but more beyond it. Too often, I found myself surprised when people assume Africa is just one country or reduce complex issues such as conflicts to simple answers like greed and ethnicity, as if this were all that motivate Africans. In 2018, the US president went as far as to speak of “shithole countries” when referring to African states. Actually, such obvious nonsense should not be repeated, but it helps to stress that treatments of Africa are needed that are rhetorically less radical, more nuanced, and better informed. I felt I could contribute to this debate and found part of my inspiration in Binyavanga Wainaina’s brilliant (and must-read) ironic instruction, “How to Write about Africa.”¹ I think and indeed hope that I have followed none of Wainaina’s cynical advice. While I do not claim to have *the* correct picture of Africa, I believe that I have a well-informed perspective on African history and politics that I want to share. And I do so in full knowledge of all the

shortcomings to which I will return in the [Prologue](#) of this book.

This is my perspective, my book, and my responsibility. Yet it is also true that you would not hold the book in your hands in this form if there were not a number of people who had helped me, and I want to acknowledge their support. To start with, I need to thank my student assistants for their tireless efforts: Annika von Berg, Steve Biedermann, Niki Erickson, Robert Gerardi, Gunnar Hamann, Leon Rein, and (last but certainly not least) Mario Serjoscha Beying. All of them conducted countless literature reviews, prepared the tables, and did a lot of fact-checking. Several colleagues aided and guided me during the research process, suggesting literature, patiently answering questions, and giving input that found its way into this book. In this context, I wish to acknowledge the kind support of Chris Alden, Wolfgang Eger, Markus Haacker, Charlotte Heyl, Katharina Holzinger, Jan Jansen, Thomas Kirsch, Daniela Kromrey, Timo Smit, Karen Smith, Thomas G. Weiss, Alan Whiteside, and Micha Wiebusch. The library staff at the University of Konstanz and the GIGA Institute in Hamburg as well as at the African Union Archive helped me to retrieve literature that seemed at times impossible to get hold of.

Cambridge University Press had four anonymous readers who evaluated my book proposal, and their thoughtful comments and suggestions helped me greatly in the early phase of this book project. Undoubtedly, without their ideas – and encouragement – the book would look different. I am very grateful for their analysis and their support. Furthermore, I am deeply thankful to Katharina Coleman, Andreas Freytag, Stefan Gänzle, Julia Grauvogel, Henning Melber, Martin Rempe, Antonia Witt, and especially Malte Brosig, Linnéa Gelot, and Elizabeth Schmidt, for their substantive feedback and comments on draft chapters of this book or the (almost) complete manuscript, respectively. Their input proved invaluable and I owe them a great deal!

This book comes out in two languages, and this has admittedly been a logistical challenge. Without David Brenner, who translated the

drafts of several chapters and proofread some others, the completion of this book would have taken months longer, and I am grateful for his work and continued assistance. I want to thank Daniel Kuhn of Kohlhammer and Maria Marsh of Cambridge University Press for their encouragement and support from the outset. Moreover, I am thankful to Klaus-Peter Burkarth, Charlotte Kempf, and Peter Kritzing of Kohlhammer and Daniel Brown, Atifa Jiwa, Stephanie Taylor, and Abigail Walkington of Cambridge University Press as well as Penny Harper, Orvil Matthews and his colleagues at SPi Global for their great support.

I thank the University of Konstanz, the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, and the University of Hamburg for giving me an academic home while I worked on this book. And I thank the Center of Excellence “Cultural Foundations of Integration” at the University of Konstanz and that center’s staff for supporting me over the past decade and providing all the funds to travel and conduct research. These funds allowed me to meet colleagues, decision-makers, and Africans from all walks of life in Africa and elsewhere who informed my perspective on that continent.

Finally, I thank my family and friends for their support and genuine interest in my work, while their occasional *disinterest* gave me time to think about something else. Without the love and support of Mickey, Santino, and Heiko, I would not have been able to finish this book. Thanks to all of you – and those I have unintentionally forgotten.

Prologue

Africa is home to more than 1.2 billion people, who speak around 3,000 languages by some estimates. There are fifty-four states recognized by the United Nations (UN). Most of them are on the continent; some are located on surrounding islands. There are territories that have been colonized or were run by a minority regime, territories that were not colonized, and territories that are still colonized. There are states that inherited a weak economy from the colonial powers and states that had a more solid economic base at independence. There are states that have very limited natural resources, states with some resources, and a few that have an abundance of natural resources. There are states with low, medium, and high levels of socioeconomic development. There are states in which external actors rarely interfere, states that witness occasional interference, and states in which external actors are so dominant that the local government is severely constrained. There are democratic, semidemocratic, and nondemocratic countries. There are states with functioning state institutions, states with semifunctioning state institutions, and there are failed states. There are internationally recognized functioning states, internationally recognized but factually nonexistent states, and internationally nonrecognized but functioning states. There are states with neopatrimonial systems and states without them. There are states in which traditional leaders play a role and states in which they play none. There are states in which there has never been a coup d'état, states that experienced one coup (often some time back), and states in which coups regularly happen into the present. There are states that are unaffected by terrorism, states that suffer from terrorists' attacks, and states in which terrorist groups

recruit, train, and attack. There are states that have witnessed a civil war or other forms of large-scale violence and states in which people lived (and still live) in peaceful coexistence. In short, Africa – in this book comprising both North and Sub-Saharan Africa – is diverse in many respects. This diversity existed before the European powers started colonizing vast parts of the continent, it existed during the colonial period, and it has existed from independence until today.



Map 0.1 Map of Africa

One could use other descriptions for a first portrayal of the political, economic, and socioeconomic situation in Africa than those above. Ultimately, exploring such a diverse continent is a question of perspective. My perspective of Africa has been shaped by a deep academic engagement with the continent: I examined numerous books

and academic articles written by Africans and non-Africans, I regularly read newspapers and internet reporting in African and non-African outlets, and I saw numerous news and documentaries on TV produced by Africans and non-Africans. In addition, I often traveled there, sometimes for short periods, sometimes for longer, and I have spoken with citizens from all walks of life on countless occasions both on the continent and in the diaspora. Based on these engagements, then, this book presents *my* perspective on African history and politics. As always in social sciences, no one will entirely share my perspective or fully agree, for he or she may have read, heard, seen, or experienced something else. At the same time, no one will completely disagree with what I write. I have no qualms admitting that I am not an omniscient “expert” about “Africa” or that I am not in a position to do full justice to such a diverse continent on the 286 pages that lie in front of you. However, the reality is that even 1,000 pages or a more intensive academic and personal engagement with African history and politics would not have done justice to the rich history and complex politics of Africa (since decolonization) either. In effect, any academic work condenses reality, reduces complexity, and is bound by the zeitgeist. It follows that this book should not be seen as an ultimate and final assessment of African history and politics. Rather, it is my exploration and analysis of selected issues that I deem important from the perspective of a political scientist who is specialized in international relations and Africa and who has an interest in historic, economic, and socioeconomic questions. This book is my humble attempt as a non-African to write about African history and politics.

During my Masters at the London School of Economics and Political Science, I read a book chapter in which John Vincent summarized Hedley Bull’s legacy. By applying this academic legacy outside the research paradigm it stems from, as I consider it universally applicable, it became my guide for research, teaching, and writing. According to Vincent, Bull’s four maxims were: “ask the big questions and get the big picture; be sceptical about every

generalization, including this one; hold up every fashion to the mirror of history; and [...] acknowledge the extent to which we are in the dark rather than pretending that we can see the light.”¹ I hope that my readers take these principles into account when engaging with this book. I invite them to form their own impressions and to make their own judgments on complex questions, suggesting that they deploy the same standard in doing so – and when judging my work. If we can agree on that, we are in a good position to avoid talking past each other as the intentions and the shortcomings of this book are clear from the onset.

Why Study African History and Politics?

On 23 June 2019, England was playing against Cameroon in the FIFA Women’s World Cup in the French town of Valenciennes. This football match will not so much be remembered for the sport but for the various incidences that occurred in the stadium, with the Cameroonian players feeling betrayed by the referee and with some of the decisions of the latter being framed as racist. As such, England’s first goal was initially ruled out but then the video assistant referee deemed that the striker had been onside. Journalists from Cameroon in the stands urged the Cameroonian players to protest and to end the game. The Cameroonian fans supported this call and indicated that they thought that England had paid for the match’s results. The Cameroonian players again hesitated to continue after they thought they had shot a goal that the video assistant referee then annulled, as it was a tight offside. After the match, a Cameroonian midfielder said she was feeling as if she were participating in a European championship and that Africa was not welcome in it.² When confronted with the accusations, England’s coach said that he was a great fan of African football and that these incidences today were a single case; in his view, the players were very emotional on the pitch. In all their games, “[t]heir supporters were dancing and singing, that’s

what the World Cup is all about. I love the joy they bring, dancing into the dressing rooms. You could feel their emotion and their hurt.”³ He also noted that Cameroonian football had improved and certainly has a bright future.

Only when we delve deeper into the colonial and postcolonial history as well as into the current political situation, and only when we place this history and contemporary political circumstances in world history and an analysis of today’s international system, will we be in a position to have a more fine-grained perspective of the events in Valenciennes and to grasp the underlying issues. Then we are able to see, on the one hand, the frustration of Africans – here Cameroon’s players and supporters – about continued marginalization and about a feeling of being treated unfairly and, on the other hand, the prejudice and stereotypes we hear from Europeans (or people in the West more broadly), in this case England’s coach when referring to the singing, dancing, and emotions of Africans with a paternalistic undertone. Two perspectives had clashed in Valenciennes and, in effect, both sides were talking past each other even though they were talking about the same match.

There are, of course, more reasons to study African history and politics and I shall mention three of them. First, African history and politics deserve more attention than they currently receive. This is because of and despite the argument so often made, that only major powers matter in international politics. As will be shown throughout this book, African actors are not bystanders in national and international politics but shape national and international politics, too. Thinking in such terms, books like Fernand Braudel’s *A History of Civilizations* appear misguided insofar as this work devotes 120 pages to European history, 76 pages to Islam and the Muslim world, 152 pages to the Far East, and 99 pages to the Americas, but only 37 pages to Sub-Saharan Africa.⁴ The same is true for the popular book *1000 Places to See Before You Die* that features 355 places in Europe, 171 in the USA alone, but only 67 in Africa.⁵ These are just two books, one

academic and one popular, which stand for many.

An analysis of Western newspaper reporting similarly shows that Africa is underrepresented. [Figure 0.1](#) shows a cartogram in which each country's size is determined by the number of articles in the international edition of *The New York Times* for the entire year 2018 that mentions the country's name. I counted the number of articles for every given country irrespective of the content of the given article. To provide other countries a chance to be seen, the size of the square that represents the USA is just a quarter of its actual size. A few countries were not mentioned by *The New York Times* in 2018 (in Africa, it was Lesotho) and thus these countries do not appear in the figure.



Figure 0.1 The world as mentioned in *The New York Times* (international edition) in 2018⁶

However, it is not only that Western media report less about African affairs as compared to other world regions, but also that online readers, who have much choice in selecting the articles they are reading, also engage less with news from Africa. *The Economist* reported that readers spent much less time reading about Robert Mugabe and the military takeover in Zimbabwe in 2017 than about Harvey Weinstein or Prince Harry's engagement to Meghan Markle. While there was discernible readership on the elections in Britain, France, and Germany in 2017, only a few people spent time reading about the elections in Kenya in the same year – even though they were no less interesting given the history of past elections in the country. And, while the situation in Somalia in 2017 earned some

attention when it came to interests in conflicts and conflict management, online readers spent significantly more time reading about Afghanistan, the Islamic State, Syria, and Yemen.⁷

A second reason to study African history and politics is about coming to terms with two extremes: On the one hand, there is talk about “hopeless,” “failing,” or even “failed” African states and “Africa” more broadly, a continent that is thought to be going nowhere or that poses a threat given amongst others the population growth and migration. On the other hand, there is talk about “Africa’s rise” or even “Afrotopia.”⁸ These are all intricate generalizations, and we should be skeptical about them inasmuch as they gloss over the complex dynamics in Africa and the continent’s political, economic, and socioeconomic diversity. I propose that we avoid conflating analysis and judgment with normative or wishful thinking – or with a pessimistic or paternalistic approach. We should instead undertake an analysis in the Weberian sense, free of value judgments and without making a final judgment,⁹ as this would not do justice to the diversity and complexity of Africa.

Third, in a globalized world, events in one corner of the world are perceptible in other corners. The Arab Spring of 2011 and the rising number of migrants in Europe and elsewhere are just two examples of this, as are the migrants fleeing from the Eritrean regime or from Somalia to other continents. The same is true for some terrorists who originate from Africa. Rising or falling oil prices might be due to conflicts, or their conclusion, in oil-exporting African states. And almost every mobile phone contains a metal, namely cobalt, originating from Congo-Kinshasa. Looking beyond such prominent cases, we also find, for example, that the Egyptian way to play croquet, which is more interesting to play and watch in the eyes of many, was adopted in other places so that this version of the game is now the most popular one.¹⁰ What is more, South African surgeons were not only the first to transplant a heart in 1967 but also in 2015 the first to transplant the male organ – that worked effectively.¹¹ In

short, there is ample proof *inter alia* with regard to resources, science, culture, and sports that show that Africa and Africans have global significance.

Aims of the Book

This book explains the complexity and diversity of past and contemporary politics in Africa broadly and might spark an interest to follow and further study African affairs. It is *not* an all-encompassing analysis of the fifty-four (or so) countries and their history since they achieved independence or overcame minority rule. And readers should be aware that they will not know “Africa” after having read the book; rather, they will have acquired a first impression, gained more knowledge, or learned a new perspective. I will also not provide solutions to any of the challenges identified in this book, nor will I make any predictions about the future. Even though Max Weber would allow a scientist to make a judgment *after* the analysis as well as take and promote his/her own position, I will refrain from doing so herein.¹² Instead, I will pose some questions at the end of the book for further consideration.

A Short Preview

This book comprises twelve thematic chapters. [Chapters 1–6](#) are more devoted to exploring the “big picture,” meaning that I embed events in Africa in a global history and an analysis of the contemporary political and economic situation. [Chapters 7–12](#) are different insofar as I delve deeper into African politics by providing more case studies, thereby examining the internal functioning of African states as well as cooperation, crises, and conflicts within and among them, as well as their ability to influence global politics. These would not be understandable without the descriptions in [Chapters 1–6](#).

Despite my focus on the period after decolonization, we need to

inquire into the precolonial era and the colonial time before turning to the actual topic of the book. This is due to two reasons: first, to highlight that Africa had a rich history prior to colonization and was certainly not a “dark continent.” Secondly, because there are some path dependencies at work, that is to say, past events in Africa shape the present. We need, for instance, to see how the colonial powers administered their African colonies to be in a better position to understand postcolonial politics and the current economic situation. And we need to take the rich precolonial history into account to understand why there is talk of an *African Renaissance*¹³ and why today’s postcolonial writers are able to link their works to that period. To this end, [Chapter 1](#) provides a short introduction into the precolonial era, the “Scramble for Africa,” and the colonial period.

The colonial time and decolonization have been described as a watershed in Africa’s history. The European colonial powers took control of all but two countries, Liberia and Ethiopia. During a period of several decades these colonies reached independence, peaking in 1960, the “African year,” when eighteen colonies became independent. [Chapter 2](#) identifies and describes the forces that played a role in making African states nominally independent, that is, recognized by other states and the UN. I analyze decolonization from three perspectives: that of the colonial powers, of the colonial state, and of the international system, demonstrating that only those three perspectives together allow us to understand decolonization in its complexity.

[Chapter 3](#) continues by exploring the legacies of the colonial period and decolonization along three fields: political and economic legacies as well as consequences for Africans themselves. Among other things, it shows how ill-prepared the colonial powers left their colonies in political and economic terms and that most postcolonial leaders took over the colonial states without altering them. The chapter reveals how rare fertile ground for state-building, democratization, socioeconomic development, and economic freedom

was at the time of independence.

One of the recurring themes of this book is interference from non-African actors into African affairs. [Chapter 4](#) is explicitly devoted to this theme and scrutinizes the interference of the (former) colonial powers, the Cold War superpowers, as well as today's major and rising powers in African affairs. The core themes, in chronological order, are the interferences during the Cold War, during the 1990s when a liberal-cosmopolitan order was promoted, the period after 9/11 with the US-led "war on terror," and the "New Scramble for Africa," concentrating on the role of China.

[Chapters 5](#) and [6](#) address the economic and socioeconomic development of the continent. Whereas [Chapter 5](#) deals with the time span between decolonization and the year 2000, touching on various initiatives to tackle the identified socioeconomic challenges of several African states, [Chapter 6](#) is concerned with the time after 2000 when the rise of China and its interests in Africa opened a new scramble for Africa. [Chapter 5](#) will show that the ideology-laden debates during the Cold War made a collective strategy to boost the economies impossible and that African and non-African actors were talking past each other for they had no common perspective on the causes of the socioeconomic misery that prevailed in several (but not all) African countries. [Chapter 6](#) then examines contemporary challenges and success stories by emphasizing the diversification of trading partners and, in that context, the role of China and other emerging powers. While one can observe more trade, more trading partners, more consumption, and more foreign direct investment, these changes do not reach all African states.

The political landscape in Africa is diverse and [Chapter 7](#), the longest chapter in this book, investigates the details. It addresses topics like the nature of the state, "Big Men" politics, neopatrimonialism, strategies for staying in power, and democratization – to name a few. Besides the focus on the presidency, this chapter discusses the roles of other actors, including cabinets,

public administrations, parliaments, political parties, militaries, judiciaries, traditional leaders, and churches as well as nongovernmental organizations.

[Chapter 8](#) is concerned with intra-African cooperation, highlighting those intergovernmental organizations meant to integrate African states politically, economically, and socially. In this chapter, I will show the rationales behind the establishment of such bodies as the Organization of African Unity, its successor, the African Union, and regional economic communities like the Economic Community of West African States. Moreover, I will explore the normative basis of these projects, the political profit, as well as the obstacles toward a deeper integration both from the standpoint of history and contemporary challenges.

[Chapters 9](#) and [10](#) deal with crises and large-scale conflicts. Specifically, [Chapter 9](#) investigates political crises, namely secession (attempts), coups d'état, electoral violence, and terrorism. I deliberate on the rationales and drivers of these types of crises, and emphasize at the same time that while there is a perception of a continent suffering from endless crises, these have in fact not at all reached every African country but are often local and temporary phenomena that even date back some time. [Chapter 10](#) then turns to large-scale violence and conflicts. It explains the absence of interstate wars and the reasons for intrastate wars while also not forgetting to mention that several African countries have never experienced such large-scale violence. I also address the question of why people choose to become rebels. The chapter then turns to genocides as a special form of large-scale conflicts, exploring the genocides in Darfur and Rwanda. Given its scale and the up to five million dead, "Africa's Great War" or "World War III" merits a separate analysis. Here I am referring to a war complex in the Great Lake region that blurred the line between inter- and intrastate conflict. Finally, I will explore the situation in refugee camps since they serve both as shelters and as recruiting places.

Thereafter, [Chapter 11](#) examines international conflict

management and introduces the various actors involved in this field. It asks what conditions have to be met to conduct international conflict management successfully; to this end, it first asks what “successful” might mean. The analysis underlines that there are neither simple problems nor simple solutions but that conflict management is a truly complex affair demanding many trade-offs and hard choices.

It emerges from this book that African actors are not passive or bystanders. Rather, throughout history they have shaped their own polities and policies as well as influenced polities and policies in the rest of the world. [Chapter 12](#) specifically turns to this issue and asks what role African actors play in international politics. I explore the means that African actors can use to impact international politics as well as the obstacles they face. The [Epilogue](#) then raises some questions derived from the preceding chapters and provides some food for thought.

This overview shows that the book is structured along selected themes. It is, of course, possible to read only individual chapters insofar as they largely stand for themselves. They contain references to other chapters to show the links between the topics and to guide readers. References within chapters are marked with “see above” or “see below.” Nonetheless, like other authors, I would appreciate if the book is read in its entirety to grasp the full perspective that I lay out. As this book is fully referenced, I have not included sections of suggested or further readings. The notes at the end provide an abundance of suggestions for a deeper engagement with any topic discussed in the pages that follow.

With that, let me stop writing about the background to the book and its technical details and ask you to turn the page to get down to business.

From the Golden Age to Conquest and Colonization

Africa's precolonial history is rich, and not just because humanity presumably has its origins there.¹ Even if this book only manages to depict a fraction of the history of Africa, this chapter must at least make clear that the continent's history did not begin with the arrival of the Europeans as the focus of this book on African history and politics after decolonization may otherwise suggest. We know a lot about Ancient Egypt, which is thought to have been a black civilization,² or about the Axumite Empire in what is now Ethiopia, and we know even more about the past two centuries, starting with the colonization. However, for the period in between, which has been described as the Golden Age,³ we have limited knowledge.⁴ Notwithstanding, we know that this precolonial era has left visible traces to this day and serves as an essential link for the ongoing postcolonial discourse. However, it is also true that the comparatively short period of colonialization and decolonization has had such a significant impact on large parts of Africa that it likely represents the most comprehensive break in the continent's history – at least from today's perspective. Therefore, some parts of the present chapter are also devoted to the colonization and the colonial period while the following two chapters examine decolonization and the effects of the colonial period.

The Golden Age: The Centuries Prior to the

European Appearance

Some historians have subscribed to the view that there was only darkness prior to the European colonization of Africa and that Africa – together with pre-Columbian America – were “picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe” unworthy to study.⁵ It is true that we know little about that period, a fact that François-Xavier Fauvelle attributes to the lack of writings from that period, a lack of archeological objects, as well as to ideological reasons, namely a disinterest in Africa’s past.⁶ This lack of knowledge and this disinterest toward Africa’s precolonial history explain and reinforce some prejudices about the continent until today. What we know is that, prior to colonization, people in Africa organized themselves into political systems like in other regions of the world. One of the oldest political systems in human history, which existed until recently, was that of Ethiopia. Until it was overthrown by Communists in 1974, a succession of 237 kings and emperors ruled there continuously for some 3,000 years. Imposing structures such as the steles in Aksum or the rock churches in Lalibela bear witness to this age. No less impressive was the Empire of Mali, which lasted from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century. Its emperor Mansa Musa I is considered the wealthiest man in the history of the world. The Jolof Empire in today’s Senegal and Gambia existed as a political unit from ca. 1530 to 1890. The Ashanti Kingdom endured from about 1680 for more than two centuries; present-day Ghana, among other states, is built upon it. Great Zimbabwe, a city of ruins in today’s Zimbabwe, serves as evidence of the Munhumutapa Empire that flourished from the eleventh to the fifteenth century. The Luba Empire in present-day Congo-Kinshasa and Zambia lasted from ca. 1585 to 1889 and the Kingdom of Congo from ca. 1390 to 1857. Founded in 1300, the Kingdom of Buganda lives on today within the boundaries of Uganda. In Zanzibar, the Omani Sultans reigned from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, also controlling large regions of eastern Africa. As such, they were the forerunners of European colonization.⁷ Their

influence extended to today's eastern Congo, one reason why Swahili is still spoken there.

Precise knowledge about the shape of political systems in precolonial Africa is rather scarce. In the western African savannah, *kafus* were the basis of miniature states; the *sarauta* system in today's Nigeria unified micro-states into kingdoms with fortified capital cities; and, in what is now Cameroon, society organized itself under a "big man" whose personal qualities or lineage enabled him to rule. In some Bantu languages in eastern Africa, the original term for "chief" disappeared. Instead, authority and respect were accorded to warriors, elders, or those who could perform rituals.⁸ Some of these systems resembled states of the European type; others were quite limited in scope and organized rather informally. There were many "decentral organized societies,"⁹ in which authority was less centralized. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch notes that in the nineteenth century, shortly before colonization, societies were organized based on military power, such as under Samory Touré in West Africa; on religion like the Mahdist state in today's Sudan (see below); or on commerce as exemplified by the Yao at the southern shore of Lake Malawi and the Nyamwezi in today's Tanzania. These societies and their organization were fluid and, because of that, the often-used term "traditional" is problematic for it is unclear to which period in the history it refers.¹⁰ Women played a central role in many places. They ruled empires, founded cities, led armies, started military conquests, and founded new states.¹¹ Some African societies were hierarchical, others stateless, and in several there was a coexistence of both.¹² There were stateless societies such as Igboland or those in Northern Uganda and the East African Rift Valley, which were nonmonarchical but had decentralized and democratic forms of operation.¹³ In Buganda, on the contrary, "the king emerged supreme with control over land but with an administrative hierarchy whose personnel came from both humble and noble origins."¹⁴ More centralized – and despotic – was the Zulu kingdom. Scarcely any of these areas had firm borders. Rule was

defined as ruling over people rather than over territories.

We also know that Africans engaged with people from other continents.¹⁵ Several hundred Africans visited Europe between 1650 and 1850.¹⁶ Earlier on, the northern African territories along the Mediterranean were linked to European markets, for example, by the Roman Empire. We know of goods brought from Asia to Western Africa some 2,000 years back.¹⁷ From the seventh century onwards, Islam spread from the Arabian Peninsula into Africa.¹⁸ People in eastern Africa traded spices and tropical goods with the Arabian Peninsula and India. Gold from Western Africa found buyers in North Africa and Europe starting in the eighth century. Emperor Abubakari II of Mali is said to have crossed the Atlantic as early as 1311. In addition, there was trade with China, India, and Indonesia.¹⁹ And from the sixteenth century onwards, Africans traded slaves with the Europeans.

The beginning of the slave trade not only marks a watershed for Africa insofar as this is considered to be the beginning of a racist thinking, which treated black Africans as inferior,²⁰ but is also an indication that African societies were well organized. It is the only way to explain how in the sixteenth century millions of slaves could be systematically deported from the interior to ports where European ships were waiting. By the time the slave trade ended in the 1860s, more than eleven million slaves had been conveyed across the Atlantic by European slave traders²¹ and another two million sent to the Middle East.²² With respect to the intra-African slave trade, it is estimated that in 1800, 10 percent of the entire African population lived as slaves; in some societies up to two-thirds of inhabitants were enslaved.²³

The slave trade varied widely in Africa. Those who were abducted across the Atlantic came mainly from the region along the coast between Senegal and the Congo as well as from the coastal regions of present-day Mozambique and Tanzania. Nearly half of all slaves transported across the Atlantic came from present-day Congo-

Kinshasa.²⁴ Other areas were either marginally or not at all affected by the slave trade.

The end of the transatlantic slave trade did not mean that the intra-African slave trade came to a standstill. In western Africa, that commerce was still widespread, and in East Africa, Tippu-Tip – one of the largest slave traders ever, working on behalf of the Sultan of Zanzibar – continued to be active.²⁵ His trade empire in the eastern Congo was secured by several thousand armed men, and many Europeans attempted to do business with him. Although the European states had played an important role in the slave trade until the mid-nineteenth century, they started to exploit that trade as an argument for bringing Africa under their control, in the name of “civilization and progress.” Colonization then gathered momentum.

Colonization

In 1414, the Portuguese made their way across the Strait of Gibraltar with a fleet to conquer the African port of Ceuta on the southern side of the strait. This began Africa’s colonization, a process of acquiring and appropriating land that leads to the formation of a colony.²⁶ Portuguese sailors continued to push southwards, undertaking expeditions along the African coast with the aim of finding a sea route to India. Although there was interest in Africa, it was the voyage of Christopher Columbus to the Americas in 1492 that first drew attention to the “New World.” The successes there of Hernán Cortés and other conquistadors who were quick to subjugate entire peoples, helped the Europeans to press ahead with the colonization of America, thereby losing sight of Africa. Risks to health also played an important role in this development. For while diseases imported from Europe to America largely decimated the indigenous population there, malaria and other maladies found in Africa had caused Europeans to die. Africa thus came to be referred to as the “grave of the white man.”

Europeans in Africa, most notably the Portuguese, at first limited

themselves to setting up commercial bases on the coasts. In 1830, France began to conquer what is now Algeria, and, around the same time, it started to bring the territory of present-day Senegal under its rule. Spain claimed the enclave of Ifni and the island of Bioko in the Gulf of Guinea. For its part, Britain had captured the coastlines of modern Gambia, Ghana, and Sierra Leone, the areas around the present-day Nigerian port city of Lagos, the now Namibian port city of Walvis Bay, Cape Town and its hinterland, as well as the island of Mauritius. These areas would form the nucleus of later colonies. With the exceptions of Algeria and South Africa, which were early colonial territories in the narrower sense, we should instead be speaking of “selective influences” of the European powers in the rest of Africa.²⁷ Such influences barely extended beyond the trading stations over which their flags symbolically waved.

Once most colonies in the Americas had gained their independence in the nineteenth century, France, Britain, and other European powers set their sights increasingly on Africa and Asia. The European powers now began to penetrate the continent in a “triple assault”:²⁸ states, private (trading) companies, and missionaries became the key players in the “Scramble for Africa” that commenced at the outset of the 1880s. Christian churches, which were interested in proselytizing, and business enterprises, which were pursuing economic objectives, were an essential part of the colonial movement. Both these groups initially took over the main work as the Europeans made their way to the interior of the continent. Notable examples include Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa Company, the Imperial British East Africa Company, and the activities of Bremen businessperson Adolf Lüderitz. All were acting in the name of the three “Cs” postulated by the Scottish missionary and explorer David Livingstone – commerce, Christianity, and civilization – while effectively adding a fourth “c”: conquest.²⁹

The reasons for colonizing Africa were multiple.³⁰ The European governments were driven by a wish for prestige, an interest in

increasing their power through colonial possessions, a fear that other European states would not recognize their claims, and a sense that they were superior. Further, they wanted to strengthen their position within Europe by means of expansion while simultaneously protecting their states externally – as well as the rule of their leaders internally. What is more, Africa promised them a wealth of resources and economic profit derived from them. The Industrial Revolution in Europe resulted in a steadily mounting demand for raw materials, and Africa was one of the sources of palm oil, the economic lubricant of that era.

The unfolding Scramble for Africa was marked by the Europeans' ignorance of the continent and its economic potential. "As a result, the division of Africa was first and foremost a diplomatic and symbolic act – indeed, an almost fictitious act – a kind of bet on the future."³¹ The German chancellor Otto von Bismarck invited other colonial powers to the Berlin Conference (1884–1885), an event that should be considered an effect of the Scramble for Africa, more than something that started or ended it. At that conference, Africa was not divided up. Nor did the representatives of the governments invited stand around a table, drawing borders with a straight edge. Nonetheless, the decisions taken there changed the long-term appearance of Africa and shaped the future of the continent, and until today give rise to the notion of a "curse of Berlin."³² Among other things, the European powers recognized the claims of the Belgian king Leopold II to the Congo Basin. Significantly, European powers enshrined the principle that any "colony" actually had to be under the control of a specific colonial power. At issue, then, was no longer signing protection treaties or hoisting flags, practices that had been common to that point. Henceforth, actual control over territories was to become more decisive. The expansion of the colonial powers into the African hinterland really took off after the Berlin Conference, but circumstances did not change everywhere.

Resistance

The European colonial powers met resistance in several places. For instance, the aforementioned Samory Touré and his soldiers fought against France that sought to penetrate the hinterland of Guinea. The Ashanti Confederation, located in the territory of what is now Ghana, managed several times to hold off British troops. In Southern Rhodesia, the Ndebele rose up in 1896 with several thousand fighters against the British settlers and, in a parallel development, the Shona rose up as well. This rebellion, later known as the First Chimurenga (or First Liberation War), could only be suppressed after several months by the settlers and troops that rushed to their aid. Bloody clashes took place in present-day Tanzania (1905–1907) and Namibia (1904–1908) between the Maji-Maji as well as Herero and Nama respectively, on the one side, and German troops, on the other. The latter brutally crushed these uprisings; German troops in Namibia even committed the first genocide of the twentieth century.³³ And Ethiopian forces, in the Battle of Adua, defeated Italian troops that were attempting to subjugate the Ethiopian Empire.³⁴ In Ethiopia, this routing contributed to a national pride that is still palpable today; meanwhile the Italians contemplated revenge.

One of the biggest uprisings in the early phase of the Scramble for Africa took place in Sudan: the Mahdi Uprising. In 1881, a rebellion began against nominally Egyptian but de facto British rule. Muhammad Ahmad, an eloquent and much respected Koran preacher, declared himself the Mahdi, the redeemer according to Muslim doctrine who will appear at the end of times to eliminate injustice in the world. This movement quickly gained followers who brought large parts of Sudan under their control. The attempted large-scale operation to liberate British national hero Charles George Gordon, who was supposed to lead an evacuation out of the capital Khartoum, was a failure. At first, the British government gave up on Sudan.³⁵ But the Scramble for Africa was in full swing by the mid-1890s and threatened to encompass Sudan as well. Italy was interested in the

region, France wished to enhance its influence on the Nile, and Leopold II attempted to send troops to southern Sudan. In the meantime, the Mahdists had become so powerful that they were beginning to attack Egypt in order to bring their holy war there. The British government then went on the offensive and eventually defeated the Mahdists. In 1899, the Mahdi rebellion was crushed.

A different kind of resistance occurred in South Africa. Not only did the indigenous population rise up there, but also white settlers. A conflict between the Boers, settlers of European descent, and the British government smoldered on after the First Boer War of 1880–1881, when the Boers, who sought independence, had taken up arms against Britain. The discovery of gold near today's Johannesburg and the refusal of the Boers to grant political rights to newcomers made the British attempt to incorporate the Boer Republics. Between 1899 and 1902 the Second Boer War – also known as the South African War – took place, leading to the merger of the Boer Republic of Transvaal and the Orange Free State together with the British Cape Colony and the Colony of Natal.³⁶ In this case, Britain relied on a scorched earth strategy. A sense of having suffered injustice at the hands of Britain, coupled with a conviction that whites were superior, provided fertile ground for Afrikaaner nationalism that created the ideological basis for the later apartheid system (see [Chapter 2](#)).

Whenever the Europeans or white settlers encountered resistance, they had the technical and military resources to crush it. Morton Stanley, for example, prevailed on behalf of Leopold II using extreme brutality.³⁷ When the Boers advanced north, over 1,000 Zulus alone fell at the Battle of the Blood River. This phase of colonial rule is one in which the “violence and a policy of selective terror” was ubiquitous.³⁸ Many African leaders died in battle against the invaders; others were overthrown or killed. Those who signed protection treaties were often downgraded from kings to chiefs.³⁹ In sum, European powers were ultimately able to crush all resistance they faced bar Ethiopia, which, however, came under short foreign rule in

1935 when Benito Mussolini invaded it.

Collaboration and Control

Not everyone in Africa opposed the Europeans. Many chiefs and parts of the population even cooperated with them. At the outset of the Scramble for Africa, it was rather easy for Europeans to conclude treaties with local rulers, thereby laying the foundation for their colonies. Often weapons, ammunition, and other European industrial products were offered in return. On several occasions, African leaders signed these protection treaties without a precise knowledge of their contents. As suggested by the cases of Ashanti and Ethiopia, local rulers frequently had the capacity to defend themselves early on, precisely because the Europeans were so ignorant of local conditions. Despite some exceptions, the local leaders did not, however, use the means at their disposal. Once their assailants turned into settlers or colonial administrators, equipped with protection treaties and hard power, it became difficult to drive them out again. This often-delayed resistance to the colonial powers can be explained by the fact that it took time for the aims and actions of the colonizers to be grasped by the now colonized. By this phase, the Europeans had frequently already established themselves and identified local supporters to strengthen their position.

Administering the colonies was unthinkable without the support of some locals.⁴⁰ Contrary to the Berlin agreements, the colonial powers did not effectively occupy their territories. The parts that they actually controlled were managed only by a few colonial officials. In 1938, for example, shortly before World War II, Britain had only 5,355 paid British officials in its service – such as administrative staff, secretaries, doctors, engineers, and botanists – for managing its fourteen colonies in Africa.⁴¹ In 1947, the administrative staff in the British African colonies numbered 1,390 and in 1957 the number stood at 1,782.⁴² These figures explain how the term “thin white

line”⁴³ developed to refer to the slim stratum of whites who would rule over the colonies together with local collaborators. In fact, “[w]hile the conquerors could concentrate military force to defeat African armies, ‘pacify’ villages, or slaughter rebels, the routinization of power demanded alliances with local authority figures, be they lineage heads or recently defeated kings.”⁴⁴

The British government, through its indirect rule, relied on chiefs and later on locally recruited elites, for managing and commercially exploiting the colonies. Wherever possible, Britain kept intact local systems and developed an “advisory relationship” with the chiefs. France, however, gave any chief an “entirely subordinate role” and considered him as a “mere agent of the central colonial government.”⁴⁵ France was more concerned with the efficiency of the chiefs than with their legitimacy as Britain was. Following its policy of assimilation, practiced in its extreme in the four communes in Senegal, where the citizens had equal rights to French citizens, France allowed Africans to enter their colonial administration, whereas Britain discouraged this and preferred Africans to enter the native administration.⁴⁶ The Portuguese administration even crushed traditional chiefdoms and installed village headmen called *regedor* instead, providing them with very limited power and privileges. The low status of the *regedor* meant that the white administrator had a much more direct control over the African population than his equivalent in most other European colonies.”⁴⁷ The colonial powers also recruited African soldiers. The French government, for example, deployed the *tirailleurs* to extend its sphere of influence in the hinterland of western Africa. With their help, the colonial administration succeeded in displacing local rulers and replacing them with chiefs who were more loyal.⁴⁸

The political sphere was reserved for the colonial powers even though, occasionally, they turned a blind eye to secretly elected chiefs, but they did not allow the participation of larger parts of the population in politics. In the British case, legislative councils were

formed to make laws for the colonial state but these councils served settlers and commercial interests and not those of locals before some reforms after World War II (see [Chapter 2](#)). In any case, the governor, sent by the British government, stood at the center of politics. In the French colonies, the governors or governor-generals had a weaker position insofar as they could not act as independently as their British counterparts could, given the high centralization of French politics.⁴⁹ The local population had no say on domestic matters let alone international ones. Even once South Africa in 1910 and Egypt in 1922 had become nominally independent as the first African countries, Britain retained the sovereignty over their foreign and security policies.

For the European powers, colonization was a triumph and easily achieved in many places, but for the African peoples it was a humiliation: “[T]he loser had to be taught who was the boss and to behave accordingly. But colonial conquest emphasized that the conquered remained distinct; he or she might try to learn and master the ways of the conqueror but would never quite get there.”⁵⁰ The poet Aimé Césaire wrote on the nature of colonialism that “colonization equals thingification. [...] I speak of societies emptied of themselves, of trampled cultures, undermined institutions, confiscated lands, of assassinated religions, annihilated artistic masterpieces, of extraordinary possibilities suppressed.”⁵¹ He indicates how the colonial powers held back development: “it is the inhabitants of Africa and Asia who are demanding schools, and it is colonial Europe who refuses them; it is the African who asks for ports and roads and it is colonial Europe who haggles; it is the colonized who wants to go forward and it is the colonizer who keeps him back.”⁵² Often, black people were treated more like animals than human beings.⁵³ That this humiliation, thingification, and refusal of development inevitably had to have consequences goes without saying (see [Chapter 3](#)).

Avoiding Colonization: Ethiopia and Liberia

Only two countries in Africa were able to avoid colonization: Ethiopia and Liberia. In Liberia, an American society bought a stretch of coast in 1822 in order to settle slaves liberated from America. The American Colonization Society not only wrote the constitution of the new state but also sent a governor who actually directed the fortunes of Liberia. It was not until 1841 when the white governor died and a settler took over his role that the reign of the American Colonization Society ended. In 1847, Liberia was granted independence.⁵⁴ However, some point to the fact that even Liberia was a quasi-colony, for it was not the locals who ruled but the Americo-Liberian settlers.

As mentioned above, Ethiopia's history goes a long way back. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Ethiopia fell into the crosshairs of Italy's imperialist aspirations. The Italian government acquired a port in present-day Eritrea and established a colony there. However, Ethiopia was able to frustrate Italy's additional efforts at expansion and became an internationally recognized state following the Battle of Adua (see above). Italy, however, managed to hold onto what is now Eritrea.⁵⁵ After the end of World War II, Eritrea became a British protectorate while Ethiopia gained independence after its brief occupation by Italy. Together with Egypt, Liberia, and South Africa, Ethiopia became one of the four African countries that were founding members of the UN. As early as 1950, the Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie won the support of the UN General Assembly for his plan to unite Ethiopia and Eritrea in a federation. This, together with a systematic undermining of Eritrea's rights within that polity, paved the way for a merger of the two territories in 1961. In effect, the Ethiopian Empire incorporated Eritrea. Hence, while a wave of independence was rolling across over Africa in the 1960s, Eritrea entered a new phase of its colonial history, to be shown in [Chapter 2](#).⁵⁶

Decolonization and Liberation

The decolonization of Africa – a process, a strategy, and a political goal of the colonial powers that led the colonies and protectorates to become nominally independent and internationally recognized¹ – was not a straightforward matter, and is still not completed. When France at the outset of the twentieth century was bringing Morocco under its control, the end of the colonial era was already commencing at the southern end of the continent. We can speak of three stages of decolonization. In the early phase of 1910–1922, only South Africa and Egypt had become independent; in the main phase (1951–1974), the vast majority of African countries gained their independence; and the late phase from 1975 was mainly characterized by the end of the Portuguese colonial empire and of the white minority governments in southern Africa. By the end of the twentieth century, all that was left of the once global empires of the European powers was “confetti.”²

There are three perspectives from which we can look at decolonization: that of the colonial power, that of the colonial state, in other words the colony itself, and that of the international system. This chapter moves along these perspectives, identifies forces in the colonial powers, in the colonies, and beyond that played a role in making African states nominally independent, and shows that the decolonization was not a monocausal process. Independence here does not mean an all-encompassing liberation. For example, one can hardly speak of there being economic independence after decolonization (see [Chapter 3](#)).

The Perspective of the Colonial Power

The perspective of the colonial power emphasizes the role of the colonial powers in the decolonization and is thus Eurocentric. Proponents of this perspective argue that the rationally operating colonial powers liberated their colonies and their populations – after they had been properly educated – into a self-determined modernity. In line with this logic, it was inevitable that a step toward independence for the African countries was taken at some point. Other proponents of this perspective assume that in a time of powerful multinational corporations, the goal of economic exploitation can be achieved cheaper than through the direct domination of the state. And still others argue that the colonies became too expensive and that the colonial power lost prestige at the international level because of them.³

Britain

Britain began early on to decolonize at differing speeds and gave up Egypt and South Africa, the only two states that gained independence in the early phase of decolonization. Over the course of two wars, Britain had become familiar with the perseverance of the white settlers in South Africa (see [Chapter 1](#)). For economic reasons and with the belief that the leaders of the four colonies on the Cape would remain loyal to Britain, the British government decided in 1906 to merge the Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange River Colony, and Transvaal into the South African Union. In 1910, that Union became a “dominion,” in other words a self-governing territory within the British Empire, similar to Australia and Canada, which likewise remained British dominions. Independence was only fulfilled later, namely in 1931 by the Westminster Statute, which granted those dominions complete legislative independence. The South African Union became a member of the Commonwealth and the British King or Queen remained the head of state. It was not until 1960, after a

referendum was held in the South African Union, that the Republic of South Africa was created – and thus the position of the president as head of state as well. South Africa had finally seceded from Britain. However, this seeming independence must not hide the fact that there was no right of self-determination for the majority of the population because the white minority was oppressing the black majority using the apartheid system. That system of racial discrimination and segregation continued into the 1990s (see below). This is why many view 1994, when the first postapartheid elections took place, as the year of independence.

At the northern end of the continent, Egypt was also being granted independence through some steps. The British High Commissioner there recognized that the protectorate could only be won over permanently as an ally of Britain if it were granted independence.⁴ In a confidential memorandum, British Foreign Secretary George Curzon wrote to the Cabinet: “I take it that what we all have in view is that Egypt would remain inside rather than outside the British Imperial system. If the best way to do this is to drop the word protectorate and conclude a treaty of alliance with her [...] why not do it?”⁵ Following this logic, Egypt became independent in 1922. However, this was not without restrictions, for Britain was retaining central rights such as control over the Suez Canal, the reason it had invaded Egypt in the first place, and the right to assume Egypt’s defense. A hereditary monarchy was set up in Egypt, and the previous sultan became King Fuad I. Britain’s continued influence is evident, for example, in 1942, when its government forced the establishment of a pro-British prime minister by force of arms. It was not until 1953 that the monarchy was abolished, and Egypt broke with Britain. Moreover, Egypt demanded that British troops leave the Suez Canal, which was subsequently nationalized (see [Chapter 4](#)).

In the rest of Africa, the decolonization of the British territories did not begin until a good ten years after World War II, although the British government had been thinking about it even before the

outbreak of the war. There were three major factors that led the British government to rethink its colonial policy in Africa and beyond: rebellions in the West Indies (1937), the appointment of the young Malcolm MacDonald as colonial minister (1938), and Lord Hailey's "African Survey" (1938).⁶ The latter precisely analyzed the situation in the colonies of Sub-Saharan Africa, coming inter alia to the conclusion that political and economic reforms were necessary.⁷ Based on this, the British government decided to invest more in the colonies, which led to an "interventionist moment."⁸ The British government initiated processes of reform yet at the same time tried to suppress the burgeoning resistance in the colonies so as to retain mastery of the proceedings. In many places, the indigenization of the administration was expedited and legislative councils were instituted in order to give the colonial population a voice in all this. In a step that mostly ensued in the 1950s, negotiating partners were decided upon before negotiations on a peaceful transfer of power with these partners commenced and before a Westminster-style democratic system was established. However, given that the British government de facto selected the leaders of the new states, it undermined the democracy before it could be practiced.

The decolonization of the Gold Coast, which became Ghana, shows this by way of example: it became the blueprint for many of Britain's later decolonizations, such as those of Botswana, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. In Ghana, in the 1940s, there was a sense of "political frustration among the educated Africans who saw no prospect of ever experiencing political power under existing conditions."⁹ The demand for self-government grew increasingly louder following a revolt, the "Accra Riots," and it was channeled through the Convention People's Party, a mass popular nationalist movement led by Kwame Nkrumah. The British government initially tried to suppress the resistance. In the context of a general strike called by the unions, Nkrumah was arrested in 1950 because he had called for civil disobedience. In 1951, a new constitution was

introduced, which foresaw an African majority in the Executive Council and the introduction of a Legislative Assembly. There were elections for that Assembly, which the Convention People's Party won. Nkrumah was subsequently released and was appointed as leader of government business and, in 1952, after a constitutional amendment, he became prime minister of the colony.¹⁰ The British government initially refused Gold Coast's request for independence owing to the nationalist movement's lack of unity as well as power struggles between the governing Convention People's Party and opposition parties, which were tied up with the politics of cocoa prices and the social upheaval that resulted from it. The British government insisted that another election had to be held first, which took place in July 1956, with Nkrumah's party emerging from it as the clear victor. The colonial administration drafted a constitution that lived up to both the demands of the Convention People's Party for independence and the opposition's demand for strong regional parliaments. Also because of a fear of an intensification of violence between factions within the colony, Britain granted the Gold Coast independence on 6 March 1957. Nkrumah and his followers were filled with emotion at midnight, when the Union Jack was lowered and the Ghanaian flag raised. Nkrumah then declared, "Ghana will be free for ever."¹¹

Britain essentially practiced a negotiated transfer of power. Britain, unlike France, Belgium, and especially Portugal, hardly clung to its colonies or defended its claims to them with its blood. And – apart from Curzon's comments on Egypt in the early phase of decolonization – there are few direct hints of a neocolonial behavior since Britain maintained much weaker economic ties with most of its colonies than other colonial powers (see [Chapter 5](#)). However, until today, many in Britain are convinced that their country brought "civilization" to its colonies. In this way, the peacefully practiced transfer of power is normatively laden and obscures that under this seemingly well-intentioned "civilizing mission" the right of the colonial population to self-determination was being withdrawn while

the colonies were furnishing Britain's economic profit and international prestige. From this perspective, nationalist movements are seen as the product of changes initiated by the colonial powers. What was supposed to develop in the colonies were some leaders that were able to assume power – and, if possible, to stay loyal to the colonial power.¹² From this point of view, the British government was always in a position to influence the course of its colonial history. The fact that Britain was spared major colonial conflicts – with one major exception, notably Kenya (see below) – helps to keep that perspective alive.

France

In comparison to the decolonization of the British territories, the decolonization of the French territories was more conflicted. The French government began much later to plan decolonization and intended to carry it out later. It suppressed claims for independence with all the harshness it deemed necessary. In Algeria, this claimed up to 45,000 lives in 1945¹³ and twice as many lives on Madagascar two years later.¹⁴ Similar to the British government, the French government initiated reforms in the colonies after 1945. However, it insisted on a greater integration of the colonies with France within the *Union française*, a union of France and its colonies, protectorates, and trust territories created in 1946. From a French point of view, colonization was a situation that was mutually profitable: France regained international importance after World War II, had access to raw materials, other economic benefits, and a reservoir of manpower to be used in the event of conflict. At the same time, the colonies were able to learn from French civilization and democracy while also benefitting economically. These convictions were solidified after World War II and led to a “colonial myth” in France.¹⁵ Consequently, the French government saw no reason to abandon its colonies.

It was not only seething in the colonies – especially in Algeria, where one of the most intense wars of liberation broke out in 1954,

and Indochina, which France lost in the same year (see below) – but also in France itself, not least because the Algerian crisis looked insoluble in the late 1950s. The weakness of the French government seemed to grant the colonial population leeway for making additional demands.¹⁶ France was under pressure to act and had to make changes if it wished to secure its colonial possessions. This circumstance was handled by a new “framework law,” the *loi cadre* of 1956. Under this law, the territories gained more autonomy and universal suffrage was introduced. In 1958, Charles de Gaulle took power in France and drew up a new constitution to be voted on in France and its overseas territories. For the colonial population, the choice ultimately meant either a federation with France and a de facto subordination to the colonial power or independence. De Gaulle threw all his political weight into the balance and toured the French colonies to promote the new constitution.

All the French colonies in Africa followed de Gaulle and became autonomous territories in the French Community (Communauté française) – apart from Guinea, which chose independence. There, the leader of the nationalist movement, Sékou Touré, with the backing of a mass movement, campaigned successfully against the referendum. Men and women alike supported Touré and the nationalist movement by building a culture of colonial resistance.¹⁷ While campaigning, Touré also drew on the fact that his grandfather Samory Touré heroically resisted French forces when they tried to penetrate into the hinterland of today’s Guinea (see [Chapter 1](#)). The reaction of the French government was to exercise an “exemplary punishment”¹⁸ upon Guinea.¹⁹ To prevent a chain reaction from occurring, France granted Guinea its independence without further preparation (see below).

At that time, even “the most skeptical of observers could not have foretold that by the summer of 1960, the structure so painstakingly set up by de Gaulle only two years earlier would no longer exist.”²⁰ For, in 1960, just two years after the referendum, de Gaulle no longer

stood in the way of decolonization. This was so because the colonies had become too expensive, and public support within France for colonial policy had dwindled. What followed was the independence of nearly all the French colonies, fourteen in all, in a process that only lasted a few months. The year 1960 thus entered the history books as the “African year” as never again did so many states become independent in one year. In addition to the French colonies, Nigeria, Congo-Kinshasa, and Somalia also became independent.

The French government slowly realized that Algeria, where a liberation war was ongoing, would also have to be surrendered as a colony (see below). In 1962, after a referendum was held there, Algeria became independent. France had lost a source of pride; a “true amputation” had taken place.²¹ The colonial myth now lived on only in people’s heads. However, although France no longer had any nominal sovereignty over them, it continued to benefit from its former colonies by cultivating close political and economic contacts, giving rise to the assumption that neocolonial thinking drove France’s decolonization (see [Chapters 3 and 4](#)).

Belgium

Like Britain and France, Belgium suppressed resistance in its colony, today’s Congo-Kinshasa, and its protectorates, nowadays Burundi and Rwanda. Yet, unlike Britain and France, the Belgian government, which had taken over the Congo, Leopold’s private property in 1908, held on to this colony and the other territories longer while not thinking through the decolonization much. Given the fact that, for example, there were fewer than twenty university graduates in 1960 in the Congo, one can hardly speak of a well-planned transfer of power. Instead, decolonization appeared more like a spontaneous process in which Belgium only maintained control because it was proceeding with such extreme – indeed, irresponsible – speed.²² The Belgian government faced the music when confronted with a united front of Congolese leaders, the headway decolonization was making

elsewhere in Africa, and a concern that it would not be able to get the situation under control. On 27 January 1960, Belgium announced that it would leave the Congo within six months. The Belgian government negotiated treaties that allowed it to continue to benefit from the Congo's wealth of resources without having to maintain the costs of administration and security. The access to the Congo's natural resources, which included securing mining rights through the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, followed a neocolonial logic as did the plans to keep some administrators and 1,000 officers to command the 25,000-strong Congolese army.²³ Because of the incredible speed with which independence came, because of the lack of preparation for it, because of the Belgium government trying to keep control, and because the Congo was dragged into the Cold War severe problems cropped up at independence: a mutiny among the soldiers, the mass flight of Belgians, a military intervention by the former colonial power and the UN, a constitutional crisis, two secessions, as well as the torture and murder of the prime minister Patrice Lumumba.²⁴

Portugal

The Portuguese-controlled territories were decolonized in quite a different fashion. Portugal had not only been the first country to establish colonies in Africa (see [Chapter 1](#)) but also the last one to initiate decolonization. For the authoritarian Portuguese regime of António de Oliveira Salazar and his successor Marcelo Caetano, the colonies were indispensable in two respects. On the one hand, they wished to be able to assert international influence, and on the other hand, they wanted to secure their regimes through a national pride based on the colonial empire.²⁵ Moreover, Portugal's industry would not have been as profitable without the cheap labor and the raw material of the colonies.²⁶ To safeguard its colonial possessions, the Portuguese government followed the strategy of Britain and France and implemented reforms in its colonies after World War II. Among other things, the colonies became overseas territories, the citizens of

the colonies became Portuguese citizens, and there was a greater decentralization, by which local institutions and practices in the colonies received increased consideration.²⁷ However, these reforms did not result in lasting contentment. In particular, the liberation war in Portuguese Guinea, today's Guinea-Bissau, grew more intense. The conflicts in the colonial territories eventually devoured about 40 percent of government spending and around 820,000 soldiers – out of a total Portuguese population of circa eight million – were deployed during the years of war.²⁸ The military governor of Portuguese Guinea, António de Spínola, concluded that the war was too costly and militarily unwinnable,²⁹ and called for autonomy of the overseas territories within a confederation with Portugal. Spínola's deliberations were well received by the military.

Yet it was not the struggle of the liberation movement itself that had directly brought decolonization. Rather, it was the disillusionment of Portuguese officers, who in the light of the colonial wars rose up against the regime in Lisbon, instigating a coup in 1974 and initiating decolonization under the new leadership. In Portugal, large parts of the population had already turned away from the regime and were questioning its colonial policy in particular. As a result, the putschists were actually welcomed. Spínola was named interim president of the country and pursued the realization that Portugal needed to retreat from the colonies, eventually taking the first step toward the independence of Guinea-Bissau in mid-September 1974. When Spínola, who continued to campaign for a confederation with the remaining colonies, was deposed a few days later, the path was cleared for a quick decolonization of the remaining Portuguese colonies. The ensuing decolonization process “was little short of disastrous.”³⁰ For, similar to Belgium, Portugal had hardly laid any groundwork for the postcolonial phase. It seemed as if the liberation movements “knew more about where they were going, and how they intended to get there, than Portugal's new politicians knew how to achieve their own objectives for the small metropolis itself.”³¹ In

1975, white settlers fled en masse from both Angola and Mozambique, after those states had also achieved independence and civil wars had started there.

Negotiated Transition

Belgium, France, Britain, Portugal, and Spain, which had colonized present-day Equatorial Guinea in addition to the Western Sahara, essentially followed the same strategy, using reforms to prevent or delay the independence of their colonies. Especially for Belgium and France, access to natural resources after decolonization was important. It is what they secured in the negotiations, which earned them the reputation of pursuing a neocolonial policy. What all of the colonial powers shared was the realization that in the post-World War II era “colonialism on the cheap was no longer possible,”³² as the reforms and investments that had been introduced drove up the costs for the colonial powers.³³ Particularly when there were large-scale liberation struggles, as in Algeria or Kenya, the costs for the colonial powers became too high. Some relief was achieved by decolonizing the critical areas themselves or by decolonizing other colonies, as demonstrated by the independence granted to Morocco and Tunisia in the slipstream of the Algerian War. In all cases where there were no wars of liberation in the early and main phases of decolonization – with the exception of Guinea – decolonization resulted from a process of negotiation between the colonial power and the nationalist movements. While the perspective of the colonial state recognizes the stronger bargaining power of the nationalist movements in the colonies – I turn to this perspective below – the perspective of the colonial power introduced here emphasizes that the European powers had the upper hand.

When focusing on the governments of the colonial powers, it should not be forgotten that there were other voices within them, namely those ardent supporters of colonization, especially in commerce but also resolute opponents of colonization or of the

colonial practices of human exploitation who called for decolonization much earlier than the governments. An early example of opposition to human exploitation is that of the actions undertaken by Edmund Dene Morel, whose research uncovered the atrocities committed against the people of the Congo under Leopold II. Morel initiated one of the first modern human rights campaigns and thereby helped to see the atrocities were condemned and that King Leopold II was compelled to hand over the Congo, his private property, to the Belgian state in 1908, which then banned most of the inhumane exploitation.³⁴

The Perspective of the Colonial State

The colonial population was not only a subject in the decolonization process, as suggested by the perspective of the colonial power. Rather, it also contributed its share to promoting that process.³⁵ As such, resistance in the colonial state was practiced in different ways and in varied intensities. There were nonviolent political pressure, labor disputes, militant workers' movements (and unions), and bloody liberation struggles. And, at the same time, there were also voices in the colonies that spoke out against independence or wished to delay it.

Pressure

In some colonies, the population built up pressure against foreign rule early on, mostly focusing on reforms of the colonial system. Although there are some exceptions to this, in most cases the colonial power was able to manage such early resistance (see [Chapter 1](#)). In Nigeria, for example, there was opposition to the merger of the northern and southern parts of the colony, and something similar was true in Sudan. And in the Congo when it was still Leopold's private property, resistance arose at the turn of the century to the exploitation of the rubber plantations. After the end of a consolidation phase in the colonies following World War I, resistance intensified again. An early

example is that of the Aba Women's Riots in Nigeria in the late 1920s, in which sections of the female population protested against British rule.³⁶ Market women and other women's groups protested in a number of colonies, such as Tanzania and Sierra Leone, against taxes or increases in food prices. In Burundi, Muslim women organized against a specific tax placed on single women. In 1935, there was a workers' strike in the Zambian Copper Belt, forming the prelude to a series of workers' strikes in Africa directed against the colonial powers. As such, there was a large strike of railway workers in French West Africa in 1946–1947 and, in Portuguese Guinea, dockworkers went on strike in 1959. Trade unions, such as the Union Générale du Travail Tunisia, turned into platforms for condemning abuses in the life world and working world of the colonies. Different from the beginning of the colonial era, when the colonial population was regarded as primitive by the colonial powers, African workers as of the mid-1930s were increasingly perceived as reasonable, reliable, and serious workers. As a result, the colonial powers and European companies had to ask themselves if they were treating them properly, thereby begging the question of whether the rest of the colonial population was not somehow just as reasonable and reliable.³⁷

At the same time as the workers' movement, nationalist movements were appearing in most African colonies and demanding independence. Often, there was a connection between these nationalist and labor movements. For example, Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone and Touré in Guinea were labor leaders who went on to become central figures in the nationalist movements. However, such individuals were just the pinnacle of the movements; the aforementioned protests and strikes are an "important reminder of the grassroots ferment that underpinned the nationalist movements, even while Western-educated elites emerged as their official voice."³⁸ These movements attracted men and women alike.³⁹ The nationalist movements often had an interest in advocating for women since they were able to present themselves as "enlightened proponents of

Western democracy and equality, including full political rights for women.”⁴⁰

The failure of France to grant rights and benefits to its colonized population as promised during World War II generated immense discontent. Out of this discontent arose a party that encompassed almost all the French colonial territories in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain.⁴¹ It developed into the platform for articulating the interests of the colonies in the French National Assembly. Felix Houphouët-Boigny from Côte d’Ivoire became the spokesperson of this party in Paris where, together with the Senegalese Léopold Senghor and others, he exercised a certain influence on French colonial policy.

Southern Africa likewise encountered pressure from nationalist movements. In 1953, Britain had merged its colonies Northern and Southern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia and Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (today’s Malawi) into the Central African Federation.⁴² This federation was intended to expand the influence of the British government and the white settlers, yet “[i]nstead, ironically, it greatly stimulated the growth of African nationalism in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.”⁴³ What increased resistance against British rule was the policy of further developing Southern Rhodesia, where most white settlers lived, at the expense of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. In 1959, the colonial power suppressed those nationalist aspirations. It declared a state of emergency in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia and imprisoned several leaders of the black nationalist movement, including the later presidents Hastings Banda (Nyasaland) and Kenneth Kaunda (Northern Rhodesia). Nonetheless, in Northern Rhodesia, there was mounting civil disobedience and bloody clashes – even though Kaunda had called for a policy of “passive resistance.” At the same time, there were reforms to the constitution that strengthened the rights of the black population.

It was the sum of the discontent with the colonial power articulated by the nationalist movements and laborers and actions like

the uprising of market women as well as more “hidden resistance” such as mass migration within a colony to regions where the colonial power had less control,⁴⁴ that contributed to the colonial powers initiating the reform processes described above.

Violence

While violent resistance against the colonial powers was at first limited in scope, it strengthened and spread after World War II. In 1946, for example, the Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache was formed in Madagascar. It called for independence from France and began a rebellion that soon succeeded in bringing one-fourth of the island under its control. It took until the end of 1948 for France to defeat the uprising with extreme brutality. There were tortures, mass executions, rapes, hunger, and flight; entire villages were burned to the ground. Up to 90,000 people perished.⁴⁵ The situation also heated up in French Cameroon, a trust territory that had previously been part of the German colony of Cameroon, where the Union des Populations du Cameroun demanded independence as well as a merger with the British zone of the trust territory.⁴⁶ The Union des Populations du Cameroun was banned in 1955 but continued its attacks on the government; the conflict cost up to 32,000 lives.⁴⁷

One of the most bitter liberation wars took place in Algeria. On 8 May 1945, the day Nazi Germany capitulated unconditionally and World War II ended in Europe, civil unrest broke out in Algeria. Algerian war veterans demanded the right to self-determination and independence. The colonial power beat down these protests ruthlessly. In the process, several thousand people were killed.⁴⁸ After that day, it was clear “that French colonialism could not be beaten by peaceful way, but was required to be eliminated by force.”⁴⁹ There were several liberation movements, but ultimately the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) predominated, launching in 1954 its struggle for the independence of Algeria in 1954. It attracted thousands of fighters, including thousands of active women.⁵⁰ The war continued for almost

eight years and cost nearly 425,000 lives. Around two million Algerians were living in relocation camps at the end of the conflict.⁵¹ The intensity of the war and the high number of victims are largely explained by the fact that France under no circumstances wanted to give up the centerpiece of its colonial empire as it was in fact not regarded as a colony but as an integral part of France.

The British colony of Kenya also faced violent clashes. The resistance against the colonial power had developed there after World War I and kept expanding in the 1930s, owing to dissatisfaction with the economic and political situation. Various currents emerged in the liberation movement. Within the Kikuyu, the largest ethnic group in Kenya, there was a militant nationalist group, the Mau Mau, along with a moderate group and another one that supported the colonial power.⁵² The Mau Mau started a conflict in 1951 that was not only a rebellion against the whites but also constituted a civil war within the Kikuyu.⁵³ The British troops mercilessly opposed the rebels, which is why the rebellion and its crackdown were also called "Britain's Gulag."⁵⁴ The Mau Mau were interned in camps, comprising more than 150,000 persons.⁵⁵ In addition, British soldiers committed acts of kidnapping, rape, and torture. An estimated 50,000 Kikuyus died during the war, probably half of them under ten years of age.⁵⁶ By 1957, Britain had crushed the rebellion but did not feel like a victor, for the costs of keeping the colony were too high and the road to independence was already mapped out.⁵⁷

Despite these levels of violence in Algeria, Cameroon, Kenya, and Madagascar, it should be noted that, in the main phase of decolonization (1951–1974), negotiated decolonization was the norm and violent conflict the exception (see above). This changed in the late phase of decolonization that took place mainly in southern Africa. There decolonization and/or the end of white minority regimes were almost always linked with intensive wars of liberation. This is linked to the fact that these territories – like Algeria and Kenya – were settler colonies, in other words the colonial population comprised numerous

individuals that had either migrated to the colonies or had been born there as children of (earlier) migrants. Shortly before independence, over one million people of French or European descent, lived in Algeria. In Kenya there were 60,000 and in Mozambique over 250,000 white settlers.

From the 1950s, there were uprisings in the Portuguese colonies. In Portuguese Guinea, these gave rise to a massacre in 1959 in which the police killed about fifty people, thereby paving the way for the local guerrilla fight that began in 1963.⁵⁸ In the other Portuguese colonies – Angola, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe – rebellions and liberation movements were launched. In the case of Angola, there were even two dominant movements, the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) and the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA).⁵⁹ In 1966, the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) additionally emerged as the third large independence movement.⁶⁰ In Portuguese Guinea, the resistance against the colonial power was fought most fiercely. The movement led by Amílcar Cabral was able to mobilize the mass and explicitly attracted women to join the resistance. It deployed women for defensive purposes in the liberation struggle and called on them to combat double colonization, in other words to fight both colonial power and male supremacy.⁶¹ By 1973, the liberation movement was able to bring large parts of the colony under its control and declared itself unilaterally independent. The war of liberation in Portuguese Guinea marked the turning point in Portugal's colonial history. It led to the formation of a group of disillusioned Portuguese officers, who in 1974 instigated a coup d'état against the fascist regime, the end of which heralded the beginning of decolonization (see above).

After the end of the Central African Federation, which culminated in the independence of Malawi and Zambia, a white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia assumed power under Ian Smith in 1965 and unilaterally declared independence from Britain. On account of the repressive policies of Smith's government, the black majority

increasingly organized itself into nationalist movements – that had been founded earlier but had been banned in the early 1960s – and launched the Second Chimurenga. Smith's regime detained hundreds of activists, fighters, and leaders, among them Robert Mugabe, but released them later under international pressure. With the independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1975, the guerrilla war in Southern Rhodesia intensified rapidly since there were now strategically important places available to which the guerrilla fighters could retreat.⁶² The war cost up to 40,000 lives. However, despite these high numbers of casualties, both sides assumed until the very end that they were capable of winning the war. Defense expenditure increased by 610 percent between 1971–1972 and 1976–1977, while expenditure on police increased by 232 percent.⁶³ Militarily, the guerrillas were unable to bring the white regime to its knees. But the costs of the war had become too high for the regime, and the population, both black and white, became weary of the conflict. Moreover, Mozambique and Zambia, suffering from retaliation of the Smith regime as they supported the nationalist movements, pressured the latter into negotiations. This constellation meant that Britain, still officially the colonial power, took the lead and initiated negotiations on the future of Rhodesia, which led to Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.

Although South Africa had been independent in terms of international law since the early phase of decolonization, it was ruled by a white minority regime. As early as 1912, shortly after South Africa became a dominion of Britain, the African National Congress (ANC) was founded as a movement against the white minority regime and its race policy. At that time, the ANC was more of a project of the educated black elites than the large movement it was to become in the decades that followed. The ANC initially advocated a policy of nonviolent resistance; it also adhered to this policy when apartheid took a tighter turn with the victory of the National Party in the 1948 election as shown by its Freedom Charter of 1955. Within the ANC,

there were also forces believing that the end of apartheid could only be achieved by military means. These forces therefore launched a military wing in 1961, the Umkhonto we Sizwe. The decision to take up the armed struggle also was made in light of the Sharpeville Massacre of March 1960, and the apartheid government's reaction to that. Ninety-nine people lost their lives in Sharpeville, a town south of Johannesburg, when police opened fire on demonstrators who had taken to the streets against the Pass Laws of the apartheid regime. The government quelled all opposition, banning the ANC and imprisoning key figures such as Nelson Mandela; others escaped into exile.

The struggle against apartheid continued. In 1976, there was an uprising of students in Soweto, a township close to Johannesburg. The police subdued the demonstration with extreme cruelty; up to 500 children were killed. The waves of protest in the country and beyond were spilling over. It took nearly a year for the security forces to regain control of the situation in South Africa. After the Soweto uprising, the ANC intensified its guerrilla struggle within the country, mainly through underground acts of sabotage.⁶⁴ With the ANC leaders being jailed or in exile, the ANC Women's League and its later chairwoman, Winnie Mandela (then Nelson Mandela's wife), became one of the key pillars in the anti-apartheid struggle.⁶⁵ As a result, it is hardly surprising that – despite a number of scandals and allegations of corruption and abuse of authority – Winnie Mandela was recognized after her death in 2018 by South African president Cyril Ramaphosa as “Mother of the Nation” and “one of the strongest women in our struggle.”⁶⁶

Both the struggle in South Africa as well as that in Namibia, where the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) had been proceeding violently against illegal occupation by South Africa since 1966 (see below),⁶⁷ contributed decisively to the weakening of the apartheid government, despite the fact that it sat firmly in the saddle domestically, thanks to an overblown security apparatus.⁶⁸ Moreover, the collapse of the gold price had already caused trouble

for the South African economy, and the costs of that security apparatus had become too high. The apartheid government had been negotiating in secret with the ANC since the mid-1980s.⁶⁹ In 1990 the ANC ban was lifted, political prisoners were released from prison, and a four-year negotiation process began, culminating in the first free elections of April 1994, which were clearly won by the ANC.

Differences

The impression that liberation movements in the colonies or in states with white minority regimes were united and worked together does not apply in all places. Instead, “the picture painted all too readily in hindsight of a nation unified in a common struggle against foreign rule is, as a rule, a historical fiction.”⁷⁰ This is well illustrated by the civil war among the Kikuyus in Kenya and the violent clashes between the liberation movements FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA in Angola, as well as between the Zimbabwe African People’s Union and the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Southern Rhodesia; the latter two had initially fought more against one another than against the white minority regime.⁷¹ The ANC, too, had antagonists like the Pan Africanist Congress or the Inkatha Freedom Party. In the province of Natal, today’s KwaZulu Natal, a civil war broke out during the four-year transition starting in 1990, a war in which up to 30,000 people lost their lives because supporters of the ANC and supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party, which collaborated with the forces of the apartheid regime, were attacking each other. Thus, the transition in South Africa was by no means as peaceful as it was later portrayed.⁷²

The colonial powers and minority regimes were able to make clever use of these divisions in and among nationalist movements. The apartheid government played the groups skillfully against each other, thereby making a significant contribution to its maintenance of power. Earlier on, the French government as well took advantage of the lack of unity within their colonies. Within the Rassemblement

Démocratique Africain, there was no consensus on how to achieve independence. On the one hand, there were the advocates of a collective independence in a possible federation of West and Central Africa with France, and, on the other, there were advocates of a separate independence of the individual colonial territories. Senghor, for example, spoke vehemently against the *loi cadre* of 1956, fearing a Balkanization of Africa, that is to say a fragmentation into smaller territories and thus refused to become part of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain.⁷³

The white settlers who had established themselves mainly in the settler colonies of Algeria, Angola, Kenya, Rhodesia, and South Africa were in some cases advocates of independence; in other cases, they opposed it, depending on whether or not they could expect to maintain control. In some cases, they collaborated with the colonial power; in others, they fought against them. In South Africa, most of the British settlers wanted the South African Union to remain with Britain, while the Boers fought for independence in two wars (see [Chapter 1](#)). In Southern Rhodesia, a group of settlers under Smith likewise opposed the colonial power, and in 1965 they seceded unilaterally from Britain. In Kenya, by contrast, the white settlers tried to prevent independence because they feared they would lack influence in an independent Kenya. Settlers in the Portuguese colonies, whose numbers had doubled in the 1950s, sided with the colonial power and helped counter the burgeoning demands of the indigenous population. And most settlers in Algeria, frequent targets of the FLN at the start of its liberation war, likewise spoke out against the decolonization of Algeria. They supported the return of de Gaulle into power yet felt betrayed by him when in September 1959 he proposed a referendum on Algerian self-determination. These settlers remained opponents of independence inasmuch as Algeria was their homeland, in which they had already lived for several generations.⁷⁴

There were efforts to delay independence in other French colonies and attempts to avoid being split up in smaller territories. These

colonies were so intertwined with the colonial power by the measures that France initiated after World War II that the aspirations of the nationalist movements barely extended beyond the autonomy that de Gaulle had allowed them after the referendum of 1958. Skillfully displaying restraints toward decolonization, Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor brought themselves into a position to obtain additional concessions from France. That is what ultimately kept them firmly in power.⁷⁵ Only Touré in Guinea opted out and thus it was hardly a surprise that France punished this by the immediate and uncontrolled independence right after the referendum and by refusing to recognize and interact with its former colony as an equal state. Unlike Touré – and unlike Houphouët-Boigny who had shared control over an economically strong colony – Senghor viewed the possible independence of Senegal with concern. He was convinced that a Balkanization could lead to the insignificance of the new countries; he therefore campaigned for a federation of West African states. Senghor became the driving force in establishing such a federation: the Mali Federation. It was supposed to consist of Dahomey (Benin), French Sudan (Mali), Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), and Senegal.⁷⁶ However, as early as 1959, before the Federation could be launched, it imploded when Houphouët-Boigny – with the support of the French government – succeeded in preventing Dahomey and Upper Volta from joining it. For, when the French government had made the actual decision that their colonies should be granted independence, it was also clear that not only should the responsibility be shouldered by the colonial population and its political leadership – thus burdening them with the weight of decolonization – but also that each of the colonies would go their own way.⁷⁷ Senghor attempted another more modest solution, namely a federation between today's states of Mali and Senegal, which then actually achieved independence together in June of 1960. However, after a few weeks, that federation too fell apart in disputes over questions of democracy, responsibility, and the claim to leadership.

The French colonies and the settler colonies are not singular cases, as there were forces opposed to decolonization elsewhere. In Nigeria, politics was associated with regions and ethnic groups. As such, a clear fault line existed between the Christian-influenced South and the Muslim-influenced North, a fissure that was (and still is) perceptible. Because people in the North feared a de facto takeover by the South, they put on the brakes once the South demanded independence. In 1956, a secession of the North was proposed, but eventually the idea prevailed – with the North’s approval – that Nigeria should be granted independence as a federal state. In Mauritius, too, the fear of one segment of the population, specifically Creoles, that they would become less important in an independent state, was the driving force behind their resistance to decolonization. For them, staying with Britain seemed less of a risk than self-rule.

It thus becomes clear that resistance in the colonies took many forms and was realized by various actors. In part, it went beyond ethnicity and religion; in part, they were precisely where the differences were situated. Violence and nonviolent resistance could go hand in hand in some colonies, just like support for and protest against independence. In any event, resistance to colonial powers took on multiple forms. There was not *one* anti-colonialism but many.

The Perspective of the International System

Neither the colonial state nor colonial power were in a vacuum. They were part of the international system that also influenced the arc of decolonization.⁷⁸ There are numerous examples of such global changes in politics that had an impact on decolonization, including the World Wars, the already decolonized states, such as India, serving as role model, the Atlantic Charter, the UN Declaration on Human Rights, the new superpowers’ rejection of imperialist ambitions, and the Cold War. Not all events favored decolonization; some actually delayed it.

World Wars

World War I provided the breeding ground for decolonization to the extent that it revealed to parts of Africa's population "the shortcomings and flaws of a weakened European population which was seemingly unable to resolve its war on an all-European basis."⁷⁹ This was especially true for those colonies that were affected by the war, primarily the German ones. After the war had broken out in Europe, British and French troops invaded the German colonies quickly and effectively – German East Africa, where German and local troops were not defeated, being the exception⁸⁰ – although there had been efforts on both sides to prevent armed violence, in an attempt to show the colonial populations that whites did not fight against other whites.

The consequences of World War I were felt in parts of the affected colonies and in those colonies where soldiers were recruited for battles elsewhere.⁸¹ On the one side, there was the educated elite, especially in the British colonies; they hoped that their loyalty to the colonial power would pay off after the war. On the other, there were the soldiers and porters deployed in Africa. Both the high losses they suffered – mainly due to climate and disease – and their pitiless recruitment by the colonial powers contributed to the dissatisfaction felt by much of the colonial population, ultimately leading to uprisings as in Morocco or Nigeria amongst others.⁸² One of the most formidable resistances was in Portuguese Mozambique, where a 15,000-strong rebel group came into being. The returning African soldiers faced the same impacts that war had had on many of their European comrades, including mental stress, social exclusion, alienation, marital and family crises, as well as domestic violence. They received virtually no support.

Although dissatisfaction within the colonial population was rising in many places, it must also be stressed that after World War I, the colonial powers could effectively consolidate their rule in Africa: "In many ways, the War marked the period in which 'pacification' of both

African and metropolitan critics of colonialism ends and colonial rule proper begins.”⁸³ Incisive changes were taking place in the colonies. For example, the British government nominally withdrew Egypt from the Ottoman Empire while also expanding its control over Sudan. The French government launched a campaign of *mise en valeur*, in other words taking measures to exploit the resources of the empire while also seeking to render that empire more loyal to the homeland.

World War II had even more visible effects on the African colonies, while at the same time duplicating for many people in and from Africa the experiences of World War I. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 – that can also be regarded as the start of World War II – made many realize how unimportant the country was for the colonial powers inasmuch as the governments in Britain and France did not rush to Ethiopia’s aid. Mussolini’s aim was to avenge the defeat of Italian troops at the Battle of Adua in 1896 (see [Chapter 1](#)). Yet, for Britain and France, the interests of Ethiopia were not important enough to warrant intervention.⁸⁴ Not until 1941, as the war was raging in Europe, did they step in to help free Ethiopia. This was one of the first Allied victories over an Axis power in World War II.

Those black soldiers who fought for the colonial powers in Europe and elsewhere saw themselves, as in World War I, threatened by racist thinking. Many of these soldiers who were deployed by France in Europe fell into Nazi-German hands following the *blitzkrieg* and only some of them were repatriated by Vichy France. “Free France,” the exiled government led by de Gaulle, also treated African soldiers as second-class: “[s]eeking to obscure the role that Africans played in freeing France from Nazi rule, de Gaulle ordered the *blanchissement* (whitening) of the Second Free French armored division before the liberation of Paris in August 1944 by replacing Africans with members of the French resistance.”⁸⁵ Such experiences and the effects of the war were not the same in all places. While some colonies, such as Uganda, were not conscribed into the military, others such as Guinea

were severely affected by the war owing to conscription, forced labor, agricultural production, taxation, food shortages, and inflation. This, too, explains why nationalism in Guinea, which had led it to opt out of de Gaulle's referendum in 1958, was more radical than in other colonies.⁸⁶

The use of African soldiers in World War I, and even more so in World War II, disillusioned these soldiers insofar as it showed them that the Europeans did not have the self-presumed (moral) superiority. African soldiers "had killed Europeans and seen European weakness and failure at close quarters. The myth of European supremacy – moral or otherwise – finally exploded, and it was this shift in the perception of some Africans of their colonial masters which was to prove of enormous and lasting significance."⁸⁷ The returning soldiers were not just disillusioned but often also frustrated over the conditions that they found back at home. Having experienced suffering equal to that of European soldiers they now demanded equal rights.⁸⁸ It was not so much their experience of the war itself, but rather how they were treated right after the war that became one of the catalysts in their desire for independence.⁸⁹

In the following years, the independence movements grew stronger, especially in northern Africa. World War II had cost the colonial powers important resources and given the population in the colonies an opportunity to demand more autonomy – and the will to do so. The independence leaders in North Africa were among those who demanded such changes. The nationalist leaders in Algeria and Tunisia had been loyal to "Free France" during the war and now called for reform and/or independence.⁹⁰ Sayyid Mohammad Idris sought Libya's independence, alluding to his backing of Britain during the war. In Egypt, the semi-independent state, forces likewise felt encouraged to drive the remaining British troops out. And in Morocco, the sultan tried to gain independence with American support. At the same time, World War II was also cleverly used by some African leaders to improve their positions. The chiefs of Bechuanaland

(today's Botswana), for instance, had been loyal to the government in London, recruiting soldiers for it – thereby highlighting how Britain had to some extent been dependent on them and bolstering their standing for years to come.⁹¹

The Rise of International Anti-colonialism

During World War II, British prime minister Winston Churchill and US president Franklin Roosevelt had written about the right of nations to self-determination in their 1941 Atlantic Charter. It was a principle that Roosevelt regarded more universalistically than did Churchill, who presided over a large colonial empire and did not necessarily want to apply the right of self-determination to the colonies. India, the most important British colony, nonetheless became independent in 1947. The USA, which emerged as a superpower after World War II, continued to campaign for the Atlantic Charter and thus the right for self-determination. Likewise, the 1948 UN's Declaration of Human Rights also implied support for decolonization. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, the new superpowers, had an anti-imperial leaning, although they did not always act consistently on them (see below).

The Suez Crisis of 1956 marks an important turning point in history as through this crisis, the USA and the Soviet Union – in an odd-looking display of unity during the Cold War – put the “old-style imperial powers,”⁹² France and Britain, in their place. Once the Suez Canal had been nationalized by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1956, France and Britain, together with Israel, sought to regain control of the canal and bring down Nasser. The Soviet Union and the US demanded the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli troops, yet such a UN Security Council resolution was blocked by the vetoes of Britain and France. The “old” imperial powers now faced off against the central powers of the Cold War. Under pressure from the superpowers, the UN General Assembly, and members of the British Commonwealth, the occupiers ultimately yielded and withdrew their

troops. However, their common position in the Suez Crisis should not obscure the fact that the USA and the Soviet Union were otherwise enemies during the Cold War – something that had consequences for the development of the postcolonial states (see [Chapters 4 and 7](#)).

The consequence of World War II, the Atlantic Charter, the anti-imperial leaning, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and India's independence opened further space for resistance in the British colonies and, hence, it is not surprising that this phase bolstered resistance against the colonial power. The French colonies in Africa were influenced by the same factors, yet two more were in play there (and the India factor was less momentous). First, there was a desire within the African colonies to receive compensation in the form of more autonomy for having supported de Gaulle and his "Free France" during the war. For, above all, the central African colonial territory of Afrique-Équatoriale française had been an important place of retreat for "Free France." Second, the Battle for Dien Bien Phu, on account of which France had lost Indochina – its most important colonial possession after Algeria – was as symbolically laden for the French colonies in Africa as the independence of India had been for the British colonies in Africa. The force and intensity of the events between the end of World War II and the Suez Crisis, as well as the rise of the USA and the Soviet Union to superpower status, were unmistakable and contributed to making the imperialism that the European colonial powers were still cultivating in Africa appear backward and thus outdated. The cracks in the woodwork of colonialism had become gaping.

United Nations

Besides these events, the establishment of the League of Nations and the UN respectively had a decisive influence on decolonization in some parts of Africa. With the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920, the mandate territories were introduced, which came to include the former German colonies, such as Cameroon or German

Southwest Africa (present-day Namibia), and the Italian colonies such as Somalia. After World War II and the founding of the UN in 1945, the mandates turned into trust territories. The UN, largely led by the USA, urged early on that these trust territories become independent. The opening act took place in 1951, with what is now Libya, which was at the time divided into a British and a French trust territory. Because the victorious powers of the World War could not agree on how to proceed with this former Italian colony, the question was transferred to the newly established UN.⁹³ Libya – whose oil and gas resources were as yet unknown – seemed too unimportant to provoke a conflict, and the UN seemed the appropriate platform for clarifying the question of its political future.⁹⁴ In 1949, the General Assembly decided that this French and British trust territory should become independent, that such independence be completed by January 1952 at the latest, and that its constitution should be negotiated in a national assembly.⁹⁵ That is how Libya gained independence.

The UN also played the role of midwife in the case of Somalian independence. Britain administered one part of it as trust territory and Italy, after 1950, the other. The two states were assigned with the mission to grant the territory independence by 1960. The British government then tried to delay the independence of both areas, partly because they viewed their part as not yet able to govern itself – and in part because they had geostrategic interests in the Horn of Africa.⁹⁶ However, the UN resolution of 1949 established the independence of the Italian area, which then ensued; the British faced the knock-on effect.

In the case of present-day Namibia, it took a long time for the UN's position on the illegality of South African rule over Namibia to prevail. Since World War I, South Africa had administered Namibia as a mandate and then as a trust territory, though that status had terminated in 1966. For, in that year, the UN ended that trusteeship, and in 1973 it (and the Organization of African Unity) named the nationalist movement SWAPO the sole legitimate representative of the

Namibian people. In 1974, South Africa was deprived of its seat in the UN General Assembly, and in 1976, the UN Security Council unanimously decided that elections should be held in Namibia that would then lead to independence. Essentially, however, international pressure did not change anything about de facto South Africa's rule. Only the domestic political situation in South Africa and the high cost of war there and in Namibia (see above) brought the parties back to the negotiating table. In May 1988, these events had led to an agreement that put the UN back at the center of the negotiations. For the parties decided on a UN peace operation for Namibia, which among other things would conduct elections and supervise the withdrawal of South African troops. Despite initial difficulties, the transition phase went off peacefully and finally resulted in Namibia's independence in 1990.⁹⁷

Realpolitik

A contribution to the end of apartheid and the occupation of Namibia was also made by the international sanctions regime directed at the apartheid government and approved by the UN, which could, however, not work as effectively as intended. In the early 1960s, the UN General Assembly adopted nonbinding economic sanctions against the apartheid state that were intended to result in trade restrictions and the reduction of air and ship traffic. In 1973, an oil embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) states followed as well as an arms embargo. These measures intensified further in the 1980s. In addition, South Africa was excluded from major sporting events such as the Olympic Games and the Paralympics. At the same time, however, there were also international supporters of the apartheid government, such as the USA. During the Cold War, the latter showed enormous interest in containing the spread of Communism, and the apartheid government was savvy in presenting itself as an anti-communist bulwark. In addition, the South African regime supported the USA in the proxy war in Angola, where

the Cold War heated up as the USA and the Soviet Union and their respective allies were supporting different conflict parties (see [Chapter 4](#)). Consequently, the US government also blocked some UN Security Council resolutions directed against South Africa. In addition to states, there were also individuals like the Bavarian Franz-Josef Strauss who played their part in ensuring that the sanctions regime could not be fully effective, in their attempts to maintain good contacts with the apartheid government. Many companies were constantly undermining that sanctions regime, thereby helping to keep the apartheid government in power.

Portugal, too, benefitted from of the logic of the Cold War. The American government did not protest against Portugal, because the US military base in the Portuguese Azores was strategically too important, thus rendering the USA effectively dependent on Portugal.⁹⁸ In fact, operations in Europe were handled from that military base, such as during the Second Berlin Crisis of 1961. Since that base was of fundamental geostrategic importance, it had to be maintained – especially in the logic of the Cold War – under all circumstances. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger even concocted a plan to occupy the Azores in the mid-1970s if the Communist Party were to win the elections in Portugal. At that time, US foreign policy was dominated by white men, some of whom also displayed sympathy for European colonial powers and minority governments in Africa. The attitude of US governments toward Africa only changed after more liberals became part of the US foreign policy leadership and after the black population in the USA linked its struggle for civil rights with the independence of the colonies in Africa.⁹⁹ For the USA, though, it remained vital that Communism be contained. Human rights and democracy (among other considerations) were sacrificed to this endeavor (see [Chapter 4](#)). In short, although the international system produced anti-colonial forces that had a positive effect on decolonization, forces in the international system simultaneously created a situation that in fact counteracted decolonization. When in

doubt, the interests of realpolitik proved stronger than the anti-colonial attitude.

Merging the Perspective

From the considerations above, it has become clear that not *one* perspective or *one* explanation can explain decolonization by itself. Instead, we should assume that decolonization has many causes, which become visible when seen from the perspectives of the colonial power, the colonial state, and the international system. As a result, elements of the perspectives can serve to provide an explanation. These perspectives are intertwined, and only when they are examined together does a more comprehensive – albeit more complex – picture emerge of decolonization and its driving forces.

Fighting for Self-Determination

Even as the colonial powers and white minority regimes were being ousted, the struggle for the right to self-determination continued in a few places in Africa. In Eritrea and South Sudan, independence movements continued to struggle for that after 1990. After the annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia in 1962, a thirty-year civil war began. Only when the communist Derg regime, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had overthrown the emperor in 1977, was itself overthrown, did the signs change for Eritrea. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front under Isaias Afwerk had participated in the fight against the regime and therefore had a supporter for its independence in Meles Zenawi, the new leader of Ethiopia. An interim government was installed, and in the UN-monitored referendum of 1993 the majority of Eritreans voted for independence, which came then.

Likewise, for South Sudan, the road led from a civil war to an independence referendum. In the early 1980s, the Sudanese government restricted the autonomy of southern Sudan, which it had

successfully acquired in a first civil war (1955–1972) and promoted the Islamization of southern Sudan. The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement was formed, and a second civil war commenced in 1983. However, the conflict lines in this civil war blurred in the early 1990s. There was a regime change in Khartoum where Omar al-Bashir seized power through a coup d'état. The end of the Derg regime in neighboring Ethiopia deprived the rebel movement of a place to retreat to. In addition, there were divisions among the rebels, importing an ethnic dimension – of Nuer against Dinka – into the struggle. Furthermore, the Ugandan rebel movement Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) had now become part of the conflict. More than two million people, especially citizens of South Sudan, died in that war.¹⁰⁰ When the conflict about South Sudan's independence ended in 2005, the peace agreement was overseen by the UN Mission in Sudan. In an independence referendum of January 2011, nearly 99 percent of those eligible voted for independence, which took place in July of the same year. The youngest state of Africa had been born (see [Chapter 9](#)).

Continuing Colonization

Decolonization, one of the most overpowering political processes of the twentieth century, has largely been completed. According to the UN, there is only one area in Africa that is not self-governed, namely Western Sahara.¹⁰¹ Already in the early 1970s, when under Spanish colonial rule, the nationalist movement in Western Sahara had been popular, after the police ended a demonstration by force of arms. From this movement emerged the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (POLISARIO) that committed itself to an armed liberation struggle.¹⁰² In May 1975, a UN mission visited the area and came to the conclusion that the POLISARIO represented the will of the people. At that time, it was already known that Spain was intending to withdraw. Spain, weakened by the coma of long-time dictator Franco, gave up the colony, and Morocco as well as

Mauritania were to take over in its place, with the USA and France supporting anti-communist Morocco.¹⁰³ Moroccan and Mauritanian units entered Western Sahara, and Spain finally withdrew on 26 February 1976. They ignored the proclamation of the Democratic Arab Republic of Sahara by the POLISARIO on 27 February 1976. Since then the POLISARIO has no longer been fighting against European domination but against Moroccan occupation as in 1979 Mauritania had renounced its claims and Morocco also annexed this part of Western Sahara.

As noted, all other African territories, including the enclave of Melilla or islands such as Réunion and Mayotte, are self-governed according to the reading of the UN. A special case in that context is that of the Chagos Islands, which are claimed by Mauritius, but held by Britain and used by the USA as a military base (see [Chapter 12](#)). This special case suggests that the reading of the UN regarding self-governed territories can be called into question. Indeed, it is a bizarre irony of world history that the colonization of Africa can still be seen in the very place where it began in 1414: in Ceuta, the tiny 18.5 km² enclave, now belonging to Spain, surrounded by what is now Morocco.

Decolonization's Legacies

Although colonization lasted only for a few decades in some African territories, its effects are still visible and perceptible in the present. This is illustrated by the facts that the languages of the colonial powers have mostly remained official ones and that places still have names like Brazzaville, Victoria Falls, and Lake Albert. Other legacies of the colonial era include whether one drives on the left or right side of the road as well as whether one indicates distances and speeds based on kilometers or miles. The membership of African states in international organizations such as the Commonwealth or La Francophonie are likewise related to the colonial past. These are, however, only preliminary indications that the colonial period and decolonization impacted on Africa, particularly on politics and economics but also on individuals. In the following, I will therefore discuss the effects of the colonial period along these three thematic blocks.

Political Effects

Given the colonial origin of the states, the state-building process, in which the newly independent states had to engage, faced severe obstacles after decolonization. I will elaborate on that in this section and thereafter discuss the artificiality of borders as another political legacy of the colonial period as well as the solidarity among African governments and the ties to the former colonial power.

State-Building

State-building is a complex process that describes the building of institutions within the state. It includes the establishment of a public administration and the institutionalization of state processes. European territories had needed centuries to become what is seen within them as “modern” states – and they are still evolving. However, the former colonies were expected to become such Western-type states within a short time and essentially without preparation or resources.

The emergence of African states followed a different logic than the emergence of European states. Over the last centuries, as Charles Tilly argues, the European states have been created and consolidated through wars. Wars made it necessary for the bureaucracy to turn from the cities to the countryside, not only to recruit soldiers but also to collect taxes for conducting wars.¹ Jeffrey Herbst shows that there was no such extension of the bureaucracy in much of Africa.² According to Herbst, prior to colonization in Africa there had been little need to consolidate states in Tilly’s sense, among other things due to the low population density there. The colonial powers also saw no need to consolidate the colonial states in the way they consolidated themselves, since they were, for the most part, safe from external attacks, having mutually recognized each other’s territorial claims. Hence, the colonial powers had no reason to build up state structures all the way into the periphery – structures that could have been used by the postcolonial states.³ The administrations set up and maintained by the colonial powers were kept small due to reasons of cost. The colonial state was particularly perceptible in the capital city yet barely in the countryside or near the borders (unless the colonial capital was located there). The colonies of West Africa, with their sparsely populated border regions, were the most susceptible to what Jan Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel in another context have called “gaps in sovereignty,”⁴ in other words the fact that the colonial power’s arms hardly reached there. The colonial population took advantage of

this, for example, by undertaking internal migrations in order to escape exploitation by the colonial powers.

The first postcolonial leaders did not see it as their priority to restructure the states they had inherited. Rather, “[t]he goal was to capture the protostate, not to dismiss or fundamentally rearrange it.”⁵ The de facto continuation of the colonial state prolonged what Basil Davidson described as the interruption of the genuine evolution of political systems in Africa that came through the slave trade and the colonization.⁶ That continued interruption created a legitimacy problem for the state itself and for the new leaders. The colonial powers had selected and supported local elites and had brought these elites into important political positions so that they could take government positions after decolonization (see [Chapter 2](#)). These elites acted as if they were representatives of the citizens, although they were, in several cases, more interested in themselves. States such as Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, or Ghana became elite projects of a small clique that took over after independence. By selecting the new leadership and effectively excluding large parts of the population from political offices and posts in the public administration, the colonial powers had prepared the way for developing concentrations of power in postcolonial Africa. The new political leadership often continued to exclude the citizens from politics. For President Touré of Guinea it was still opportune during the French colonial era to call for strikes. After decolonization, strikes in his country became taboo and were suppressed.⁷ What is more, accepting the colonial language as the official language in the postcolonial state had the effect that those who could not communicate in that language – large portions of the population – were excluded from positions in politics and the public administration. “Ironically, therefore, much of the space that had existed under colonial rule after World War II for the expression of opposition voices was closed off in the post-colonial period.”⁸ Large parts of Africa slipped into what some called “independence without freedom” or an

“autonomy in the framework of a dictatorship.”⁹

The colonial powers had often relied on local chiefs – either traditional or “invented” ones – to exercise authority during the colonial period and these chiefs sought to play an important role after decolonization. The existence of chiefs was, in cases such as Uganda or Zambia, something that ultimately made it difficult for postcolonial governments to consolidate their power and influence over these men for they enjoyed local legitimacy (see [Chapter 7](#)). In Eswatini (then Swaziland) King Sobhuza II was even able to dismantle the governance structures set up by Britain in favor of an absolute monarchy. The king was crucial for Britain during the colonial time and carried out functions for the British government, thereby cementing his power. During the independence negotiations, the British government wanted to have a Westminster-type constitution and to ensure civil liberties, including the right to establish political parties. Sobhuza perceived this as a threat;¹⁰ however, he was unable to assert his position at that point. He decided to play by the rules of the game, founded his own party, and stood for vote at the first legislative council. His party won all seats. Sobhuza waited for five years after independence and in 1973 banned all political parties by decree, arguing that parties would not fit with the political conditions in the country. Thereby, Sobhuza ended the separation of power and dismantled what Britain thought would be the postcolonial order. “[B]y the time of Sobhuza’s diamond jubilee in 1981, the authority of the Swazi monarchy was absolute.”¹¹ Eswatini had turned into an absolute monarchy. In effect, Sobhuza only sat out the multiparty system imposed by Britain at independence while he was widely respected by Swazis.

Since the colonial states were “a pure model of bureaucratic authoritarianism,”¹² no democratic tradition could have emerged from it. “The isolation of the government from the governed, the refusal to tolerate opposition or criticism, the fear of delegation authority, the branding of all virile opposition as treasonable action – all these were

learned from Africa's colonial masters by the Africans who took over African government at independence."¹³ Even though the colonial powers introduced democratic institutions shortly before decolonization in some places, with their ruling style, they had contributed to the fact that these institutions had a limited chance to survive as the case of Eswatini suggests. Instead, authoritarian government emerged out of those forces the colonial powers placed as leaders or out of leaders that came otherwise into power (see [Chapter 7](#)).¹⁴ Only Botswana and Mauritius have consistently experienced democratic structures and multiparty systems since decolonization. At least in the case of Mauritius, there have also been regular alternations of government between the parties.

Closely linked with the problems of exclusion, lacking legitimacy, and authoritarianism is the absence of a social contract in the sense of Jean-Jacques Rousseau or Thomas Hobbes, in other words the explicit (or discernibly implicit) consent of the population to surrender parts of its freedoms and subordinate itself to the state, which in return would grant that population its protection. Large parts of the population had no experience with a state legitimated in this manner because the colonial powers had not ruled legitimately, and they had displayed no responsibility toward the colonized. The population first had to (and still has to) learn loyalty toward a legitimate state. Such a process has not been completed everywhere, a fact that is also considered as cause for the slow socioeconomic progress.¹⁵ Nigeria is an example of that. Inter alia because of the heterogeneity and divergent visions of the postcolonial state (the North sought independence as a separate state from the South; see [Chapter 2](#)), large parts of the population found it difficult to consider independent Nigeria as legitimate. Further reasons for this legitimacy crisis in Nigeria are different political cultures – that were forcefully brought together in one state by the colonial power – and difficulties in consolidating these differences. Moreover, the unequal education opportunities led to various developments within Nigeria. Unlike in

most other African countries, political parties emerged along ethnic lines in Nigeria. Furthermore, there was a widening gap between the poor and the rich. And finally, the postcolonial government proved incapable of addressing these issues.¹⁶ This in sum led the population to show limited loyalty toward its state and perceive it as hardly legitimate.

Borders

With their independence, the former colonies accepted the colonial borders – and that was accompanied by problems. Only a few states, such as Botswana, Burundi, Egypt, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Morocco, Rwanda, and Tunisia, had a “meaningful precolonial identity.”¹⁷ Most other states – and with them, the territorial redistribution of the continent – originated with the colonial powers. This reorganization was “a ruthless act of political amalgamation, whereby something of the order of ten thousand units was reduced to a mere forty.”¹⁸ The definition of the colonial borders followed the logic of reconciling interests between the colonial powers; the borders were drawn without the participation of the African population.¹⁹ However, this is hardly a unique feature if one thinks of former colonial territories in other world regions or, for example, of the borders of present-day Poland. The latter are essentially a product of negotiations undertaken by Britain, the Soviet Union, and the USA. Borders elsewhere were thus also defined by others.²⁰ Nonetheless, it is not surprising that there was often tension within or between the new African states. Divided peoples tended (and still tend) toward irredentism, that is to say the aspiration of groups to be unified (in the same territory). The vision of a Greater Somalia uniting ethnic Somalis is emblematic of this (see [Chapter 9](#)). By contrast, in areas with peoples who have been forcibly unified, there have been efforts to achieve autonomy, or even a secession, as the de facto division of Nigeria into a northern portion and a southern one indicates. At times, people also benefit from the borders inasmuch

as there was cross-border trade and smuggling as well as political leverage due to the border that was drawn arbitrarily in their eyes.²¹ However, South Sudan's independence, attained by bloodshed, and the collapse of Libya in the post-Gaddafi era also show how fragile colonial borders can be. Given that, secession efforts such as those of South Sudan, Katanga (Congo, 1960) or Biafra (Nigeria, 1967) have nonetheless been very rare (see [Chapter 9](#)).

While states and their institutions were (and are) often fragile, borders in Africa are of a paradoxical permanence. The political leadership and sections of the population contribute(d) to that. The British government thus failed with its plan to establish a Central African Federation permanently and the Mali Federation promoted by Senegalese president Senghor fell apart faster than it could be created (see [Chapter 2](#)). Before all the African countries had been decolonized, the political leaders of the independent states had already declared the colonial boundaries drawn to be permanent with the 1964 Cairo Declaration.²² In short, "[t]here is more at work here than sheer inertia: the present arrangements represent a choice."²³ In that sense, it is questionable whether Ali Mazrui's prediction from 1993 is apposite that "[o]ver the next century the outlines of most present-day African states will change in one of two ways. One will be ethnic self-determination which will create smaller states, comparable to the separation of Eritrea and Ethiopia. The other will be regional integration towards larger politics and economic unions."²⁴ This is because, so Mazrui's assumption goes, borders are the last thing to be decolonized.

Alterations of borderlines caused by external actors appear unlikely as there are no reasons at this point in time to assume that African states will shift the borderlines of their neighbors through interstate wars or put into question the territorial integrity of another state by other means. This certainty – that the colonial powers already possessed (see above) – contributes to the fact that the governments of the independent states see no necessity to develop their states from

within, in the sense of Tilly, or consolidate state institutions broadly. Consequently, we can argue that Herbst's assumptions about the colonial state not developing from within apply in the postcolonial phase, too, and that the center-periphery problem remains virulent in several African countries.

Solidarity

The common experience of having been colonized, which includes all African states except Ethiopia and Liberia, led to a feeling of solidarity, which has been articulated since the beginning of the twentieth century in the diaspora by the Pan-Africanists and was brought to Africa by Nkrumah, among others. This was one of the factors motivating the independent states to establish the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). A little earlier – and for similar reasons but with Pan-Arabism as the foundation – the Arab League came into being and independent North African states eventually joined the organization. Yet, the efforts of political leaders to cling to the sovereignty, which was in some cases acquired through bloodshed, and their refusal to tolerate any external interference, made them less willing to hand over any sovereignty to the OAU or the Arab League respectively, which in turn massively weakened these organizations (see [Chapter 8](#)).

Those nationalist movements that received help from other such movements often maintained good relationships among themselves. As such, Algeria became one of the leaders of the Global South in the 1960s and 1970s, for it was a gathering point for the continent's guerrilla fighters who received training there.²⁵ The feeling of solidarity among the dominant liberation movements in southern Africa is documented by regular meetings between the ANC, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi in Tanzania, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, MPLA of Angola, SWAPO of Namibia, and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. The fact that democratic South Africa has cultivated “silent diplomacy” toward Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe,

that is to say that critique was only voiced behind closed doors, has its roots in the solidarity between the ANC and the ZANU-PF, as well as in the recognition of Mugabe as a hero of that liberation movement.²⁶ But there were as well antagonisms between governments, especially when the leadership of one country had supported a different liberation movement than that which later came to power. For example, the support of Congolese president Mobutu Sese Seko for the Angolan liberation movement FNLA led to Mobutu being unable to assert his claim to leadership on the continent because most other African states supported the competing MPLA, the movement that then came to power.

Tying Former Colonial Powers and Former Colonies

Most of the newly founded states remained closely associated with their former colonial powers. The British queen Elizabeth II was still the head of state for a few years of some of the former British colonies. Numerous French advisors came to the former French colonies, maintaining close contacts with the new governments and continued to exercise de facto control. After the loss of Indochina, the French government thought it could play a stronger and more durable role in its former African colonies, which is why the French government cultivated close relations with the postcolonial leadership – Touré in Guinea was an exception here. Due to the personalized political systems in Africa, the relations between France and its former colonies were also rather personal. “Monsieur Afrique,” Jacques Foccart, chief advisor to the French president on African Affairs, influenced France’s Africa policy for decades and used his network and his personal ties with African politicians to directly impact policies in the former colonies. The relations between France and its former colonies are labeled “Françafrique,” a term that was supposed to describe the initial wish of several colonies to maintain close links with France and use the latter’s help to develop. Yet this term more and more became a byword for France’s neocolonial behavior (see

The former colonial powers established organizations such as the Commonwealth of Nations, the Organisation internationale de la francophonie and the Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, and the independent African states became part of these. These organizations were meant to keep cultural ties between the former colonial power and its colonies. However, there have been some interesting changes of camps: the formerly Portuguese colony of Mozambique joined the Commonwealth in 1995 and the former German and Belgian colony of Rwanda likewise became a member of the Commonwealth in 2009. The aims of such organizations have been and continue to be similar: they seek to promote solidarity and cooperation among the member states, thereby maintaining the ties between the former colonies and former colonial powers. The Commonwealth, for its part, sees itself as promoting liberal-cosmopolitan values such as democracy, human rights, peace, security, and the rule of law. La Francophonie, by contrast, emphasizes the French background of its members much more, maintaining: "The French language and its humanist values represent the two cornerstones on which the International Organization of La Francophonie is based."²⁷ However, the significance of these organizations beyond cultural exchange should not be overstated.

This cultural exchange is just one element of the exchange between the former colonial power and its former colonies. Newspapers, radio, TV, and related websites, such as those of Radio France Internationale and BBC World, continue to transport the positions and thinking of the former colonial powers. This is coupled with study exchange programs and the colonial language remaining the instruction language in schools and universities (particularly in those that train the future elite). Via these means, particularly Britain and France, and to a lesser extent Belgium and Portugal, still shape the perspectives and thinking of the African elite and parts of the population. Considering this, we have to question whether the

temporary disruption of the genuine evolution of African states in the sense of Davidson has become a permanent one. This is linked to the phenomenon of “cultural imperialism,” which I address below.

Economic Effects

The effects of the colonial era on the economies of the new states were massive. Some see the European colonization of Africa as reason for the still prevailing economic difficulties, which we can observe in several African states, because the colonial powers introduced an economic system that was meant to exploit the colony and was maintained through property rights and governing systems. This system has changed little since then – except that today the African elite benefits from it, too.²⁸ Jean-François Bayart argues that African elites became clients of the colonial powers during the colonial period and both developed a mutually beneficial relationship, which was, however, dominated by the Europeans. This behavior of African elites contributed to a pattern of extraversion in the economy, here meaning that Africans looked outwards and interacted with the non-Africans but faced structural constraints and dependencies when doing so. This pattern is still visible.²⁹ Others argue that “the original sin of colonialism in Africa was that it did not introduce a full-blooded capitalist system, based upon private property and thereby generating the pressures towards competition and accumulation necessary to drive self-sustained economic growth.”³⁰ Furthermore, the colonial powers wanted to operate in Africa on favorable terms, which is why they paid their workers poorly. On that basis, domestic demand could not be generated and there could be no accumulation of capital that could have continued to finance economic development after independence. The consequence was a manifestation of the economic and socioeconomic conditions of the colonial period that continue to have an effect.

All colonial powers exploited, wherever possible, the natural

resources of the colonies and created economies that were mostly dependent on one (or a few) export commodities and, thus, on the world market price for them. As a result, Mauritius, for example, was dependent on sugar, Zambia on copper, and São Tomé and Príncipe, along with Ghana, on cocoa – conditions that still obtain in part today. The colonial powers wanted to have the raw materials of their colonies and all further processing was supposed to take place in the metropolises. Consequently, no significant industrialization took place, apart from Egypt and South Africa. In a global economy dominated by industrial goods, former colonies had a competitive disadvantage, as apart from natural resources, they could contribute little to the production of such goods and hence could not benefit from that part of the value chain (the processing of natural resources and their sale), which promises more profit.

The colonial borders left a negative impact on the economies of the independent states. Three points weigh in especially. First, in some states like Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Mauritania, Niger, and Uganda, the borders drawn contained few or no natural resources. However, this does not mean that those states possessing mineral resources ended up in a superior economic position, which is linked to acquisitiveness, mismanagement, and corruption there (see [Chapter 5](#)). Yet the starting conditions were better for resource-rich states given their ability to supply goods for the industry-dominated world economy. Second, the splintering of Africa into a large number of states brought into being some small and hardly viable states in economic terms. While some (designated) presidents like Senghor in Senegal or Nkrumah in Ghana warned of that Balkanization citing political and economic fears, local elites and the colonial powers de facto advanced that splintering. This leads Douglas Yates to hypothesize that France led its two large territories France West Africa and French Equatorial Africa into independence as thirteen separate states, because it knew that those states were hardly viable and hence dependent on France.³¹ Last, through their drawing of the borders, colonial powers left behind

sixteen landlocked countries; nowhere else on earth are there so many states of that type. This had a negative impact on their economic development, as they had no direct access to the maritime commerce that is crucial in the global economy (see [Chapter 5](#)).

France, which dominated West Africa, did little to develop its colonies in the Sahel, where several landlocked countries in Africa are located. Instead it concentrated on its colonies at the coast, like today's Côte d'Ivoire, while neglecting the hinterland. For example, "[w]ith a relatively large and densely-settled population, with few known natural resources, with no sea-coast, with undependable and sparse rainfall, Upper Volta [today's Burkina Faso] was used as a labour reservoir for 'development' projects in more promising parts of the colony (Ivory Coast [Côte d'Ivoire] in particular)."³² Indeed, the French government encouraged migration within its colonies, so that migration turned into a "social and economic institution."³³ Little has changed in this overall setting since the colonial period. It was estimated that in 2007, prior to a major political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire (see [Chapter 9](#)), up to three million Burkinabe lived in that country.³⁴

The colonial powers, however, also left behind an infrastructure that had not existed in precolonial times. Although the transport system was primarily designed to move goods out of the hinterlands of the colonies or was designed to serve strategic military considerations, the postcolonial states were able to build on that and use it for their economy. The railway between Kenya's Mombasa and landlocked Uganda, which Britain had built in the period 1896–1901, is one example of this. However, such infrastructure projects did not exist in all colonies. As such, the rail network is very unevenly distributed in Africa.³⁵ At the time of independence, Egypt and South Africa had the largest rail networks on the continent, and they were also the two states that added the most train kilometers after independence. By contrast, there were no railroads in countries like Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, or Niger.

The education system, too, primarily served the interests of

colonial powers. Taken together, the colonial powers invested little in the training of the colonial population, so that after decolonization there was little technical expertise for many professions. In 1960 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 43.2 percent of children were in a primary school, 3.1 percent in a secondary school, and 0.2 percent in tertiary education. The difference between boys and girls was blatant: 54.4 percent to 32.0 percent in elementary school, 4.2 percent to 2.0 percent in secondary school, and 0.4 percent to 0.1 percent in tertiary education. In the years to follow, the proportion of children going to school rose steadily – and the gap between boys and girls narrowed.³⁶ These figures obscure the fact that there was a distinguished tradition of education in Africa. North Africa, for example, is the site of some of the oldest educational institutions in the world: the universities in Cairo, Fes, and Tunis. The colonial powers also brought European-type education institutions and founded inter alia Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone, the University of Algiers, the Antananarivo Medical Training Academy in Madagascar, the Gordon Memorial College in Sudan, and Makerere University College in Uganda. In South Africa there were the University of the Cape of Good Hope, the South African College, the Lovedale Missionary Institute, as well as the Stellenbosch Gymnasium. Liberia and Ethiopia had institutions of higher education as well.³⁷ All in all, however, the universities were too few and too small for such a large continent and such a large population – and these institutions mainly served to train whites.

Mali is an example in which all mentioned facets of the colonial heritage cumulatively have an effect and is hence a good case to illustrate the impact of the colonial period on the economy. Mali is a landlocked country, resource-scarce, and with very limited industrial production. There were hardly any private investments during the colonial period and thereafter. The transport infrastructure is weak, as the railway lines running through Mali were built by France to connect the navigable Niger River with the port in Dakar, Senegal, in order to transport goods more easily and cheaply. The population

migrated toward the states at the coastline; the wage level remains low along with the domestic demand. Taken together, this led to poor rankings of Mali in standard indicators like GDP, economic growth, and the number of people living below the poverty line. Mali continues to be dependent on France and is part of the CFA franc, the joint currency of the former French colonies, which is controlled by France (see [Chapter 5](#)). In addition, Mali shows several of the political impacts of the colonial period, which I have mentioned above. This includes the new elite's use of institutions created by the colonial powers, the instability of state institutions – that hardly operate beyond the capital city – as well as the forced union of different groups within one state, which hence do not necessarily consider the state as legitimate. Therefore, it comes as little surprise that there were secession attempts (see [Chapter 9](#)). The political and economic impacts of the colonial period surfaced during the crisis of 2012/2013, which showed that the state and its democracy were by far not as consolidated as many had thought.³⁸

Irrespective of the situation in several former colonies, Bill Warren contended in 1980 that the colonial phase has been progressive for Africa (and Asia). According to him, the colonial era formed the basis for a capitalism of the local population and was hence essential for economic growth in the former colonies.³⁹ Although this thesis was subjected to neocolonial criticism and ran counter to the dependence theory, which was popular at that time (see [Chapter 5](#)), it can be argued that the colonial powers indeed left behind societies that were fully integrated into the world economic system, that had largely adopted the principle of division of labor, and that no longer engaged primarily in subsistence farming as before colonization. Rather, these societies were producing surpluses that found buyers in local and international markets. The number of workers dependent on this increased starkly. Moreover, the European monetary system was introduced. Thus, “its cumulative impact by the end of the colonial era almost always amounted to an economic

revolution,”⁴⁰ one which no nationalist movement and no postcolonial government wanted to undo.

At the same time, we can argue that the colonial state was repressive in political and economic terms to the extent that large parts of the population could not familiarize with the market economy. They, as well as the new elite, were therefore often inclined to find solutions to their economic challenges in Marxist and other revolutionary thoughts. In other words, the colonial conditions were also a fertile soil to turn against a capitalist market economy and rather long for socialism. In this logic, the economic revolution, which was brought by the colonial powers, was to be followed by another one, which should lead to political and economic freedom for the population, as several leaders and intellectuals demanded.

Individuals

The colonial period and decolonization changed the lives and, in some measure, the psyche of individuals living in the colonies. Although it is wrong to generalize and place millions of people into a few and narrow categories, it nonetheless makes sense to select a few groups of people here to at least hint at the effects of colonization and decolonization in order to get a feeling for how the era of foreign rule *was able* to impact them.

The new elite, which was often installed by the colonial power, and those who had been a part of the liberation movement benefitted from the transfer of power. They moved into the key positions of the states. Whenever there was a liberation struggle, it often led to the members' loyalties shifting more toward the movement.⁴¹ This was exhibited clearly by the FLN in Algeria and by liberation movements in Southern Africa like the ANC in South Africa, SWAPO in Namibia, and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. It was not always possible to distinguish the state from the liberation movement, which from then on was the dominant party.⁴² Hence, it is not surprising that in Namibia, South

Africa, and Zimbabwe there has not yet been a president who was not himself active in the liberation struggle and that a large number of cabinet members were also active in that struggle.⁴³ For some, this state of things offset the hardships associated with the phases of colonization and decolonization or the suffering under a minority regime and the liberation struggle respectively. Yet many others remained aware that they were the “wretched of the earth,” as Franz Fanon put it with revolutionary vigor in 1962. In his view, the new elites had failed, and he insisted – to no avail – that the peasant population was the social class that was to lead the true revolution that would follow decolonization.⁴⁴

The impacts of the colonial era on the psyche of the population were massive, although it undoubtedly affected individuals in quite different ways. The colonial powers explained to the colonized that they were inferior or subordinate people who were unable to lead a life like Europeans or to ascend to the positions occupied by them. For example, the African soldiers deployed by France in World War I were told that everyone in the army could be promoted according to their talent, yet their talent was insufficient.⁴⁵ In Belgian Congo, the colonial population could become *évolués*, who could apply for a *carte du mérite civique* or a *carte d’immatriculation* once they spoke French, adopted the European living style, and became Christians. This status delivered high privileges and brought the *évolués* close to the status of the white colonial population. The hurdles to achieve that status were, however, high and the “requirements humiliating as well. During the period of application, an inspector was allowed to pay surprise visits to the family home, to see whether the candidate and his family lived in a truly civilized fashion.”⁴⁶ Inspectors decided whether applicants would receive the status, based on a series of requirements including whether they sat at the table and ate with the appropriate utensils and plates, whether their wife also sat at the table, and whether the bathroom was properly cleaned. Two years prior to decolonization, in 1958, when there were roughly fourteen million people living in

Congo, only 1,557 Congolese had a *carte du mérite civique* and 985 a *carte d'immatriculation*.⁴⁷

While many individuals were driven into the nationalist movements by having been oppressed physically or psychologically, others began to believe what they were being told about themselves. As a result, they endured self-doubt, self-effacement, and shame.⁴⁸ For example, Africans at school were required to adopt European first names because the white teachers – as Nelson, actually *Rolihlahla*, Mandela affirmed – were prejudiced against African education, and because “British ideas, British culture, British institutions were automatically assumed to be superior.”⁴⁹ Communication often took place in the language of the colonial powers, something that was unfamiliar to most of the colonized. The repressive measures of the colonial powers were able to conceal for decades what is obvious today: when seen from a cultural and social vantage point, the colonial order was inconsistent and full of loopholes.⁵⁰ With such a view, we can speak of a revolution that took place in the wake of decolonization.⁵¹

This revolution is ongoing. Those voices that claim that the colonial powers brought civilization to Africa or that the use of force and other forms of repression were merely a “painful necessity” in the sense of Alexis de Tocqueville have not yet been silenced. As cynically stated by Achille Mbembe, “France could justifiably expect gratitude and recognition from the formerly colonized.”⁵² Africans are only gradually gaining sovereignty over their interpretation of their history. For – as shown in the present book as well – this history has primarily been written and disseminated by whites (especially white *men*). This is where “postcolonial studies” pick up the thread. Its proponents also promote a mental emancipation, which encompasses science as well, in addition to political and economic emancipation from the former colonial powers. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o speaks of the need to decolonize the mind, and thereby focuses on language. This is because, by itself, the use of the language of the colonial powers

continues to convey their culture, history, and identity. Consequently, it suppresses the culture, history, and identity of indigenous people.⁵³

The continued use of the colonial language, the continued existence of the colonial education system as well as the continued university education of the future elite in the former colonial powers, coupled with the symbolic legacies of the colonial period with which I began this chapter, lead some to speak of cultural imperialism. This form of imperialism is also characterized by the sidelining of the precolonial culture and the proclamation that the European (and now American) culture is superior. Other than decolonization in terms of international law, we can argue that to a great extent imperialism in cultural terms is still intact today.⁵⁴ Yet at the same time, it became clear in one of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o's later works that he benefitted from this Western education and language skills.⁵⁵ In that context, he indicates an area of tension. On the one hand, Western education was an advantage for him, opening the way for his literary work; on the other hand, Westerners' ignorance of his culture and language contributes to a sense of inferiority.

The nationalist movements and the political leaders of Africa were and are dedicated to a "crusade for equality."⁵⁶ Overcoming the feeling of inferiority produced and enhanced by the colonial powers seems urgently needed because, as Stephen Jay Gould declared,

We only live once. We only get to go through this world once, as far as we know, and if our lives are thwarted, if our hopes are derailed, if our dreams are made impossible by limitations imposed from without, but falsely identified as residing within us, then in a way that's the greatest tragedy one can imagine. And millions – hundreds of millions – of human lives have been so blighted.⁵⁷

External Influences

The vast majority of African states became independent during the Cold War, in which the two superpowers – the USA and the Soviet Union – were competing for influence, as were China and France. These circumstances meant that the young and unconsolidated states, from their outset susceptible to external interference, were now further exposed to influences. After the Cold War ended, a decade commenced in which fewer forces were impacting the continent. The nearly meteoric rise of China in Africa (and beyond) that began around the year 2000 – along with the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2001 – marked another turning point in Africa’s history after a decade of relative calm. These events heralded a phase of heightened interest in African countries, especially in the areas of security and economic policy. This newest phase, labeled the second (or often just “New”) Scramble for Africa, continues to the present day.

Cold War Era, Decolonization–1990

World War II had shifted the balance of power in the world. The decline of the two major colonial powers, Britain and France, as global players was entering its final phase while new superpowers were embarking on their struggle to establish spheres of influence in Africa.

Superpowers

Relations between the Soviet Union and African countries were more volatile than it might seem at first glance even though communist thinking would have been adaptable to nationalist movements.¹ This volatility was partly the result of the fact that the Soviet definition of socialism was not compatible with the one developed by African leaders. Moreover, there were only a few viable cultural, economic, and political links from the past on which close cooperation might have been built. The nonconvertibility of the Soviet currency also meant that the Soviet Union was unable to penetrate the economies of African countries on a large scale.² Nonetheless, the Soviet Union managed to achieve a few political successes in Africa, for that state and its allies – most notably Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic – proceeded pragmatically, relying on rapid aid and the financing of major projects such as the construction of the Aswan Dam in Egypt after 1960. An advantage for the Soviet Union was that it was not associated with the colonial powers and their exploitative policies.³

Initially, the Soviet Union furnished support to a few African states. However, after Nkrumah's departure in Ghana in 1966 and Modibo Keita's ousting in Mali in 1968, as well as the expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972 following the change in its government, the Soviet leadership realized that financial assistance was only appropriate if it was certain that the recipient countries would remain in the socialist camp. In addition, any such aid would now have to be used more efficiently and over a longer period of time. Hereafter, then, aid was to be offered to liberation movements in Southern Africa and to a few selected countries that were already independent. Ethiopia had moved into the Soviet Union's camp. Together with Angola and Mozambique it became a special focus of Soviet interests. The Soviet Union was not as interested in multilateral development cooperation as in taking bilateral action, mostly in exchange for products. Taken together, the financial support of the Soviet Union was very minimal, and "[m]ost received nothing."⁴ Even

economic linkages with countries like Angola and Ethiopia were not as extensive as one might have expected given their close political ties.⁵ Instead, the Soviet Union maintained its influence through its military support for radical governments and liberation movements in Africa.

After World War II, the USA wanted to replace the European colonial powers as the most influential player in Africa also with the aim of letting the US economy benefit from better relations with African states. The USA thus supported decolonization nominally – yet only selectively. President Dwight Eisenhower perceived the growing nationalist movements to be a product of communism and showed them little sympathy.⁶ Nevertheless, he sought to support pro-Western and pro-business forces in Africa. The gap created by the withdrawal from Africa by the governments of Belgium, Britain, and Portugal could be filled in part by the United States. For the USA, the Truman Doctrine remained central, that is to say containing communism was paramount.

The Soviet Union could at times count on Cuban support. In the mid-1960s, the Cuban Revolution was first exported to Africa by Fidel Castro. Cultural proximity (many Cubans have African roots) along with enthusiasm for the Revolution resulted in tens of thousands of Cuban doctors and aid workers going to Africa; countless Cuban soldiers were also deployed there. An example of this phenomenon was the conflict in the Congo, where Che Guevara (among others) offered support in 1965.⁷ And, in conducting its own foreign policy in Angola, Cuba actually helped the Soviet Union in that country. There, the geopolitical interests of the two superpowers and their struggle over spheres of influence in Africa became particularly visible. This is where the Cold War heated up in the 1970s. In fact, the civil war into which Angola fell following decolonization was also a proxy war between the USA and the Soviet Union and their respective allies – most of all Cuba and apartheid South Africa, which sought to prevent the establishment of a socialist state next door and to protect its

economic interests.⁸

In light of the outcome, it hardly matters whether we assume that African conflicts escalated with the entry of the superpowers and their allies,⁹ or whether we assume such interventions were a calculated step to underscore relationships of dependency, as well as testing out and selling weapons.¹⁰ For the intervention of the superpowers was not going to be something that benefitted the states of Africa and their inhabitants. Authoritarian governments and their actions against civilians were being shored up, and wars were also being supported with weapons, money, training, and active intervention – yet without concern for civilian casualties. Unsurprisingly, this strengthened mistrust particularly toward Western countries in many places, a mindset having its origins in the slave trade and even more in the colonial era. Democracy, human rights, and the rule of law – if ever meant seriously – were abandoned in favor of geopolitical considerations, making it easier for authoritarian leaders in Africa to remain in power (see [Chapter 7](#)). Like Mobutu in Congo-Kinshasa, such authoritarian leaders were often explicitly supported by one of the superpowers.

China

Besides the USA and the Soviet Union, the Chinese government began to get more interested in African countries during the Cold War. While it failed to bring the Cultural Revolution to Africa – apart from one attempt in Tanzania – it did manage to take a leadership role internationally by means of the 1953 Bandung Conference, which was an Afro-Asian conference aimed to promote the end of colonialism and neocolonialism. The Bandung Conference not only led to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement, but also established that key principles of Chinese foreign policy, such as mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, together with noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, became enshrined as principles of the movement – even if the Chinese government itself did not always

keep to these principles. After concluding its break with the Soviet Union in 1965 over ideological and leadership questions, China was able to propagate its own ideology in Africa. According to it, the rural population was to be the bearer of revolution while, according to Soviet ideology, that role would be played by the urban proletariat. The Chinese perspective was easier to adapt in the view of many African governments and nationalist movements for their countries were rather rural.

China's interest in Africa was – like the ones of other states – not selfless. Its government fought for greater influence worldwide, opposed the international recognition of Taiwan, and advocated for its own permanent seat on the UN Security Council, which it ultimately obtained in 1971. Before, Taiwan held that seat. In that process, good relations with African nations were important because Africa had become a major voting bloc in the UN General Assembly since decolonization. To this day, China denies support to all states that recognize Taiwan. Burkina Faso, Chad, Liberia, and Senegal had long supported Taiwan before initiating ties with China. In early 2020, Eswatini was the last African country that still officially recognized Taiwan, thus having no formal relations with China, which puts increasing pressure on the country to cease its diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

France

France played (and plays) a special role in Africa following decolonization. For, unlike Belgium, Britain, and Portugal, it did not withdraw fully from its former colonies; even with Guinea it reestablished bilateral relations in 1975 after the two countries had broken with one another in the wake of decolonization (see [Chapter 2](#)). President de Gaulle “succeeded in creating the impression that France in imperial decline was, at the same time, France in international ascendancy.”¹¹ Then as now, France has perceived its sphere of influence in Africa as key to defending its claim to global

leadership. "Without Africa, France would find itself naked, if you can call it that, reduced to the Hexagon [in other words the shape of mainland France] and relegated to the rank of middle power that would have no other ambition than to simply survive as well as possible."¹²

The French government used a variety of strategies to exert influence. This included military and intelligence operations, a military presence, treaties that granted France economic hegemony in its former colonies and that resulted in a de facto loss of autonomy for them, as well as a common currency with France, the CFA franc, which was effectively controlled from Paris and in which African governments had little say.¹³ Some African governments let French ambassadors participate in cabinet meetings and sought French approval before making decisions.¹⁴ France's policy toward its former colonies was thereby based on a strong personalization of relations.¹⁵ On the one side, there were the African leaders; on the other, there was France's "Monsieur Afrique," Jacques Foccart, who for years dominated France's Africa policy as chief presidential advisor on African affairs in this position being instrumental in preserving or deposing a number of governments.¹⁶ In Gabon, for instance, a coup d'état was put down in 1964, through which the Francophile and authoritarian president Léon M'ba was supposed to be unseated. Without having to be asked, the French government sent 600 soldiers to assist M'Ba in returning to office. "The de Gaulle government may have intervened out of friendship for M'Ba. But it definitely did so to protect French interests, particularly the uranium, which was essential for securing an independent atomic force, and investments in petroleum, manganese, iron, and wood."¹⁷ When M'Ba died two years later, France played a pivotal role in the election of his successor. The candidate it chose was Omar Bongo, who had joined the French colonial administration in 1958 and had shown himself to be pro-France. He was certainly not a French lackey, occasionally asserting himself by threatening to work more closely with the USA.

Nonetheless, he was helpful to France because he did not destroy Le Clan des gabonais, a clan whose members aimed at maintaining the regime. In doing so, Bongo managed to protect the interests of some influential people in France and Gabon.¹⁸

As suggested by the intervention in support of President M’Ba, France did not always stop at applying diplomatic or economic pressure. Between 1960 and 1991, it intervened militarily more than thirty times in sixteen of its former colonies, leading Adekeje Adebajo to describe France as a “pyromaniac fireman.”¹⁹ France regarded it as its “natural right”²⁰ to intervene in its former colonies and many looked upon these areas as France’s *chasse gardée* or private hunting grounds. The same holds partly true today, as suggested by the interventions in Mali (beginning in early 2013) and the Central African Republic (beginning in late 2014) (see [Chapter 11](#)).

Liberal-Cosmopolitan Order, 1990–2000

The Soviet Union’s process of slow decline as a superpower came to a close with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. That meant the end of the Cold War, which had a number of perceptible consequences for Africa. One was that the instability of African states became much more apparent; as a result, more internal conflicts were taking place in them (see [Chapter 10](#)). Another consequence was the end of the struggle between the USA and the Soviet Union over spheres of influence in Africa. Up until then, that struggle had resulted in authoritarian governments being able to remain in power – or were even brought to power with the help of the superpowers or France. Those authoritarian presidents would now have to answer questions about whether they were complying with democratic standards, good governance, human rights, and the rule of law – that I am summarizing here as “a liberal-cosmopolitan order.”²¹ The USA and its allies were increasingly linking any possible support to such requirements. To implement these

conditions, they also made use of international organizations such as the UN, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), all of which were solidly in the hands of the USA and its Western allies.

The democratization activities, which were linked to mass popular movements in the countries that pushed for democracy (see [Chapter 7](#)), concentrated on those countries in which civil wars had recently ended. These states were weak and unable to independently maintain democracy or implement one of its most important elements, that is to say elections. An era of “democracy dependency”²² began in 1989 when the UN held elections for a constitutional assembly in Namibia and experienced its provisional highpoint in the 2007 presidential election in Congo-Kinshasa where the elections were safeguarded by a UN operation with more than 16,000 troops. Democracy dependency means that due to the limited capacities and the legacies of civil wars, some states were not able to sustain democratization without external support.²³

The USA was the country most insistent on democratizing Africa, proving more consistent in its efforts in the 1990s than during the Cold War. While it had abided since 1974 by a rule that support for other countries would be linked to their human rights record,²⁴ this condition was not always reflected in reality, as already shown above (see [Chapter 2](#)). In 1992, the USA even terminated its support for Mobutu, the long-supported president of Congo-Kinshasa. The basic idea was that development assistance could work better in states with democratic structures and would thus be more helpful to the US economy in the long run.

At its core, the policy of the USA and other Western states to promote democratization was implemented in four main ways.²⁵ First, the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s set up by the World Bank and the IMF, leading inter alia the African governments to undertake austerity measures (see [Chapter 5](#)), had a significant side effect: parts of the public were so unhappy with the economic

situation that they took to the streets and demanded reforms.²⁶ Second, there was direct assistance for democratization efforts. Elections were financed in this way, leading some countries into the just-described democracy dependency. Third, democratization was encouraged through support granted to domestic and transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Although such organizations have been present in Africa since the end of World War II, it took until the 1980s and 1990s for them to become active on a larger scale, recruit more staff, and assume some state functions.²⁷ This was because structural adjustment programs had forced African states to reduce their budgets for state institutions, social spending, and otherwise, and the gaps could be filled in by NGOs, both international and domestic ones, mostly funded from abroad.²⁸ In the euphoria phase in the West after the Cold War, there was an interest in the spread of the liberal cosmopolitan order; thus financial resources for these became available.²⁹ Last, and most importantly, Western aid was conditional. It was a lever that worked because there were no alternative countries, beyond the USA and its Western allies, that were willing to support African states at a similar scale in the 1990s.

However, not all African states democratized in the 1990s. In Uganda, governed by Yoweri Museveni since 1986, no parties had been permitted on the grounds that doing so would fail to secure a lasting peace after the civil war there. In this context, Joshua Rubongoya also speaks of “Pax Musevenica” – a peace established by the president after years of bloody conflict in Uganda.³⁰ In that phase, the Ugandan president understood how the violent history of his country and the international community’s desire for stability could be exploited for his own purposes. “If manipulating foreign governments was a sport, President Museveni of Uganda would have been World and Olympic champion.”³¹ For this reason, Museveni was able to hold out until 2005, before giving in to the pressure to allow parties; he held a referendum on restoring multiparty elections and, in this way, again secured the support of the Western donors. He

certainly benefitted from the fact that the USA and other Western countries were focused on developing democracy in the post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Latin America – and that Africa was playing more of a secondary role at the time.³²

Democratization and the West's demand for it were not always consistent since in some cases Western governments preferred authoritarian governments, especially in North Africa (and the Middle East). Consequently, there was not much pressure applied on North African states in the 1990s to implement the liberal-cosmopolitan order, for US officials commonly feared destabilized states that could potentially damage US interests.³³ Although a multiparty system was introduced in Algeria in 1988, the military intervened and stopped the second round of elections when the first round of 1991 revealed that the Front islamique du salut (FIS), an Islamist party, was going to win (see [Chapter 10](#)). While publicly reminding the parties to be peaceful and calling for the elections to be continued, the USA, France, and other European states were in fact supporting the ruling junta.³⁴ To a certain extent, this case was a precursor of what would be observed after the Arab Spring, when Mohamed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected president of Egypt.

New Realities, since 2000

Two factors put an end to the phase in which the USA and its Western allies had been so instrumental in shaping African policy to a notable extent and to pursue their ideological interests. On the one hand, there was Islamic terrorism (and for European countries, migration from Africa in addition) that led them to cooperate with African governments and once again put more emphasis on stability and strategic interest than the liberal-cosmopolitan order. On the other hand, there was the role that China – and to a lesser extent, countries such as India, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey – were playing in Africa. The new scramble for the continent that had begun with China's interest

in Africa differed from the imperial scramble little more than a century earlier in three key respects. First, African countries are recognized as states, hence giving them some bargaining power.³⁵ Second, non-African state actors now do not use armed force to bring the local population under control. And lastly, the Scramble for Africa is no longer based on a rivalry between imperial states. Linked to that, businesses that stand behind the scramble are no longer solely Western ones such as British Petroleum, Shell, or Total. Indian companies are also well represented, such as Reliance Industries and Tata, as are Brazilian companies such as Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, Malaysian companies such as Petronas, and especially government or private companies from China such as Huawei, the Sunshine Group, and Tecno. Besides companies in raw materials – the sector that played the biggest role in the imperial scramble – those who invest in the African countries increasingly include IT, service, and communication companies such as Microsoft, Uber, and Orange, or car manufacturers such as Mercedes, Renault, Toyota, and Volkswagen or the Chinese manufacturer Geely, which since 2018 has produced in Tunisia.

China's Rise and the (Renewed) Interest of Other States

As shown above, China is not a new player in Africa.³⁶ Nonetheless, since the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2000, Chinese interest and influence in Africa has grown massively so that we can speak of a new phase of Chinese engagement in Africa (also see [Chapter 6](#)). Since then, the Chinese government has essentially been pursuing three main objectives. In addition to the One-China Policy (see above) and access to strategic raw materials (see below), China also wants to underscore its role as a new superpower and expand its sphere of influence.³⁷ Along with China's government and state enterprises, its private companies and migrants are also active in Africa. Howard French, in the light of the steadily increasing number of Chinese migrants living in Africa, goes so far as to describe Africa

as “China’s second continent” in which one million migrants are building a “new empire.”³⁸ The role of the Chinese government, state-owned enterprises, and migrants in Africa has occasioned heated discussions. There are three ways of thinking about the current situation: China is seen as a development partner, an economic competitor, or as a colonizer.³⁹ The last motive is fostered by the completion of a military base in Djibouti in 2017, China’s first such base outside of its own country, and the fact that China’s current activities resemble the imperial scramble for Africa despite the differences outlined earlier.

The Chinese government has attempted to combat the perception of being a colonial power by using two different strategies. On the one hand, the Chinese leadership is more present than almost any other counterpart in Africa, with many high-level and multiday visits. It also regularly invites African leaders to China, thereby giving the impression of hosting a dialogue among equal partners. Meetings between African elites and members of the Communist Party are also part of this strategy. On the other hand, China – like Britain, France, the USA, and others (see [Chapter 3](#)) – uses internationally directed television channels to broadcast a specific image of China in Africa and beyond.⁴⁰ Furthermore, it provides training for African journalists as well as scholarships for Africans to study in China.⁴¹ In other words, the Chinese government relies heavily on “soft power,” in other words attracting others instead of coercing them.⁴² However, it stands to reason that a political and economic heavyweight like China would occasionally flex its muscles and use “hard power” as has been suggested by the case of Zimbabwe. Its military chief, Constantino Chiwenga, visited Beijing shortly before the 2017 coup that led to the downfall of Robert Mugabe. This would suggest that Chiwenga had received support from the Chinese leadership to carry out the coup.⁴³ After the 2018 presidential election, the Chinese government, despite concerns expressed by the EU, urged that the results be respected and protests against them be ended. China positioned itself behind

Emmerson Mnangagwa, the new president of Zimbabwe. Mnangagwa had been trained as a guerrilla in China at the time of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle and consequently been designated an "old friend" by President Xi Jinping during a visit in 2018. This also indicates that ties established during the liberation struggles can prove quite sustainable, especially if they are consistent with current economic and political interests.⁴⁴

China cooperates with African countries differently than Western countries do. The latter still link their support to political and economic requirements previously specified in the "Washington Consensus" and later revised somewhat. That "consensus" demanded far-reaching reforms from African governments in exchange for financial aid (see [Chapters 5 and 6](#)). The Chinese model of cooperation, also known as the "Beijing Consensus," is intended to convey to other countries the Chinese approach to boosting its own economy.⁴⁵ That approach includes a tight internal leadership and pragmatic economic policies, which promote innovation. What is more, the Chinese government speaks of "economic cooperation" with African states, whereas Western governments speak of "development aid" or "development cooperation" thereby highlighting relations of dependency.

Brazil, India, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey increasingly have economic and geopolitical interests in Africa, too. India, for example, has significant economic interests in Africa and is trying to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. It therefore needs the votes of African states. Although Brazil's policy toward Africa is markedly economic, it also has a geopolitical dimension, signaling its own interest in a permanent seat on the Security Council.⁴⁶ Like India, Japan is suspicious of China's expansion in the East Asian region and beyond and therefore attempts to counter China's influence by extending its hand to African states.⁴⁷ The Japanese government is even attempting to build an alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative – a large-scale investment project to build or strengthen

trade networks and transport infrastructure between China and countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The Japanese government does so with the aim of “complicat[ing] China’s strategic calculus and also maintain[ing] a multipolar world as much as possible.”⁴⁸ Also for this reason, since 2011, Japan has had a military base in Djibouti. Turkey’s active policy toward Africa – President Erdogan was, for example, one of the first foreign leaders to visit Somalia in 2011 – can also be explained by the EU’s de facto refusal to include Turkey in its ranks and the resulting policy of finding other partners. Another critical factor here is Erdogan’s vision of a Greater Turkey that connects up with the image of the Ottoman Empire. Erdogan is pursuing an ambitious plan of making Turkey a first-class powerhouse in Africa.⁴⁹ To that end, its government has opened thirteen additional embassies and consulates in Africa since 2013, thus making a total of thirty-eight such representations on the continent, which is more than Britain with its thirty-six high commissions and consulates there.⁵⁰ Since Saudi Arabia does not have enough agricultural land to feed its population, it is buying land in Africa, especially in Ethiopia and Sudan,⁵¹ extending its influence in the Horn of Africa. Since Saudi Arabia plans to develop itself into a logistics and shipping hub, it needs to have considerable stability in the Horn of Africa, viewing peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea as key in that context and thus providing massive support for the rapprochement between those two states.⁵² The Saudis similarly have a military base in Djibouti, a location from which it is easy to observe which countries have interests in Africa: besides China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, Djibouti also hosts French, Italian, and American bases.

Russia is also trying to become a more influential player in Africa. President Vladimir Putin’s attempts to build closer relations with the continent culminated in the first Africa-Russian summit held in Sochi in October 2019, at which Putin hosted more than forty African leaders, copying the Chinese way of holding such summits. The agenda included talks about trade and investment – but more

importantly about arms sales, with Russia being the largest arms exporter to the continent. Yet, “[f]or all the pageantry on show in Sochi, Russia remains a bit player in Africa [...] Mr Putin may want Africans to think of Russia as a great power. But a summit does not make it so.”⁵³ This statement holds even in the light of Russia becoming more and more involved in crises and conflicts in African countries like the Central African Republic, to which it sends weapons and mercenaries in support of a weak regime – and gets mining concessions in return. In fact, Russia has not yet succeeded in obtaining a base in Djibouti, despite years of lobbying.

After its retreat following decolonization, Britain began to get more interested in Africa again, once the government of Tony Blair came into power in 1997. Subsequently, the British military intervened in the civil war in Sierra Leone in 2000 and interfered in the land reform in Zimbabwe in 2000, when white farmers were being expropriated. Moreover, Britain was the driving force behind the intervention of NATO in Libya in 2011, alongside France and the USA. Interest in African states continued to increase as the Brexit negotiations proceeded. To diversify its trading partners and reduce its dependency on the EU and in its attempt to create a “global Britain,” the British government was also relying on Africa.⁵⁴ To that end, then Prime Minister Theresa May traveled to the former British colonies Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa in 2018 to stimulate trade – and do some dancing. Her successor Boris Johnson then invited African leaders for a summit in early 2020, which should lead to more British investments in and trade with Africa.

War on Terror

The heightened pace of globalization after 1990 inter alia led people to move around more frequently and more freely and hence conflicts in one part of the world had a direct impact on those elsewhere. Until that point, conflicts from elsewhere were to be transferred to Africa; now they also moved in the opposite direction. The realization that

weak states in Africa could provide a breeding ground for Islamic terrorism is only the most prominent example of this phenomenon.

Due to its geographical proximity to France and the active role of the French government there, the Algerian Civil War (1991–1998) was a precursor to the spillover of conflicts from Africa. One of the parties to the conflict, the Islamic terror group Le Groupe Islamique Armé hijacked an Air France plane in 1994 and carried out a series of attacks on the Paris Metro and suburban trains between 1995 and 1996, killing around a dozen civilians and injuring over 200. The group justified its attacks by arguing that the French government was supporting the military regime that it was fighting against in Algeria.⁵⁵

Earlier on, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the US government among others had been concerned about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.⁵⁶ US institutions in Africa became targets to an unprecedented extent after the attacks in Paris and some time before Islamist terrorism reached the USA on 11 September 2001. In Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, the capital cities of Tanzania and Kenya, attacks on the US embassies occurred simultaneously on 7 August 1998, causing the deaths of 224 Kenyans and Tanzanians, as well as twelve Americans. In retaliation, the US fired cruise missiles at targets in Sudan (and Afghanistan) where they suspected al-Qaeda training camps. Such were the first visible signs of “the war on terror.” However, that conflict had actually already started in Sudan, a safe haven for al-Qaeda, where the USA tried to get the government (through sanctions and negotiations) to take Osama bin Laden into custody.⁵⁷

After 9/11, the policy of the USA toward Africa underwent a radical change, for “terrorism replaced communism as the rallying cry for American overseas involvement. During the first decade of the global war on terror (2001–10), the United States revamped its Cold War African strategy, increasing support for repressive regimes in strategic states in exchange for cooperation on counterterrorism.”⁵⁸

The USA once more became active in Africa. This change was signaled by launching the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in Stuttgart, responsible for coordinating US military operations in Africa since 2008 and by the increased presence of US troops in Africa, where it has military bases in Djibouti, Niger, and elsewhere.

With the help of NATO and the EU, other Western states also pursued their security interests in Africa after 9/11. In out-of-area deployments from 2005 onwards, NATO provided logistical assistance to AU operations in Somalia and Sudan, two states viewed as safe haven for terrorists. Moreover, the organization also helped secure the sea route at the Horn of Africa, which is pivotal for international trade, through the large-scale Operation Ocean Shield. At the same time, there were corresponding EU operations with similar mandates in all three of the NATO operation theaters. Furthermore, several European states deployed troops to Mali (2013) and the Central African Republic (2014), thereby underlining their willingness to engage in African security policy (see [Chapter 11](#)). Something quite similar is the case with regard to China and India. India has been active in peace operations in Africa for a number of years, and China is increasingly becoming an important player in this area. In 2019, China was the UN's second-largest funder of UN peace operations,⁵⁹ spent US\$100 million on the African peace and security architecture, and had more troops in Africa in the context of peace operations than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council.⁶⁰

Migration and Fears of It in Europe

The danger of Islamic terrorism in Europe is overshadowed by and concurrently linked to the most recent security challenge from the perspective of European states, namely migration flows from Africa. Inspired by the literature of biblical apocalypse, French writer Jean Raspail published his novel *Le Camp des Saints* in 1973, and the British BBC aired the film *The March* in 1990. Both are fictional portrayals of a mass influx of Africans into Europe, anticipating images that later

appeared at the fences of the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, on the Italian island of Lampedusa, or in overcrowded boats on the open sea. During the Arab Spring in 2010–2011, the numbers increased so greatly that the already existing migration toward Europe was now noticed by the broad European public – and viewed as problematic. Until 1999, the fences around Ceuta and Melilla had been easily surmountable before they were expanded into bulwarks with EU funds. These barriers became the EU’s “dirty secret” initially, before the so-called refugee crisis reached its height in 2015, at which point they were regarded as a good example of how to deter migration.⁶¹ This shows quite well how discourse and awareness have shifted in Europe.

The Arab Spring obscured the fact that a good portion of the migrants did not come from Northern Africa but from Sub-Saharan Africa. The European Border Agency detected 818,000 of what it considers to be “illegal border crossings” from African countries into the EU and Schengen Associated Countries between January 2009 and September 2018. At the forefront were 126,000 detected illegal border crossings from Eritreans. Nigerians came second with 103,000, and Somalians came third with 65,000. With an estimated population of 4.3 million in 2010, Eritrea has experienced particularly remarkable emigration (see [Chapter 7](#)). Something similar occurred in The Gambia with just under 45,000 emigrants from among 1.6 million inhabitants. By contrast, figures are lower from the North African countries in the same period. There were nearly 47,000 from Algeria, just over 22,000 emigrants from Egypt, almost 5,000 from Libya, close to 50,000 from Morocco, and about 50,000 from Tunisia.⁶²

As dramatic as the pictures were and as large as the influx seemed, one does have to question the perception that there had been an exodus of people from Africa. In absolute numbers, four times as many people have migrated from their countries of origin to others within Africa since 1960, yet at the same time, the populations of these countries have grown in equal measure so that the actual

percentage of migrants within Africa has hardly grown.⁶³ However, the proportion grew of those who went to Europe, Asia, or North America instead of remaining within Africa. In 2017, 9.1 million people born in Africa were residing in Europe (including Britain), 5.1 million of them from Northern Africa and 4.0 million from countries south of the Sahara. In Asia – particularly the Gulf States – there were 4.4 million people coming mainly from Egypt and Eastern Africa, and another 2.6 million were living in the USA and Canada.⁶⁴ Despite these facts and the qualifications related to them, the discourse has shifted considerably, and pressure from anti-immigrant parties is mounting, which in turn has modified the policies of European governments toward African countries – a topic to which I will return below.

Raw Materials, Land, and Future Markets

Along with geopolitical and security considerations, economic interests play a central role in positioning external actors toward African states. If gold, rubber, and palm oil were the main focus of economic interests back during the imperial scramble for Africa, then fossil fuels and uranium became increasingly sought after during the Cold War and later on bauxite and rare earths, materials needed as raw materials for industry. In 2017, African countries produced 8.7 percent of the world's crude oil, with Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria as the largest producers. Furthermore, African countries – especially Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria – contributed 6.1 percent to the global gas production in 2017.⁶⁵ In 2015, three countries produced around 12.1 percent of global uranium, with Namibia and Niger at the forefront, followed by South Africa.⁶⁶ Beyond that, Africa stores 7.5 percent of the world's secured oil reserves, 7.1 percent of the secured gas,⁶⁷ and 18 percent of the uranium.⁶⁸ Other raw materials, which are of great importance for industry, are likewise available in large quantities in Africa. In 2016, 11.5 percent of globally produced bauxite, needed for aluminum manufacture, came from Africa, notably

from Ghana, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and particularly Guinea, which by itself produced 10.7 percent of the world's bauxite. Africa is likewise the source of 63.1 percent of the world's mined cobalt, used inter alia to produce batteries; the largest single cobalt producer is the Congo with 53.8 percent of the world's total. In addition, 30.5 percent of diamonds produced worldwide stem from seventeen African countries; in this instance, Botswana is the largest producer at 17.2 percent, followed by Congo with 10.2 percent and Angola with 7.4 percent.⁶⁹ Chocolate lovers should also know that 60 percent of global cocoa production derives from two African countries, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana.⁷⁰

This abundance of raw materials is not evenly distributed across the continent. While South Africa and Congo-Kinshasa, for example, have large and diverse supplies of raw materials, countries such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mauritius, and Rwanda hardly have any. However, some resource-poor states have another attractive resource: land. That said, some of these countries are experiencing so-called land grabbing, which refers to the "control (whether through ownership, lease, concession, contracts, quotas, or general power) of larger than locally-typical amounts of land by any persons or entities (public or private, foreign or domestic) via any means ('legal' or 'illegal') for purposes of speculation, extraction, resource control or commodification at the expense of agroecology, land stewardship, food sovereignty and human rights."⁷¹ External players are acquiring land on a large scale in order to produce biofuels or foodstuffs.⁷² These actions have sparked a political and academic debate. For some, land grabbing has become so prevalent that one can speak of a "silent recolonization of Africa."⁷³ In particular, China is seen as a big buyer or leaseholder of land in Africa, and the statistics on Chinese purchases or leases are so staggering that some refer to them as "naked imperialism."⁷⁴ Based on intensive fieldwork, however, Deborah Bräutigam comes to a different conclusion: Chinese investors may be increasingly involved in buying African land, yet their interest

has “not, so far, translated into significant land acquisitions. In most cases, the amount of land at stake in these negotiations was far smaller, and the outcomes much more problematic than reported.”⁷⁵

With rising labor costs in China and other Asian countries, foreign investors are more and more looking to African countries as a possible site for production. Clothes are increasingly being manufactured in countries such as Ethiopia and Mauritius by brands such as H&M, Hugo Boss, Nike, and Tommy Hilfiger. Cars are being assembled in Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, and South Africa, as well as in Rwanda since 2018 and in Ghana since 2019. Alongside companies from Western countries and China, companies from India, Turkey, and elsewhere are represented in Africa. Special economic zones make countries such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Rwanda attractive for foreign investment, because in such zones rules apply that are beneficial for foreign companies and make investment easier.⁷⁶ With a few exceptions, including Burundi, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe, the total value of industrial goods increased throughout the continent between 2000 and 2016. In Nigeria and Congo-Brazzaville, manufactured industrial goods, for example, have quadrupled in value; in Ethiopia, their value has nearly quintupled.⁷⁷ These figures nonetheless obscure the fact that the share of manufactured goods of the GDP decreased in most African countries;⁷⁸ frequently they still depend on the export of raw materials.

At the same time, consumer spending in Africa rose sharply between 2000 and 2016. Despite exceptions such as Eritrea and Malawi, which experienced a decline in spending, this trend was evident in almost every country on the continent; on average, consumer spending doubled.⁷⁹ Business consulting firms have therefore been raving about the African market, identifying Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, South Africa, and Tunisia as important markets and in addition view Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Uganda as future markets (see [Chapter 6](#)).⁸⁰ This narrative is often linked to the emergence of a new middle

class, the existence of which is less questioned than whether it has had any positive effect on political and economic developments.⁸¹ Moreover, Africa is showing itself to be a continent with an age pyramid favorable to business and consumption, with more young than old people and with many increasingly seeking to benefit from modern technology and telecommunications. Although some see the risks – especially political instability – others highlight the opportunities. There is even talk of an African boom, which is significantly fueled by China and by other countries of the Global South in its wake – and which Western states may be in danger of missing out on (see [Chapter 6](#)).

A Changing Policy toward Africa?

These new realities have led Western countries to modify their policies toward African states, something which has since become visible in a variety of areas. The USA and its allies, for example, have long relied on the World Bank and the IMF for implementing their interests and demands. By creating the New Development Bank, a bank established by the BRICS states, in other words Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is less interesting for this book) in which China plays a crucial role, the Chinese government has been undermining this strategy of the Western countries.⁸² In addition, China increased its influence within the IMF, with that fund's 2015 capital increase – while the influence of the African countries declined as they were unable to go along with the capital increase and therefore lost some voting power. For its part, the World Bank responded to the Chinese policies. According to an analysis by Diego Hernandez, for every percentage point that China increased its financial assistance to African states, the World Bank cut 15 percent of its obligations to African countries.⁸³

Despite the capital increase and the subsequent increase of its influence, China does not necessarily need the World Bank or the IMF.

Its state-owned Exim Bank supplied US\$67 billion in loans to African states between 2000 and 2010, US\$12 billion more than the World Bank.⁸⁴ The credit flows from China to African countries have increased to such an extent that some not only wonder about the debt problems China might create abroad but also about dependencies on China. As such, Djibouti has a debt stock to China as share of GDP of almost 100 percent. This is certainly an extreme, but Congo-Brazzaville, Niger, Zambia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, and South Sudan (in descending order) also reach a significant percentage.⁸⁵

Along with the World Bank and the IMF, European countries have also used the EU and its predecessors as instruments in their political and economic relations with African countries (see [Chapter 5](#)). Since 2000, there have been regular EU–Africa summits at the heads of state and government level. The EU’s Africa policy was raised to a new formal level with the 2007 Joint Africa–EU Strategy, enabling a common framework for the EU’s policy toward Africa, covering issues such as peace and security, migration, trade, and climate change. The intensive discussion that took place on how to curb migration from Africa following the “refugee crisis” of 2015 (see above) led to more development cooperation with African countries in order to improve the prospects for people in their countries of origin so that they are less inclined to migrate. This culminated in a proposal by Germany to launch a “Marshall Plan for Africa.” Together with such noble goals, the Europeans, including Germany, which had just been heavily impacted by migration – did not hesitate to approach authoritarian and semidemocratic governments in Africa in an attempt to persuade them to curb migration flows. German chancellor, Angela Merkel, subsequently traveled to Ethiopia, Mali, and Niger in 2016 and undertook additional visits to Africa, such as Algeria in September 2018, with the aim of encouraging governments to better defend their borders and prevent migrants from crossing the Mediterranean (or even get close to it). North African countries from Morocco to Egypt

became important cooperation partners, and European countries established close ties to them – notwithstanding reservations about democracy, good governance, or the rule of law in these states. The EU had to realize that the NATO-led intervention in Libya and the forceful removal of Gaddafi had a downside, for it was Gaddafi who had cooperated closely with the European states in curbing migration across the Mediterranean. Now the EU had to empower a new government in Libya, which faces the difficult task to rebuild a collapsed state. What is more, the EU has even set up a €115 million aid program for Sudan, against whose then president, al-Bashir, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Militias involved in the 2003 genocide in Darfur (see [Chapter 11](#)) are now being used to prevent migrants from crossing the Sudanese border for Libya and thus for the Mediterranean Sea.⁸⁶ To some extent, the policies of the European states have been successful, as shown by decreasing numbers of migrants. Evidently, confidence in the new policy of not permitting any migration to neighboring Mediterranean countries is so high that Spain decided in 2018 to downsize its border facilities in Ceuta and Melilla.⁸⁷

The rhetoric also changed rapidly. In his State of the Union speech in September 2018, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker affirmed that “[t]o speak of the future, one must speak of Africa – Europe’s twin continent.” He then called for relations to be seen less through the lens of development aid and moved on to promise a free trade agreement between the EU and Africa.⁸⁸ Whether such an agreement will be that helpful is questionable. The Ghanaian economist Kwabena Otoo put it quite plainly: “We cannot compete with the subsidized products from Europe – free trade between Europe and Africa is like a football match between Real Madrid and Boli Bamboi’s school team.”⁸⁹

Starting with President Nicolas Sarkozy, France initiated a process of treating African governments more on an equal footing.⁹⁰ This new

policy was continued under President François Hollande and culminated in President Emmanuel Macron's visit to Algeria in December 2017. There he campaigned to open up a new chapter in relations between France and what had once been its primary colony. Prior to his visit, he did not hesitate to call France's colonial-era behavior "a crime, a crime against humanity, a true barbarism."⁹¹ Under Macron's tenure, the forgotten role of African soldiers in World War I (see [Chapter 2](#)) has also been officially recognized. In a ceremony in November 2018 at the Arc de Triomphe, Benin-French singer Angélique Kidjo sang a homage to the colonial soldiers before world leaders and an international audience on what was the 100th anniversary of the war's end. At the same time, Macron began to contemplate returning property that France had looted from its colonies. Having said that, this new rhetoric and symbolism have been accompanied by support for current governments in the former colonies, regardless of their willingness to uphold democratic standards, something demonstrated, for example, by France's support for the authoritarian president of Chad.

The USA changed its attitude as well. Although many had thought that President Barack Obama would be more inclined toward Africa his policy regarding the continent was in fact quite pragmatic and hardly idealistic.⁹² His government scarcely criticized the takeover by the Egyptian military bringing Abdel Fattah al-Sisi into power, thus rendering stability more important than the democratic promises of the Arab Spring.⁹³ The United States' highly self-interested approach to Africa as practiced under Obama's successor is even more distinct. Then National Security Adviser John Bolton described it as follows: "The United States will respect the independence of other nations in providing humanitarian, security, and development assistance - we are not among those powers that pursue dollars for dependency. However, we draw the line at funding causes that harm our interests and our citizens."⁹⁴ Hence, the US Africa policy is adhering to an "America First doctrine" while at the same time acknowledging that a

more pragmatic approach has to be applied in order to neutralize competitors in Africa such as China. All the same, the disparaging (albeit denied) remark of the 45th US president that African states are “shithole countries” also signals his indifference and/or general dislike of the continent.

The West “no longer enjoys a monopoly of influence over Africa’s future development,”⁹⁵ despite France’s continuing strength, EU efforts, and US activities in Africa in the post-9/11 era. The result is that North–South relations, as described since the 1970s, are being overlaid or even replaced by South–South and South–East ones. These ties are praised by observers as “the first good news for Africa since the end of the bipolar political order” because they are capable of suspending the dependency of African states on their former colonial powers and the USA.⁹⁶ For some commentators, though, it is clear that African countries “need more than extra choices over whom they strike deals with. They need the power to choose their politicians, too.”⁹⁷ This impassioned discussion over the questions of whether African states will become economically and politically dependent again, and of whether democracy is required, has just started. It will be some time before we can make a solid assessment of these issues, one which is freed up from the political and economic wishful thinking that has shaped the discussion all too frequently at present.

Africa's Economy, 1960–2000

Human beings are part of the economy – they shape and are shaped by it. The economic situation is one of the factors determining the living standard of people who are not engaged in a subsistence economy and is therefore seen as a cause of relative prosperity or poverty. [Chapter 3](#) showed that at the end of the colonial period, large parts of the continent had undergone an economic revolution and the new elite did not want to turn back the wheel of history. African states – together with their governments, people, and companies – were now nominally independent from the colonial powers and, as such, a part of the international economic system. Despite high hopes, however, there was an economic upturn only in a few African countries after decolonization. In this chapter, I will discuss some reasons for that, concentrating on structures and historic challenges like an unfavorable geography, the continued economic dependence on the colonial powers or other non-African states, and the lack of setting the course of the new political leaders before discussing African and non-African initiatives and strategies for economic growth. I concentrate on the phase up until ca. 2000 in this chapter, for, as shown in [Chapter 4](#), a new scramble for Africa started then changing the economic situation. The following [Chapter 6](#) discusses the developments thereafter.

Africa's Economic Development – A First Look

If we look at the overall economic development of Africa since the “African Year” of 1960, we can observe an economic upturn on the

continent from the late 1960s until the early 1980s. This was followed by a recession, an extended period of stagnation, and yet another recession before economic growth began to return in the mid-1990s through to the present day. This first appraisal obscures that while a few countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Togo reflect this picture, other countries diverge considerably. While there has been steady growth in the economies of Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Egypt, Kenya, Lesotho, Morocco, Mali, Seychelles, and Tunisia since the early 1960s, this same period has witnessed an unremitting contraction of the economies in the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Kinshasa, Liberia, Madagascar, Niger, and Zambia. Furthermore, this appraisal does not show that African economic growth was low compared to the rest of the world. In 1960, the average GDP per capita worldwide was US\$3,690 while only US\$1,320 in Africa. By 1990, the global per capita average had nearly doubled to US\$7,170, yet Africa had only grown to US\$1,458. In 2017, the average GDP worldwide was US\$10,636 and only US\$1,980 in Africa.¹

Historic and Structural Challenges

Several African states were, and still are, faced with historical and structural challenges, which gave, and still give, them a difficult environment to develop their economies. I have already discussed the problems that have continued to affect Africa since the colonial period, such as the close alignment of infrastructure with colonial powers' economic interests and the lack of education of the colonial population (see [Chapter 3](#)). Besides this legacy, there are structural challenges largely related to the unfavorable geography of Africa. As such, climate, soil conditions, topography, and the incidence of tropical diseases play their part in constraining economic growth in several African countries.² For example, agriculture in Africa is severely affected by elevated levels of evaporation following irregular

precipitation that is often either excessive or nonexistent. Although a great deal of this has changed in recent decades, there are still too few artificial irrigation systems; hence, agricultural production in many places is still dependent on natural precipitation. Droughts, such as those in the Sahel in the early 1970s, cost up to 100,000 lives.³ Finding methods to combat this is not as easy as it may seem. Many terrestrial plants are stimulated to blossom by the variations in brightness during the daylight hours across different times of the year. Due to Africa's proximity to the equator, such variations hardly occur during the year. In addition, many plants require seasons that are cooler and drier, yet neither of the two are a given in many parts of Africa.⁴ Given that, it is difficult in Africa to grow crops that are staples in other parts of the world and thus enhance food security (and food variety) in those places.

Due to these difficult conditions for agriculture, food security in the 1970s and 1980s was "the single most critical area of concern,"⁵ as it is still in some regions as the 2018 drought at the Horn of Africa illustrated. Between 1971 and 1980, food production in Africa increased by 1.8 percent per year, but the population was also on the rise. An annual population growth of 2.9 percent not only managed to consume the surplus production of food, but effectively demanded an even greater level of production.⁶ However, these figures belie the variety of situations in individual countries. While Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Eswatini, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, and Tunisia had an annual increase in food production between 1971 and 1980, the situation was devastating in Algeria, Ghana, Mozambique, and Namibia, each of which experienced more than a 3 percent loss per capita.⁷ This was related to lower productivity rates per hectare and nonutilization of available land in many places. As a result, many countries were dependent on imports and donations of food, which in some cases have a long-term negative impact inasmuch as it destroyed local markets.

HIV/AIDS or tropical diseases like malaria, which hit Africa particularly hard given its geographic location, also negatively affect the economy. Considering the direct medical costs together with productivity losses, Africa in 1987 lost an estimated US\$0.8 billion, or 0.6 percent of its GDP, as a result of malaria.⁸ The impact of HIV/AIDS has been no less momentous. Although the intensity of that epidemic's impact on the African economy is a subject of some debate among scientists and policymakers, most studies demonstrate that the disease has a considerably negative impact on the economy primarily in shape of a (temporary) loss of work forces. As was calculated in the early 1990s, for Sub-Saharan Africa, HIV/AIDS reduced GDP per capita growth by 0.15 percent, and by as much as one-third in the ten most affected countries.⁹ The prognoses that HIV/AIDS would lead to a deep economic crisis did, however, not actualize. The human tragedy affected the economy less than anticipated. However, the prognoses of the 1990s led to a mobilization of funds to fight HIV/AIDS, as many governments in Africa and beyond as well as NGOs and other civil society actors saw assistance as a necessity to fight the diseases' impact on socioeconomic development.¹⁰

In some respects – and briefly leaving the period under scrutiny in this chapter – we can find that the same is true for the Ebola outbreak that ran from 2013 to 2016 in West Africa, affecting Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in particular. In October 2014, the World Bank estimated that the epidemic could cost up to US\$32.6 billion lost GDP by the end of 2015. A month later, it estimated the costs to be US \$3–4 billion lost GDP and in 2016 toward the end of the crisis it estimated that the GDP lost was US\$2.8 billion.¹¹ The human tragedy that cost the lives of at least 11,300 people led to increasing efforts in Ebola prevention, including vaccinations. Yet at the same time, only a few lessons have been drawn and health provisions remain poorly equipped and underfunded to deal with another outbreak.¹² This has been the case in West Africa as elsewhere on the continent, as the Ebola outbreak in Congo-Kinshasa in 2019 indicated.

HIV/AIDS and Ebola are not found on the entire continent. While HIV/AIDS is a major problem in Southern and Central Africa, its scale is significantly smaller in Western and North Africa.¹³ Ebola on the contrary has turned into a health crisis in just four countries thus far and even there it was not all over the place. In fact, in Congo, only a very small part of the country has been affected by Ebola.

A quite different geographic problem is posed by the location and size of many countries, as well as their distance from maritime trade, all of which result in economic problems.¹⁴ Negatively impacting the trade opportunities of many African countries – and difficult or impossible to overcome – are: the high number of landlocked countries, the Sahara Desert as a barrier to Europe's markets, the short coastline relative to Africa's land mass, and the fact that only 21 percent of the population live within 100 kilometers of the sea or a navigable river (whereas in the USA it is 67 percent of the population and in Western Europe, 89 percent).¹⁵ Ethiopia, for example, became a landlocked country with Eritrea's independence in 1993 (see [Chapter 2](#)) and, once a war broke out between the countries and Ethiopia also entered into a conflict with Somalia, Djibouti's port became the last accessible port, even though it took days to transport goods there. This is one of the reasons why Ethiopian Airlines became one of Africa's most important airlines and Addis Ababa's airport an important air traffic hub. To decrease transportation costs and allow for larger shipments, the Ethiopian government restored the old railways to Djibouti with Chinese help and opened the line in early 2018. The travel time was reduced to a mere ten hours. While there are already trains operating between Djibouti and Ethiopia, the transport of people and goods between Kinshasa and Brazzaville – the capitals of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo, which are just separated by the river Congo – is still completed with the help of ferries, as plans to build a 1.6 kilometer bridge did not move beyond the planning stage.¹⁶

Such historical, structural, and geographic challenges together

create a difficult point of departure, yet they are not by themselves responsible for the economic misery as the case of Mauritius shows. At first sight, this archipelago is geographically disadvantaged on account of its location in the midst of the ocean, more than 2,300 kilometers from the African mainland and just over 1,000 kilometers from Madagascar. The country, which hardly has any natural resources, was made economically vulnerable by extreme dependence on sugar as the dominant export commodity. Consequently, in 1961, James Meade – Nobel Laureate in economics – provided a very bleak forecast for the development of Mauritius.¹⁷ But things turned out differently because, first, Mauritius managed to negotiate good sugar quotas with the European Economic Community (EEC). Second, it copied the Taiwanese model of success by building an export-oriented industry based on textile processing and, parallel to that, the country was greatly expanding its tourism sector. In a third step, Mauritius replicated Singapore as a financial center while also positioning itself as a bridge between Asia and Africa, with its population being about two-thirds Indian, approximately one-third Creole, and a small proportion stem from Europe and China. In its most recent stage, Mauritius modeled itself on Bangalore and attempted to transform itself into a cyber island.¹⁸ The concurrent process of democratization, the existence of functioning state institutions, and investments in education are also factors that help explain Mauritius' economic success.¹⁹ Mauritius has converted its geographical disadvantage into an advantage, and its position as a bridge between Asia and Africa was actively used by China and India as they became increasingly active in Africa.

Dependencies

Even though Mauritius managed to escape its dependence on sugar, the continuing focus on exporting natural resources found in many African countries is not surprising. On the one hand, the colonial

economy was mostly designed for this kind of export, and the postcolonial era simply continued the established practice. On the other hand, trade in such goods is relatively resistant to institutional failure. That is, even when a government fails, natural resources continue to sell and bring important revenues.²⁰ Most economies hence continued to remain dependent on the export of raw materials and agricultural products and the postcolonial governments rarely laid any groundwork for diversifying their exports. For example, after independence, Ghana continued to depend on cocoa, Zambia on copper, and Chad, Egypt, and Sudan on cotton.²¹ With the discovery of fossil fuels, dependencies shifted toward the sale of these commodities in Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, and Nigeria. The lack of diversity in these economies, however, made them heavily dependent on the world market price for those respective commodities. It is clear that this will make an economy vulnerable.

Changes in the world economic system could influence the development of Africa's economy. As a result of the Vietnam disaster in the 1970s, the predominance of the USA wavered in economic terms. The elimination of the gold standard as well as the oil crises of the 1970s put many countries at risk. The global economy was thereby plunged into recession and the African economy along with it. However, the shock to oil prices did not impact all African countries equally. Exporters of fossil fuels such as Algeria, Angola, Gabon, and Nigeria even profited, while most other countries saw their public debt increase and their foreign exchange reserves decline. The fact that African currencies were regularly overvalued further hampered foreign trade. Changes in the world market impacted on the production of certain products such as cocoa and coffee. In the 1980s, Côte d'Ivoire gained 60 percent of its export earnings and 40 percent of government revenues from the sale of cocoa and coffee. National producers received guaranteed prices for their products. Once the price for cocoa and coffee collapsed, this guaranteed price factually

subsidized the producers at the government's expense as the latter received less on the world market than it paid to national producers. As a consequence, it cut the guaranteed price in half, with severe effects on the economy, the socioeconomic development, and investments in the future like education. This then led to a dependence on international donors.²²

Old Colonial Powers and New Superpowers

During the Cold War, dependence on the former colonial power – and, increasingly on other Western states – significantly determined the economic development of African countries as did the trade policy of the industrialized countries. [Table 5.1](#) shows the five most important sales markets of selected African states as well as the volume of worldwide and intra-African exports. This clearly exhibits how frequently the former colonial power was the largest export destination. For the former British colonies, though, this only applies to the period immediately after independence as in contrast to the former Belgian and French colonies, Britain's predominance in its former colonies faded rapidly. Egypt, which had become independent in the early phase of decolonization, falls completely outside this pattern of dependence on the former colonial power.²³ Likewise, Ethiopia's most important trading partner was not Italy, its short-term occupation power. Egypt and Ethiopia are interesting in another respect: while for most African states, Europe and the USA became the main customers for their exports, Egypt and Ethiopia have a greater diversity of export destinations. In the case of Ethiopia, one can observe the economic links with the Arabian Peninsula that has continued for centuries, and in the case of Egypt, one can see strong economic ties with the former Soviet Union and its satellite states. Kenya, too, had a distinctive feature – its main export destinations were not Europe or the USA but the neighboring states of Uganda and Tanzania, essentially due to the existence of the East African Community (1967–1977) (see [Chapter 8](#)). Kenya is also an exception

here because, as shown by [Table 5.1](#), intra-African trade was overall markedly weak. The data reveal another key development, namely that the USA was becoming increasingly important for African countries with regard to trade. By contrast, the Soviet Union could not come within reach of the importance of the USA as a trading partner for African countries during the Cold War.

Table 5.1 Trade with five largest individual trading partners, Africa and the world, 1950–2000 (in US\$ million)²⁴

Algeria						
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
1. France	243.20	France	318.70	France	540.20	USA 7,509.64
2. Britain	18.80	Britain	21.70	Germany	129.70	France 2,091.55
3. Germany	13.00	Germany	10.70	Soviet Union	49.00	Germany 1,942.06
4. Morocco	8.70	Italy	7.00	Italy	42.50	Italy 922.55
5. Netherlands	5.80	Madagascar	5.40	Britain	41.50	Netherlands 817.53
Africa	31.30					
World	322.20					
Congo-Kinshasa						
	1950	1957	1970	1980	1990	2000
1. Belgium & Lux.	159.30	Belgium & Lux.	238.90	Belgium & Lux.	310.80	Belgium & Lux. 563.05
2. USA	35.10	USA	64.70	Angola	26.40	Switzerland 16.70
3. Britain	29.30	Britain	27.10	Italy	84.40	Britain 74.30
4. Germany	6.80	France	29.30	Britain	53.60	USA 50.30
5. South Africa	6.40	Germany	26.20	France	51.40	France 30.50
Africa	10.80					
World	267.40					
Cote d'Ivoire						
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
1. Belgium & Lux.	159.30	Belgium & Lux.	238.90	Belgium & Lux.	310.80	Belgium & Lux. 563.05
2. USA	35.10	USA	64.70	Angola	26.40	Switzerland 16.70
3. Britain	29.30	Britain	27.10	Italy	84.40	Britain 74.30
4. Germany	6.80	France	29.30	Britain	53.60	USA 50.30
5. South Africa	6.40	Germany	26.20	France	51.40	France 30.50
Africa	10.80					
World	267.40					

available

1.	France	29.22	France	153.00	France	680.81	Nether	426.89	France	547.00
2.	USA	22.74	USA	87.56	Nether	426.00	Italy	245.35	Nether	357.69
3.	Algeria	13.54	Germany	45.02	Italy	360.7	France	209.30	USA	304.54
4.	Nether	91.13	Nether	42.45	Germany	268.98	Germany	199.00	Mali	207.69
5.	Italy	6.34	Italy	40.33	USA	259.87	USA	167.00	Italy	171.79
Africa		35.46		33.45		587.92		936.55		1,200.85
World		151.19		467.34		3,131.62		2,812.62		3,580.70

Egypt

195019601970198019902000

1.	Britain	109.49	Soviet	88.70	Soviet	293.00	Italy	872.49	Soviet	408.10	Italy	764.92
			Union		Union				Union			
2.	India	62.80	China	44.50	Germany	45.34	Yemen	248.90	Italy	315.75	USA	399.76
							DR					
3.	USA	44.30	Yugoslavia	38.80	India	41.35	USA	234.00	USA	221.84	Nether	299.17
4.	Italy	42.80	India	38.70	Czech	36.12	Israel	182.30	Israel	167.85	France	278.52
5.	France	42.20	Czech	37.20	Italy	25.31	Nether	175.11	Nether	166.64	Israel	265.97
Africa		0.90		19.10		52.53		40.52		125.47		232.02
World		500.90		566.80		772.97		3,045.87		2,585.19		4,771.26

Ethiopia

195019601970198019902000

1.	Djibouti	8.50	USA	27.20	USA	59.61	USA	77.11	Germany	51.75	Somalia	17.07
2.	Britain	2.30	Italy	6.10	Germany	8.90	Djibouti	48.47	Japan	43.71	Germany	94.30
3.	Italy	1.60	Britain	4.50	Italy	7.60	Italy	43.07	Djibouti	85.31	Japan	56.52
4.	Sudan	1.50	Saudi	3.90	Saudi	6.67	Soviet	89.22	USA	31.73	Djibouti	48.72
			Arabia		Arabia		Union					
5.	Nether	61.40	Sri Lanka	3.50	Japan	6.64	Germany	35.97	Saudi	29.92	Saudi	38.62
									Arabia		Arabia	
Africa		5.40		3.80		8.40		56.72		37.33		160.96
World		34.70		73.90		122.73		424.73		294.20		571.46

Guinea-

Bissau

195019601970198019902000

no data available
no data available

1.			Portugal	2.70	Portugal	3.01	Spain	12.91	India	84.38
2.			Cabo Verde	0.10	Spain	2.80	India	12.77	Uruguay	58.64
3.			Germany	0.10	Switzerland	2.56	Portugal	2.43	Singapore	30.92
4.			Angola	1.10	Cabo Verde	0.68	Britain	1.31	Senegal	3.17

5.		Netherlands	Netherlands	Cote d'Ivoire	1.00	South Korea	3.10
Africa		0.20	2.06	1.61		5.15	
World		3.20	11.09	34.11		179.86	

Kenya

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

1.	Britain	20.40	Britain	27.00	Uganda	46.75	Uganda	78.90	Uganda	90.35	Uganda	317.50
2.	USA	6.40	Germany	18.30	Britain	43.64	Britain	58.68	Britain	43.79	Britain	244.90
3.	Germany	4.80	USA	11.00	Tanzania	41.31	Germany	150.90	Germany	85.05	Tanzania	145.61
4.	South Africa	2.60	Japan	5.70	Germany	19.11	Singapore	8.72	Rwanda	75.25	Pakistan	31.10
5.	India	2.50	Italy	4.40	USA	18.96	Italy	63.97	Pakistan	60.43	Netherlands	95.73
Africa		6.00		9.00		121.20		377.86		432.68		777.91
World		55.00		109.70		303.14		1,387.45		1,116.20		1,737.20

Nigeria

1950 1960 1970 1979 1990 2000

1.	Britain	200.00	Britain	220.00	Britain	350.50	USA	7,485.40	USA	5,568.57	USA	11,494.88
2.	USA	36.90	Netherlands	58.20	Netherlands	208.00	Netherlands	2,118.20	Spain	942.30	India	3,918.60
3.	Netherlands	11.00	USA	43.70	USA	142.30	Germany	372.00	Netherlands	936.49	Spain	2,345.31
4.	Germany	3.10	Germany	35.00	France	105.80	France	3,600.70	Germany	599.18	France	1,656.58
5.	Cameroon	1.10	Italy	19.60	Germany	88.10	Britain	1,057.40	Italy	299.83	Italy	1,116.94
Africa		2.70		3.20		14.80		327.00		672.08		1,901.74
World		250.00		461.80		1,239.30		17,221.70		10,273.08		27,156.87

While for many African states, the paramount export destinations were the former colonial powers as well as other European and North American countries or Japan, the opposite did not hold true, in other words trade with Africa was not so important for those states. Only the oil-exporting countries of Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria held more prominent places in the trade statistics of those states. In 1975, for instance, France imported merely 1.4 percent of its goods from the oil-exporting countries of Algeria, 0.04 percent from Libya, and 1.6 percent from Nigeria. And it received only 4.7 percent of its imports from the rest of the African states. The same roughly applies to Germany, which received a total of 7.7 percent of its imports from Africa. Italy obtained 7.8 percent of its imports from the continent, Britain 7.7 percent, and the USA 8.6 percent. The Soviet Union

imported only 5.4 percent of its wares from Africa.²⁵

The trade policy of the industrialized countries ran counter to attempts to boost economic development in Africa. As such, agricultural subsidies to protect farmers in the industrialized countries as well as the Multifibre Arrangement of 1974 were development-adverse and cemented the economic dominance of industrialized states at the expense of countries in the Global South. The EEC, for example, made the protection of European farmers a priority not only to assist its rural population but also to remain self-contained in times of the Soviet threat during the Cold War. A complex system of agricultural subsidies and rules to protect the European market emerged, which not only saved agricultural production within Europe but also made (and makes) the subsidized agricultural products of Europe capable of competing on the world market. African farmers faced a double disadvantage for they found it more difficult to enter the European market with their products due to the protection and because they could not compete with the prices of the European products since they were highly subsidized. The USA and Japan similarly supported (and support) their agricultural sectors. The consequences for African countries is that opportunities for growth and employment and ultimately socioeconomic development are undermined.²⁶ The same is true for the textile industry of African (and even more so Asian) countries, which suffered sustainably from the Multifibre Arrangement, which allowed industrialized countries to reduce imports from developing countries in order to protect their own textile industry. Because the textile industry is thought to be the starting point for industrialization and because developing countries have a competitive advantage in this sector as the textile production is labor-intensive and thus better suited for countries where there are lower wages and less welfare costs, this agreement had devastating effects on developing countries.²⁷

The European trade policy also manifested a relationship of dependence of Africa on Europe. When negotiations commenced to

establish the EEC, Africa was still by and large colonized. The French government recognized that it might retain its influence in its former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa over the long term, unlike in northern Africa or Indochina.²⁸ That is why, in negotiations with other European countries, France insisted that its colonies also have access to the European market. And that is precisely what transpired, thus laying the cornerstone for a pan-European trade policy with the African states.

After decolonization, a new form of trade relations was needed. Apart from radical states like Guinea, the independent African states wanted to retain close ties to the European market. What emerged was an “association agreement” concluded in 1964 in the Cameroonian city of Yaoundé, which was then extended in 1971 for another four years.²⁹ The deal was supposed to build a free trade zone and reduce trade barriers. The fact that this was once more a French initiative is best seen by the collection of countries that signed the 1964 Yaoundé Convention: they were almost exclusively former French colonies. Part of the agreement was a provision for development aid. While this was in some ways “natural” for France on account of its colonial history and while it proved immediately profitable because France no longer had to pay aid alone, the agreement proved remarkable for Germany – the other economic heavyweight in the EEC – inasmuch as its interests lay elsewhere fewer than two decades after World War II and the end of the Nazi regime. Although the majority of African countries signed on to the Yaoundé Convention, its critics could not be ignored, most notably Touré and Nkrumah, with the latter describing this “association agreement” as an instance of the “collective neo-colonialism of the European Common Market.”³⁰

Neocolonialism and Dependence Theory

Given the circumstance of existing dependencies, two concepts gained in importance. On the one hand, there was dependency theory, which assumes a hierarchy between metropolises and the periphery as well

as that the development of the periphery, that is to say the developing countries, is constrained.³¹ Dependency theory relies on a thesis formulated by Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer maintaining that the terms of trade for countries that export primary goods are worsening while the terms of trade for industrialized countries are improving.³² Starting in the 1960s, the terms of trade for African countries had become worse. Many of them needed to export more of the same commodity in order to import the same amount of another one. For Madagascar and Togo, this was a particularly negative development since the price of coffee and cocoa beans was falling.³³

On the other hand, there was the concept of neocolonialism that describes the relationships between former colonies and the colonial powers as well as the dependencies of the colonies (see [Chapter 2](#)).³⁴ The continuing economic significance of the former colonial powers to the colonies becomes particularly clear when it comes to France. The local currency, the CFA franc, remained linked to the French franc and portions of the currency reserves of those former colonies that were (and are) organized in a monetary union, are deposited at France's central bank. France also secured privileged terms of delivery for raw materials through cooperation agreements while at the same time ensuring that its former colonies restricted their imports from countries besides France. In light of that and the interference of France in its former African colonies as described in [Chapter 4](#), François-Xavier Verschave argues that it is more appropriate to characterize the relations between France and its former African colonies as “mafiafrique,” instead of the propagated image of “Françafrique.”³⁵

What unites the dependence theory and neocolonialism is how they subordinate the former colonies – that were henceforth referred to as *developing countries* – to the former colonial powers (and other stronger states such as the USA). The figures I have provided in this chapter show that these two concepts certainly did not materialize out of thin air. It is not surprising, then, that neocolonialism in particular

continues to survive as a concept, even though it has lost some of its prominence because it is increasingly being deployed as a strategy by African leaders to justify and/or cover up their own failures. Robert Mugabe is a showcase for that. He was long seen as an Anglophile who loved cricket, wore British suits, maintained close contacts with Arthur Soames (the last British governor of South Rhodesia) and his son (a Tory MP), and regretted the standing-down of Margaret Thatcher because he was thankful to her for organizing Zimbabwe's independence.³⁶ In 1997, the new government under Blair came into power and with it a new, more offensive policy toward the former colonies that was less burdened by history. This policy found one of its most prominent expressions when Minister Clare Short remarked that she is Irish and hence had been a colonized person as well. At the same time, Mugabe came under domestic pressure, started putting through a disputed land reform, and then also started his tirades against the former colonial power, such as during the UN General Assembly in 2002 when he berated Britain saying: "I appeal to this General Assembly to convey to Britain and especially to its current, Prime Minister, Mr. Tony Blair, that Zimbabwe ceased to be a British colony in 1980 [...]. We want to be left in peace to carry out our just reforms and development plans [...]. We refuse to be an extension of Europe."³⁷

Development Cooperation

Economic cooperation after decolonization also entailed to a great extent development assistance that is to say financial or technical aid for poorer countries and their population. Here, too, the dependence on Western states was plain. [Table 5.2](#) shows the official development assistance (net) to some selected countries (negative figures designate years in which repayments offset the aid). The table *inter alia* discloses that financial assistance tended to increase from 1971 to 1990, that the former colonial power frequently provided the largest amount of it, and that the USA evolved into a major donor of financial

assistance, which also applied to Japan. Furthermore, the table displays how international organizations, most of all the World Bank, became increasingly important as donors, and how European countries, with time, channeled money toward Africa through the Commission of the European Community. The table also shows that the African Development Bank, founded in 1964, became active as a multilateral donor.

Table 5.2 Total net official development assistance, 1971–1990 (in US \$ million)³⁹

AlgeriaCongo-Ghana									
Kinshasa									
1971	1980	1990	1971	1980	1990	1971	1980	1990	
Australia	0.1	–	–	–	–	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.8
Austria	3.0	0.5	23.1	0.1	–0.2	2.0	–	0.1	2.0
Belgium	0.3	4.1	2.3	56.7	169.7	95.4	–	0.1	0.2
Britain	0.1	0.8	0.7	0.2	1.3	3.4	16.0	34.8	22.3
Canada	4.2	0.2	1.1	0.9	13.5	14.3	7.7	13.9	28.4
Denmark	1	–	–0.3	2.0	0.9	–	0.2	–0.4	3.2
Finland	–	–	0.1	–	–	0.4	–	–	0.5
France	89.6	75.3	122.2	4.2	39.4	174.2	1.1	3.3	11.7
Germany (West)	0.8	28.6	5.4	0.8	36.8	112.4	6.5	26.2	66.0
Italy	8.0	0.5	9.3	0.1	0.6	145.1	n/a	0.5	10.5
Japan	–	4.8	0.3	0.7	39.4	44.1	0.3	2.5	71.9
Netherlands	0.6	1.9	–	1.9	3.9	3.9	0.3	4.8	24.8
Norway	–	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	1.2	0.6
Sweden	–	2.4	19.2	0.2	2.0	–	–	0.4	2.0
Switzerland	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.1	0.6	1.0	0.1	0.2	3.7
United States	0.1	–1.0	–	12.0	11.0	32.0	17.0	19.0	13.0
African- Development Bank	–	–	–	–	–	38.0	–	–	2.9
EEC	5.1	0.6	21.2	20.2	23.0	53.7	0.1	8.6	19.6
World Bank	–	–	0.3	2.1	19.6	73.0	3.4	9.4	185.4
IMF	–	–	–	–	37.6	–	–	28.9	–

With the payment of bilateral and multilateral financial assistance, the world became divided into donors and recipients.³⁸ African states were on the receiving end, dependent on the donors. A feeling was spreading that they had not yet achieved true independence. This feeling was amplified by the fact that the World Bank and the IMF were essentially institutionalizations of US hegemony and pushed through their structural adjustment programs (see below).

(Lack of) Setting the Course

In the first years following independence, economic policy decisions were not high up on the priority list of the new governments. As shown above and in [Chapter 2](#), the postcolonial government effectively continued the economic policies of the colonial power. In many places, a primary driver appeared to be Kwame Nkrumah's motto "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto you." As the decolonization coincided with the Cold War, several of Africa's new states were drawn into the conflict between the capitalist and Marxist-Leninist economic models. While some states like Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, and the former Portuguese colonies were attracted to the Marxist-Leninist economic model, others such as Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Tanzania developed an "African socialism," whereas still others, including Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya, and Congo-Kinshasa sympathized with the capitalist model. And there were also states such as Egypt that switched from one model to the other.⁴⁰

The new political leaders occasionally made decisions that weakened the economy. As such, companies were nationalized in a number of countries, which often reduced their efficiency while also scaring off private investors from abroad. In Guinea, by way of example, there was a hasty nationalization of several businesses, which led to a stark reduction in production⁴¹ and in Mozambique, there was a selective nationalization, which was primarily harmful to its citizens considering that it affected them but not the large businesses financed by apartheid South Africa.⁴² Moreover, several governments interfered in the economy to benefit themselves or their clients. Clientelism caused the public sector to become bloated, as well as instigated corruption and tax evasion. In the extreme case of Congo-Kinshasa, much of what was generated went straight into the hands of President Mobutu, the then fifth-richest individual in the

world, who “certainly bled the Congo of its wealth far more efficiently than King Leopold.”⁴³ However, there were also heads of state such as Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere and Burkina Faso’s Thomas Sankara who did not enrich themselves personally. Sankara even went so far as to use bicycles and a Renault 5 (a very small car – annotation for generation SUV) as the official car for himself and his ministers, which is part of the reason why he is honored in Burkina Faso up until today even decades after his death (see [Chapter 9](#)).⁴⁴

Industrialization was thought to be a strategy for an economic upturn. However, this attempt has been a twofold failure. By focusing on the industrial sector, the agricultural sector was neglected and collapsed although it had been the most important economic sector in many places. The Mauritanian government, for instance, being under French influence, concentrated on the mining of iron ore and copper as well as its beneficiation. It paid little attention to the agricultural sector, including livestock farming, despite the fact that out of 600,000 economically active citizens, 400,000 people worked in the livestock farming sector and another 160,000 in the agricultural sector.⁴⁵ Droughts and high taxes brought the population to the mines and the agricultural production collapsed because of that. As the working conditions and the payment in the mines were miserable, there could also be no economic upturn made on that basis from below.⁴⁶ As this example suggests, the industrial sector was barely able to gain a foothold. Beyond this case, the aforementioned development-adverse policies of industrialized states also contributed their part to the failure of industrialization. In 1960, 7.2 percent of eastern African GDP came from the manufacturing sector. Ten years later, it was 10.3 percent. In western Africa, the increase in the same period was slightly higher, from 6.3 percent to 11.1 percent. In northern Africa, though, the share of GDP from manufacturing even fell from 14.8 percent to 13.3 percent.⁴⁷

A wealth of resources does not automatically benefit the economy and the population. Rentier states can emerge. In such states, rents are generated outside of the local economy, only a few individuals participate in the generation of them, and the government is the main recipient of these rents.⁴⁸ Rentier states in Africa include Angola, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, and South Sudan, as these countries are dependent on the rents generated primarily through the sale of oil.

Rentier states mostly suffer from resource curse, that is to say the paradox that, despite the wealth of natural resources, economic growth and social economic development lag behind the potentials of the countries.⁴⁹ This phenomenon can hardly be denied even though “for every Nigeria or Venezuela there is a Norway or a Botswana,”⁵⁰ which means that there are some countries that can use the wealth of resources to the benefit of the economy and the population and not just to the benefit of a few. Notwithstanding, according to a World Bank report, the GDP per capita in resource-scarce, developing countries worldwide grew two to three times as fast as in resource-rich countries between 1960 and 2000.⁵¹ A good example of the resource curse is Congo-Kinshasa. Despite being a country with an abundance of resources, the Congo only reached place 179 out of 182 with regard to the GDP per capita and ranks 179 out of 182 in the human development index 2018 (also see [Table 6.3](#)).

There are several reasons for the resource curse. The use of revenues – in particular, the lack of willingness to save parts of the revenues generated by the sale of resources instead of spending them – seems to be a key explanation.⁵² Furthermore, it is assumed that the political system plays a role. Parliamentary systems are more able to use the revenues productively, as these systems are more representative and the governments are more dependent on Parliament.⁵³ Besides that, institutional quality plays a role – in countries where property rights are not well protected and where there is high corruption, the climate for investment is poor and it is unattractive to invest in sectors other than the raw materials.⁵⁴ What

is more, the type of resources and the technical means to exploit them play a role.⁵⁵ Finally, the question whether the state was industrialized early or late offers an explanation. The earlier a state was industrialized, the better the quality of its institutions. And the stronger developed they are, the more positively they affect economic growth in the distribution of income, which helps to soften the resource curse or hamstring it altogether. If states are able to survive from the revenues generated by the sale of resources, they will not need to develop a functioning tax system that they have to explain to the citizens and for which they need citizens' support, and thereby strengthen the institutions and their acceptance. However, if state institutions are weak, there are multiple options for uncontrolled public spending, patronage, and self-enrichment.⁵⁶ This is particularly observable in petro states like Nigeria. At decolonization Nigeria was the exporter of foodstuffs and had an industrial sector that produced, amongst others, textiles and furniture. The discovery of oil in the 1970s, however, led foreign and domestic investments to flow into the oil sector, while other sectors were neglected. The loans the government took out led to rising debt and political instability, as illustrated by several coups (see [Figure 9.1](#)), and therefore paved the way for the exploitation of the state.⁵⁷ The result is that Nigeria is actually not oil-rich, but rather "oil-dependent."⁵⁸

The resource curse is often accompanied by what is called the "Dutch disease," which is "chronic and debilitating"⁵⁹ in Africa. The term refers to the fact that economies that are dependent on just one good (in most cases oil), generate a trade surplus, which appreciates their own currency and in turn makes imports cheaper and exports more expensive. This weakens the production in the country and thus has a negative impact on the economy of the state. There are, however, states like Botswana, that were able to avoid the Dutch disease with a strong industrial sector.⁶⁰ Notwithstanding this case, the diversification of the economy is difficult, as the profits of the resource sector make investments in other sectors less attractive.

Moreover, the resource sector attracts the most talented workers, whose creativity and ideas are missing in other sectors.

Above those explanations offered here, political instability and wars, which I will discuss at length in [Chapters 8 and 9](#), were and are likewise barriers to growth; they come at a cost of up to 2 percent of economic growth per year.⁶¹ In such a climate, the protection of private property becomes less important and that property can be subject to confiscation. In addition, private groups use their resources to scare off others by starting war.⁶² The market-oriented private sector is thus deprived of its foundations, and investors become discouraged.

Initiatives and Strategies for Economic Growth

There have been several initiatives and strategies put forward on how to strengthen the economies of African states. Some of them stemmed from Africa, others from outside the continent. These initiatives and strategies include the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Group of 77 (G77), the Brandt Commission, the trade policy of the EEC, the Lagos Plan of Action of the OAU, and the World Bank's Berg Report.

UNCTAD, G77, and Brand Commission

The UN declared the 1960s the "Decade of Development" and established UNCTAD to promote trade between rich and poor states. UNCTAD provided a platform for developing countries to represent their positions vis-à-vis the industrialized countries more effectively.⁶³ Under the leadership of Latin American states and Yugoslavia, the developing states founded the G77 to better coordinate themselves in the UNCTAD context and beyond.⁶⁴ Initially, the group included its eponymous 77 members; in 2015, it had grown to 134 and encompassed all the states of the Global South. That said, the African

influence within the G77 was and remains minor; only Algeria and Egypt have played a notable role, while China, India, and Yugoslavia dominated the group.⁶⁵ In the early years of the G77, there were only a few meetings of the African members, “partly because of financial problems, partly because of some skepticism as to the benefits to be derived from UNCTAD and/or the G77, and also because of the persistence of the traditional mistrust and lack of effective communication between the English and French-speaking countries.”⁶⁶

In the 1970s, the G77, in demanding a new world economic order, launched a debate about the Global South’s dependence on the dominance of the industrialized countries. However, Western countries paid little attention to sustainable development cooperation during the Cold War. And, while the G77 was theoretically large enough to have an international influence, it was neither homogenous nor united enough for its demands to have an impact. The Tanzanian president Nyerere therefore called the G77 a “trade union of the poor.”⁶⁷ Western states considered the G77’s positions unrealistic. In turn, the G77 saw the West’s refusal to create a new world economic order as an attempt at buying time, with the aim of maintaining the status quo.⁶⁸

Closely related to the G77 appeals were other international initiatives, such as the work of a commission under former German chancellor Willy Brandt. That commission drafted a report between 1978 and 1980 calling for more cooperation between the Global North and the Global South and calling for a just world economic order. However, at a time when Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were heading governments in London and Washington, and when their neoliberal positions became increasingly prevalent internationally, the proposals of the commission did not find fertile ground, much like the G77 appeals.

Although the G77 and the Brandt Commission failed in their demands, their appeal for a new world economic order laid a

foundation for more active trade relations within the Global South (“South-South relations”) and for an enhanced dialogue among major states from the Global South such as the IBSA group comprising the like-minded countries India, Brazil, and South Africa. In addition, they supplied many of the arguments that have shaped the debate into the present. However, the G77 has been severely weakened in recent years with the collapse of Yugoslavia and even more so the emergence of the BRICS club, which not only factually replaced IBSA but also resulted in the abandonment of the leadership roles of BRICS states in the G77.⁶⁹ It is the BRICS states that are now actively involved in shaping a multipolar and post-Western world order and other than the G77 they have the means to achieve that.⁷⁰

Postcolonial European Trade Policy

The trade policy of the EEC changed with Britain’s accession to that community in 1973, as the British government also wanted the Commonwealth members, in other words its former colonies, to benefit from European economic assistance.⁷¹ Another factor that explains the changing trade policy was that the African states increased their bargaining power by joining forces with the Caribbean and Pacific states, supplemented by British and Dutch efforts. The Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (or ACP) was thereby founded and at first comprised forty-six countries.

The European states had been defensive at the negotiations on the Yaoundé Convention in 1963 and were anxious to avoid the impression of pursuing a neocolonial policy. In the late 1960s, they were freed of this pressure in their negotiations with the ACP countries on a new trade agreement.⁷² At the same time, the ACP countries managed to better organize themselves and make their positions heard. This was the climate in which the Lomé Convention was negotiated as the successor agreement to the Second Yaoundé Convention of 1971. The very fact that the term “association” now disappeared was understood as a turning point in relations between

Europe and Africa (and the other ACP countries). It is another matter altogether whether such talk was turned into action. In retrospect, it is particularly remarkable that the African states spoke with one voice in the negotiations, thereby increasing their bargaining power. A “politically, psychologically, and institutionally more formidable African group”⁷³ was formed under the auspices of Nigeria, the country that led the negotiations. Ratified in 1975, the Lomé Convention guaranteed the EEC quota-regulated access to agricultural products and minerals. The Convention was set up in such a way that even President Touré of Guinea agreed to sign. It was extended three times before it expired in 2000 and was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement (see [Chapter 6](#)).

Internal African Initiatives

Parallel to the G77 proposals, African states made proposals of their own on how to boost the economy across the continent. Among these was an idea to stimulate economic growth through regional economic communities. The early establishment of the Southern African Customs Union in 1910 had created a longer tradition of regional communities in Africa. Following decolonization, similar attempts were made to forge regional blocs such as a trade deal between Burkina Faso and Ghana, a Common African Market inaugurated in 1962 by Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Morocco, as well as the aforementioned East African Community. Except for the Southern African Customs Union, though, these initiatives were short-lived or not at all even implemented. Other blocs appeared instead such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Until a robust reform processes in the 1990s and after, these regional organizations were generally weak, not least “because African leaders have so far only paid lip service to the idea of political unity.”⁷⁴ From an economic (and political) perspective, most of these regional communities fell short of expectations (see [Chapter 8](#)).⁷⁵

One of the strongest supporters of the regional economic

communities was the Economic Commission for Africa. In 1947, the colonial powers had rejected an Indian proposal to create such a commission and make it a sub-organization of the UN. One year after Ghana's independence in 1957, such a commission was then set up – despite resistance by the colonial powers – with the objective of being a think tank for the development of Africa.⁷⁶ From the perspective of the Economic Commission for Africa and Adebayo Adedeji, its head from 1975 until 1991, there were five principles that Africa's development were to build upon:

(i) the deliberate promotion of an increasing measure of national self-reliance; (ii) the acceleration of internally-located and relatively autonomous processes of growth and diversification and the achievement of self-sustained development process; (iii) the democratization of the development process; (iv) the progressive eradication of mass poverty and unemployment and fair and just distribution of income and the benefits of development among the populace; and, (v) the acceleration of the process of regional economic integration through cooperation.⁷⁷

Disappointed with the behavior of Western states, the Commission not only supported the call for a new world economic order but also developed the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) together with the OAU. In that plan, the OAU diagnosed Africa as marginalized and as having inherited structural problems from the colonial powers. These problems could only be eliminated with financial support from external funders. Moreover, economic integration within the continent was intended to help in achieving this goal. One of the key arguments was that African countries could only be economically successful as a bloc. Consequently, an African Economic Community was to be created by the year 2000.⁷⁸ One could hardly detect self-criticism by the heads of state and government, such as the insight that they had made poor economic policy decisions. From the outside, the plan was therefore criticized as “a document that is utopian, largely lacking in

practicable prescriptions”; it was “primarily a statement of hope.”⁷⁹

African efforts to obtain more economic growth and economic independence had another pillar, namely the African Development Bank Group that began its work in 1966.⁸⁰ Initially, only African countries could become members of the Bank. Yet their financial capacity was thereby limited, which is why non-African states were allowed to become members as of 1982. The Bank funded several agriculture, transport, health, education, and environmental projects as well provided technical assistance and conducted research. However, the Bank was ineffective and corrupt while infrequently coming forward with its own initiatives.⁸¹ Also, because it did not develop its own theory of development, it was always playing “second fiddle to the policy advice of other [institutions], especially the IMF and World Bank.”⁸²

The overwhelming power of the World Bank, the dominance of Western states, and Africa’s dependency on the industrialized countries troubled the African Development Bank Group as well as all other African initiatives. The already small personnel of many African governments was focused on the World Bank and attracting aid funds from it. The African initiatives gradually became less important, and African states switched to the neoliberal path prescribed by the IMF and World Bank institutions. African institutions did not have the capacity, the autonomy, and the accountability required to prevail.⁸³

The World Bank and the IMF

As early as 1981, the World Bank had spelled out its agenda in the Berg Report. This antithesis to the Lagos Plan of Action rendered a harsh judgment on African leaders and their economic policy decisions. The Berg Report called on them to adjust their exchange rates, to focus on developing their agricultural sectors, and to manage their economies better. It likewise demanded that the public sector, which had grown bloated in many places often due to clientelism, would have to be scaled down in order to become more competitive.

At the same time, the World Bank's report hardly mentioned the historical and structural challenges African states faced.⁸⁴

Despite all the substantive differences between the Lagos Plan of Action and the Berg Report, the two shared the not explicitly stated awareness that Africa's economic misery also had to do with the fact that the continent had been integrated (involuntarily) into the capitalist system dominated by Europe and North America and that there were adjustment difficulties during that process. While the World Bank regarded this process of integration as irreversible and called on the African states and international donors to solve any problems that cropped up, many African leaders and intellectuals employed Marxist thought, to seek a way out of the system.⁸⁵ Amílcar Cabral, who led the liberation movement of today's Guinea-Bissau and Sékou Touré in Guinea serve as examples for this. This fiercely waged debate between representatives of the capitalist and Marxist orders mirrored the Cold War itself, making it difficult-to-impossible to achieve compromises in this phase. For the most part, the actors were talking past one another.

While there were scarcely any noteworthy steps taken by African states to implement the Lagos Plan of Action, the World Bank and the IMF forged ahead and intensified their policies. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western states, the World Bank, and the IMF found it easier to push through its conditions as there was no alternative for African states in sight during the 1990s (see [Chapter 4](#)). The policies of both institutions, which essentially demanded structural adjustments from the African states in exchange for financial support, were retrospectively referred to as the "Washington Consensus."⁸⁶ This program consisted of ten elements: budgetary discipline, reduction or prioritization of public spending, tax reforms, market-determined interest rates, market-based exchange rates, trade liberalization, foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights.⁸⁷ This so-called consensus – that was not at all based on voluntary consent of the African states – was designed to

allow the markets to operate freely and keep the state out of the economy as much as possible. Owing to the implementation of the Washington Consensus, a reversal took place in the postcolonial economic history of Africa. After many independent states had initially focused on industrialization and market intervention, they were now supposed to let the market govern on its own. The days of economic sovereignty for African states were now a thing of the past.

In the 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF had largely prevailed. Since many African countries needed financial support, they had to submit to the terms of those institutions. Niger is just one example. It made itself dependent on the production of uranium due to a lack of alternatives and financed its increasing public sector with the sale of that product. When the price for uranium collapsed in the early 1980s and tax revenues consequently decreased – a fact the government considered as a marginal problem – the government borrowed money from the international capital market. Increasing interests and a further decline of the uranium demand led to an increasing public debt, which in turn eventually led the government to accept the conditions of the World Bank and the IMF to escape the misery through structural adjustment programs – with only some success.⁸⁸

Like Niger, the vast majority of African states participated in World Bank and IMF programs. In 2004, there were only seven African countries that had never participated in a conditional IMF program, namely Angola, Botswana, Eritrea, Eswatini, Libya, Namibia, and Seychelles.⁸⁹ The circumstance that African countries entered into such programs not only resulted from their dependence but also from their general unwillingness – and that of the international community – to implement proposals from Africa.

Economy, Socioeconomic Development, and Development Cooperation

Hardly anything summarizes so clearly the problems and successes of the African economy as two often-cited cover stories that appeared in *The Economist*. After one of them had described Africa in 2000 as the “hopeless continent,”¹ the magazine apologized for that thirteen years later, speaking of the “hopeful continent” and of “Africa rising.”² The 2000 cover story highlighted the many human tragedies and bloody conflicts. In 2013, by contrast, *The Economist* focused on the economic and demographic potential of Africa. This image of an up-and-coming Africa was also taken up by Christine Lagarde, then director of the IMF, who said in 2014: “Africa’s achievements are remarkable, and the overall outlook for the continent is optimistic. This is an exciting time for Africa.”³

Africa’s measurable economic performance has increased in recent years. Not least for demographic reasons (Africa has more young than old people), the image of an emerging continent full of potential is indeed acceptable. Yet, even back in 2000, we would have been able to paint such a picture – at least a picture of a continent with potential, because the structural factors were similar at that time. This goes to show that the (Western) perspective on Africa’s economic and political situation has changed. Today, the opportunities are increasingly noted while the risks recede into the background. This is largely related to the economic interests of China, India, and other

emerging states, which, as shown in [Chapter 4](#), have launched a new scramble for Africa and which are not only doing their share to help its economy grow but also change the image of Africa.

Changes

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the World Bank and the IMF continued to stand by their structural adjustment programs and African states remained dependent on the payments of these institutions. Western governments also attached conditions to their aid, especially the promotion of a liberal cosmopolitan order. At the same time, a way of thinking developed according to which decisions would be made less often over the heads of Africans and their governments – and more with their participation in the process. As demonstrated by the first invitation of African leaders to a G8 summit, that of 2005 in Gleneagles, Scotland, Western states have increasingly required greater responsibility of African governments. This was just one expression of what was described in the political debates as “African ownership,” that is to say, the participation of African players or their (co-)responsibility for making decisions. African ownership became a buzzword: “African leaders (rightly) insist on it, international organizations (rightly) preach it and many non-African actors are (unsurprisingly) hiding behind it. The concept of African ownership is so omnipresent today that it is more than surprising that the simple question of who actually owns it has not yet been asked.”⁴ Earlier, in 1991, the Cameroonian journalist and development specialist Axelle Kabou had formulated the matter provocatively, contending that Africa was neither poor nor powerless. She thereby countered the prevailing image of a world divided into donors and recipients, developed and developing states, as well as poor and rich countries. Additionally, she criticized the failure of African elites.⁵ The concept of African ownership can also be seen as a response to the debate over “Africa’s fate” for which Kabou’s work provided a major

impetus. However, the notion of African ownership, primarily promoted by non-African actors, appeared to be largely rhetorical and the dependency of most African states continued, particularly upon Western states.

Many were convinced that drastic steps were necessary to eliminate the problems of Africa, durable and intense as they were. These problems included its comparatively weak economic performance, which resembled an economic malaise in several countries and was accompanied by socioeconomic challenges. Those challenges ranged from poverty, poor health care, and a lack of educational opportunities, all the way to low life expectancy and inadequate food security. In 2006, the economist Paul Collier suggested attempting a “big push” because, according to his analysis, incremental steps had not led the economic or the socioeconomic development to improve substantially at that point in time. Instead, greater efforts were needed to escape from what Collier called the conflict trap, the corruption trap, the primary commodity trap, and the fractionalized society trap.⁶

The extensive debt relief decided upon at the G8 summit in Gleneagles was such an instance of attempting a large-scale measure. Earlier on, the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in 2000, too, were an effort to address the socioeconomic challenges (in Africa and beyond) in a concerted effort. Among other things, these goals were intended to halve global poverty, to improve educational opportunities, and to lower infant and maternal mortality rates (see below). The EU likewise had great aspirations when it signed on to the Cotonou Agreement – the successor to the Lomé Convention (see [Chapter 5](#)) – attempting to take its economic relations with African states (and those in the Caribbean and Pacific) to a new level. It began to establish Economic Partnership Agreements with African regional economic communities, thus creating free trade zones between the EU and regions in Africa with the aim of promoting sustainable development and reducing poverty there. Although launched with

different intentions, all of these proposals and policies had one thing in common: they reinforced the image of a world divided into donors and recipients while also maintaining the relations of dependency.

China behaved differently, when it initially pursued primarily economic interests in Africa. Its government imposed no conditions, and it directed no pejorative rhetoric against African states. On the contrary, as shown in [Chapter 4](#), the Chinese government literally courted African leaders. China's economic (and later on geopolitical) interests and the new scramble for Africa triggered by it resulted in a drastic change. For, from this point on, the monopoly was over that had been held by Western governments and those international institutions and organizations that they have used as vehicles to assert their interests. Following the almost meteoric appearance of China in Africa – and India in its slipstream – as well as its economic interests on the continent, there was in fact a “big push,” albeit a different one than that envisaged by Collier or the Western governments. As a result, the perspective shifted also because now the prospects were being given more attention than the risks.

While researchers and policymakers initially concentrated their attention on the Chinese government and its interests – rendering China the active player and Africa the passive one – that focus has increasingly shifted to the African governments when it comes to relations between China and African states. Obert Hodzi qualifies China's role in Africa by arguing that it is the African elites who decide whether and how China's support can work in their countries. He thus indicates that the effects of China's economic support are not automatic but greatly depend on how this support is used by representatives of the respective countries. According to his thesis, therefore, the narrative that China is developing Africa is incorrect. Rather, political elites in African states are doing their part to allow development to take place or not.⁷

The consequences of China's rise in Africa became perceptible in Western development policy. Western states had to change their

strategy in order not to surrender the field completely to China and other countries that posed fewer (or no) critical questions and placed fewer (or no) conditions. As shown in [Chapter 4](#), the World Bank reduced its conditions and Western governments pursued a similarly pragmatic course. From that point in time, there was, for example, no longer talk of democracy as condition for aid but instead of good governance. This pragmatic approach – that closely links security, geostrategic, and economic components – is the lens through which governments ponder the challenges of the African economy and possible solutions to them. This debate is accompanied by a postcolonial and reflexive approach that has its roots in Africa and that is discussed by scientists and intellectuals. According to that approach, Africa must emancipate itself politically and economically while looking self-assuredly into the future (see [Chapter 7](#)). The clearest expression of this approach was the vision of an African Renaissance propagated in the late 1990s by then South African president Thabo Mbeki, which culminated in the New Partnership for African Development (see [Chapter 8](#)).

More Trading Partners

As the Cold War ended, the trading partners of African states diversified, a development that has intensified in the new millennium, thereby reducing the dependence of the African economy on Western states. Not only did this mean that African states were trading now with more non-African ones but also that they were engaging in more intra-African trade, as shown in [Table 6.1](#), with a reference to the trade figures of Kenya with Uganda; those of Guinea-Bissau with Nigeria, Togo, and Ghana; Ethiopia's with its neighbors Somalia and Sudan; and finally Congo-Kinshasa's with its neighboring state of Zambia. In addition, the table shows that countries such as China, India, and South Korea are increasingly becoming important export destinations for African goods. And countries like Switzerland, Pakistan, and Turkey also now appear in the lists of Africa's most

important trading partners.

Table 6.1 Trade with five largest individual trading partners, Africa and the world, 2000–2017 (in US\$ million)⁸

Algeria						
	2000	2010	2017			
1.	Italy	4,418.36	USA	13,827.32	Italy	5,980.62
2.	USA	3,425.76	Italy	8,778.25	Spain	4,469.18
3.	France	2,920.74	Spain	5,908.64	France	4,099.82
4.	Spain	2,329.69	Netherlands	1,163.53	USA	3,242.36
5.	Netherlands	1,658.14	France	3,776.02	Brazil	2,144.18
Africa		560.53		3,036.17		2,228.51
World		21,953.69		57,000.17		34,372.06
Congo-Kinshasa						
	2000	2010	2017			
1.	Belgium	716.05	China	2,326.74	China	3,106.94
2.	USA	225.19	Zambia	1,194.32	Zambia	1,701.63
3.	Finland	78.64	USA	515.38	South Korea	543.83
4.	Netherlands	33.94	Belgium	276.47	Finland	480.28
5.	Italy	26.73	Saudi Arabia	184.27	Italy	254.27
Africa		20.39		1,369.61		2,008.07
World		1,169.71		5,353.11		7,841.04
Cote d'Ivoire						
	2000	2010	2017			
1.	France	547.00	Netherlands	1,450.73	Netherlands	1,394.33
2.	Netherlands	457.69	USA	1,063.89	USA	930.48
3.	USA	304.54	Ghana	794.61	France	759.88
4.	Mali	207.69	France	708.73	Belgium	758.35
5.	Italy	171.79	Nigeria	664.31	Germany	685.44
Africa		1,200.85		3,394.42		3,367.35
World		3,580.70		10,272.42		11,793.5
Egypt						
	2000	2010	2017			
1.	Italy	764.92	Italy	2,224.27	U. Arab Emirates	2,596.50
2.	USA	399.76	USA	1,692.13	Italy	2,385.10

3.	Netherlands	299.27	Saudi Arabia	1,673.30	USA	1,946.00
4.	France	278.52	Spain	1,660.28	Britain	1,387.00
5.	Israel	265.97	India	1,268.84	Turkey	1,039.20
Africa		232.02		4,417.41		2,232.80
World		4,771.26		26,579.11		23,295.60

Ethiopia

	2000	2010	2017			
1.	Somalia	97.07	Germany	265.29	Sudan	962.82
2.	Germany	94.30	China	241.76	Switzerland	433.58
3.	Japan	56.52	Somalia	224.12	China	346.39
4.	Djibouti	49.72	Netherlands	173.42	Somalia	285.84
5.	Saudi Arabia	38.62	Saudi Arabia	146.49	Netherlands	274.19
Africa		160.96		444.61		1,437.66
World		571.46		2,193.13		4,225.43

Guinea-Bissau

	2000	2010	2017			
1.	India	84.38	India	132.11	India	256.91
2.	Uruguay	53.64	Togo	8.06	Vietnam	80.03
3.	Singapore	30.92	China	3.88	Nigeria	14.70
4.	Senegal	3.37	Singapore	2.81	Togo	7.19
5.	South Korea	3.10	Cote d'Ivoire	2.01	Ghana	4.64
Africa		5.15		12.69		35.29
World		179.86		154.24		380.88

Kenya

	2000	2010	2017			
1.	Uganda	317.50	Uganda	632.23	Pakistan	619.4
2.	Britain	244.90	Britain	489.28	Uganda	597.95
3.	Tanzania	145.61	Tanzania	404.26	USA	457.24
4.	Pakistan	131.10	Netherlands	327.45	Netherlands	424.59
5.	Netherlands	95.73	USA	269.29	Britain	372.91
Africa		777.91		2,067.75		2,007.52
World		1,737.20		4,733.26		5,747.04

Nigeria

	2000	2010	2017			
1.	USA	11,494.88	USA	26,583.52	India	14,952.33
2.	India	3,918.60	India	18,444.75	USA	5,979.48

3.	Spain	2,345.31	Brazil	6,485.84	Spain	3,250.18
4.	France	1,656.58	Spain	3,715.99	China	2,782.27
5.	Italy	1,116.94	France	3,252.99	France	2,694.68
Africa		1,901.74		7,436.99		5,622.18
World		27,156.87		82,799.28		49,335.23

Looking at all African countries, we can see that together their export volumes to China expanded by 1,423 percent between 2000 and 2017; in the same period, India received 413 percent more exports from Africa and South Korea 229 percent. The fact that exports to these three countries represent a rise in African exports that is well above average is illustrated by another fact, namely that the total volume of all exports by African countries to the world at large increased by only 187 percent. In other words, China has become especially important in terms of exports, which can be primarily explained by its own economic growth and the need to supply its own industry with raw materials. [Table 6.2](#) shows the sums of exports and imports to and from Africa in 2017, demonstrating that, despite the mounting importance of China and India, the former colonial powers remained the most significant buyers of African goods. And they likewise were the main source of imports to Africa, but only if they are considered together with other European countries as a trading block that is to say the EU plus Britain. Indeed, the EU was in sum Africa's most important trading partner in 2017, accounting for 30.3 percent of all exports and imports. China followed well behind with 13.5 percent, ahead of India and the USA.

Table 6.2 Total net receipts from OECD countries, 2017 (in US\$ million)⁹

Rank	Country	Imports	Exports	Total	Percentage of world total(%)
1	EU	153,064	127,541	280,605	30.3
2	China	73,375	51,138	124,513	13.5
3	India	22,221	35,613	57,835	6.3
4	USA	23,979	26,563	50,542	5.5

5	Japan	10,240	6,597	16,836	1.8
6	Brazil	8,467	4,954	13,422	1.5
7	Russia	9,291	1,151	10,442	1.1
	World	512,087	413,096	925,182	100

More Consumption

Along with the diversification of trading partners and the increase in intra-African trade, expanded consumption within Africa is helping to bring about economic change. In 2008, consumer spending in all African countries totaled US\$860 billion. In 2015, it was already US \$1,420 billion, and the forecast for 2025 is US\$2,100 billion;¹⁰ for 2030, it is US\$2,500 billion.¹¹ This is accompanied by an expansion of the African middle class and the fact that fewer people have to live below the poverty line of US\$1.90 per day (see [Table 6.3](#)).¹² This implies that an increasing number of people can afford consumer products. Beer production exemplifies these changes in consumption in Africa. As such, Africans more and more prefer factory-produced beer over home-brewed. In recognition of this trend and wishing to fuel it further, Western beverage producers have increasingly invested in Africa in recent years. SABMiller, a company originally from South Africa that has expanded internationally in recent decades and is now the second-largest beer producer in the world, recognizes the great potential of the African market, where the company has its highest growth rates. It was estimated in the mid-2010s that the market for home-brewed beer was up to four times higher than that for factory-made beer. In attempting to convince Africans of the benefits of industrially brewed beer, SABMiller now has some competitors who sense similar business opportunities on the continent. In order to meet demand and make their products more attractive to customers, beer manufacturers are brewing not only lager beer but also larger quantities of beer based on sorghum or manioc.¹³

Consumer spending is not evenly distributed across the continent. Also due to the sizes of their populations, people from only three

countries – Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa – account for more than half of the continent’s consumption.¹⁴ Other lucrative countries in terms of consumer spending are Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Sudan, Tanzania, and Tunisia.¹⁵ The main causes of rising consumer spending include increasing urbanization, population growth, demographic change, the expansion of the middle and upper classes, the spread of information and communication technologies, as well as the formalization of markets.¹⁶ Finally, more foreign direct investment also drives greater consumption.

More Foreign Direct Investment

Investments in the beer market are a reflection of total foreign direct investment in Africa. These investments remained at a low level until the early 1990s when they started rising sharply until 2004. Between 1990 and 2004, foreign direct investment grew from US\$2.845 billion to US\$17.725 billion. Between 2004 and 2016, foreign direct investment then veritably exploded, rising to US\$53.189 billion before falling again. In 2018, the countries that received the most foreign direct investment were Egypt and South Africa, where investments have been made not only in the raw materials sector but also in areas such as food processing, the real estate market, and renewable energies.¹⁷ The main reasons for increased foreign direct investment in Africa are Chinese investment, which in turn attracted investment of companies of other countries, and the price of oil, which made it appealing to invest in the African oil industry. The decline in oil prices and the flagging demand for consumer goods around the world were the main reasons for the slump after 2016, which might be exacerbated by difficult macroeconomic conditions, including the trade policy of the forty-fifth president of the USA, his trade war with China, Brexit, the emergence of populist governments in countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Italy, and Mexico, and finally the coronavirus crisis that unfolded when I finished this book.

African companies are also investing in African states other than

their home country. In 2017, for example, foreign direct investment from Morocco and South Africa in other African countries rose by around 65 percent in each case, thus highlighting the expansionary interests of the companies based there.¹⁸ The South African supermarket chain Shoprite, for example, has operations in fifteen African countries, making it the largest supermarket chain on the continent. And the South African telecommunications company MTN operates in twenty countries, is the eleventh largest of its kind in the world, and generates about one-third of its sales revenue in Nigeria, its most important market.¹⁹

While the increase in foreign direct investment in Africa is vast, it is, however, caught up in the fact that Africa's share of global foreign direct investment in 2018 was just around 3.5 percent.²⁰ One reason for this low share is found in the World Bank's "Ease of Doing Business Index," which compares the difficulty of doing business in various countries using ten indicators, such as the procedures for launching a business, for obtaining building permits and access to electricity, and for registering ownership. Among the first 100 countries in the 2018 ranking were nine African countries, namely Mauritius (25th), Rwanda (41st), Morocco (69th), Kenya (80th), Botswana (81st), South Africa (82nd), Zambia (85th), Tunisia (88th), and the Seychelles (95th). At the same time, among the last twenty places (170–190) are thirteen African countries, including the Central African Republic, Congo-Kinshasa, Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, and South Sudan.²¹ High bureaucratic and infrastructural hurdles in the African countries, as well as the economic risks posed to investors by legal and monetary issues there, are all doing their part to keep foreign investment low, particularly in those countries that bring up the rear in this index. At the same time, political and security-related reasons (see [Chapters 7](#) and [9](#)) are hardly conducive to the investment climate. The neighboring countries of Burundi and Rwanda, which are similar in size, history, and structural challenges, illustrate how different dynamics can unfold. While Rwanda entered a phase of

political stability following the 1994 genocide and began to display an openness to investment, political instability still predominates in Burundi. Hence, it is not surprising that Rwanda receives more foreign direct investment than Burundi,²² something that was reemphasized with the opening of a factory by the car manufacturer Volkswagen in Rwanda in 2018.

More Private Economic Activities

The private sector and the framework under which it operated became increasingly important following the implementation of the structural adjustment programs (see [Chapter 5](#)) as well as the accompanying liberalization of the markets; both of these coincided with a further decline in the subsistence economy. In the 1990s, it became increasingly clear that Africa was lagging economically behind other regions of the world because, along with its weak state institutions, there were also ambiguous property rights, and poorly functioning markets, which in sum meant that there were few incentives for economic development.²³ However, the chances of economic development can be enhanced when there is constructive cooperation between the political and private sectors. Seen historically, there have been three critical junctures that have determined the relationship between the private sector and the state (thus far): during the colonial era, in the postindependence phase, and in the period of reform enforced by the World Bank and the IMF.²⁴ In Mauritius, for example, the postcolonial government supported the private sector, using sugar revenues in the first years after independence to put the country and its economy on a solid footing – a prerequisite for its later economic growth. In contrast, in Guinea and Ghana, for example, the private sector was hardly suited to be an economic engine because the countries were weak in the wake of the socialist systems established after independence. In addition, the leaderships of many African countries understood power in economic matters as a type of political power and therefore did (and do) a great deal to impede the private

From the 1980s on, these circumstances were countered by the structural adjustment programs, with the latter providing for the privatization of state-owned enterprises, which in turn was intended to have a positive effect on economic development. The development strategy of the Ghanaian government from the mid-1980s onwards, for example, was one of backing the expansion of the private sector and to this end in 2001, it created a Ministry of Private Sector Development, specifically responsible for coordinating dozens of programs for the private sector with the aim of realizing a “Golden Age of Business.”²⁶ This was done in light of the fact that in the roughly fifteen years since their inception, Ghana’s structural adjustment programs were not as successful as intended because private companies invested less than was hoped for, largely because they had little confidence in state institutions or in the legal protection of their investments. What is more, they feared that the government would interfere in their areas of business.²⁷ After years of difficult political and economic conditions, many seemed to eschew investments. This picture has changed in recent years, though. In Ghana, investment has grown since 2000 and in 2018 it overtook Nigeria as the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in western Africa.²⁸

This type of progress has become even clearer in formerly communist Ethiopia, where the economy has flourished since the final phase of the Meles prime ministership (1995–2012). Under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (since 2018), the country’s ongoing political and economic opening has further boosted the economy. All this is linked to the expansion of the private sector, in particular, but there are also investments in large infrastructure projects, the most prominent of these being the railway line to Djibouti (see [Chapter 5](#)) and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a huge dam to which the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa will be attached. In Ethiopia’s private sector, low-wage manufacturing jobs predominate, making it

attractive for foreign investors; likewise, it helps that labor costs are rising in China and other Asian countries.²⁹ The footwear industry is just one field that is experiencing increased investment in Ethiopia – not only from European but also from Chinese investors.

While Ethiopia and Ghana are attracting investors, other states for their part discourage them, such as Zimbabwe, the government of which has repeatedly threatened and sometimes carried out expropriations, like in 2000, when the farms of white Zimbabweans were occupied and de facto expropriated as part of land reform or in 2016 when several diamond mines were taken under state control and extraction licenses were withdrawn.³⁰ The consequence has been a further decline in foreign investment and the shutting down of foreign-owned stores like the KFC fast food chain or the Edgar clothing store. The new president Emmerson Mnangagwa has been unable to stop these developments, despite the high hopes for economic revival when he took over power in 2017.³¹

More Advanced Than Often Assumed

There is another phenomenon observable in several African states: leapfrogging. Indeed, using modern technology, some African countries leapfrogged, that is to say, they used radical innovations that allowed them to catch up and indeed leapfrog others. To give an example: several African countries leapfrogged the use of landlines and went straight to use mobile phones. In 2016, two-fifths of Sub-Saharan Africa's population had a mobile phone. Yet, there were stark differences between countries. In the Central African Republic 22 percent had one, in Congo-Kinshasa 26 percent, in Côte d'Ivoire 53 percent, and in South Africa 68 percent.³² The same is true for the use of mobile money, spent through mobile phones, through which Africans skipped the opening of bank accounts. M-Pesa, a mobile money service operating in Congo-Kinshasa, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Tanzania had 37 million active customers and almost 400,000 active agents as of end-2019.³³ There is also leapfrogging with regard to transportation and fight against diseases with drones being inter alia used to deliver blood and medicine to people in need, such as in Rwanda, and to fight malaria like in Zanzibar. In short, Africa is more advanced than often assumed.³⁴

More Efforts against Corruption

Only with the end of the Cold War and the end of support of the superpowers did the issue of corruption become a focus of discussion on the causes of economic and socioeconomic hardship of most African countries (and elsewhere in the world). Former World Bank staffers, such as Peter Eigen, became central figures in the anti-corruption movement that created Transparency International, an NGO dedicated to fighting corruption worldwide, in other words the abuse of entrusted power for private gains.³⁵ Corruption inhibits investment and restricts innovation because investors have little

interest in engaging in countries with high levels of it, unless the profit offsets the losses, as in Kenya where investments take place despite chronic corruption. By contrast, investors by and large keep away from Mozambique where corruption finds expression in various forms, including the bribing of decision-makers, the demand of political elites for rents, patronage, and payoffs to bureaucrats, police officers, or nurses, who expect a bribe for their (non)actions.³⁶ This is, however, also changing given large-scale gas discoveries in northern Mozambique. Countries with high levels of corruption often form shadow economies that elude government taxes while promoting the informal sector (see below). Finally, the quality of education and health care may decline because staff and equipment become too expensive for students or patients. Even on a small scale, corruption has a negative impact: road checks and fees for stamps or seals increase the costs of transport and official procedures. This so-called petty corruption is omnipresent in many African countries. Even in one of the world's largest refugee camps in the Kenyan town of Dahab, refugees pay security guards to get preferential treatment.³⁷

Corruption is also prevalent in the wealthier African countries, as demonstrated by the various charges against former South African president Jacob Zuma and against several high-ranking politicians in Mauritius. According to Transparency International, Africa ranks as that region with the highest level of perceived corruption. Yet, for all its pervasiveness, corruption is seen in some African countries as a minor problem, for example in Botswana and Namibia. And countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal have improved their records considerably in recent years.³⁸

From the standpoint of participants, corruption is rational because it is a way to generate income and because it follows a logic of negotiation, giving, solidarity, predatory authority, and the redistribution of funds that is comprehensive to the participants.³⁹ By contrast, politics is clear in its rhetoric and seeks to end corruption. Hence, the African Union (AU) declared in its 2003 AU Convention on

Preventing and Combating Corruption that corruption has “devastating effects on the economic and social development of the African people” and called for a decisive struggle against it.⁴⁰ China, too, takes more care of corruption and increasingly questions African governments, so that a member of a Kenyan delegation led by President Uhuru Kenyatta noted that it is “like talking to the World Bank.”⁴¹

Large-scale corruption is often associated with greed and/or is used by the political leaders as a way to preserve their power. Recent examples include the (formerly Marxist!) long-term Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos and his daughter Isabel dos Santos, who was the first female billionaire (in US dollar terms) of Africa, King Mohammed VI of Morocco, Cameroonian president Paul Biya, the president of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, or King Mswati III from Eswatini, one of the last absolutist rulers in the world.⁴² It is hardly surprising that Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, and Morocco are among the fifteen countries that have not ratified (and in some cases not even signed) the AU Convention on Combating Corruption, though Angola eventually ratified it in 2017 shortly after the dos Santos era had ended.⁴³

Informal Economy and Informal Work

Africa is the world region in which the informal economy is most pronounced. What is understood as “the informal sector” of the economy or “informal work” is the production of goods or provision of services with the objective of generating income. There are no written rules here, and the labor relations are not contract-based. Instead, they are based on custom and personal relationships. The “companies” in this sector are not formalized and not registered with public authorities. Consequently, those who are active in this sector are exposed to a number of personal and economic risks since their work is not covered by protective rules, ranging from working hours

to accident insurance. They also have no safety net, which would include access to social security or employment courts. Such people are often subject to arbitrary dictates and are at greater risk of poverty; it is therefore no surprise that the vast majority of those employed in the informal sector do not do so voluntarily. Moreover, the informal economy has a negative impact on the state because it deliberately avoids tax revenues that might have been used for infrastructure, social policies, or other government expenditure. The length and complexity of registration processes, a weak and sometimes ineffective judiciary, and the ability of influential actors to sidestep laws and rules – all these play a role in why people and companies are active in the informal sector.⁴⁴

Examples of informal workers are waste pickers, especially in the metropolitan areas, who search through the garbage for materials that are recyclable or can be used personally. Often unrecognized, this kind of labor, which rarely lifts these workers above the poverty line, helps to make waste management and urban life more sustainable.⁴⁵ Another example is that of the informal laborers, who for a small fee arrange the allocation of passengers in taxis/minivans.⁴⁶ Street vendors or domestic workers who do not report their income and have no contractual relationship with their clients are likewise informal workers. The informal sector encompasses not only individuals but also networks of cross-border traders and firms. Such companies are active inter alia in transportation services, the wholesale and retail sectors, as well as in music and film distribution.⁴⁷

The size of the informal sector is enormous; in some countries, it contributes well over half of the GDP.⁴⁸ In Nigeria, there are an estimated 700,000 informal shops that sell soft drinks but only thirty-one supermarkets of the prominent chains Spar, Shoprite, Massmart, and Game.⁴⁹ Yet within Africa there are big differences. In southern Africa, only 40.2 percent of the labor force works in the informal sector while it is 67.3 percent in northern Africa and 92.4 percent in western Africa. In Angola, Burkina Faso, Benin, Chad, and Rwanda,

most workers are employed in the informal sector, with over 94 percent in each country. Cape Verde and South Africa have the lowest shares at 46.5 percent and 34.0 percent, respectively. Particularly affected are young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four as well as older persons of sixty-five and over. And there is a strong urban-rural divide, which is most pronounced in southern Africa. Here 57.1 percent of the rural population work in the informal sector; the urban proportion is 32.7 percent.⁵⁰ In spite of these percentages, informal work is overall a more virulent issue for the cities since there, in addition to the difficulty of finding work, it is more difficult than in the countryside to locate secure shelter and food supplies. In effect, “informal cities” have developed.⁵¹ Unsurprisingly, the higher one’s educational attainment, the lower one’s risk of having to work in the informal sector. It is in the nature of the matter that these numbers must be regarded with caution, but also because several countries are not even assessed by the International Labour Organization, which provided the aforequoted numbers. Nonetheless, these numbers provide good insight into the situation, disclosing the size and importance of the informal sector.

Although the informal sector is a permanent challenge for most African countries, it tends to grow in economically and politically difficult times, as suggested by the example of Egypt. There, after the 2011 revolution, the number of street vendors climbed sharply, and money changers on the street did good business. This expansion of the informal economy was related to less control by the government and police in the post-Mubarak period, as well as the fact that the economic downturn in these years made it more difficult to earn a living in the formal sector.⁵²

With respect to the total labor force, more women (89.7 percent) than men (82.7 percent) are employed in the informal sector, which is a contrast to the global average.⁵³ This implies that women’s labor is used less in the formal sector. This is coupled with negative consequences for the economies of countries because there is a

statistical relationship between gender equality and economic growth. Those countries in which there is more equality between men and women in legal and actual terms, show a greater economic growth. Thus, gender equality may be seen as a stimulus to the growth of the economy.⁵⁴ These assumptions apply to Sub-Saharan Africa. In northern Africa, however, there is a so-called gender equality paradox. That is, efforts by governments to improve the position of women, for example through education and health care, have not helped them to participate more in economic (and political) life.⁵⁵ While some here would intuitively point to the role of Islam in those countries to explain the diminished position of women in the labor market, there are also comparative studies showing that the causal factor is not Islam but the presence of oil. For the oil sector is male-dominated and because this sector has such a dominance in oil-producing countries, it has a lasting impact on women's employment.⁵⁶

The informal sector has increasingly been perceived as problematic for the economic development. There have been efforts by the International Labour Organization to get people out of this sector or to formalize their work,⁵⁷ and so African governments likewise try to curtail the parallel economy.⁵⁸ In his research on the informal economy, Hernando de Soto points out the untapped economic potential slumbering in this sector on the one hand and the lack of access that many in African countries (and other countries of the Global South) have to legal systems on the other hand. This effectively excludes them from property rights and thus from the possibility of expanding their business through credit financing.⁵⁹ De Soto's central thesis is that countries with successful economies underwent a transformation at some earlier point in time, at the close of which a formal and unified right to property emerged that became the precondition for successful economic activity. However, neither the colonial powers nor most postcolonial governments in Africa took steps to implement such a transformation. In some countries, such as Ethiopia, land can only be owned by the state. Where there is a formal

right to property and general access to justice, such as in South Africa or Mauritius, the economies prove more successful than elsewhere, which underscores de Soto’s thesis while at the same time explains why there is more attention being paid to informal work, its general potential, and its formalization.

Socioeconomic Development

The aforementioned economic difficulties and the problems that result from informal work are also reflected in the Human Development Index of the UN Development Programme. This index represents the dimensions of health, knowledge, and standard of living by considering data on life expectancy, school education, and economic performance within countries (see [Table 6.3](#)). In 2018, of the thirty-eight countries that have a “low human development” according to the Human Development Index, all but six are African. However, there are also seven African countries, namely the Seychelles, Mauritius, Algeria, Tunisia, Botswana, Libya, and Gabon (in order of rank), that are considered to have a high level of development and fourteen seen as having a medium level of development (not ranked at all are Somalia and Western Sahara).⁶⁰

Table 6.3 Economic and socioeconomic development⁶¹

	GDP per capita (2018)	Life expectancy at birth, in years (2018)	Infant mortality rate (2018)	Annual population growth in % (2018)	GINI index (2018)	Adult literacy rate in % ⁶⁴	Poverty headcode in % ⁶⁵	Human Development Index (2017)
Algeria	4,816	76.50	20.1	2.01	27.6 (2011)	81.4 (2018)	0.5 (2011)	0.75
Angola	3,230	60.38	51.6	3.28	42.7 (2008)	66.0 (2014)	30.1 (2008)	0.58
Benin	896	61.17	60.5	2.73	47.8 (2015)	42.4 (2018)	49.5 (2015)	0.51

Botswana	8,031	68.81	30.0	2.20	53.3 (2015)	87.7 (2015)	16.1 (2015)	0.72
Burkina Faso	710	60.77	49.0	2.87	35.3 (2014)	41.2 (2018)	43.7 (2014)	0.42
Burundi	211	60.90	41.0	3.17	38.6 (2013)	68.4 (2017)	71.8 (2013)	0.42
Cameroon	1,498	58.51	50.6	2.61	46.6 (2014)	77.1 (2018)	23.8 (2014)	0.56
Cape Verde	3,787	72.57	16.7	1.16	47.2 (2007)	86.8 (2015)	8.1 (2007)	0.65
Cen. Afr. Rep.	385	52.24	84.5	1.52	56.2 (2008)	37.4 (2018)	66.3 (2008)	0.37
Chad	813	53.71	71.4	3.02	43.3 (2011)	22.3 (2016)	38.4 (2011)	0.40
Comoros	1,363	63.91	51.3	2.24	45.3 (2013)	58.8 (2018)	18.1 (2013)	0.50
Congo- Brazzaville	2,652	63.91	36.2	2.58	48.9 (2011)	80.3 (2018)	37.0 (2011)	0.61
Congo- Kinshasa	419	60.03	68.2	3.23	42.1 (2012)	77.0 (2016)	76.6 (2012)	0.46
Côte d'Ivoire	1,693	57.02	59.4	2.55	41.5 (2015)	43.9 (2014)	28.2 (2015)	0.49
Djibouti	n/a	65.89	49.8	1.56	41.6 (2017)	n/a	17.1 (2017)	0.48
Egypt	2,907	71.66	18.1	2.03	31.8 (2015)	71.2 (2018)	1.3 (2015)	0.70
Equa. Guinea	10,602	58.06	62.6	3.65	n/a	95.0 (2014)	n/a	0.59
Eritrea	n/a	65.54	31.3	1.90 (2011)	n/a	76.6 (2018)	n/a	0.44
Eswatini	4,820	58.32	43.0	1.01	51.5 (2009)	88.4 (2018)	42.0 (2009)	0.56
Ethiopia	570	65.87	39.1	2.62	39.1 (2015)	51.8 (2017)	30.8 (2015)	0.46
Gabon	9,077	65.84	32.7	2.60	38.0 (2017)	84.7 (2018)	3.4 (2017)	0.70
Gambia	519	61.44	39.0	2.95	35.9 (2015)	50.8 (2015)	10.1 (2015)	0.46
Ghana	1,807	63.46	34.9	2.19	43.5 (2016)	79.0 (2018)	13.3 (2016)	0.59

Guinea	943	60.71	64.9	2.83	33.7 (2012)	32.0 (2014)	35.3 (2012)	0.46
Guinea-Bissau	622	57.67	54.0	2.49	50.7 (2010)	45.6 (2014)	67.1 (2010)	0.46
Kenya	1,202	65.91	30.6	2.31	40.8 (2015)	81.5 (2018)	36.8 (2015)	0.59
Lesotho	1,402	52.95	65.7	0.80	54.2 (2010)	76.6 (2014)	59.7 (2010)	0.52
Liberia	541	63.30	53.5	2.45	35.3 (2016)	48.3 (2017)	40.9 (2016)	0.44
Libya	7,529	72.52	10.2	1.48	n/a	86.1 (2004)	n/a	0.71
Madagascar	438	66.31	38.2	2.67	42.6 (2012)	74.8 (2018)	77.6 (2012)	0.52
Malawi	517	63.28	35.3	2.64	44.7 (2016)	62.1 (2015)	70.3 (2016)	0.48
Mali	778	58.45	62.0	3.01	33.0 (2009)	35.5 (2018)	49.7 (2009)	0.43
Mauritania	1,349	64.46	51.5	2.78	32.6 (2014)	53.5 (2017)	6.0 (2014)	0.52
Mauritius	10,579	74.51	13.6	0.05	35.8 (2012)	91.3 (2018)	0.5 (2012)	0.79
Morocco	3,357	76.22	19.2	1.25	39.5 (2013)	73.8 (2018)	1.0 (2013)	0.67
Mozambique	5,996	59.31	54.0	2.91	54.0 (2014)	60.7 (2017)	62.4 (2014)	0.44
Namibia	6,073	63.02	29.0	1.88	59.1 (2015)	88.3 (2011)	13.4 (2015)	0.65
Niger	399	61.60	48.0	3.82	34.3 (2014)	30.6 (2012)	44.5 (2014)	0.35
Nigeria	2,396	53.95	75.7	2.59	43.0 (2009)	62.0 (2018)	53.5 (2009)	0.53
Rwanda	826	68.34	27.0	2.64	43.7 (2016)	73.2 (2018)	55.5 (2016)	0.52
São Tomé & Prín.	1,297	69.93	24.4	1.88	30.8 (2010)	92.8 (2018)	32.3 (2010)	0.59
Senegal	1,547	67.38	31.8	2.78	40.3 (2011)	51.9 (2017)	38.0 (2011)	0.51
Seychelles	4,385	74.30	12.4	0.95	46.8 (2013)	95.9 (2018)	1.1 (2013)	0.80

Sierra Leone	474	53.90	78.5	2.14	34.0 (2011)	34.5 (2018)	52.2 (2011)	0.42
Somalian/a		56.71	76.6	2.83	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
South Africa	7,440	63.54	28.5	1.36	63.0 (2014)	87.0 (2017)	18.9 (2014)	0.70
South Sudan	n/a	57.37	63.7	0.60	46.3 (2009)	34.5 (2018)	42.7 (2009)	0.39
Sudan	1,856	64.88	42.1	2.39	35.4 (2009)	60.7 (2018)	14.9 (2009)	0.50
Tanzania	957	64.48	37.6	2.98	37.8 (2011)	77.9 (2015)	49.1 (2011)	0.54
Togo	672	60.49	47.4	2.45	43.1 (2015)	63.7 (2015)	49.2 (2015)	0.50
Tunisia	4,402	76.31	14.6	1.15	32.8 (2015)	79.0 (2014)	0.3 (2015)	0.73
Uganda	710	62.52	33.8	3.72	42.8 (2016)	76.5 (2018)	41.7 (2016)	0.52
Zambia	1,672	63.04	40.4	2.91	57.1 (2015)	86.7 (2018)	57.5 (2015)	0.59
Zimbabwe	1,822	60.81	33.9	1.41	43.2 (2011)	88.7 (2014)	21.4 (2011)	0.53

These large differences between African countries are also reflected in other indicators of a country's level of development, such as the proportion of those living below the poverty line (of US\$ 1.90 dollars a day) as well as rates of infant mortality and of literacy. For example, while in 2012 in Madagascar 77.6 percent of the population lived on less than US\$1.90 a day, the figure was 0.5 percent each in Algeria and Mauritius. Viewed statistically, while in 2017, 87.6 out of every 1,000 children died before their first birthday in the Central African Republic, the proportion was only 10.6 children per 1,000 in Libya. And while in 2012 only 15.5 percent of the population was literate in Niger, the proportion was 94.4 percent in South Africa (see [Table 6.3](#)).

What all these numbers do not reveal are the differences within each country. The Gini coefficient represents these differences to some extent by providing a measure of whether the income of each adult

within a state is equal. If the income is the same for all the citizens, the coefficient assumes a value of zero. If all the income accrues to a single individual, however, the coefficient takes the value of 100. As [Table 6.3](#) shows, there is a highly unequal distribution of income in some African states. Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa are among the countries in which that distribution is the most unequal, whereas in Algeria, Egypt, and São Tomé and Príncipe there is more equal distribution of income.

Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals

Alongside other goals, combatting poverty, reducing child mortality, and expanding primary education have been at the core of UN development efforts since 2000 when the Millennium Development Goals, eight international development goals to be achieved by 2015, were adopted. According to these MDGs, the number of people living in poverty worldwide should be half of the 1990 level; all children should be able to attend primary school; gender equality should be fostered; and infant mortality rates should be reduced by two-thirds and maternal mortality rates by three-quarters. In addition, the further spread of HIV/AIDS should be halted, environmental sustainability should be ensured, and a global partnership for development ought to be advanced.

The adoption of the MDGs was one of the precursors of the far-reaching initiatives that followed five years later in 2005, which was proclaimed by British prime minister Tony Blair as the “Year of Africa.” In addition to the G8’s promise of debt relief and the first invitations to African leaders to attend its summits (see above), the new initiatives included the relaunch of Live Aid concerts, which in 1985 had raised funds to eliminate the consequences of the drought in Ethiopia. In 2005, the concerts were no longer just held in Philadelphia and London but also in Paris, Rome, Berlin, Barrie (Canada), Chiba (Japan), Cornwall (Britain), Edinburgh, Moscow, and Johannesburg (South Africa). With an estimated 1.7 million attending

these concerts and another 2-3 billion watching the live broadcast, the “Live 8” concert became the biggest music event in history. The global acceptance of the MDGs “brought the issue of socioeconomic development back onto the international agenda, mobilised public attention, and to an extent, overcame aid fatigue.”⁶⁶ There was no other time in history after decolonization when Africa – and especially Sub-Saharan Africa – received as much international attention as in the summer of 2005. The expectations were high, as was the will of Western governments to make investments and, for their part, the African leaders contributed to the euphoria by pointing to their New Partnership for African Development (see [Chapter 8](#)), including African ownership and the hopes associated with it.

Between 2004 and 2017, the net official development assistance and official aid received doubled from around US\$82 billion to US\$162 billion, as a result of the concerted efforts made around the world and African states benefitted from this. Ethiopia, which became the largest recipient of payments, got US\$1.8 billion in 2004, increasing to US\$4.9 billion in 2018.⁶⁷ In many places, such cash flows resulted in greater dependency on foreign assistance. A multitude of local actors ranging from government ministries, corporations, and NGOs all the way to (aspiring) businesspeople were looking for funding opportunities, and national parliamentarians saw it as one of their key tasks to secure development projects for their constituencies.

It is hardly surprising that the ambitious MDGs and their related subgoals could not be achieved in their entirety. This should not disappoint, as much has been accomplished since these goals were adopted and we should not lose sight of the fact that the starting point for Africa was more difficult, as compared to other world regions.⁶⁸ As for eradicating extreme poverty, Sub-Saharan Africa saw a 28 percent reduction – which nonetheless means that 47 percent of the population continued to live in extreme poverty. There was also progress in Sub-Saharan Africa in the area of primary education, with

the rate of primary enrollment rising from 52 percent to 60 percent though it still fell (well) short of the 80 percent target. The infant mortality rate in Sub-Saharan Africa fell from 179 per 1,000 children to 86.⁶⁹ Yet at the same time, in the period from 2014 to 2016, it has to be said that no other region in the world had as many malnourished people as Sub-Saharan Africa (23 percent). In northern Africa, that portion was below 5 percent. Beyond this, a few more numbers that are not directly related to the MDGs likewise depict the state of development: although 427 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa got access to clean drinking water between 2000 and 2015, 695 million people were left without sanitation access.⁷⁰ In 2012, 730 million had to rely on biomass for cooking, and a total of 620 million Africans below the Sahara had no access to electricity; in fact, their energy consumption averaged less per capita than what a 50 watt lamp consumes.⁷¹

The year 2015 had been foreseen as the closing date for these MDGs. Then, seventeen “Sustainable Development Goals” were formulated as a new vision to be achieved by 2030 to promote sustainable development in all countries of the world. The goals include an end to poverty and hunger, gender equality, and improved health, education, sanitation, access to water, modern energy, and dignified work for all. There are also measures to combat climate change like reducing the use of plastic bags and deforestation.⁷²

Effectiveness and Discussions

The effectiveness of development assistance has been fiercely debated since the 1960s. The economist Jeffrey Sachs argues that the structural difficulties of Africa, described above and in [Chapter 5](#), can be overcome and that only more financial resources are needed.⁷³ Collier maintains that any aid has to be customized. Since geography, conflict, and bad governance are the main causes of Africa’s difficult socioeconomic situation, it is important to plan and implement aid in such a way that it can counteract these causes.⁷⁴ In the 1970s, Péter

Bauer was among the first to criticize foreign aid as not helpful for the course of developing countries.⁷⁵ Later on, Nicolas van de Walle pointed out that foreign assistance does not encourage economic and political reforms but prevents them instead. In fact, the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s rather undermined state institutions and reinforced the socioeconomic status quo than promoting reforms. In light of these challenges, the globalization, and a worldwide interdependence, former head of the IMF, Horst Köhler, has suggested thinking of development politics as “interdependence politics” and adjusting it accordingly.⁷⁶

Several African writers share this critique of contemporary development assistance and call for more cooperation on an equal footing. James Shikwati, for instance, is completely opposed to development aid because it promotes dependency while also stifling entrepreneurship and trade relations between neighboring states. For him, it effectively supports only the ruling elites.⁷⁷ Dambisa Moyo claims that developing countries in Africa find themselves in a vicious circle in which dependence on development aid, corruption, market distortion, and poverty all have the same effect, which is greater dependence on assistance.⁷⁸ Both Shikwati and Moyo join in the chorus of those calling on Africans to display more self-confidence and break out of their victim role. Here there is a direct connection to the state of a country, its institutions, political systems, and ruling elites – the subject of the [following chapter](#).

States, Political Systems, and Actors

Since decolonization, a complex set of political systems has emerged in Africa. Some countries democratized, particularly in the 1990s, while others are run by authoritarian leaders. We can also see that some of the former have made efforts to strengthen their democracies whereas others have started to dismantle them. Moreover, neopatrimonial rule, that is to say when leaders as patrons use state resources and get loyalty from their clients in return, remains prevalent in several African states, but there are also countries without such systems. And while there are a number of states with functioning state institutions, it is also true that there are some territories that can barely be called states for the state institutions have ceased working. There are a variety of actors operating in these political systems besides the president, including the government, the public administration, parliamentarians, the military, judges, traditional leaders, and NGOs all being discussed in this chapter after an analysis of the nature of the states, the political order, and strategies for maintaining power.

States

Six decades after the “African Year” of 1960, the culminating point of decolonization, state-building in Africa is still in full swing, and only a few states are consolidated, according to the Western understanding of

states. In 1982, Jackson and Rosberg argued that “the inquiring student of African politics may be better advised to read Machiavelli or Hobbes than the ‘constitutions’, official plans, or party programs of most African governments if he [or she] wishes to understand their central characteristics and dynamics.”¹ Daniel Posner and Daniel Young indicated twenty-five years later that the biggest change since the end of the Cold War has been that African leaders seek to achieve their political goals through formal institutionalized channels.² They thus conclude that great progress has been made in the institutionalization of states. In 2018, Posner and Young even presumed that there are only “pockets of old-style authoritarianism.”³ The decrease in coups d’état (see [Chapter 9](#)) as well as the involvement of parliaments in political decision-making processes may be evidence for this argument. In the following, however, I will show that these “pockets” are not to be underestimated and in doing so I align myself with those who acknowledge but do not overestimate the developments described by Posner and Young. For, while the expansion of state institutions is unquestionably occurring, it often serves to legitimize the not always democratically elected leaders more than it limits their power.⁴ The fact that the African states are still in a period of consolidation and that institutionalization is both up and down is reflected in the many, often substantive constitutional changes taking place in African countries, prompting Charles Manga Fombad to speak of a “never-ending story of the making, unmaking and remaking of constitutions.”⁵

The standard that Western observers apply to states and state-building processes in Africa and other postcolonial areas is the classic view of Western state theory. Accordingly, a state has three elements: a national territory, a constitutive people, and state power.⁶ According to this notion of states, there is a defined territory recognized by other states in which a population lives that maintains a legal relationship with that state, which is expressed through nationality. The territory of the state and the constitutive people gathered there are ruled by

state power, which is embodied by state institutions such as government, public administration, police, military, parliament, and courts.

Since the current African states are of colonial origin and were not formed on their own over the course of centuries – in a process during which people would have learned loyalty to them – the persons legally identified as nationals do not necessarily feel connected with “their” state and in some cases perceive it as illegitimate (see [Chapter 3](#)). In those places where the population does not perceive the state as legitimate, there are upheavals and forms of internal fragmentation. Frequently, such states are powder kegs, such as Congo-Kinshasa, a country shaken by wars and uprisings, which has made little progress with regard to its population considering it as a legitimate state. In such unconsolidated states what results is a process of trying to balance the relationship between the population and the state. This process can, for example, also end in (attempted) secessions, as shown by the cases of Biafra (Nigeria), Kantanga (Congo-Kinshasa), as well as Puntland and Somaliland (both Somalia) (see [Chapter 9](#)).

In some African countries, (parts of the) state institutions are missing, or they are not functional and have little or no impact beyond the capital cities. Countries like the Central African Republic or Somalia, where there is little state power outside the capitals, or countries like Congo-Kinshasa, where the state does not have a monopoly on the use of force, are little more than empty shells in which core functions of the state, such as to ensure the safety of its citizens, are no longer performed. Libya is another example of this. Gaddafi held this country together violently, but he barely built state institutions during his reign that were able in any benevolent sense to provide public goods to the people.⁷ Instead, the state and its institutions were constructed so that they could neither survive Gaddafi nor challenge him.⁸ It is therefore hardly surprising that those who took over after Gaddafi’s overthrow in 2011/2012 faced a double challenge: building state institutions and holding the country together.

Both tasks turned out to be very difficult, and, roughly a decade after Gaddafi was overthrown, one can barely speak of a functioning state called Libya. Instead, Libya is divided into several parts, which are only able to work inwards with difficulty. Following the Western understanding of states, it is difficult to consider such territories as functioning states, which is why they are often labeled “failing” or “failed.”

Where the state is more institutionalized, those individuals who try to use state power for their own purposes face more difficulties. It is almost cynical to note that the strong institutionalization of the state during the apartheid in South Africa provides the institutional foundation for the postapartheid state that is extremely stable and resistant to attempts to undermine its institutions. The apartheid state displayed its sovereignty through the entire territory, and this penetration – which in the days of apartheid was by no means benevolent to the black majority – is relied upon by today’s South Africa. Elsewhere as well, state institutions have proved resilient to attempts by governments to manipulate them for their own ends. An early example of this is Mauritius, where the government of Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam declared a state of emergency in 1971 after riots had taken place. More than a few feared that Mauritius would slip into an authoritarian system. In 1976 the constitutional possibilities of the government were exhausted, and it was forced to hold elections. It then carried them out, for there was no consensus within the government or within the state to govern beyond the possibilities offered by the constitution.⁹ Recent examples where there are resilient state institutions include Nigeria and Senegal, where parliaments refused to give their consent to extend the presidential terms of Olusegun Obasanjo and Abdoulaye Wade respectively, or Kenya and Malawi where courts annulled national elections (see below). It is these examples that support the argument of Posner and Young that the institutionalization of states is advancing.¹⁰ Yet, the example of Nigeria also demonstrates that,

within a state, functioning state institutions and nonfunctioning state institutions can coexist. For, as highlighted by the situation in northern Nigeria, the government is scarcely in a position to sustain its monopoly on the use of force throughout the country. Just as there were gaps in sovereignty in the colonial state (see [Chapter 3](#)), these continue to persist today.

Nonetheless, even weak states have an astonishing capacity to function, namely in controlling the flow of foreign funds, especially aid payments, as is aptly described in Frederick Cooper's metaphor of "gatekeeper states."¹¹ In such states, there is weak internal control and external dependence. African leaders inherited such states from the colonial powers, but exacerbated the negative consequences of this type of state for there is no longer any external power – in other words the colonial power – that controls the gate. Instead, there is an ongoing struggle within the state to control it. Closely related is the fact that even the nonconsolidated African states can refer to the third element of the classical three-element doctrine of states, namely a state territory. The presence of this element helps to explain why many territories, despite immense challenges regarding constitutive peoples and state power, are commonly regarded as states – and why they become beneficiaries of development aid payments. Every country in Africa has a state territory. Thus these states exist on paper through the territories formed by the colonial powers, and they obtain external sovereignty through being recognized by other states or international organizations, a phenomenon that is also called "negative sovereignty"¹² or "international legal sovereignty."¹³ However, such states are barely able to work inwards. They lack internal sovereignty or "positive sovereignty,"¹⁴ referring to the ability of the government to provide public goods to its people, as well as exercising both a control function and a monopoly on the use of force in the state territory.

All this makes it clear that state-building is a process, a process that has been hardly completed anywhere, as states are more

breathing beings than static constructions – in Africa and beyond. Changes are bound to follow. There is no shortage of ideas for the future shaping of African states, and a process is under way in which more and more proposals derive from African actors, challenging the European concept of states. Linking socioeconomic development with a mechanism for mutually controlling democratization and state consolidation through the African Peer Review Mechanism (see [Chapter 8](#)) is just as worth mentioning here as the attempts to curtail coups and thereby strengthen the rule of law (see [Chapter 9](#)). In addition, more and more African intellectuals are mapping out the states of the future. They talk about the need for Africa to decide for itself what it wants. As a result, it should consider orienting itself more on concepts of coexistence and well-being such as *ubuntu*, *noflaye*, or *imihigo* that situate individuals in a community as well as promote humanism and the well-being of every individual. Whatever the case, so these accounts go, African states should emancipate themselves.¹⁵

Political Order and Democratization

Four major upheavals of political systems in Africa can be identified since decolonization. Taken together, these have resulted in a complex set of political systems on the continent. The first upheaval originated with the colonial powers, namely the transfer of power to national elites and in many cases the installation of democratic structures that allowed for a distribution of power in the postcolonial states (see [Chapters 2 and 3](#)).

This upheaval was followed by a second one, in which these structures were dissolved. The mechanisms leading in Zambia to the concentration of power in President Kenneth Kaunda are exemplary for several cases in postcolonial Africa. After Kaunda had initially only criticized the opposition, he increasingly turned unwilling to tolerate it. In an environment in which there was no experience with or

tradition of democracy the opposition parties were eventually banned, and a one-party system was formed.¹⁶ Ideology was monopolized and everyone who opposed Kaunda's ideology was seen as an enemy of the country. The president headed the party - which itself did little programmatic work but was built around Kaunda's ideas. Kaunda controlled which candidates were nominated in upcoming elections, ensuring that no one arose who posed any threat to him. If necessary, the electoral rules were adapted overnight so that unpleasant candidates could be excluded from voting lists. Learning from the colonial powers, Kaunda also used a "carrot and stick tactic" and one of "divide and rule."¹⁷ At the same time, a personality cult had developed around Kaunda.

Based on this mechanism, "Big Men," that is to say the autocratic, often corrupt, and often totalitarian men (see below), established themselves in the years after decolonization, and, with a few exceptions such as Botswana or Mauritius, they undermined attempts shortly before decolonialization to ensure a distribution of power. In the process, the Big Men were often supported by the former colonial powers, the USA or the Soviet Union, both of which were anxious to preserve or expand their spheres of influence. While presidents like Kaunda or Senghor in Senegal ruled in authoritarian fashion though largely without violence, there were also brutal leaders such as Idi Amin in Uganda, or Francisco Macías Nguema, who ruthlessly suppressed all opposition in Equatorial Guinea in the style of the Cambodian tyrant Pol Pot. In many cases the justification given for authoritarian rule was that it was the only way to establish stable political conditions. Democracy thus fell victim to political stability - something mainly due to international constraints, namely the Cold War setting (see [Chapter 4](#)). The result of the second upheaval, then, was that multiparty systems had turned into one- or no-party systems and that power had been personalized. The phase of "Bigmanity" was under way.¹⁸ Ethiopia and Liberia, the only two countries that had not been colonized, already had authoritarian rulers, an emperor and

president respectively, in office when most of the other African states were becoming independent.

The third upheaval came with the end of the Cold War, which along with the onset of conflicts (see [Chapter 10](#)) and the failure to consolidate and economically develop the African states, also ended the “postcolonial phase.” The label “postcolonial” was less used thereafter.¹⁹ “By subtle metamorphosis, the bureaucratic authoritarianism of the colonial state legacy became the patrimonial autocracy almost everywhere ascendant by the 1970s. [... T]his pathway led to the economic and political bankruptcy afflicting most states by the calamitous 1980s, and the battered, delegitimated – and weak – state that faced the democracy moment of 1990.”²⁰ Indeed, a wave of democratization hit several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa; sixteen countries that did not have a multiparty system before had held elections by 1994.²¹ The North African countries were only touched by this wave years later, during the Arab Spring of 2010/2011. Starting with Benin in 1991, democratic structures took hold in many African countries. For the most part commencing with mass protests and international pressure to allow opposition parties, many presidents saw it as a necessity to open up their political systems and carry out reforms.²² They were particularly inclined to undertake reforms if these promised to keep them in power, or if the costs of maintaining their authoritarian rule were becoming too high.²³

An example of this third upheaval is Ghana. From the mid-1960s onwards, that country had alternating military and civilian governments and was faced with economic instabilities. In 1981, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings assumed power through a coup, banned political parties and started to work toward economic growth with the help of the IMF and the World Bank. Some of Rawlings’ policies were successful whereas others failed. While he could point to an economic growth and managed to bring political stability, he failed to “forge a nationalistic ethos.”²⁴ This left “the country in a

paradoxical combination of both stability and flux. Stability was a result of the longest period of unchanged government since the demise of Kwame Nkrumah's regime in 1966; flux was apparent in the unrequited demands and aspirations of many Ghanaians."²⁵ Since political parties were banned, people organized in clubs. Moreover, trade unions as well as churches became platforms to express opposition such as to the structural adjustment programs that Rawlings implemented. Rawlings long opposed multiparty elections but eventually gave way to them in 1991, when he suggested a roadmap to a new constitution, which was adopted by a referendum in 1992 with 92 percent of the votes. That constitution allowed for political parties. While there is disagreement about the intentions of Rawlings' decision to allow for multiparty elections,²⁶ the view prevails that Rawlings mastered the transition well and managed to stay in power through free and fair election as most observers described the subsequent vote.

The events in Ghana and in Benin as well as in South Africa where apartheid came to an end and democratic elections took place in 1994, plus similar events elsewhere, contributed to the fact that many observers in this phase assumed that the democratization of African countries would advance steadily. The introduction of term limits was seen as an example of how even the Big Men were ready to prepare their departures – a development that was appreciated by Western countries. An observation underlined these changes: previously, hardly any former leaders lived in the country they once ruled as they either were forced to flee, killed, or died in office, but the presence of these leaders became an increasingly common phenomenon, giving rise to the assumption that democracy and democratic transitions would prevail.²⁷

In some of the countries that were democratized in the 1990s, there has been a return to more authoritarian structures in the 2000s and especially after 2010 – marking the fourth major upheaval.²⁸ While some states like Benin or Ghana continued to follow the path to

democratization, elsewhere hybrid regimes developed, combining elements of democracy and autocracy. These were especially characterized by strong presidents so that the notion of “presidentialism” became prominent over time.²⁹ The notion that China had achieved its economic ascent because of its strict political leadership played a part in this return to more authoritarian structures – or at least it provided a good justification for it. Tanzania is a good example to show how countries that had democratized returned to a more authoritarian style of government. There, the elections in 2015 were seemingly a turning point toward more democracy as the opposition got as much votes as never before. In fact, however, they heralded the authoritarian rule of John Pombe Magufuli.³⁰ The president and his party closed political space when they curbed the freedoms of speech, of the press, and of assembly and became less tolerant of opposition parties and public dissent. However, it was less so the president who pushed this agenda initially than his party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution), which had ruled since independence. They had passed the relevant bills that restricted political space even before Magufuli was nominated to run for the presidency. It seems as if this policy “follows in a long tradition of dominant parties in hybrid regimes that turn to more authoritarian forms of rule as the threat from the opposition grows,”³¹ in their attempt to hold on to power by all means.

The repeal of earlier introduced term limits and shrewd interpretations of constitutions are similarly representative of the partial abolition of democratic structures taking place during the fourth upheaval. [Figure 7.1](#) shows where there were legally fixed term limits and where these still exist or were abolished yet again. As shown there, the trend is clearly toward introducing and then eliminating them as exemplified by Senegal. In that case, there has been a back and forth regarding term limits over the past decades. There have been no fewer than nine reforms and one circumvention regarding term limits between 1970 and 2016, often meant to

liberalize political competition while also constraining competition; hence the reforms regarding term limits have been embedded in larger reform packages.³³ If we assume that democracy is the cause of term limits and not vice versa, this picture of the present situation as pictured in Figure 7.1 should come as little surprise.³⁴ In order to uphold a democratic facade – also toward donors – African presidents have become increasingly creative, precise, and comprehensive over the years in justifying the abolition of term limits.³⁵ One consequence (or maybe fun-fact) of this development of having longer term limits is that African presidents are getting older on average. While they were fifty-two years old on average in 1980, that average increased to sixty-six in 2019: “The continent’s greying leaders are in no hurry to leave, a sentiment expressed funkily by Mr Bongo in his 1977 song ‘I wanna stay with you.’”³⁶




Figure 7.1 Presidential term limits in Africa³²

The Arab Spring and its aftermath caused the North African states to go through the third and fourth upheavals in much less time than the rest of Africa. Nonetheless, the result has been the same. In Egypt, when the democratically elected President Morsi fell from power, it meant that democratic institutions that had been introduced only a few months earlier after the fall of Hosni Mubarak, were overthrown. In Tunisia, by contrast, the democratic structures established during the Arab Spring have by and large been able to hold. In Algeria and

Morocco, governments reacted by making reforms – and warning of a return to civil war in the case of Algeria – thereby escaping the turmoil of the Arab Spring.

The events in North Africa reflect the realization that there was a significant difference between the first two upheavals and the last two. While the nationalization of power through decolonization encompassed all African states (bar the noncolonized Ethiopia and Liberia) and the formation of authoritarian systems headed by Big Men encompassed the vast majority of African states, democratization and its partial reversal only took place in some states. Thus, the situation for analysts – especially for democracy researchers – has become more unclear, something which Gabrielle Lynch and Gordon Crawford summarize well when speaking of a “reality of contradictory trends.”³⁷

Strategies for Maintaining Power

As in other regions of the world, leaders in Africa also seek to maintain their power. If they work in democratic systems, they attempt to convince voters through words and deeds. In authoritarian systems, the situation is different. In essence, the repertoire of opportunities for authoritarian rulers to remain in power includes four elements that are rarely used individually but in a combination. First, building a neopatrimonial system of rule along with a patronage network in order to keep the population in a dependent relationship; second, violence or threats of it against those who (potentially) resist; third, manipulation of elections in order to preserve a democratic facade; and fourth, a cultural pillar that is used to indoctrinate the citizens.

Neopatrimonial Rule and Big Men

Despite occasional criticism, neopatrimonialism is the concept most commonly used by scholars to describe and explain the political order

in several African countries.³⁸ The concept has its origins in Max Weber's typology of rule (*Herrschaftstypologie*) in which he describes three types of rule, two of which are relevant here: traditional and legal-rational rule. Rule by tradition is based on a belief in an order and authority that has always existed. Closely associated with traditional rule is the concept of patrimonialism, which Weber understands as including inter alia the formation of a personal administrative (and military) staff for the ruler, which helps the ruler to make the population into subjects.³⁹ In such systems, an individual rules through power and prestige and regards the population, which has no rights of its own, as part of his household. Power is personalized in the individual at the top. By contrast, legal-rational rule that shapes today's Western states and is also referred to as "rule of bureaucracy" is characterized by a different legitimation of those who rule and perceives a different linkage between rulers and the administrations. Accordingly, rulers legitimize themselves through legality - one could also say that they come to power through procedures governed by law. The public administration similarly legitimizes itself through legality, that is to say through law-governed activity but likewise through competence.⁴⁰ Since African states contain both elements of legal-rational rule and of patrimonialism, Samuel Eisenstadt introduced the term "neopatrimonialism" in the early 1970s to describe this hybrid form.⁴¹ This way of exercising rule became the dominant one in postcolonial Africa, also because in many places the reluctance of the Big Men to distinguish between a private and an official self "corresponds to the normal forms of social organization in precolonial societies."⁴²

By focusing on the individual at the top, the concept of neopatrimonialism illustrates that patronage networks are tied to one person, and that the loss of that person also causes changes within the network or, under specific circumstances, lets the network collapse. Neopatrimonial systems are thus dependent on individuals and more susceptible to major changes than institutionalized systems - which

are able to operate independently of individuals.⁴³ From the vantage point of those at the top of the patronage network, it is important to secure power so that there will be no competitors endangering their position and upsetting their network. Even though “the presence of some extremely powerful people operating behind or partly behind the scenes should not be discounted, their influence has probably been overrated: the almost constant internal feuding that characterizes patrimonial leadership more often than not targets and frequently neutralizes those who get too close to the ruler.”⁴⁴

The phenomenon of neopatrimonialism is closely related to the phenomenon of the “Big Man.”⁴⁵ The latter concept, which originally stems from anthropology, focuses on those individuals who preside over a patronage network.⁴⁶ The concept characterizes the Big Man as someone who has appropriated or acquired power while also amassing wealth. He distributes some of that power and wealth in his network, receiving political support in return. That support in turn helps him to accumulate more wealth through the exploitation of additional resources.⁴⁷ In addition, the Big Man makes use of status symbols that are selected from the social notions appropriate in his country. These together with his status as a rich and powerful man, mean that his followers want to maintain a relationship with him. He thus does not necessarily have to control them or compel with force, for his supporters usually come by on their own, seeking to benefit in economic matters and in matters of safety and social welfare. Often, the Big Man brazenly uses this personalization of power for his own purposes. Mobutu, the former president of Congo-Kinshasa, is a prime example of the Big Man. In an interview in 1988, he candidly admitted: “I have a lot of money. According to my estimate, somewhere under 15 billion CFA francs in all. Is that such an exorbitant sum for somebody who, for 22 years, has been a great country’s head of state?”⁴⁸

The personalization of power creates a paradox.⁴⁹ By refusing to consolidate the state that he heads, the Big Man is actually sawing off

the legs of his own chair for he is undercutting state institutions and has no other institutional basis beyond patronage and violence for retaining his office. In such personalized systems, there are no more checks and balances because the state is an informal system.

Elections served (and continue to serve) to maintain a democratic facade. However, they are controlled in neopatrimonial systems so that the Big Man remains in office – either through manipulation and occasional violence, or without those means if his patronage network is effective enough on its own (see below). Such a democratic facade has an important function for the Big Men, as on account of weak institutions, such rulers are unable to control the entire territory of the state. Through opportunities for political participation such as elections, they attempt to stop any pressure in the first place from arising within the population since they are not necessarily able to control such pressure once it becomes stronger. Thus a democratic element was, even at the high point of authoritarian rule in 1970s, “an important reference point for even the most authoritarian regimes.”⁵⁰ It goes without saying that it is difficult to overcome such a neopatrimonial system because it is so deeply entrenched in the society and undermines the state itself. It is likewise clear that such a system is one of the biggest obstacles to the democratization of the African countries concerned.⁵¹ This is elucidated by the following two examples.

In the course of the 1990s, President Robert Mugabe lost much of his popularity in Zimbabwe and failed in 2000 to win a majority for a new constitution through a referendum. Around the same time and capitalizing on the failed referendum, the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was founded, which managed to channel resistance to Mugabe’s rule. Mugabe concurrently came under pressure within his own party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front, or ZANU-PF. At that time, the country was effectively ruled by a body that met unofficially: the Joint Operational Command (JOC), which brought together the top military leaders, the

police and intelligence chiefs, as well as the head of the central bank – all under Mugabe’s leadership.⁵² The events that took place after the failed referendum in 2000 made visible two features of neopatrimonial systems: serving the patronage network and ensuring that no one jeopardizes the power of the Big Man. First, war veterans in Zimbabwe demanded that the long-promised land reform finally be implemented. Mugabe saw in the fulfillment of this demand a way of serving an important clientele and thus allowed the farms of white settlers to be occupied in a well-orchestrated action in 2000. In that process, people suddenly became war veterans who, on account of their age, would never have been able to participate in the liberation struggle of the 1960s and 1970s. The prime purpose of the forced land redistribution was to gratify Mugabe’s network and contain any resistance from below. Mugabe also suppressed resistance within the party leadership by dismissing those who questioned his power, as in what transpired after the Tsholotsho Conspiracy. In November 2004, some leaders of the party met at a place called Tsholotsho to discuss the future leadership of the party. Mugabe learned of this meeting and suspended the participants from the party. In addition, Jonathan Moyo (see below) and Emmerson Mnangagwa fell out of favor. The latter succeeded in returning to the leadership of the country and in rejoining the JOC. One reason why this happened was because Mnangagwa was dangerous to Mugabe – as demonstrated by the successful coup of 2017 – and Mugabe therefore deemed it better to include him in his inner circle than to exclude him.

Mnangagwa became an important pillar in Mugabe’s attempt to secure his power and is considered as the central figure in Operation Murambatsvina (“move the rubbish”), the aim of which was to deliberately destroy “illegally built” houses in those Zimbabwean townships where the MDC had its strongholds. The implicit goal of this operation was to intimidate the population so that the 2008 elections would turn out in Mugabe’s favor (see [Chapter 9](#)). Despite the violence carried out by ZANU-PF, the election resulted in a strong

outcome for the MDC, which, together with international pressure, ultimately forced Mugabe to form an “inclusive government” with the MDC. This government was subject to the long-term effects of a neopatrimonial system, namely the chipping away at state institutions and the ability of those controlling the network to secure power. As such, ZANU-PF controlled key posts in the new government and hence any government action. The old cliques continued to operate, giving the MDC ministers no chance to do their job properly. ZANU-PF merely had to sit out the years until the next election in order to return to power by itself. Mugabe and his network made sure that the MDC would not be able to use its chance to persuade the population through government action. In fact, the MDC party structure was weakened as it was concentrating on its fights in the government instead of its campaign and its connection with its voters. As a result, Mugabe and ZANU-PF barely needed to manipulate the elections.⁵³

In Cameroon, too, there is a well-functioning network of patronage under longtime president Paul Biya. Government positions and promotions are not awarded or granted according to competence but according to the plan to involve certain individuals and groups.⁵⁴ Simple people in Cameroon receive ceremonies or money to finance family celebrations. Nice-sounding titles like “Member of the Upper Council of the Magistracy” or “Administrative Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party” also help to keep people in the patronage.⁵⁵ Beyond this, Lilian Ndangam describes how patronage works in detail, showing that all the country’s journalists accept *gombo*, which is a “metaphor for various payments, freebies and rewards,” thus allowing them to be influenced as to whom and what they report on.⁵⁶ The consequences of this type of patronage are serious, as journalists describe events, embed them into a larger context, and evaluate them thus having an important control function over the government. *Gombo*, however, effectively undermines this function. In such ways, democratization efforts are weakened, while the neopatrimonial system is strengthened.

Violence and Intimidation

There is probably no country in the world in which there was never an act of violence or even of killing when political conflicts occurred or security forces were deployed. When writing about violence and intimidation in what follows, I am thus more concerned about examining the system behind the violence or the threat of it. In cases where violence or the threat of it are used steadily and systematically to pressure people to commit or omit particular deeds, a culture of fear develops that subordinates people permanently to those state or informal institutions from which the violence or the threat of it emanate.

Up until today, there has hardly been any other African state where violence has been used as often for political control as in Eritrea, which has been ruled by Isaias Afwerki since its independence from Ethiopia in 1993. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) under Isaias' leadership continues to refuse to admit other parties, despite promises it made during the liberation struggle. Those who had not fought alongside the EPLF in the struggle were allowed to return to Eritrea, albeit only as private persons and not as members of a movement competing with the EPLF. In a first wave of oppression, which began immediately after independence, Isaias and his closest circle managed to silence mutinous soldiers, war veterans, and all civil society groups through violence and imprisonment. In a second wave of violence that broke out in 2001 following the war against Ethiopia (1998-2000), Isaias had a group of high-profile politicians and intellectuals arrested whose demands included human rights, an independent judiciary, as well as free and fair elections. They were never seen again. Students campaigning for the release of one of their leaders were deported, and the university was closed down. Disguised by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Isaias went on to abolish press freedom and expelled journalists from the country. "President Isaias – challenged by those who had fought alongside him for so many years – had emerged victorious. He now ruled supreme, surrounded by a

small clique of party, military and security officials, none of whom was his equal.”⁵⁷ Part of the system of oppression is conscription or a form of nonmilitary service, which can also be described as forced labor. When this service was first introduced in 1995, it was limited to eighteen months and was intended as a means of rebuilding the country. In 2002, the time limit was abolished. Regarding the laborers involved in this service, the UN reported that it would “effectively abuse, exploit and enslave them for indefinite periods of time.”⁵⁸ The inhabitants of Eritrea were not permitted to leave the country until the 2018 peace agreement with Ethiopia and the border guards were ordered to shoot anyone attempting to flee, “a power they often abuse to extort money or sex from would-be refugees.”⁵⁹ When the border was reopened after that peace treaty, some wondered whether it was only to get rid of the regime’s opponents.⁶⁰ There is no organization in Eritrea that is not controlled by the EPLF nor is there mobile internet and thus little opportunity to organize protests. Efforts to adopt a constitution were shelved in 2000. To date there have been no elections and no parliamentary sessions since 2002. Nonetheless, there are signs that things could change because the peace with Ethiopia and the fact that Ethiopia can no longer be named a threat means that Isaias has lost the main justification for his repressive policies.⁶¹ However, as long as conscription remains compulsory and the mass exodus continues, it can hardly be assumed that any changes will be lasting.

Along with Equatorial Guinea under Francisco Macías Nguema, Uganda under Idi Amin, and South Africa, Namibia, and South Rhodesia under minority regimes, Eritrea is clearly a particularly extreme example of how governments systematically use and threaten violence in order to remain in power. What is more common than such a widespread threat or use of violence is the targeted use of force in the context of elections, such as Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina depicted above.

Electoral Manipulation

Elections are one of the most important tools of legitimacy inwards vis-à-vis the population and outwards vis-à-vis other governments. That is why they are also repeatedly held in authoritarian systems, with incumbents ensuring through manipulation that the opposition has no chance of winning. In addition to violent intimidations, as discussed in [Chapter 9](#), there are more subtle ways to influence elections. For “the manual of electoral fraud is three chapters long and covers the election campaign, the organization of the polling process, and the counting of the ballots.”⁶² Opposition parties receive less – and less valuable – time on state radio and television as well as space in newspapers for presenting their programs and goals. Moreover, the opposition’s representatives are physically prevented from appearing in election campaigns, for instance when they, their drivers, or pilots are detained. The heads of government offices can order their employees to elect the incumbent while also dismissing supporters of the opposition. Should there be an economic emergency or even a food shortage, loyal followers can be reinforced in their dedication to the incumbent by means of targeted assistance. During the polling process, there can be voters who are multiply registered, no longer alive, or suddenly no longer registered. Leeway for vote rigging can be expanded by means of absentee balloting, the gerrymandering of voting districts, or modifying the accessibility or hours of polling stations. Furthermore, requiring a person to vote in their hometown can result in fraud. And, if such measures are not sufficient, one can manipulate the counting of votes at the polling stations themselves, the transmission of the results to the national electoral commission, or the final tallying of the results.

Out of 143 presidential elections held in Africa between 1990 and 2011, 25 are regarded as free and fair, in other words 17.5 percent. For 118, that is to say, 82.5 percent of them, these attributes do not apply, according to a dataset of Sylvia Bishop and Anke Hoeffler. In an additional 22 elections, complete data are not available. To assess

whether elections were free, seven indicators were taken into account: the legal framework, the capacity and independence of the electoral management body, the electoral rights, the voter register, the campaign process, and the media access. To assess whether the elections were fair, three further indicators were considered: the voting process, the role of officials, and the counting of the votes.⁶³ If one looks only at the criteria that provide information on whether a vote was fair, a different picture emerges, according to which 46 percent of the 143 presidential elections were fair and 54 percent were not. All the same: these numbers underline the fact that unfree and unfair elections are more the rule than the exception in the twenty-year period investigated.

Culture and the Securing of Power

Securing power can also have a cultural element. As Kabou argues:

The African dictatorships are primarily cultural dictatorships. Our autocrats know this so well that they have not developed any political concept that could open up the people's mentality to the outside world. The entire cultural policy of Africa since independence emphasizes traditional values: respecting the boss, revering the elderly, fearing the upper classes and supernatural forces, worshiping money, and glorifying in idolatrous fashion the pre-colonial past.⁶⁴

These cultural elements go together with ritual worship of presidents. This form of veneration becomes visible as streets and buildings bearing his name and pictures of him are visible everywhere. Presidents also like to see themselves as irreplaceable, and they like to be "convinced" by their population to remain in office instead of retiring. Such was the case of Denis Sassou Nguesso, president of Congo-Brazzaville, who claimed in 2016 that his people had refused to let him step down.⁶⁵ Togo's president Gnassingbé Eyadéma (1967–2005) even considered himself as a superhero and had comic books

published with him starring in this role. Among other things, he nurtured his personality cult using the story that he had been the only passenger to survive a 1974 plane crash (although in reality other passengers survived as well) and that he therefore had superhuman powers. Banalities become news items that portray the president on a daily basis in local newspapers or on TV as the great ruler of the land.⁶⁶ A prime example of this is Yoweri Museveni, president of Uganda, whose previous day's activities can be found in *New Vision*, the government's mouthpiece, or in its online edition. On the day I drafted these lines, 13 February 2019, we learn that Museveni attended yesterday's AU summit, where he presented – for the umpteenth time – his thoughts on Africa's political and economic integration. In place of a summary of these thoughts, we find his entire speech.⁶⁷

In countries where a liberation struggle has taken place, as in Zimbabwe or Namibia, there is an additional phenomenon, namely the worship of the heroes of the liberation struggle. At monstrous sites referred to as “Heroes’ Acres,” funerals of the countries’ national heroes are performed in state ceremonies. On these occasions, the heroic acts of the liberation struggle are commemorated, and the youth swears to venerate the heroes of the struggle and to defend their work. Another form of worship is found in Eswatini, where once a year young girls – not always voluntarily – celebrate their chastity and virginity by dancing at a lengthy ceremony in front of others including King Mswati III, who uses the occasion to select additional girls as wives, effectively degrading these women while making reference to culture and tradition.⁶⁸

The prevailing political culture – preserved and used by Big Men – is also one that privileges men over women. Achille Mbembe notes that power in what he calls the *postcolony* is male and that the *polis* is the equivalent of a male society that understands sexuality (and, relatedly, the function of the genitalia) as subordinating women to men.⁶⁹ The spread of Islam and Christianity as well as colonization are

key factors explaining why women lost the important role that they had played in politics and society prior to this phase.⁷⁰ After decolonization, women were deliberately depoliticized in many places, and when they organized politically – if at all – it was mostly within the women's organizations of the governing parties.⁷¹ In this manner, they became part of the patronage network maintained by their respective Big Men.

Notwithstanding, women were (and are) politically active,⁷² yet like the case of Bibi Titi in Tanzania, who was active during the liberation struggle and later on worked alongside President Nyerere⁷³ indicates, they did not move to the front of their movements or parties for a long time, but rather acted in the background. Until the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as president of Liberia in 2006, there had been only three presidents who were women, namely Carmen Pereira in Guinea-Bissau (1984), Sylvie Kinigi in Burundi (1993–1994), and Ruth Perry in Liberia (1996–1997). These were interim leaders and none of them entered office through elections.⁷⁴ Before 2000, there were merely nine women who had competed as candidates for presidential posts in Africa.

The election of presidents such as Johnson-Sirleaf in Liberia or Joyce Banda in Malawi (2012–2014) as well as the appointment of Catherine Samba-Panza (2014–2016) as interim president of the Central African Republic are, however, clear signals of a paradigm shift taking place in some African countries. Even more significant are constitutional and legislative changes, such as those of 2011 and 2012 in Morocco, where, in the context of the Arab Spring, activists first advanced women's rights, dismantled discrimination, and established the indivisibility of human rights between the sexes. And a year later, as a result of a heated discussion that had flared up over a specific case, a law was abolished that had enabled men to avoid punishment for raping women, if they went on to marry the victim afterwards.⁷⁵ These political changes are accompanied and prepared by more and more feminist research, which points to the changes and explains their

need.⁷⁶ As [Chapter 6](#) has shown, de facto gender equality is a key explanation for socioeconomic progress.

Other Actors

Thus far, one might get the impression that only presidents– and in some cases prime ministers or monarchs – count for my emphasis on Bigmanity and neopatrimonial systems. Despite their prominence and importance, however, there are other actors who likewise have influence in the political systems of African states. In the following, I will introduce the most important of them.

Government

The centralization of government business in the office of the president is a continuation of the colonial era; by contrast, the size of cabinets is related to the neopatrimonialism systems. With an average of more than twenty-eight ministers in 2018, African cabinets are rather large. While the island state Seychelles had the smallest cabinet with ten members in 2018, followed by the other island states of Comoros and São Tomé and Príncipe with twelve each (Malawi with fifteen had the smallest one among the mainland states), there were fifty-nine cabinet members in Cameroon and forty-eight in Congo-Kinshasa, making them the largest cabinets on the continent. If we were to include deputy ministers and ministers of states, Uganda would have the largest cabinet in Africa with eighty members.⁷⁷

The posts of ministers are often used to service the upper echelons of a patronage network or to satisfy certain population groups by representing them with an individual minister. The composition of the Zimbabwean cabinet at the time of the Unity Government (2009–2013) exemplifies this well. Altogether, in 2009, that cabinet comprised forty-one ministers (including the president and his deputies) plus fifteen deputy ministers, approximately half from Mugabe’s party and the other half from the MDC, which for its

part had two factions.⁷⁸ On the one hand, the phenomenon becomes visible here that, in a phase following crises or conflicts, cabinets tend to become bloated so as to involve various groups of the population in them. The same picture is seen in the cabinet of Kenya after elections there in late 2007 were overshadowed by massive violence. On the other hand, it becomes clear that leaders like Mugabe also use the size of the cabinet to raise people loyal to him into ministerial offices and thus feed their patronage network. It is striking that in 2009, some thirty years after Zimbabwe's independence, 58 percent of the cabinet members from Mugabe's party had participated in the country's liberation struggle.⁷⁹

One of the strategies used to keep the network of the president submissive is a constant rotation of the ministers. According to our count, a total of ninety-nine different ministers were appointed under Mugabe to his cabinets between 1994 and 2012.⁸⁰ This practice is also common in other states; usually ministers or prime ministers serving under a system-dominating president are dismissed due to "ill-performance." In Guinea-Bissau, between 2000 and 2019, there were no fewer than twenty changes in the office of prime minister, along with repeated reappointments of former prime ministers. In many countries, such as Cameroon, Congo-Kinshasa, Egypt, Sudan, or Zimbabwe, the post of prime minister was abolished after independence, only to be reintroduced later.

Public Administration

Public administrations in Africa are of colonial origin, and have no traditions in the precolonial era. It was the colonial powers who brought the elements of legal-rational rule to Africa.⁸¹ In general, public administration in African countries is rather weak, with only a few exceptions such as South Africa. There are several reasons for this. In 1992, Jonathan Moyo, later an important political figure in Zimbabwe (see above), addressed the role of bureaucracy for the development of African states in one of the few scholarly writings on

the subject. There he remarked that “African systems of administration are staffed by people who lack craft-literacy and craft-competence,”⁸² referring to, on the one hand, people’s ability to develop abstract models and design a management process, and, on the other, the possibility of using those models and abilities. The members of the bureaucracy “have been brought up under well-entrenched systems of extended kinship and political patronage. Their exposure to the ideal of impersonal public service has been brief.”⁸³

Beyond Moyo’s explanation, the low economic performance and the inadequate reform processes of the past – especially the structural adjustment programs – are among the reasons why public administrations are weak. In addition, the pay of qualified and tech-savvy members in the upper ranks of administrations is low and many of them either move to the private sector or leave the country altogether.⁸⁴ Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan shows in an analysis of several western African states that the meager pay for bureaucrats despite their prestige-related positions does not only make corruption a chronic problem but also results in a culture of impunity and less motivation to perform the actual work.⁸⁵ And since there are hardly any administrative schools and little university research and teaching on public administration that is locally anchored, there are no signs of a reversal of this trend.⁸⁶ In Congo-Kinshasa, for example, public administration is more a part of the country’s problem than its solution. Due to its reluctance to implement a development agenda or reform processes and its inability to mobilize and manage financial resources the public administration has lost legitimacy.⁸⁷ And even in South Africa, the country with perhaps the best-functioning public administration in Africa, there is a trend toward recruiting and promoting individuals more on the basis of political considerations than of qualifications.⁸⁸ Since Cyril Ramaphosa became president in 2018 there have been attempts to curb this trend.

It appears that African administrations in a number of places see themselves less as service providers of the people and more as

instruments of the rulers. As such, Afrobarometer data reveal that populations do not feel well treated by public officials. On average across all African states, the survey for 2016–2018 reported that 19.7 percent felt treated with no respect, 24.1 percent with a little bit, 29.1 percent somewhat, and 23.3 percent with a great deal. Here considerable differences can be identified between countries: over two-thirds of people in Cape Verde and Lesotho claim to have received either somewhat or much respect, whereas in Gabon the opposite is the case.⁸⁹ This comparison suggests that there is a connection with how prevalent neopatrimonialism is, for the latter is less pronounced in Cape Verde and Lesotho than in Gabon.⁹⁰

On the basis of these findings, it may come as little surprise that some are considering forming a new public administration that is more in line with local needs and less oriented on the legal-rational rule in the Weberian sense that is so characteristic of Western administrations.⁹¹ At the same time – and contrary to these thoughts and attempts – the trend that is often supported financially by external donors continues to be bringing public administrations more in line with Western standards, as shown for instance in the launching of the Chalimbana Local Government Training Institute in Zambia, in which prospective administrative employees are trained with assistance from abroad.

Legislature and Parties

The role and influence of parliaments on political decisions is something that varies widely in Africa. As such, there are strong parliaments like those in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mauritius, or South Africa.⁹² In South Africa, for instance, parliament is a place of thorough debates and an institution through which opposition parties hold the government to account. Other parliaments in Africa are, however, mostly weak, such as in Chad, Eswatini, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, or Sudan.⁹³ In those cases when parliaments have little influence, they cannot do much to help consolidate democracy.⁹⁴

Where parliaments in Africa are weak, there are often three reasons that prevail. First, there is the authoritarian character of political systems with centralized power, which leave little or no room for a parliament to have its say. Such systems do provide parliamentarians with certain incentives. A survey of 883 members of parliament in seventeen African countries (Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) reveals that only 10 percent of them said that their most important task was to control the government. Meanwhile, 19 percent of the parliamentarians said that their most important task was to represent the population; 9 percent saw their most important job was to write laws, and 25 percent saw their main role debating and adopting laws. But much more important in the eyes of the respondents is supporting their constituencies: 2 percent indicated that receiving money for their district was their most important task, 4 percent said that helping with personal problems was the most important one, and 29 percent saw the development of their voting district as most crucial.⁹⁵ In other words, it was not the primary interest of these members of parliament to exercise their function of controlling the government, something that ought to be present in a system of power sharing and mutual monitoring between the executive and legislative branches.

These results can be explained by the fact that the colonial past and the neopatrimonial character of African political systems have incentivized parliamentarians to focus on their clientele (and their reelection), especially in light of the low pay and poor staffing, instead of controlling the government – toward which they have a relationship of dependence – or bringing bills into the legislative process. Changes take place when there is a critical mass of reform-minded parliamentarians who have been granted more financial resources and better human ones. In these ways, parliaments can strengthen themselves from within, something which in the best case

is flanked by appointing a parliamentary chairperson to go along with the reform agenda. That is the conclusion of a study of six African states (Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda) that outlines a path for how parliaments can become more influential and thus counteract a centralization of power as well as problematic incentives.⁹⁶

The second reason why parliaments frequently remain weak is that the opposition is usually too fragmented to deal effectively with the government. As of late 2019, there were thirty-three political parties in Morocco that played a significant role in the previous elections, and in Algeria there were thirty-two, in Senegal and Tunisia twenty-five each, in Liberia twenty-three, and in Burkina Faso twenty-one to play such a role.⁹⁷ After a long phase of one-party systems, and experimentation with no-party systems as in Eswatini and Uganda, there are no longer one-party states in Africa (apart from Eritrea and Western Sahara) but only multiparty ones. In those systems, the opposition is also mostly splintered owing to the effects of a previous lack of consolidation processes. Yet the fragmentation rarely occurs along ethnic lines, because ethnic affiliation plays no significant role in party preference, with only a few exceptions like Kenya or South Sudan.⁹⁸

Third, many parties are weak because they rarely work programmatically, or they are often little more than an association of the chairman's supporters. Besides a few ethnic parties, there are also parties aimed at forming alliances between ethnic groups, "catch-all parties" that seek to engage the entire population, program-oriented parties, as well as parties oriented toward one person.⁹⁹ Only if governing parties have a solid bureaucracy and do programmatic work are they then able to function as a counterbalance to the president who comes from their ranks.¹⁰⁰ There are only a few such parties, including the ANC in South Africa, that have a considerable say in government policy or are even in a position to bring about a transitions at the presidential level – as suggested by the resignations

of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma there. In Ghana, too, the parties are well organized, rooted throughout the country, and perceived as legitimate.¹⁰¹ Aside from these and a few other exceptions, though, the finding remains that political parties are “the weakest link” in African democracies.¹⁰²

Military

The military – “historically Africa’s quintessential anti-constitutional actor”¹⁰³ – is a factor not to be underestimated, which, unlike in Europe or North America, operates more inwards than outwards in most African states. Mauritius is the only African country that has no standing army. Since decolonization, militaries have repeatedly influenced government action in two ways. On the one hand, by threatening a coup or by actually carrying out one, which would then lead to a civilian government being brought into line or a new government being installed. On the other hand, the military can take power directly into its own hands when military leaders become the heads of state or government, as happened in Egypt after the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi in 2013. Of the ninety-one prime ministers and presidents in office between 1989 and 2014, 45 percent had considerable experience either in a state’s military or in a rebel group.¹⁰⁴

Stephen Akintoye observed in the 1970s that those militaries that overthrew their leaders usually had a dislike of their rulers’ extravagant lifestyle and wished to be different from the politicians whom they were overthrowing. These military leaders thus promised to fight corruption, to show justice to all, to release political prisoners, to initiate a form of national reconciliation, to strengthen the economy, and to return as soon as possible to a civilian-led government. In return, they demanded that the citizens trust them, cooperate with them, and decline taking the law into their own hands.¹⁰⁵ Although today there is a clear positioning against coups d’états, the numbers of which have decreased, it is important to note

that Akintoye's description remains accurate, as shown by the overthrowing of Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso in 2014 (see [Chapter 9](#)). The military, which is often not seen by the population as part of the political classes, still offers hope to many that authoritarian systems can be overcome. Consequently, the military can be a driver and a vicarious agent for such hopes – and produce new rulers. At the same time, what was already true in the 1970s is still true: some military governments fail to fulfill their promises to make space as quickly as possible for civilian governments. Historical examples include Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Compaoré in Burkina Faso, Amin in Uganda, Mengistu in Ethiopia, and al-Bashir in Sudan. Obiang in Equatorial Guinea, who came to power in 1979 through a coup, is still ruling.

Judiciary

In one of the few political science papers on African courts, Karen Mingst observed in 1988 that the relative ignorance of political scientists regarding the subject had four causes. First, it reflects the relative insignificance of courts in Africa. Second, there is a political culture, which is based on the colonial experiences during which given the authoritarian nature of the colonial state there have been either no courts or the colonial population had had no access to them. Third, the challenges of the postcolonial phase were so great (see above and [Chapter 3](#)) that strengthening the court system was not a priority. Lastly, it can hardly be assumed that, due to external dependence (see [Chapters 4 and 5](#)), African states would have been able to develop autonomous institutions, a process that would include courts.¹⁰⁶ Little has changed in this assessment, although the rule of law and thus the importance of courts is on the rise in many African democracies and hybrid systems¹⁰⁷ – something which, however, is mainly due to international pressure and external demands for rule of law. The development of courts' independence is reflected in the Mo Ibrahim Index of Judicial Independence. The value of this index has

increased somewhat throughout Africa since the first survey was completed in 2008.¹⁰⁸

Yet empirical reality is more complex than these figures suggest, as shown by the examples of Kenya and South Africa. In South Africa, President Zuma invited the Sudanese president al-Bashir to an AU summit in 2015, knowing well that his country was obliged to detain the Sudanese president and transfer him to The Hague, where the International Criminal Court had issued a warrant for his arrest. Undeterred by that warrant, however, the Zuma government allowed al-Bashir to enter South Africa. A court in the capital of Pretoria then ruled that al-Bashir was not allowed to leave the country. Yet the government ignored the verdict and got al-Bashir out of the country in a hurry. Presumably related to this incident is the surprising decision made by Zuma two years later to withdraw from the International Criminal Court.¹⁰⁹ This decision was overturned in the end by the country's High Court, which ruled that the decision did not pass parliament and was therefore unconstitutional and invalid. This time Zuma bowed to the court's decision. In Kenya, too, the Supreme Court proved its independence when it annulled the presidential elections of 2017, stating that the election board had failed to verify official results before announcing them. In the first such decision in Africa, it ordered that a new vote must be held – and the contenders accepted the ruling. Something similar happened in Malawi, where in 2020 the Constitutional Court annulled the 2019 elections and ordered a new vote, which the opposition candidate won. While we see in Kenya, Malawi, and South Africa that the courts can exercise a controlling function and uphold the constitution, we see in other countries that the courts are effectively controlled by the government and decide in their favor. In 2015, the president of Equatorial Guinea Obiang went so far as to dissolve the courts by decree so that he might rule without constraints.

In several African countries – and beyond – there are “dual polities.”¹¹⁰ That is, along with state institutions, there are other forms of collective organized decision making. In this context, traditional leaders are a powerful group of actors who, together with state institutions, are creating in many places what Richard Sklar calls “mixed government.”¹¹¹

In order to better understand the significance and role of traditional leaders in Africa, we need to take a look back at the colonial era, as some colonial powers contributed to the fact that traditional leaders survived colonialism as an element of Africa’s political systems.¹¹² Some traditional leaders were even “invented” by the colonial powers. They were used for administrative purposes, which is why Mahmood Mamdani also describes them as “administrative chiefs” who – although the following statement is controversial¹¹³ – often developed into “full-blown village-based despots, shorn of rule-based restraints.”¹¹⁴ The British system of indirect rule in particular needed traditional leaders, in order to close the sovereignty gaps in the colonial state to the greatest extent possible, so that the colonial power did not have to provide any resources for that (see [Chapter 1](#)).

Mamdani argues that unlike in the (capital) cities, where the population was in direct contact with representatives of the colonial power, the villages were mostly controlled by local traditional leaders, who further developed their influence there. While urban populations in many colonies began to organize against European rulers, traditional rural leaders increasingly established themselves, creating and consolidating tribal identities. These continue to have an impact and furnish several African states with a stark distinction between the urban and rural areas. In the cities, the nationalists, who assumed power after independence, were able to “Africanize” the government apparatus, while in the countryside, tribalism prevailed.¹¹⁵ Above all, in several rural areas the population still does not accord legitimacy to the state as much as to the local institutions, of which the traditional

leaders are a part. This is why those leaders are able to retain their influential role and why parallel or mixed governance systems come to be.¹¹⁶

The development of postcolonial state institutions led to a situation in which traditionalism, embodied by the traditional leaders, came into contact with modernism, embodied by the new governments and their bureaucracies. If the traditional leaders were strong enough, they either entered into an alliance with the new government and were used by them to act in the rural areas, or there was a mutual hostility, often meaning that things came to a standstill in many places, because they had a local influence that was difficult to do away with.¹¹⁷

Traditional leaders are therefore a major factor and are increasingly being discovered by research, after the focus had been primarily on presidents following the Cold War and the heyday of Bigmanity.¹¹⁸ For “whether or not they are legitimate in the eyes of researchers, whether or not they were created by colonial officials, local rulers are an important factor in African politics that cannot be ignored.”¹¹⁹ Even clearer on this is Richard Sklar who specifies that “[t]he *kgotla* [in Botswana], the *Alake* [in Nigeria], and the marabouts of Senegal exert power in their societies regardless of one or another academic interpretation of their roles.”¹²⁰ Recent scholarship and surveys confirm this perspective. For example, one study shows that in nineteen African countries traditional leaders are viewed as legitimate, and many respondents think they should play a more important role.¹²¹ What is more, Afrobarometer data reveal that on average populations have confidence in traditional leaders. This confidence is most pronounced in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Senegal. In those places, more than 60 percent of respondents say they have a lot of trust in traditional leaders.¹²² This ensures these leaders’ influence, which can also be worth money in neopatrimonialism systems, as shown by the example of Nigeria, where traditional leaders expect to be kept well disposed. One governor avowed: “[Y]ou will read that as

corruption. But me, I probably will read that as political survival, because I first have to survive before I can become incorruptible.”¹²³

A country’s political leadership thus usually does well to get on the good side of the traditional leaders, inasmuch as the latter’s local legitimacy can be leveraged to mobilize support for the ruling party and government.¹²⁴ For, similar to the colonial governments, they cannot extend their rule to the entire state territory; rather, state leaders need the local support that traditional leaders can provide them, especially in rural areas. As shown by the example of Nigeria, this condition can lead to patronage and mutual dependence becoming determining factors. Yet it can also foster democracy because national governments are eager to act in ways that promote political and socioeconomic development in line with the positions of traditional leaders. In such cases, there is a paradox at work: nonelected individuals end up helping democracy.¹²⁵

Civil Society and Nongovernmental Organizations

In the light of weak state institutions – a condition that has been encouraged by the structural adjustment programs (see [Chapter 4](#))¹²⁶ – it is not surprising that national and international nongovernmental actors such as trade unions, NGOs, churches, companies, and international development organizations like the World Bank play an important role in many places. In several cases, they even assume governmental tasks and provide public goods, such as health care and education. This led some to speak of shared governance¹²⁷ or of “twilight institutions.”¹²⁸

Indeed, since 1990, significant influence has been gained by national civil society actors. Large amounts of development aid that flow through NGOs into their destination countries played an important role in this development. What has been termed “NGO-ization” essentially means that these organizations can then put pressure on the government, especially internationally operative NGOs like Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International. Yet, local NGOs

are influencing governments, too. Gregory Mann goes back further in time and demonstrates how far the influence of NGOs can reach. He argues, with reference to the Sahel zone, that these organizations reprogrammed the new political leadership right after decolonization, thereby making a key contribution to the phenomenon of nongovernmentality in the region that made people ask what a government actually is, given that they have not experienced such an institution much while NGOs have provided public goods for decades. With his historical analysis, Mann helps us to view the current weakness of state institutions not only as a failure of local elites or as a result of the economic policies of the 1980s and 1990s. Rather, according to his findings, the root of this often-diagnosed nongovernmentality lies in the early phase after independence and is linked to the role played by NGOs.¹²⁹ Kenya likewise reflects the far-reaching influence of NGOs. For Kenya's political process became more democratic by integrating former NGO staff into the government, by increasing the voices heard in the decision-making process, by the lobbying efforts of the NGOs, and by the imitation of the NGOs in its governance.¹³⁰

Against the background of NGOs' influence, it comes as little surprise that governments like that of Ethiopia are trying to suppress the influence of NGOs by means of tougher laws. Governments can, for example, set a higher percentage ceiling on foreign financing and make it more difficult for organizations to perform their work. In so doing, these governments get rid of disagreeable NGOs and shape others that show them more sympathy while avoiding critical issues. Not only in the countries where they operate but also outside them, NGOs are criticized on grounds of their dependence on foreign funds, which obstructs the long-term work of NGOs and in addition runs counter to the idea of African ownership.¹³¹ According to this critique, NGOs do not help to emancipate African populations but instead reinforce relationships of dependence.¹³² In addition, dysfunctional outcomes sometimes result from the variety of NGOs in African

countries, the lack of coordination among them, and their competition for funding.¹³³ As a result, the organizations lose sight of their immediate goal.

It is not only formal organizations that are able to channel and transmit opinions. Rather, modern communication technologies and social media are also helping civil society organize itself on an ad hoc basis without needing an institutional platform. This was evident during the Arab Spring (2010–2011), or in the downfall of Compaoré in Burkina Faso (2014) that had been preceded by mass protests aided by online mobilization.¹³⁴ What was already clear in 2009 in Iran was once more demonstrated in the Arab Spring, namely the increased organizational ability and speed of the masses through the use of social media, which “revolutionized the collective imagination of what is possible.”¹³⁵ Hence, some governments, like that of Biya in Cameroon in 2017, have been shutting down the Internet as soon as they sense the danger of protests against their government.

In democratic countries like South Africa, social media has also been used to organize protests. As such, the student protests beginning in 2015 under the motto “Rhodes Must Fall” (#RMF), a reference to a statute of Cecil Rhodes on the campus of the University of Cape Town, which students wanted to take down as Rhodes represents the colonial and racist thinking they were fighting, was organized through social media. Students used social media also to promote political messages such as their calls for free access to higher education and for the decolonization of the curriculum. Social media, Twitter in particular, creates a space for discussion and opened ways for youth participation in it. This virtual discussion can then enter more traditional media and spark public debates. In the case of South Africa, students were able to set the news agenda.¹³⁶ Potentially, their protests signaled a new “post-transitional phase” of the public culture in South Africa.¹³⁷

The work of local groups cannot automatically be equated with work against the government or the pursuit of a liberal-cosmopolitan order. Civil society actors have also been active in supporting

governments and known to go along with an authoritarian system. Nic Cheeseman describes this as follows: “The relationship between civil society and the state is therefore best conceptualized as a two-way valve that enabled authoritarian regimes to maintain social control, but at times empowered non-state actors to exert leverage on the government.”¹³⁸ Examples include religious communities such as the Catholic Church in Congo-Kinshasa, which supported Mobutu’s rule, and Pentecostals in Nigeria who are increasingly influential, most notably their pastor Temitope Balogun Joshua, sometimes referred to as “Prophet.” The latter is not only considered the third-wealthiest man in Nigeria but also has admirers across the continent, even some presidents who at least indirectly take advantage of his popularity. For “pastorpreneurs” like Joshua have contacts at the top levels of states whom they sometimes also assist with sensitive tasks such as arms deals.¹³⁹ At the same time churches can serve as forums for resistance against authoritarian rulers, as Ghana shows (see [Chapter 7](#)).

The debate over the influence of nonstate actors is often accompanied by the description of transnational phenomena, in other words those political, economic, and cultural processes that take place across the borders of a state. There is obviously a link to globalization, which opens the door to such a transnational perspective, indicating that “non-state actors are the conveyors of international regulations and activities without states having formally delegated the task to them.”¹⁴⁰ James Ferguson maintains that the classical distinction made by political scientists between the local, state, and global levels – which he refers to a “vertical topography of power” – is increasingly coming under pressure in Africa. The weakness of states described above is part of the explanation for this. The other is that the lower and upper levels, the local and the global, are so strongly integrated into a transnational context that it becomes impossible for states to exercise complete sovereignty.¹⁴¹ This argument is underlined by the influence of mining or oil companies as transnational actors at the local and global level, and by the operations of NGOs like Amnesty

International or the International Committee of the Red Cross. Transnational processes and nonstate actors are part of a phenomenon referred to in the literature as “governance without government.”¹⁴² This phenomenon is not exclusively but more likely present in areas with weak statehood, such as Somalia where there is, in fact, no anarchy but instead a control and regulation structure that is beyond state institutions and that is largely supported by transnational actors.¹⁴³ Hence, nonstate actors can, like traditional leaders, become part of a “mixed government.”

Intra-African Cooperation and Integration

Political and economic cooperation within Africa has a long history.¹ Diplomats were sent from an early point in time between some regions. Trade and trade routes were organized across territories, especially between the coastal regions and the hinterland.² In western Africa, different states and groups repeatedly came together to form larger political units, such as the Ashanti Empire in what is today Ghana or the Sanhaja Confederation in today's Mauritania.³ Intra-African cooperation was therefore nothing new when in 1889 the British Cape Colony and the Orange Free State set up a customs union, forming the nucleus for the Southern African Customs Union, which a few years later was joined by the British protectorates of Bechuanaland (today's Botswana) and Swaziland (today's Eswatini) as well as the colony of Natal. In 1945, Egypt, the only decolonized territory in Northern Africa at that time, became a founder member of the Arab League. And shortly before and right after independence, intensive efforts were made to prevent a Balkanization of Africa (see [Chapter 2](#)), which, among other things, meant that the Mali Federation emerged for a brief time and that Zanzibar and Tanganyika merged to become Tanzania. Concurrently, there were efforts made to establish a United States of Africa. Such a vision of a unified Africa had been nourished since the end of the eighteenth century from ideas that had been considered repeatedly in the African diaspora, which promoted Pan-Africanism.⁴

Intra-African cooperation was as multifaceted then as it is today. In this chapter, I will focus on the postcolonial phase in which the independent states – or mostly their leaders – maintained and still maintain bilateral contacts that were sometimes close and at others less so and in which they founded intergovernmental organizations that were sometimes close and at others less so. At the continental level, those organizations include the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its successor organization, the African Union (AU), as well as regional economic communities on the subregional level like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In the following, I will introduce not only some of these organizations but, even more, the driving forces and difficulties of a (lack of) deeper political and economic integration. I will also discuss various explanatory models for these phenomena.

Attempts at Integration and Refusal to Integrate

In the phase after independence, which took place right in the middle of the Cold War, almost none of the African states had global ambitions. Instead, the politics of these countries were directed inwards.⁵ Algeria and Egypt are the two exceptions to that rule, for both were leaders in the Non-Aligned Movement and Algeria also had tremendous influence in the UN.⁶ The South African apartheid government was also active internationally, particularly to justify its race policy and to find support. It was not difficult for African states to attach themselves to different states or international organizations. As such, they were able to maintain close ties with their former colonial power; they could turn to either the USA or the Soviet Union; they could show solidarity with other former colonies in Africa or other world regions; or they could undertake efforts to create a federation of African states. It was not necessarily a problem to latch onto multiple

states or groups of them simultaneously and hence many states went ahead and did so.

In this phase, in which one-party systems and authoritarian regimes arose in most of these countries (see [Chapter 7](#)), foreign policy was made by the head of state. In 1966, William Zartman noted with reference to West Africa that foreign relations occasionally came to a complete standstill whenever a president was engaged in other activities or was on vacation “since there [was] no alternative figure or institution qualified to handle them.”⁷ In other words, foreign policy was mostly a personalized affair and less an institutionalized one. It was in such a context that African heads of state discussed the possibility of political integration on the continent.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there were essentially two camps on what collective cooperation between independent Africa states might look like. On the one hand, there were those who spoke out against a Balkanization of Africa, making attempts to advance a deep political integration of the independent states with the aim of founding the “United States of Africa.” These more radical states and their governments – which included Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Morocco, as well as Algeria’s exile government – formed the Casablanca Group, led by Ghana’s Nkrumah and Guinea’s Touré. These states were also driven to obtain political and economic independence from the former colonial powers and saw this as a possibility if they were to cooperate closely with one another. Although they shared this common goal, they remained suspicious of each other as the issue was who would ultimately lead these United States of Africa. The Casablanca Group was opposed by the Monrovia Group, which included Liberia and Nigeria as well as most states in Francophone Africa. That group was not promoting an “African Nationalism” but rather a nationalism focused on their now independent states. It wished to focus on their countries, holding onto newly gained sovereignty, and it remained skeptical of a project of political integration with other African states. The fronts were

hardened and an agreement between the two camps seemed almost impossible. In this phase, the Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie brought himself to mediate between the two camps, inviting them in 1963 to a conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital. The result of that conference was the founding of the OAU.

What all the African states could agree on at that Addis Ababa conference were what would become the twin goals of the OAU: freedom and unity. The goal of freedom was combined with a call to liberate the remaining colonies and those countries with white minority regimes. The term unity was elastic, however; it hardly referred any longer to the idea of establishing the United States of Africa but rather to a solidarity between the member states. Factually, it was the Monrovia Group that carried the day with its demands. Indeed, different from the dreams of Pan-Africanists like Nkrumah, the creation of the OAU – whose core principles included the protection of state sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states⁸ – signaled a preliminary end to the United States of Africa. A year later, in 1964, the colonial boundaries were formally acknowledged with the Cairo Declaration of the OAU in which the African states recognized each other and their respective sovereignty.⁹ Given that, one has to question the repeated assumption that the OAU was an institutionalization of Pan-Africanism. Rather, it should be argued that the organization sealed the preliminary end of the Pan-Africanist vision of creating the United States of Africa and was no more – but also no less – than the prologue to institutionalized multilateral cooperation among all African states.

Beyond the OAU there were other integration projects such as the Arab League, which in 1945 was also launched as a postcolonial project.¹⁰ Although the League also includes eleven African states from Mauritania to Somalia, the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula remain the principal sites of its activity. Consequently, it will not be discussed in detail in this book. Instead, I will limit myself here to drawing some parallels with the OAU, to demonstrate that the

OAU was not a special case in history. The Arab League's founding phase was similar to that of the OAU for there was one camp that favored the founding of a Pan-Arab state and another that favored a loose union of states. Just as in the case of the OAU, the camp prevailed that sought less integration and more national independence. Both organizations had a strict hierarchical set-up, were driven by the heads of state, and had few options to force the member states to follow certain policies. And like the OAU, the Arab League also rapidly became less significant. Even though the League eventually strove to play a larger role in the international arena through its support for the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011, its institutions are still observably weak and remain so since its members insist on preserving their sovereignty.¹¹

At a subregional level, regional economic communities developed parallel to the OAU and the Arab League.¹² Although some of the Maghreb states had already considered forming an economic community in the 1950s, the Arab Maghreb Union was only founded in 1988.¹³ Prior to that, the East African Community emerged in 1967, the ECOWAS in 1975, and the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS) in 1983, whose predecessor, an economic and customs union, had been established in 1964. With the creation of such regional economic communities, African countries entertained the proposal to stimulate economic development through regional economic integration (see [Chapter 5](#)). In the Horn of Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development was established in 1986, primarily as a response to recurring droughts (1974–1984) and their massive consequences, including famine and poverty. In 1980, the states of southern Africa founded the Southern African Development Coordination Conference. The “Frontline States,” as they were called given that they, as independent states, bordered South Africa where the apartheid regime was still in power, aimed to defy the apartheid government in South Africa after Zimbabwe had gained its independence in 1980, thereby eliminating

the last buffer state of the white minority regime in South Africa. From the vantage point of the Frontline States, their efforts to free South Africa (and Namibia) from apartheid needed to be accompanied by economic cooperation, hence the establishment of the organization.¹⁴ The East African Community – comprising Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda – significantly advanced the economic integration of its member states in its ten-year lifespan up to 1977 before it collapsed due to the tensions between Tanzania and Uganda that culminated in a war between the two countries (see below and [Chapter 10](#)). At the same time, the other regional economic communities fell short of the economic expectations. This is also true for the period after 1980 when the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action, emphasizing the need for greater regional integration as a key step toward achieving Africa's economic independence and the economic recovery of the continent (see [Chapter 5](#)).

Obstacles to Integration

There were multiple reasons for the lack of deeper integration within the regional economic communities; they can be divided into technical and economic issues, on the one hand, and political ones on the other, even though that distinction cannot always be made sharply. Among the technical issues were the African governments' lack of enthusiasm for a free market, for foreign investment as well as poorly designed structural adjustment programs of international donors such as the World Bank and the IMF, which proved too focused on nations and not sufficiently on regions.¹⁵ Moreover, low demand for goods and services, minimal trading volumes, weak and varied levels of industrialization within one region, inadequate infrastructure, and the absence of conflict resolution mechanisms were further factors explaining the lack of a deeper regional integration.¹⁶

The political domain was the source of much more fundamental problems, namely the strict adherence to state sovereignty and the resulting reluctance of African leaders to participate in a regional or

continental integration process. As a result, only bilateral and multilateral cooperations could develop but no integration project could be successful in terms of binding the states so closely together that a supranational organization would emerge. In fact, the OAU was deliberately created to be a weak organization.¹⁷ It was run by the heads of state and had few options to enforce compliance, for example through sanctioning. The OAU Secretariat was provided with limited rights and powers. The OAU Secretary General did not even have the right to participate in meetings of the heads of state and government.¹⁸ Strict adherence to state sovereignty and the principle of noninterference, an unwillingness to engage in the OAU, and the continent's general drift into authoritarian rule meant that the OAU was regarded by critics as a "club of dictators."

Differences

Although the OAU was supposed to unify Africa, the African states did not act in concert. Even on one of the twin goals, "freedom," there was not always unity between the states and their leaders. Undoubtedly, the OAU became an important platform from which to denounce ongoing colonization as well as to compel decolonization in the late phase and it was rhetorically uncompromising toward the white minority governments in southern Africa.¹⁹ However, this did not mean that all member states were supporting the liberation struggles in southern Africa or that they boycotted the respective minority governments economically and diplomatically.²⁰ Attempts by Tanzanian president Nyerere and Guinea's president Touré, for example, to oblige OAU member states to bankroll a specially organized African Liberation Committee failed because other heads of state saw the fund as a Tanzanian initiative to be viewed with suspicion.²¹ As a result, the OAU's institutional base for supporting the liberation movements remained weak, and the backing of those movements was effectively dependent on the individual member states. In particular, the radical North African states Algeria and

Egypt, along with Ghana, Guinea, and Tanzania, became the most important bilateral supporters of the liberation movements. President Nasser's nationalist revolution in Egypt and his commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement (see [Chapter 5](#)) became an inspiration to many later African leaders such as Namibia's Sam Nujoma and Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda.²² The political leadership in Algeria likewise attached special importance to the liberation struggle and was interested in exporting its revolution and radical anti-colonial policies.²³ Algeria therefore became an important refuge for freedom fighters. Liberation movements from Angola, Eritrea, Mozambique, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia received military training there, including the later presidents Joaquim Alberto Chissano, Samora Machel, and Nelson Mandela.²⁴

Differences were also visible on a bilateral level. States did not always adhere so closely to the principle of noninterference. The East African Community ultimately failed because of that as the Tanzanian and Ugandan governments intervened in each other's internal affairs, culminating in one of the rare interstate wars of the postcolonial era (see [Chapter 10](#)). Libya under Gaddafi was particularly active, interfering in the internal affairs of several states, backing some and helping to bring down leaders there. In 1973, it even occupied a part of Chad, its southern neighbor.²⁵

At the multilateral level, however, OAU member states adhered to the principle of noninterference. The collective did not criticize any head of state or government of another African country – except for the white minority regimes. A few heads of state complained about this. In the context of the 1978–1979 war between Tanzania and Uganda, Tanzanian president Nyerere sharply criticized the OAU, casting light on the underlying problem, noting that there was a “tendency in Africa that it does not matter if an African kills other Africans. Had [the Ugandan president] Amin been white, free Africa would have passed many resolutions condemning him. Being black is now becoming a certificate to kill fellow-Africans.”²⁶ In 1978 as well,

Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo proclaimed: “We must begin to depart from the diplomatic habit of closing our eyes to what should be deprecated simply because it is happening in an African country or because it is committed by a fellow African leader.”²⁷ Yet little was done in the end. Even after 1990, when South Africa had a black government led by Mandela, it was rebuffed by other African leaders. In 1996, when Mandela criticized Nigeria’s then-president Sani Abacha for executing domestic opponents, the OAU described Mandela’s initiative as “not an African way to deal with an African problem.”²⁸ To underscore his solidarity with other African countries, Mandela thereafter refrained from further criticism.²⁹

Internal disagreements and the reluctance of its member states to identify common positions made it difficult for the OAU to develop political clout; there was an “awareness of impotence.”³⁰ Ultimately, the OAU and regional economic communities (as well as the Arab League) “nurtured the perception of foreign policy as a conclave of the mighty.”³¹ The criticism that the OAU was a club of dictators had thus not materialized out of thin air. But much more important are the questions as to why the states officially insisted on adhering to the principle of noninterference and how they could profit from their OAU membership.

Political Profit

Mutual support and the principle of noninterference were crucial elements to preserve the territorial integrity of states – and to preserve their governments. The OAU was highly helpful in this realm. It played a key role in ensuring that the African states strictly respected the colonial borders. At the same time, the OAU brought recognition to members in terms of negative or international legal sovereignty (see [Chapter 7](#)). In one case, it even granted the barely existing state of Western Sahara international recognition and, in the process, political weight. And the leaders of African states benefitted from this mutual practice of the principle of noninterference. A head of state would run

the risk of losing power if other leaders were to refuse that state recognition or actively intervene in its affairs by supporting, for example, a rebel movement. Consequently, based on the assumption that leaders want to stay in power, they needed to be cautious in how they conduct foreign policy in a volatile environment that does not provide them any guarantees of power. Maintaining good relations with heads of state in the surrounding countries was thus essential and recognition by the OAU or regional economic communities was at a minimum helpful to secure their power.³² At the same time, though, heads of state needed to protect themselves domestically in order to counter resistance that might endanger their power internally (see [Chapter 7](#)). This internal and external balancing process has led Steven David to introduce the term “omni-balancing.”³³ While this concept applied (and still applies in part today) to most African countries, there are other countries such as Botswana or Mauritius where such omni-balancing does not have to occur, since in those states the head of state or government is legitimated democratically, and domestic resistance is thus articulated by constitutional means instead of violent, revolutionary ones.

For many African leaders, regional and continental cooperation has therefore been a means to an end, that is to say it helped enhance their own domestic position and preserved state sovereignty. The assumption is widespread that mutual recognition, which can be translated into political power in a domestic context, was (and is) used purposefully by African leaders.³⁴ To achieve such aims, it was necessary that the secretariats of the organizations remained weak, the member states and their governments strong, and state sovereignty institutionally protected.³⁵ This results in a seeming paradox, for, according to the conventional logic, political integration should inevitably lead to sovereignty being transferred to the supranational institution. Without this transfer of sovereignty, so that assumption goes, an international organization cannot act because it would have neither opportunities nor powers to do so.³⁶ In the case of the OAU

and regional economic communities, though, political integration effectively led (or leads) to a reinforcement of national sovereignty. Hence Fredrik Söderbaum's notion of "sovereignty-boosting."³⁷ Thus, the question arises whether the OAU and the regional economic communities were in fact projects of political, economic, and social integration or whether they were loose associations of states that primarily benefitted specific leaders. The OAU, the regional economic communities, and the Arab League supplied plenty of evidence for the latter conclusion in the period up until the 1990s.

Turning Point, Changes, and New Context

The 1990s were, in many respects, a comprehensive turning point for African politics. And this was not only because the OAU had achieved one of its twin goals, namely the freedom of African states, once apartheid ended in South Africa. The Cold War had also ended, meaning that the superpowers were no longer vying for spheres of influence in Africa (see [Chapter 4](#)). The speed of globalization increased, a new type of war emerged, blurring the lines between war, organized crime, and massive human rights violations (see [Chapter 10](#)), and conflict management became increasingly internationalized. It was in this context that the state collapsed in Somalia and the genocide took place in Rwanda – along with failure of the world community to prevent either of them. The UN had to admit that it was unable to solve all crises on its own. Hence, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali encouraged closer cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in the managing of conflicts, thereby strengthening the latter (see [Chapter 11](#)).³⁸ In sum, one cannot help but recognize that the international environment in which African states have acted since the last decade of the twentieth century has radically changed.

This comprehensive turning point meant that African states would had to reorient themselves in terms of foreign policy. Among other

things, this reorientation brought – like elsewhere – a new wave of regionalization in Africa, the second such wave on the continent since decolonization.³⁹ Many of the regional economic communities underwent reform processes and expanded their responsibilities. Many followed the call of Boutros-Ghali, extending their mandates to the area of security policy.⁴⁰ With the accession of South Africa, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference became the Southern African Development Community, or SADC, and started to develop mechanisms for conflict management. Something similar transpired at the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, which in 1996 became the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or IGAD. Likewise, ECCAS in Central Africa established a regional security architecture in the late 1990s. Just prior to that, the first humanitarian interventions by African countries had taken place. Clearly, ECOWAS in Western Africa was on legally difficult terrain in 1991 when it intervened in the Liberian civil war, for its founding documents did not allow for such an intervention.⁴¹ Nonetheless, this intervention became emblematic of the emerging doctrine of “African solutions to African problems.” The outcome of these developments was that a polycentric security cooperation began to arise in Africa (see [Chapter 11](#)).⁴²

Other regional economic communities, by contrast, limited themselves to economic integration. For example: the East African Community (EAC), newly founded in 2000, does not have a security agenda. The Community of Sahel-Saharan States was created in 1998 with the aim of establishing a free trade area between the member states, and although meanwhile it comprises twenty-nine member states and can thus be considered in numerical terms a serious economic cooperation project, it has never completely shaken off its past as a pet project of Gaddafi. Moreover, it has made little progress in implementing free trade.⁴³ Considerably more serious is the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), founded in 1994, which now extends from Egypt in the north to Zimbabwe in

foreign policy bureaucracies. And the differences are patent. South Sudan spent US\$0.12 billion on wages and salaries in 2016, Ghana spent US\$2.85 billion in the same year, Angola US\$8.56 billion in 2015,⁴⁴ and Morocco spent US\$13.4 billion in 2018.⁴⁵

The consequence of this lack of financial and human resources is that many African countries have a reduced or concentrated diplomatic presence. The resources available are often invested where they will be most profitable to the state and more so its government, which are in Western states and China, as well as at the headquarters of international organizations. As such, at the UN in New York and the EU in Brussels, all the African states (Western Sahara is not included here) have an embassy;⁴⁶ in both Washington and Beijing fifty of the states are represented.⁴⁷ At the AU in Addis Ababa, forty-eight states (plus Ethiopia as host country) have a delegation.⁴⁸ In economically important African countries such as Egypt and Nigeria, thirty-five African states are represented, and in Angola there are twenty-one. Yet in Chad, which is economically weaker, there are only twelve African embassies; not even all its neighbors have an embassy there. And in Togo there are only eight African states represented.⁴⁹ If there are no relations between states at subordinate levels, bilateral relations between states effectively consist of relations between heads of state and government themselves. In other words, as far as this personalization of foreign policy is concerned, the comprehensive turning point of the 1990s has not brought on changes everywhere, and in many places foreign policy continues to be the exclusive domain of the head of state and government also because this is a beneficial policy field for them (see below).

The African Union: Old Wine in New Bottles?

In 1999, Gaddafi invited African heads of state and government to Libya to discuss a reform of the OAU.⁵⁰ At this summit, Gaddafi went further than many of those present had expected, for he drew on Nkrumah's ideas and proposed the immediate founding of the United

States of Africa.⁵¹ The other leaders declined to go along. Instead, they voted in favor of establishing the African Union, which began its work in 2002 after a three-year process of transformation. As earlier in 1963, the overwhelming majority of states sided with those who favored a rather loose alliance of African states. Thus, the AU did not become a supranational organization and its Constitutive Act continued to define the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states as objectives of the organization. Notwithstanding, the organization created by the heads of state and government in 1999 was a much different organization than the OAU.⁵²

The changes to the OAU are exhibited in the area of security policy. In fact, the establishment of an African peace and security architecture – the creation of a Peace and Security Council, a continental early warning system, five regional stand-by forces, and a Panel of the Wise (see [Chapter 11](#)) – take account of the doctrine of “African solutions to African problems.” The creation of this security architecture was accompanied by an end to the strict adherence to state sovereignty as well as to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. Article 4h of the AU’s Constitutive Act provides that the Union may intervene in member states, should there be genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. A shift in norms from *noninterference* to *nonindifference* had been carried out on paper.⁵³ This shift was in accordance with the international trend of anchoring human security in international law. The AU took on a pioneering role here, as it was the first organization in the world to make a binding commitment to the “responsibility-to-protect” – known in the AU as the “principle of nonindifference.” There was a euphoria in Africa and beyond, suggesting that the AU and the African security architecture were opening a new era for the continent and accordingly the AU was endowed with larger budget and staff. In 1990, the OAU had a budget of approximately US\$25 million and a staff of 600.⁵⁴ In 2017, by contrast, the AU had a budget of US\$769 million, with US\$131 million alone for the AU Commission,⁵⁵ which

has a staff of approximately 1,450.⁵⁶

The efforts to develop African solutions to African problems, to enhance multilateral cooperation within Africa, and to give a new push to socioeconomic development, led to the founding of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) in 2001, an initiative aiming to comprehensively advance the continent's development.⁵⁷ This initiative is based on a series of similar proposals put forward by the presidents of Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa. NEPAD stands in the tradition of the initiatives discussed in [Chapter 5](#) inasmuch as it emphasizes the need to expand intra-African trade. However, the initiative was no longer related to the idea of realizing economic autonomy for Africa but much more related to the idea of integrating the continent more thoroughly into the global economy. That is one reason why NEPAD was welcomed and supported by the G8 countries, the EU, and China – and why at the same time it was criticized by other African governments and civil society groups that saw NEPAD as in effect supporting the Washington Consensus. In addition, some African governments regarded NEPAD as a parallel structure to the AU and hence made NEPAD an explicit AU program. Nine years later, in 2010, the NEPAD Secretariat was abolished in favor of the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency, which then was fully integrated into the AU structures.

A further reason why some African leaders were at times skeptical toward NEPAD is that the initiative linked sustainable economic development with good governance and the rule of law, in the process establishing programs that increased the obligations of the participating states and their governments. To this effect, the African Peer Review Mechanism has become an outstanding element of NEPAD. At its core, this mechanism foresees first, a self-evaluation by each country that ideally involves a broad dialogue with its population; and second, an external evaluation by the NEPAD Secretariat and a panel of African experts. The evaluations cover the areas of “Democracy and Political Governance,” “Economic

Governance and Management,” “Cooperate Governance,” and “Socioeconomic Development.”⁵⁸ In a final step, the country report bringing together the internal and external evaluations is discussed among the leaders of the participating states. This peer review mechanism along with its publicly accessible reports – which at times are very critical – is a remarkable development. Equally remarkable are the attempts of some governments to water down those reports, as well as the fact that fifteen African states still do not participate in this assessment that is voluntary.⁵⁹ Despite all the weaknesses and obstacles associated with it, it should still be noted that the evaluative processes highlighted the state’s willingness in many countries to practice good governance – which is why this was well perceived among Western donors.

However, this new understanding of sovereignty and the willingness to be assessed externally did not mean that the states were willing to give up more sovereignty to the AU and turn that organization into a supranational organization.⁶⁰ This is especially clear from the “Grand Debate.” Into the late noughties, Gaddafi stuck with his plan to found a United States of Africa. After 1999, he repeatedly floated relevant proposals inter alia to establish joint ministers for defense and foreign policy as well as for transport and communication at the AU level, and even called for a “Union Government for Africa.” In 2007, his proposals culminated in an AU summit in Ghana’s capital Accra (tellingly, the center of Pan-Africanist Nkrumah’s activities) for explicitly addressing Gaddafi’s proposals. The heads of state and government present at that meeting decided that in the long term they would hold onto the vision of the United States of Africa and the interim goal of a Union Government for Africa. However, they also decided that they first needed to enter into a discussion process in which they would consider the impacts of these plans on state sovereignty.⁶¹ In effect, Gaddafi’s vision was off the table. Despite some further efforts during his tenure as AU chair (2009–2010), Gaddafi made no progress with respect to greater

African political integration – except for a new AU flag.

Drivers and Barriers to Cooperation and Integration

Especially in the start-up phase, several heads of state got involved in the AU and NEPAD and it has been asked whether South African president Mbeki was “Africa’s savior.”⁶² Other leaders, though, were and are displaying less interest in the AU and its programs, something being documented by the fact that they do not regularly attend the AU summits. For them, being a part of the AU seems merely a *modus operandi*. Consequently, it is also not surprising that there was no discussion on whether an OAU member should become an AU member or not at the time the AU was being established. All OAU member states simply became members of the AU. This transpired even though the AU, represents a reversal in several respects and even though it might be seen as a frontal attack by the nondemocratically elected leaders as the AU is promoting human rights, the consolidation of democratic institutions, and good governance. In examining a state’s willingness to be part of the AU, two explanatory models have taken shape: one based on norms and values and one linked to *realpolitik*.

From the one perspective – at its core a constructivist one – norms and values are the clue that holds regional organizations together. Laurie Nathan argues that regional organizations must have an “external logic,” thereby referring to the interests, gains, and material conditions that make such an organization a beneficial venture for its member states. Yet an “internal logic” is also needed – in other words a normative congruence between states – in order to promote a regional organization in the long term.⁶³

The argument that regional organizations have a normative basis has indeed often been used in analyzing African organizations. The normative basis of the AU has been seen as Pan-Africanism as well as, increasingly since that organization’s founding, human security, the principle of nonindifference, and the nonacceptance of nonconstitutional changes of government.⁶⁴ The concept of “security

community” from the 1950s has experienced a revival in this context. A security community is regarded as a community of states that are so well integrated that conflicts between them are resolved peacefully.⁶⁵ In the early stages of the AU – and given that there were hardly any interstate wars in postcolonial Africa – this concept has been often used in analyzing the security policy of the continent and in the subregions.⁶⁶

This model of explanation, though, owes us an answer to the question of what exactly the internal logic of the AU or of the regional economic communities is and more importantly whether the norms and values behind it are shared by all states in their practical politics.⁶⁷ I have already argued that the OAU/AU implies more a de facto end to Pan-Africanism rather than its institutionalization. The (re)admission of Morocco to the AU in 2017 is a further example that illustrates reservations toward a shared set of values. Morocco had left the OAU in 1984 over the issue of Western Sahara. Owing to its colonial aspirations in Western Sahara, Morocco opposes a basic consensus between African countries, namely that these states share a clearly anti-imperial and anti-neocolonial policy on account of their history. Morocco’s conduct in Western Sahara was hardly different in 2017 than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. In this respect, Morocco (and the states approving its admission) undermines a potential basis of AU values, namely anti-imperialism. The principle of nonindifference, human security, and the censuring of nonconstitutional changes of government are also hardly suitable as a normative basis shared by all African states if one examines the inconsistencies in their application. If the above values had been internalized, an intervention in Zimbabwe following the 2008 elections, in which massive violence took place, should have been just as inevitable as in Kenya in 2007–2008 (see [Chapter 9](#)).

Notwithstanding, this perspective helps in seeing that transnational stakeholders such as international corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and civil society can aid establishing,

shaping, and developing regional organizations. Academic work also points to the influence of nonstate actors insofar as they view market forces as drivers of regional integration.⁶⁸ Following that model, regional organizations develop out of economic needs. It is an argument that can be applied to the first wave of African regional organizations that were founded after decolonization, in response as well to the desire for economic independence. The relaunching of the EAC in 1999 can also be explained in this fashion. Within that community, many see business interests as the central driver of the East African integration project, above and beyond political leadership.⁶⁹

The approach linked to *realpolitik* to explaining continental as well as subregional cooperation, integration, and refusal to integrate draws our eyes to the role of the political leadership in the member states and is closely related to the arguments outlined above on how states and their leaders use organizations. For many countries, the AU and regional economic communities are a means to an end in the first instance. Among the advantages of these organizations are not only the aforementioned solidification of power for the heads of state but also the monies that accrue to the state itself (and its political leadership as well). For what is basically required to receive funding from Western donors, still central for several African states (see [Chapter 6](#)), is that a state signals its support for specific principles such as human rights protection, good governance, and the rule of law. Given that, it is opportune to belong to the AU (and the regional economic communities). In addition, the AU and the regional economic communities have become stakeholders in international politics who have the ability to influence governance in their regions – and sometimes beyond them (see [Chapter 12](#)).⁷⁰ Hence, states can articulate their interests through these organizations and see them materializing. This is a well-known strategy, especially for smaller states, to make their voices heard and explains why the density of embassies at international organizations is greater than elsewhere.

Because of their ability to influence governance in their region, one might conclude that these organizations have taken on a supranational character.⁷¹ On the other hand, the financial and institutional weakness of the AU and some of the regional economic communities and the dependency of their member states are also a reality, which is why we should consider them rather as intergovernmental organizations than supranational ones.⁷² This argument finds support when we examine the construction and decision-making structures of African organizations. Herbst has identified a pattern here, namely that organizations in Africa are, first, relatively large with respect to their number of member states; second, very formal; third, nonhierarchical, treating all member states equally and keeping their secretariats weak; and, finally, designed to respect state sovereignty.⁷³ Looking at the AU this way, it seems reasonable to argue that states, and even more their political leadership, use the organizations for their own purposes. One may even go as far as to argue that the design, resources, and mandates of intergovernmental organizations in Africa all reflect the unwillingness of states and their political leadership to engage in deeper political integration that includes a larger transfer of sovereignty. In this sense, the organizations are constructed rationally inasmuch as they follow a logic of avoiding integration in the political sphere. To be clear, the reluctance to engage in political *integration* does not mean that states refuse to *cooperate*. In fact, as the African peace and security architecture shows, there is indeed intense cooperation among African states in some fields (see [Chapter 11](#)).

With respect to economic integration, there is a more integration-friendly outlook at the subregional level. There, currency and customs unions as well as free trade agreements are widespread and being implemented gradually. Yet problems can be found here, too, such as the double and multiple memberships of some states in regional economic communities (see [Figure 7.1](#)). This makes it more difficult for states to integrate more deeply into an economic community

because programs, like trade agreements of different organizations, obstruct or even exclude each other.⁷⁴ This is the point of departure for a long-standing harmonization process of the three organizations COMESA, EAC, and SADC. These have joined forces to form the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite, and they unveiled a common free trade agreement in 2017.

At the same time, multiple membership also suggests that some states are not necessarily behind the organization's agenda or its programs. As shown, it is the interests of heads of state in acquiring a maximum of political legitimacy from outside their countries⁷⁵ that is the driver to take part in as many institutions as possible and to engage in forum-shopping, that is to say to choose the organization that a state finds most helpful in addressing a specific task.⁷⁶

Political Crises

This chapter deals with political crises, focusing on secessions and the lack thereof; coup d'états and attempts to thwart them; electoral violence and the reasons for its rise; as well as terrorism and its effects. Despite their different shape, they share that they can potentially challenge or even undermine state institutions, weaken the state, dwarf the economy, and pose a threat to the population. Such crises run counter to any state-building attempts African states have undergone since decolonization. Despite being the children of the weakness of states there is, however, also evidence showing that secessions, coups, and electoral violence might lead to more legitimate governments and advance democratization in the long run. Such news is missing with regard to terrorism.

I must stress at the outset that not all African countries are affected by such crises. Indeed, of the fifty-four states, twenty-seven underwent a secession attempt or have an active secessionist movement,¹ forty-five witnessed a coup (attempt),² and only about half of African countries saw electoral violence.³ Providing figures for terrorism is tricky as it is notoriously difficult to properly define it (see below). The following exploration of crises must not overshadow these figures and must not shape the perception of a crisis-prone continent. If at all, we should rather speak of a few crisis-prone countries and several countries that have experienced political crises, often some time back.

Secession

A secession is the withdrawal of a political entity, herein a secessionist state, from its mother state. While the material consequence of secessionism are easy to discern for they are primarily concerned with territory, in other words with a redefinition of boundaries, the reasons for secessions lie beneath the surface. Given the age of African states, their colonial origin (see [Chapter 3](#)) as well as their weakness and lack of consolidation (see [Chapter 7](#)), it is surprising at first glance that secessions are rare in Africa. In only two cases, Eritrea and South Sudan, were succession attempts successful in the sense that the new states that emerged from secession gained international recognition. Somaliland has been successful on a different scale. There, state institutions function and there are democratic credentials. However, Somaliland has failed to secure international recognition thus far.

Why Break Away – and Why Stay

As indicated above, the reasons for secession are various. Often cited is social and cultural heterogeneity of a country's population, which might cause tensions or even civil war. Secessions as "radical surgery" can be a solution to such a crisis.⁴ South Sudan can serve as an example (see below). Secessions also occur when parts of the population consider a secession as economically advantageous.⁵ Secession attempts of resource-rich regions such as Biafra (Nigeria), Cabinda (Angola), Katanga, and South Kasai (both Congo-Kinshasa), feed into that argument. There are also hints that low per-capita income and slow growth rates increase the secession risk as they exacerbate the grievances within a country's population.⁶ Furthermore, weak state institutions and times of political and economic transition make states more vulnerable to secessions.⁷

Considering these explanations, we would expect a large number of secessions to take place in Africa. There is, however, a "secessionist deficit."⁸ Pierre Englebert and Rebecca Hummel point to the weakness

of states, their lack of internal sovereignty, and their dependence on external sovereignty, that is to say international recognition, to explain this lack. Reminiscent of Cooper's notion of the "gatekeeper state" (see [Chapter 7](#)), they argue that secessionist movements do not necessarily seek secessions, as a secession would itself not serve their interest. A secessionist state would not receive international recognition and thus the secessionists could not use the resources for their purposes. "Given the undiversified nature of Africa's economies, their lack of industrialization, their dependence on commodity extraction and their small and parasitic private sectors, the continent offers a significant material premium to internationally recognized sovereignty, tilting the odds for elites in favour of staying within the state, even if they do not immediately benefit from power at the centre."⁹ In other words, the cost-benefit calculation runs against secession.¹⁰ Access to a weak existing state seems more beneficial for secessionists, turning the threat of secession more into an instrument of political bargain. The Yoruba in Nigeria exemplify this, for they, despite other statements, "had no interest in breaking away from Nigeria, because this would have cut them off from their main source of income, the oil revenues."¹¹ Looking back into history, secessionist movements find cases like Biafra and Katanga, which teaches them that secessions lead to difficult-to-win civil wars or even international interventions that restore the territorial integrity, which shows them the high risks they are facing if they move ahead.

In effect, African states and their governments are reinforcing each other and thus also secure their territorial integrity. Thereby they apply a principle known as *uti possidetis* (as you possessed), which refers to the keeping of the territorial status quo as found at decolonization. This principle was enshrined in the Cairo Declaration of 1964 (see [Chapter 3](#)). Serious secessionist movements must present a compelling argument that is in line with this principle to stand a chance of success. Otherwise, international recognition is ruled out and secessions are not beneficial. Hence it is not surprising that most

secessionist movements base their claims on historic arguments with a direct link to the colonial time.¹² Eritrea, for example, claimed to be an Italian colony whereas Ethiopia was not; the Western Sahara emphasizes that it was a Spanish colony, whereas Morocco was under French rule; Somaliland claims to have been administered by Italy and not by Britain as the rest of Somalia (see below); South Sudan found that Britain treated it differently than northern Sudan (see below); and the former British part of today's Cameroon cites its colonial history as justification for its agitation against the former French part of Cameroon. In short, there is a pattern here, namely the utilization of the colonial history to offer a compelling argument for a legitimate claim to succession that is in line with the *uti possidetis* principle.

Going Alone and Getting Recognized

The case of South Sudan shows why and how a secession is possible despite the *uti possidetis* principle and how the balance between territorial integrity and the right of self-determination can also be calibrated.¹³ The trajectories of South Sudan's secession reach back some decades. Northern Sudan was Arab-Muslim dominated whereas black Christians inhabited the South. Roughly a decade prior to decolonization in 1956, the British government brought together North and South Sudan. At the Juba conference in 1947, the Sudanese were consulted on that question, but not the South Sudanese. The subsequent use of North Sudanese administrators to govern South Sudan fed the frustration in the latter, and, in 1955, South Sudanese leaders demanded their independence. The tensions eventually led to a civil war, which "was the culmination of ethnic, racial, cultural, religious, political and economic problems that had faced Sudan since the Turco-Egyptian conquest of the country in 1821."¹⁴ The war lasted until 1972, cost the lives of 500,000–700,000 people, and resulted in an autonomy of South Sudan.

During the 1980s, the government of Sudan increasingly challenged that autonomy and aimed at Islamization of South Sudan,

which in turn caused the emergence of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement that started another civil war. This war against the Sudanese government became a complex affair with several conflict lines, which cannot be explained herein.¹⁵ Until its end in 2005, it had caused the death of more than two million people. The peace agreement of 2005 foresaw, amongst others, autonomy for South Sudan, the suspension of Sharia law, the division of the oil revenues between South and North Sudan (the former has the oil field, the latter the ports to ship it), and the holding of a referendum on South Sudanese independence by 2011. In that referendum 98.83 percent voted for independence, which came in July 2011, witnessed by international guests – and also by the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir. The Sudanese government recognized South Sudan as did other states and the country became the 193rd member of the UN. However, this recognition did not mean that South Sudan was a functioning state. As the political instability and the civil war that broke out in 2012 indicate, state institutions were too weak and could neither prevent such crises nor handle them.

Besides the ethnic, cultural, and religious arguments, it was the suffering of people in South Sudan that contributed to the exceptional recognition of South Sudan as an independent state, thus breaking the *uti possidetis* principle. One must also not forget the pariah status of the Sudanese government of al-Bashir, which hosted and supported Islamist fighters, and under whose aegis a genocide took place in Darfur (see [Chapter 10](#)). Both contributed to the international acceptance of South Sudan's claim for independence. The fear that the undermining of the *uti possidetis* principle would lead to a surge of secessionist ambitions across the continent was, in retrospect, unjustified.¹⁶

Sovereign but Not Recognized

Different from war-torn South Sudan with its weak state institutions, Somaliland is a de facto existing state with functioning institutions,

yet it lacks international recognition, even though it is more democratic and its government has more legitimacy than several of the recognized African states. Paradoxically, its mother country Somalia is a recognized state despite its apparent weakness.

During the 1980s, the Somali National Movement (SNM) emerged as a rebel movement. It gathered its main base of support from the Isaaq clan, which lives in today's Somaliland, a territory that used to be British Somaliland. The group fought to end systematic discrimination of Somalia's authoritarian ruler Siad Barre, whose policy had "turned genocidal" toward the Isaaq.¹⁷ It sought to overthrow Barre, yet it did not seek independence. In 1991, things, however, changed rapidly. In January, a coalition of rebel movements, to which the SNM belonged, ousted Barre, and, in May, clan elders declared the independence of Somaliland.

The explanation for the sudden support of a secession has several elements, including that the population of Somaliland had demanded such a secession in light of the widespread devastation that Barre's crackdown on the SNM had left behind. Large parts of Somaliland lay in ruins. The coalition that came into power in Somalia after Barre did not consult with the SNM on the interim government, which triggered fears in Somaliland that the status quo of discrimination would continue. Moreover, attempts had failed to build a Greater Somalia that would include the territories in which ethnic Somalis live in Ethiopia and Kenya, and the experience during the Barre years and with the interim government suggested that this vision would not materialize in the foreseeable future. Consequently, Somalilanders turned their back on this vision. Economic considerations also came into play. On the one hand, with the crumbling of the Somalia state and the rise of the informal economy, incentives for Somalilanders to engage with Somalia diminished. Independence offered them greater control over their trade and their economy and raised hopes of international aid for their country at a time when aid flow to Somalia came to halt.¹⁸ On the other hand, cooperation with Ethiopia –

Somaliland's neighbor to the South – appeared more beneficial, because access to the Haud grazing land – located in Ethiopia's Ogaden region – appeared more likely to come through cooperation with Ethiopia than through other means such as a Greater Somalia. Ethiopia had seen the ousting of the communist Derg regime in 1987, which had backed Barre, and Ethiopia's new leader Meles and his party seemed more sympathetic toward Somaliland.

Despite this seemingly logical way toward secession, it is also true that Somaliland's secession was less rational but “an unintended consequence of anti-regime struggle and collapse of the parent state. Calculations of what secession actually means started only after independence had been declared.”¹⁹ Indeed, the SNM was not prepared to run a state. In the early phase of the secession, clan elders in favor of secession secured control over state resources, making the secession advantageous for them. Then, however, they selected a government, which undermined their role.²⁰ The initial position of clan elders in favor of secession is arguably the reason why internal opposition within Somaliland toward independence was marginal. Only after the fact would Somalilanders search for a legal justification for their declaration of independence – and find it in its colonial history. As such, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that between 26 June and 1 July 1960, Somaliland existed as a sovereign state following the decolonization – before it entered into a union with Somalia – and its now sought independence is thus essentially a “voluntary dissolution between sovereign states.”²¹ If the international community were to apply the principle *uti possidetis* strictly, so their argument goes, Somaliland would be an internationally recognized state.²² Yet, Somaliland awaits formal recognition.

Notwithstanding, some states grant support and, attached to that, lend some form of recognition to Somaliland. Ethiopia, for instance, maintains a trade office in Somaliland. The Ethiopian government is concerned with border security at the Ethiopian-Somaliland border

and is also concerned with its Ogaden region and secession attempts within that region, where ethnic Somalis live. Ethiopia is unlikely to recognize Somaliland formerly for it would give a precedent for the Ogaden case. Yet, given its resistance against a Greater Somalia – as shown through the “63/64” alliance with Kenya, a defense pact meant to thwart any such attempt – the de facto existence of Somaliland is helpful for Ethiopia. For the same reason it is also helpful for Kenya. Hence, it is unsurprising that Kenya and Somaliland aim at fostering trade among themselves, a policy that can also be interpreted as factual support for Somaliland.²³

More Attempts, Less Successful (Thus Far)

There are numerous secessionist movements in Africa, with some being more active than others. As such, no one at this point can see a *Volkstaat* of white Afrikaners in South Africa emerging and being recognized internationally, even though some Afrikaners have already built the Afrikaans town Orania. The same is true for Namibia’s Caprivi-Strip. On the contrary, the Tuaregs’ attempts to build the Azawad republic in Northern Mali has borne some fruits. With the downfall of Gaddafi in 2011, the ensuing security vacuum in the region, and the return of heavily armed Tuaregs who had served as Gaddafi’s mercenaries, they gained some ground with their secessionist claims. Initially working in alliance with Islamist groups, they used the political instability in Mali in 2012, took control over the north, and declared their independence even though there were doubts whether they or the Islamists were in control.²⁴ Having broken their cooperation with the Islamists, who advanced toward the capital, the Tuaregs’ ambitions were in a way recognized by France, when the French government used them to regain Mali’s north from the Islamists and on some occasions gave them unprecedented leeway to exercise authority.

When distilling the conditions that allow a successful secession from the aforementioned cases, one finds four central points: First,

having been a separate colony or at least having received a significantly different treatment within a colony, is certainly helpful for secessionists. Second, the mother state's acceptance of separation contributes to its success, as international recognition is otherwise unlikely. Eritrea's secession discussed in [Chapter 2](#) adds to that. Third, the expressed will of the seceding population, such as through a referendum, seems a precondition for a recognized secession.²⁵ Finally, the support of other states is helpful. Indeed, international law is neutral with regard to secessions and only its consequences are regulated internationally.²⁶ In essence, the acceptance of secessions is a political affair as the recognition of Kosovo but the nonrecognition of Catalonia on behalf of the EU indicate.

Coups d'États

Coups are “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive.”²⁷ This understanding points to three key elements of coups: the target, which is the chief executive, in other words depending on the political system either the head of state or head of government; the perpetrators, who are mostly state internal elites, often but not exclusively from the military; and the tactics, with coups being illegal, sudden, and overt. Coups can see bloodshed but can also be essentially violence-free. As such, Ruth First noted in 1970 after the first series of coups in postcolonial Africa that “[i]t has proven so infectious, this seizure of government by armed men, and so effortless. Get the keys of the armoury; turn out the barracks; take the radio station, the post office and the airport; arrest the person of the president, and you arrest the state.”²⁸

Fact, Figures, and Explanations

There have been 206 coup attempts in Africa between 1950 and April 2019, when the Sudanese president al-Bashir was unseated through a

of the incumbent raises the likelihood of them. Mugabe's and al-Bashir's ousting in 2017 and 2019, after thirty-seven and thirty years in power respectively, support this view. Less intuitively explained is that development aid seems to increase the risk of a coup.³² If the assumption put forward by Jonathan Powell and colleagues that coup-plotters are "rational actors that consider the costs and benefits of their actions given a particular environment"³³ holds, and if we further assume that they engage in rent-seeking behavior,³⁴ we can argue that the striving to take power, which would then allow them to access state resources, explains why coup leaders try to unseat state leaders. This makes coups more likely in cases when larger sums of foreign aid flow.

Beyond these structural factors, there are also case-specific explanations for coups. I tease out Burkina Faso – the country that has seen the highest number of successful coups – to give a glimpse of the individual reasoning for them, and to show that the structural explanations indeed have explanatory power. I concentrate on the four most recent coups of 1983, 1987, 2014, and 2015. In the early 1980s, domestic opposition grew against Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, a coup-leader-turned-president. Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaoré, both in the higher echelons of the military, were at the forefront of the opposition. In 1983, the government arrested Sankara as well as two further allies, Henri Zongo and Jean-Baptiste Lingani. Blaise Compaoré then led a revolt to free his comrades.³⁵ Sankara was inspired by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara and had a strong anti-imperialist and pan-Africanist thinking, which guided his policy and explains why he and the clique around him staged the coup that brought him into power in 1983. The young revolutionary and charismatic Sankara jointly ruled with Compaoré, Lingani, and Zongo in the following four years, pushing through his revolutionary agenda including the renaming of Upper Volta into Burkina Faso, the land of the upright people. Sankara fought the Big Men image, "dispensing with the presidential limousine fleets [...], dogmatically flogging

corruption [...] and rallying the people behind his revolutionary reforms with slogans which were often belligerent.”³⁶ Sankara strengthened local governance and challenged the role of traditional chiefs and trade unions.³⁷ Attempts to dismantle the neopatrimonial system led to the loss of crucial support, and the divisions between Sankara and his fellow three leaders became evident. This culminated in Sankara’s assassination in 1987 by a commando unit loyal to Compaoré, who himself became president.³⁸ Given that Sankara and his revolution had been popular in Burkina Faso, Compaoré needed to justify the assassination without moving too far from Sankara’s ideals.

Compaoré’s authoritarian leadership, his attempts to amend the constitution to allow him to run for a third term in office (after the introduction of presidential term limits in 2000) coupled with economic problems led to mass protests in 2014, twenty-seven years after his rise to power. In October, protestors torched buildings of the government, parliament, and ruling party and headed to the presidential palace. In light of these events, Compaoré stepped down a few days later, having initially thought he could serve for a transitional period after he had withdrawn his suggested constitutional amendment. General Honoré Nabéré Traoré tried to assume power but was outmaneuvered by Yacouba Isaac Zida, another military man, who sided with the protestors while Traoré was seen as too close to the just-ousted president. Zida announced that the military stepped in “to prevent a state of anarchy that would be detrimental to the goal of democratic change.”³⁹ He gave way to a more civilian government on 18 November when Michel Kafando became interim president. Together with Zida as prime minister and minister of defense, interim president Kafando paved the way for an election scheduled to take place in October 2015.

On 17 September 2015, a few weeks before the election could take place, members of the former presidential guard loyal to Compaoré staged a coup, detained the country’s interim government, and assumed power. However, the junta, headed by General Gilbert

Diendéré, could not consolidate its power. Protestors took to the streets. “Emboldened by their success in preventing Compaoré’s third term, Burkinabé citizens were not afraid to challenge this latest threat to democracy.”⁴⁰ No less important, regional leaders, the AU, and the regular army mounted pressure to restore the transitional government and refused to grant support to the junta. On 23 September, the regular army entered the capital Ouagadougou and confronted the junta. Eventually, the interim government was restored and the election could proceed.

Democratization, the African Union, and Fewer Coups

The number of coups has declined over time. Two reasons are primarily brought forward to explain that: democratization and the anti-coup policy of the AU. As such, there is evidence that democracy makes states less vulnerable to coups, as the state, its institutions, and, most importantly, the government enjoy more legitimacy.⁴¹ No less important is that the AU has adopted a strict policy against coups. However, the AU has a broader view and speaks about “unconstitutional changes of government,” which have to be condemned and, if needed, sanctioned to restore the constitutional order, particularly if they are directed against democratically elected governments.⁴² The organization’s understanding of unconstitutional changes of government includes interventions by mercenaries, replacement of the chief executive by armed or rebel groups, the refusal of the chief executive to relinquish power following a defeat in an election, and finally amendments or revisions of the constitution, which are an infringement on the idea of democratic government changes.⁴³ If an unconstitutional change of government takes place, the AU suspends that country from that organization until constitutional order has been restored. As the 2015 coup in Burkina Faso suggests, not recognizing coup leaders puts pressure on them and

facilitates the restoration of constitutional order.

Some analysts and politicians have wondered whether we should distinguish between good and bad coups, with the former being endorsed as they lead to more democracy. The Arab Spring in 2011 put this question at the forefront when Mubarak, Gaddafi, and Ben Ali – the authoritarian leaders of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia – were pushed out of their offices by unconstitutional means. The same is true for the situation in Burkina Faso in 2014, which is thus often not viewed as a coup. We see that the AU was more reluctant in condemning these constitutional changes of government. The organization had to ponder whether these coups were unconstitutional changes of governments or rather an expression of the will of people, who saw no constitutional way to express it. This question is linked with another one, that of whether the army, which usually steps in, is the better ruler. Despite some exceptions, it holds that “[i]n general, armies everywhere have proven better at staging coups than at managing genuine transition to civilian rule.”⁴⁴ In fact, “the historical record shows that militarily rulers ‘govern’ no better than elected civilians in Africa, and often much worse – witness [Ibrahim] Babandiga, Idi Amin, Jean Bedel Bokassa and Sani Abacha.”⁴⁵ At the same time, we have instances like those in Burkina Faso in 2014 when a military interim president gave way to a civilian president within days and helped to arrange and hold elections. And we could witness events in Sudan, where after al-Bashir’s ousting in early 2019 and the military takeover, the military sequentially pulled back and eventually agreed to share power with a civilian government. There is evidence that “democratic coups” *can* pave the way toward more democracy, particularly as the new leaders are pressured – inter alia by the AU – to hold elections.⁴⁶ Issaka Souaré gives empirical support for that claim by showing that the time in power of coup-born regimes has dropped sharply since 1990. While the period between 1990 and 2000 saw coup leaders staying in power for an average of 20.4 months, the period between 2000 and 2012 witnessed an average of only 11.4 months in power.⁴⁷

Electoral Violence

Electoral violence has become a common phenomenon since the advent of multiparty elections in the early 1990s with 55 percent of African states having experienced such violence since then.⁴⁸ After Kristine Höglund found in 2009 that electoral violence is a distinct phenomenon and noted that it “to a large extent remains an unmapped research field,”⁴⁹ research on the topic now thrives and concentrates on motives, timing, actors, and forms of violence. As such, the main motive for electoral violence is to influence an election. Importantly, electoral violence is not only meant to influence the voters’ choice but can also serve the purpose of canceling elections or preventing voters from casting their ballots.⁵⁰ Electoral violence occurs either before the elections, on the day of the elections, or after the elections yet before the elected assume their office. Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs goes further and argues that electoral campaigning is essentially an everyday process. Hence, she considers any form of violence that is intended to influence the following elections as “the everyday politics of electoral violence.”⁵¹ The actors involved in that kind of violence include ordinary citizens, the military, the police, paramilitary, political parties, and rebel groups. The activities they undertake are various and have different intensities. The forms of violence include harassing and intimidating candidates, close affiliates of candidates, election workers, and voters. In more intense forms, there have been cases of rioting, bombing, property destruction, assault, physical attacks, and assassinations.⁵²

Explaining Electoral Violence

The reasons for electoral violence have direct links to the issues discussed in [Chapter 7](#) for they are related to the shape of the political system, the functioning of states, patronage, as well as the coexistence of parallel (informal) forms of governance. There is also a link to democratization after 1990 and the unpreparedness of states for such

a process.⁵³ Indeed, since the (re)introduction of multiparty elections, much can be gained – and lost – during an election. In other words, a lot is at stake, particularly for the incumbents, who time and again engage in several forms of electoral manipulations of which electoral violence is the most drastic element (see [Chapter 7](#)). They and their competitors often see elections as the new “battlegrounds”⁵⁴ in which they compete for power and control over the state and its resources. “The key problem is that, although the formal institutional mechanisms have changed, the underlying logics of politics have not. Power and resources are still largely concentrated at the centre, raising the stakes of electoral contests, and patronage politics is still the dominant mode of political mobilisation.”⁵⁵ In those countries that have a winner-takes-it-all electoral system, the likelihood of electoral violence increases as the competition for political power becomes more intense, given the risk and potential loss. As voters in countries with a functioning neopatrimonial system tend to vote for the candidates they assume to have more capacity to distribute patronage, elections become costlier for those seeking to be elected in such places. During the 2019 elections in Nigeria, for example, vote-buying was a widespread phenomenon.⁵⁶ Since the resources that are distributed in a patronage system are mainly state sources, access to state power becomes crucial, which further raises the stakes at elections.

In Kenya, where violence has prevailed in all elections since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1992, violence has become a political strategy to prevent nonsupporters from participating in elections. Like the British during the colonial period, political actors practice a divide-and-rule system in Kenya, playing ethnic groups off against one another, favoring some through patronage and investments in their areas while neglecting others.⁵⁷ Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, assumed office in 2002 but did not honor his preelection deal with Raila Odinga, a Luo, to make him the prime minister of their coalition. Odinga subsequently established a new party, the Orange

Democratic Movement, through which he competed in the 2007 elections against Kibaki. The elections of 2007 turned into a “41 against 1” affair, an informal campaign slogan indicating that the other forty-one ethnic groups had to stand against the Kikuyu, the dominant ethnic group.⁵⁸ By placing loyalists in positions at the high court and the electoral commission, Kibaki had made preparations to “win” the elections under any circumstances.⁵⁹ Despite obvious widespread irregularities, different opinion polls, early results that suggested otherwise, and a chairperson of the electoral commission who was himself unsure about the results of the elections, Kibaki was declared the winner by a small margin. The violence and revenge attacks that followed were unprecedented. More than 1,000 people died and hundreds of thousands were displaced until the violence came to an end, following a power-sharing agreement between Kibaki and Odinga.

Incumbents do not only benefit from access to political power and thus to resources but also from the immunity that is inherent in their position but which they would lose once leaving their office. This is why some governments engage in intense violent campaigns prior to elections, particularly if they anticipate a defeat, as the elections in Zimbabwe 2008 suggest. The government-run Operation Murambatsvina, which started earlier but was intensified before the 2008 elections, had the goal to destroy buildings and clear illegal townships in which the main opposition party had its strongholds. At least 700,000 people lost their homes or livelihoods during that operation.⁶⁰ The candidate of the opposition, Morgan Tsvangirai, became himself a victim of violence when police severely tortured him in 2007. Notwithstanding the massive violence and further attempts to manipulate the elections, Tsvangirai won the first round of the vote but fell short of an outright victory according to the official results. President Mugabe came second in the first round of elections. Given their involvement in past violence and atrocities, such as the ethnic cleansing in Matabeleland in the 1980s, the *Gukurahundi*, a series of

massacres against Ndebele civilians who largely supported the opposition party,⁶¹ Mugabe and his cronies needed their offices to shield them from prosecution. In 2008, there was a debate about an amnesty for Mugabe if he would be willing to step down after the lost first round of elections, but there was no debate about extending that amnesty to other senior figures of the national government or of Mugabe's party.⁶² "Mugabe," as one of his former comrades told me in early 2009, "probably would have welcomed the idea that he could exit with dignity and retire. But I don't believe the people he brought into powerful positions, particularly the military and the police, would have allowed him to leave." It was this mutual dependency and the political, economic, and above all personal risks they faced, that led the ruling clique to continue their violent campaign, which resulted in more deaths and eventually led Tsvangirai to pull out of the second round. Mugabe was reelected unopposed. He only shared power with Tsvangirai under heavy pressure from regional and other states (see [Chapter 7](#)).

In 95 percent of all cases of electoral violence, violence occurred before the elections. In 24 percent of cases, there was violence both before and after the elections. And in 4 percent of the cases did violence occur solely after the elections. The same statistic shows that postelection violence is more intense and more fatal.⁶³ The aforementioned Kenyan crisis as well as the aftermath of the 2010 elections in Côte d'Ivoire confirm this picture. In fact, the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire lasted for four months and resulted in 3,000 deaths and more than one million displaced people.⁶⁴ At no other instance of electoral violence have more people died since 1990.⁶⁵ Côte d'Ivoire was recovering from a civil war and the UN monitored and certified the 2010 presidential elections that were supposed to reunite the country and end the political crisis and the economic one. Despite some minor incidents and against the civil war history, the elections were remarkably peaceful, seeing Alassane Ouattara – the candidate of the opposition – winning some 54 percent of the votes in the

second round of the elections. The incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo, who had been in office since 2000, however, wanted to stay in power at any price and had influential and powerful actors on his side. Among them were the administration that was under his control; the state TV, which became the vehicle for his hate campaigns; armed supporters, including the upper ranks of the military as well as some paramilitary movements; and the Constitutional Council, which invalidated the results of the election in some of the country's departments, which then led to Gbagbo's victory.⁶⁶ Gbagbo and Ouattara each set up their governments and were sworn in. Most states and all relevant international organizations, including the AU and West Africa's ECOWAS, recognized Ouattara as duly elected president, sent a mediator, and applied pressure to convince and force Gbagbo to resign. With the help of the UN, whose peacekeepers protected the hotel in which Ouattara stayed, and France, which provided assistance, Ouattara's armed supporters pushed Gbagbo and his supporters onto the defensive. Eventually Gbagbo was arrested and the violent conflict ended.

Effects of Electoral Violence

The effects of electoral violence include a resumption of civil war – as happened in Angola in 1992, a weakening of ties between voters and politicians, as well as a setback to democratization or the consolidation of democracy.⁶⁷ However, some also voice the argument that despite the occurrence of electoral violence, states can democratize and strengthen their institutions. Taking a more historic perspective, Daniel Ross sees violence as an integral part of democratic systems and considers it an expression of dissatisfaction with the conduct of elections that might cause improvements in the elections and, hence, democracy over time.⁶⁸ Staffan Lindberg finds that the holding of elections alone will democratize states irrespective of whether they are flawed or not. For him, multiparty elections usually bring liberalization, and their repetition creates incentives for

political actors, together fostering democracy.⁶⁹ The 2019 elections in Nigeria can be viewed as an example for this claim as fewer people engaged in violence to influence the elections and challenge the results than in previous ones, which had been violent. At a polling station, a follower of an opposition candidate “looked on as [the incumbent’s] supporters gloated. ‘If our candidate loses, we’ll accept it,’ he said. ‘Life goes on.’ If the rest of the country’s political class shows the same restraint then Nigeria’s flawed democracy will have made progress.”⁷⁰

Terrorism

Finding a definition for terrorism is notoriously difficult for there is no clear distinction between terrorists and what some would call freedom fighters or opponents, who use violence to push their position. Defining terrorism is therefore linked to a political and ethical debate that relates to the question about just wars. Considering a historic example, the problem becomes clear. While the apartheid government in South Africa denounced the ANC’s actions as terrorism considering that the movement targeted civilians, the ANC’s supporters in South Africa and elsewhere, including in the West, argued that the ANC’s fight against systematic oppression was morally justified and there was no other way to end apartheid than by force. As I cannot overcome that definitional problem, I focus on those terrorist groups that systematically target civilians with indiscriminate violence,⁷¹ like al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and the Lord’s Resistance Army. Such terrorist groups aim at sending out political messages that are intended to go beyond their immediate target. This is why perfidiously terrorism functions so well in our time with modern communication technology that brings the message of terrorist attacks from one corner of the world directly to another. Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and al-Shabab in Somalia are two cases through which I will illustrate the reasons for the emergence of terrorist groups, the effects

of their activities, and the links to politics elsewhere.

Breeding Ground for Terrorism

A number of factors explain al-Shabaab's rise in Somalia. To start with, al-Shabaab can be viewed as a child of the "war on terror" of the USA and its allies after 9/11. The wars in and the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, plus the situation in Palestine, triggered reactions within the Muslim world that found their expression in a rising pan-Islamic solidarity – but also in a further rise of terrorism.⁷² Those individuals who founded al-Shabaab have primarily been veterans of the war in Afghanistan, where they had supported al-Qaeda. These veterans then imported al-Qaeda's ideology into Somalia. Moreover, Ethiopia's invasion in Somalia, starting in late 2005 after Somali Islamists had declared jihad against Ethiopia, also helped al-Shabaab as there was a widespread desire in Somalia that Ethiopian troops leave the country and al-Shabaab was thought to be in a position to achieve that goal. Within Somalia, the collapse of the warlord system that prevailed after Siad Barre's ousting in 1991 led to more insecurity and, as a consequence, there was a desire among citizens to regain security. In such a fragile situation, "religion gave comfort" and opened up "a discourse that was friendly to Islamist groups, and in this sense, the stage was set for al-Shabaab."⁷³ Somali citizens could agree with the emerging Islamic Courts, whose consolidation was primarily driven by al-Shabaab, and which pushed that group into a central position. Religious leaders "were simply seen as the best alternative."⁷⁴ The business community also supported the Islamic Courts and helped al-Shabaab because that group provided security. Large-scale corruption also played a role as did the installation of the Western- and Ethiopian-backed transitional government in Somalia that sidelined some clans, which in turn sought to balance their loss of influence by supporting (or at least not opposing) al-Shabaab. Finally, it became trendy among the youth to join al-Shabaab. However, it is also true that people were not simply

pulled into the group by structural factors or because they found it attractive.⁷⁵ In fact, al-Shabaab brutally recruited and forced several youngsters to join them.⁷⁶ Al-Shabaab is primarily active in Somalia, but its attacks on refugee camps in Kenya and the attack on Nairobi's Westgate shopping mall indicate that it operates beyond the Somali borders and is thus a threat to regional security.

The emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria cannot be understood without a brief look into history. The introduction of Western education under British colonial rule created resistance within the northern part of the colony, which was Muslim-dominated. Books in particular (in the Hausa language: *boko*) were "seen as both a threat and a symbol of the increasing impact of an alien, colonial, Christian, materialist and corrupt process of Westernization."⁷⁷ Since that time, several Islamist groups have sprung up in the Islamic dominated parts of Nigeria. The immediate roots of Boko Haram, however, only reach back to the 1990s, with the rise of Mohamed Yusuf and the installation of him as leader of what the media later dubbed Boko Haram; "[t]hrough his charismatic personality he became a magnet for its members."⁷⁸ Yusuf and his even more radical successors not only reject(ed) Western education and books, but broadly Western civilization. In their eyes, Western civilization includes "constitutional provision as it relates to, for instance, the rights and privileges of women, the idea of homo-sexualism, lesbianism, [...] multi-party democracy [...], blue films, prostitution, drinking beer and alcohol and many others that are opposed to Islamic civilization."⁷⁹ Particularly young men, suffering from rather poor socioeconomic conditions and often having been educated in Qur'anic schools (there being a limited number of state-run schools in northern Nigeria), are attracted to Boko Haram. These men primarily come from Nigeria, but also from neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.⁸⁰ Besides religious aspects, it is also true that corruption, socioeconomic backwardness, as well as unconstitutional and undemocratic practices in northern Nigeria, contribute to the emergence and strengthening of

As these overviews suggest, there is not *one* reason for the emergence of terrorist organizations. Notwithstanding, there is a pattern visible. The breakdown of the state institutions – or in some areas the failure of the postcolonial governments to project their influence in the first place – and the resulting instability and insecurity leads to a rise of alternative forms of governance, which can – but not necessarily must – be run by groups like al-Shabaab or Boko Haram. For many citizens, these groups provide that stability and security they strive for. This is also why it would be wrong to view such groups solely as terrorist groups, also because some claim territory and govern there. In effect, they provide a form of government in those areas where state institutions fail to do so. Indeed, most terrorist groups are born in (parts of) countries with weak or failed state institutions. Even though several individuals join them voluntarily, such terrorist groups are in no way legitimate representatives of the local population. They are often the last resort for locals to obtain a minimum of security while many reject their ideology and demands for obedience.

Other than with regard to secessions, coups, and electoral violence – forms of political crises that might lead to more stable and inclusive political conditions or even democracy – there is no such news attached to the activities of these terrorist groups that I considered herein. Rather, they spread fear, undermine the state and its institutions, and thus poison the environment in which people search for a legitimate form of governance that serves their interests.

Large-Scale Conflicts

Conflicts and the use of violence are part of a widely spread image of Africa, as *The Economist's* title story "The Hopeless Continent" of 11 May 2000, which pictured a youngster with a rifle, suggests (also see [Chapter 6](#)).¹ In reality, the situation is much more nuanced. Even if we use the broad definition of "armed conflicts" as provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program ("a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties [...], results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year") we can still identify twelve African countries that have not witnessed such an armed conflict since decolonization.² The number of states unaffected by violence even increases significantly if we follow stricter definitions of conflicts, such as those of the Correlates of War Project or the Center for Systemic Peace, which admittedly do not explore "armed conflicts" but "wars" (see below).

Warfare differs from case to case and from time to time, making it impossible to speak of one type of conflict prevailing in Africa. Drawing on Christopher Clapham's categorization,³ William Reno distinguishes between five types of warfare and rebels in Africa: anti-colonial rebels, majority rule rebels, reform rebels, warlord rebels, and parochial rebels. First came the anti-colonial rebels to fight the colonial powers in the 1950s and 1960s; thereafter came the majority rule rebels aimed at finishing the liberation of African states by fighting the white minority regimes during the 1970s and 1980s. Active primarily in the 1980s, the reform rebels, disillusioned by the despotic and corrupt group of leaders that came into power after

decolonization, aimed at overthrowing the first-generation leaders, reforming their countries, and building strong(er) institutions. With hindsight, the term “reform rebels” can be misleading as these leaders, too, often turned into authoritarian leaders. Ethiopia’s Meles and Uganda’s Museveni are examples of this. The 1990s saw the rise of warlord rebels, who had – as opposed to reform rebels – no ideology, apart from themselves. They were products of the systems of personal rule in their countries and were more interested in getting access to state resources and in increasing their wealth than in anything else. Charles Taylor of Liberia was probably the most prominent warlord in Africa. Finally, the parochial rebels emerged to protect circumscribed communities. In contrast to warlord rebels, parochial rebels are not seeking control over the state but only over a smaller community.⁴ As I have scrutinized anti-colonial and majority rule rebels in [Chapter 2](#), I concentrate on the other types of rebels in this chapter and, in addition, include discussions on the (absence of) interstate wars and the reasons why civilians become rebels. Moreover, I turn to genocides as a specific form of warfare and to Africa’s World War, a war complex in the Great Lakes regions, before I end with an overview of the refugee camps scattered throughout the continent and the challenges there.

States Fighting States

Interstate conflicts between African states rarely occur. If there is violence between African states it is mostly linked to border disputes arising from the colonial period. The colonial powers and the postcolonial governments did not delimitate and demarcate the borders precisely, thus opening space for disputes such as those between Egypt and Sudan in 1958; between Algeria and Morocco in 1963, known as the “Sand War”; between Burkina Faso and Ghana in 1964; as well as between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1975 and 1985. The use of force between states in such situations was mostly short

and of low intensity. Different here is the conflict between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya in 1964, which was essentially an irredentist conflict as Somalia tried to annex those parts of Ethiopia and Kenya in which ethnic Somalis lived. The subsequent Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977-1978) did not help to materialize the dream of a Greater Somalia, yet cost the lives of an estimated 60,000 people, including 25,000 civilians, and caused hundreds of thousands to flee.⁵ The conflicts about the Ogaden region resulted in strained relations between Ethiopia and Kenya on the one hand and Somalia on the other hand (see [Chapter 9](#)). The conflict between Libya and Chad in the 1970s was one about borders only on the surface. While Libya officially claimed the Aouzou Strip in Chad in the 1970s based on an unratified treaty between the colonial powers Italy and France – the Mussolini-Laval Accord of 1935 – and annexed the area for the first time in 1973, the interests of Gaddafi lay somewhere else. Gaddafi was more concerned with the uranium in this area, given his plan to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, he aimed to overthrow Anwar as-Sadat, the then Egyptian president. Given the heavily defended Libyan-Egyptian border, it is assumed that Gaddafi wanted to start a revolt from the south, in other words from the Aouzou Strip.⁶ It is important to stress that only the conflicts about the Aouzou Strip and the Ogaden region as well as the Sand War between Algeria and Morocco in 1963 were conflicts of territorial conquest in Africa after decolonization; only in these cases was the territorial integrity of African states questioned.

The interstate conflicts between Tanzania and Uganda in 1978-1979 as well as between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998-2000 are different inasmuch as they were fought by states, which intended to impose a unilateral result on the contention and involved at least 500 directly-related fatalities; hence their classification as “international wars” as opposed to the other aforementioned conflicts.⁷ In 1971, General Amin overthrew President Milton Obote in Uganda. The latter sought refuge in Tanzania, where President Nyerere allowed him to

plan and start a rebellion to take back power. This in turn led Amin to attack Tanzania with the support of the Libyan air force in 1972 and Obote had to wait for another chance. The Obote-Amin rivalry and the first fighting of 1972 were the prologue to a major war that followed in 1978. Then, Ugandan troops invaded Tanzania and annexed a 710-square-mile territory. Officially, Amin stated that the borders needed to be adjusted based on arguments derived from the colonial time. He claimed that the Kagera River used to be the recognized line between the British and German spheres of influence and hence the borderline between Tanzania and Uganda should follow that river.⁸ Amin was under pressure domestically at that time and chose to go on the offensive and attack Obote's loyalists and troops. Following Amin's invasion of Tanzania, that country's troops as well as those of Obote marched into Uganda and took the capital city Kampala in April 1979. Amin fled to Zimbabwe and Obote was eventually reinstalled as president. There were more than 4,000 casualties, troops and civilians.

At first glance, Ethiopia and Eritrea fought because of a border dispute, one centered on the border town Badme. However, the causes of the war lie somewhere else. The rebel movements of the later leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea – Meles and Isaias – were united in their fight against the Ethiopian Derg regime, led by Mengistu, who ruled with an iron fist. They succeeded in bringing down that regime in 1991 and Meles became Ethiopia's strong man. However, their common fight overshadowed tensions between the movements, which revolved around three issues: first, whether or not to consider the Soviet Union as the vanguard of communism; second, different positions on federalism (endorsed by Meles and strictly opposed by Isaias, who preferred a centralized state and feared spillover of an Ethiopian federalism); and third, different military strategies.⁹ In 1993, Eritrea was granted independence (see [Chapter 2](#)) and thereafter Meles and Isaias walked separately. Both regimes had neopatrimonial traits, cherished absolute power, and preferred regime

stability to democratization. The newly independent Eritrea struggled to stabilize politically and economically, being dependent on Ethiopia. Toward the late 1990s, the latter tightened its economic policy toward Eritrea, a move that some see as the reason behind the timing of the war.¹⁰ Given that the war, which broke out in 1998, was essentially one between two allies-turned-foes, with its leaders facing severe domestic challenges, it is no surprise that Eritrea's president used the war as justification for his tight grip on power. John Abbink notes that the war was indeed "all about the politics of state survival."¹¹ An estimated 100,000 people were killed during that war. Despite a ceasefire agreement in 2000 that ended the war, the dispute lingered unresolved until 2018 when Abiy became Ethiopian prime minister and reached out to Isaias. Also because of that he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019. The length of dispute is partly explained by the fact that it was embedded in a set of conflicts in the Horn of Africa, where there was a "intermeshing of domestic insecurities, interstate antagonisms, and global policies."¹²

Despite these conflicts and their magnitude, it remains a fact that interstate wars have hardly occurred in Africa. Once more, the Cairo Declaration of 1964 (see [Chapters 3 and 9](#)) comes into play when we seek to explain that. Through this declaration, African states accepted the colonial borders – following the principle of *uti possidetis* – and hence manifested the principle of territorial integrity on which they had agreed when they passed the OAU Charter in 1963 (see [Chapter 8](#)). Because of this and because of several leaders having themselves acceded power dubiously, African governments widely – but certainly not in a sacrosanct way (see below) – respected the noninterference principle.¹³ Hence, they rarely fought against one another.

Intrastate Conflicts after 1990

As indicated, the number of conflicts within countries – or, intrastate conflicts – is significantly higher than that of interstate conflicts;

according to the Center for Systemic Peace there were ninety-two armed conflicts in Africa until 2016, if we leave aside liberations struggles and only count those conflicts that took place after decolonization.¹⁴ Forty out of the ninety-two conflicts took place between decolonization and the end of the Cold War in 1990 and fifty-two thereafter, thus indicating a rise of conflicts after 1990. As the international environment was different during the Cold War as compared to the period thereafter (see [Chapter 4](#)), I concentrate on the post-Cold War conflicts.

With the end of the Cold War a new type of conflict emerged, which blurred the lines between organized crime, war, and massive human rights violations. Mary Kaldor described these as “new wars.”¹⁵ In such new wars, conflict parties target civilians more than ever and try to achieve their goals by spreading fear. The parties involved gain more from fighting in political and economic terms than from winning the war. Predatory social conditions emerge and prevail. The state monopoly on the use of force is undermined, the use of force is privatized,¹⁶ and conventional (international) conflict management enforces rather than appeases the situation. Due to the weakness of the state, which was masked during the Cold War by external involvement (see [Chapters 4 and 7](#)), Africa became particularly vulnerable for this type of conflict after 1990. This was also because used weapons particularly from the Soviet Union flooded Africa; the big global “military waste-disposal”¹⁷ fueled several African conflicts. The spread of new wars is also linked to globalization, in other words the political, economic, military, social, and cultural interdependence between states and peoples. Globalization has its roots much earlier,¹⁸ yet, the 1990s and the spread of modern communication and information technology gave a new impetus to globalization. One consequence of the increased connectivity of the world has been that supplies from, for example, illicit gold, diamond, and coltan mines have become available around the world, making the extraction of these resources more attractive. These factors together led to a rise of

warlord rebels and, later on, parochial rebels.

The findings of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, who seek to explain civil wars, feed into this analysis, for they maintain that greed, that is to say access to profits such as those derived from the sale of natural resources, explain rebellions that lead to intrastate conflicts better than grievance, which refers to political issues like ethnicity, religion, or social class.¹⁹ Their analysis juxtaposes explanations centered on motives, mostly related to debates in political science, with explanations centered on opportunity, mostly stemming from economics. One of the underlying assumptions in the greed model is that rebels need to generate income and to this end engage in criminal activities, as other than the regular army, they do not have access to state revenues. This is in line with Kaldor's arguments, as the model likewise assumes that rebels benefit more from fighting than from winning. Put bluntly, the continuation or even institutionalization of violence bears profits for rebels.²⁰

The Liberian civil war illustrates the changing global context, the rise of new wars, and the emergence of warlord rebels as well as the explanatory power of the greed model – and the latter's weaknesses. Since freed slaves from the USA took over power in Liberia in 1847, this Americo-Liberian group had ruled the country. Only in 1980 did Samuel Doe stage a popular and successful coup and became the first non-Americo-Liberian president. Scared of counter coups, he clamped down on the opposition. Notwithstanding, members of the Gio and Mano groups organized a coup attempt in 1985, after which 3,000 members of these two ethnic groups were massacred. All this happened during the Cold War years, during which the USA supported Doe to protect US investments in Liberia, such as the rubber plantations of tire makers and to avoid Liberia joining the communist camp or establishing close relations with Gaddafi's Libya. Following the 1985 massacre, rebels found it easy to recruit, particularly among the Gios and Manos. The ethnic cleavages that Doe had opened deepened. Prior to Doe, there had hardly been any ethnic hostilities in

the country. Charles Taylor could especially manipulate the now opened ethnic differences. He formed the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), gained regional support thanks to his personal networks, and invaded Liberia with his troops on Christmas Eve in 1989. In early June 1990, with the rebels advancing toward the capital city Monrovia, Doe published a “pathetic plea”²¹ to US president George Bush: “Our capital is named after your President Monroe. Our flag is a replica of yours. Our laws are patterned after your laws. We in Liberia have always considered ourselves ‘stepchildren’ of the United States. We implore you to come help your stepchildren who are in danger of losing their lives and their freedom.”²² Yet the world had changed and “Doe had lost his strategic value to Washington and become an orphan of the Cold War.”²³ The USA did not rush to his help.

The NPFL, which “had no clearly defined ideological identity beyond its leader’s [Taylor] description of himself as a ‘cold-blooded capitalist’ and ‘worshipper of Reaganomics’,”²⁴ split in July 1990, with the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), led by Prince Yeduo Johnson, abandoning Taylor. After the split, the INPFL and NPFL fought Doe’s troops – and one another. In the first post-Cold War attempt to field an African peace operation, ECOWAS established the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to restore order. Doe was tortured and murdered by the INPFL, but in light of ECOMOG’s presence, neither the INPFL nor the NPFL could claim the presidency and the fighting continued. An interim government with little control beyond Monrovia assumed office, while Taylor and his NPFL controlled larger parts of Liberia. The INPFL eventually dissolved, but new rebel groups emerged, a fact linked to the war economy and explained by the greed argument. None of them wanted to capture the state and reform its institutions, but to benefit from the war. Taylor and his commanders profited from the war through the trade of timber, rubber, and diamonds as well as simply through roadblock tolls. Therefore, “[f]or

them to talk of opening the roads or uniting with the Monrovia based government only remained an illusion because their business was at stake if that happened.”²⁵ In such an environment, ECOWAS’s attempts to broker a peace deal that would last longer than a few weeks were doomed. The warlords had local support, which was the basis for their political careers after the war.²⁶ Only in 1997 were the conditions ripe to hold elections, which Taylor won with an outright majority of 75 percent amid claims of voter intimidation. After the elections, rebel groups intermitted their fighting, which, however, resumed in 1999 and started the second Liberian civil war that only ended in 2003. Both wars cost the lives of 150,000 people and displaced 1 million out of 2.4 million in prewar Liberia.²⁷ The conflicts also destroyed health infrastructure particularly in the rural areas, which later on contributed to the Ebola outbreak in 2013–2016 and the failure to halt it (see [Chapter 5](#)).²⁸

The Liberian civil war, its build-up, and its solution were part of a regional power play both within West African countries and among them. To give just a few examples: Côte d’Ivoire’s long-term president Houphouët-Boigny disliked Doe after the murder of Adolphus Tolbert in 1980, who was related to him by marriage and son of the ousted Liberian president Tolbert. Compaoré, who seized power in a coup in Burkina Faso (see [Chapter 9](#)), was supported in that coup by a Liberian squad that included Johnson, who was initially part of Taylor’s NPFL. These two examples show that the anti-Doe movement “had become inextricably involved in a wider pattern of West African intrigue.”²⁹ Moreover, the civil war in neighbouring Sierra Leone (1991–2001) and the one in Liberia influenced one another. Indeed, Liberian and Sierra Leonean rebels fighting for the NPFL triggered the civil war in Sierra Leone and, given that the natural resources fueled the conflict, the “porosity of national borders has been a major factor sustaining rebellion” in both countries.³⁰ Finally, regional conflict management through ECOWAS was also an attempt of Nigeria to claim hegemony in the region, an attempt that not only Taylor

opposed but also regional states, which had their own strategic and security interests.³¹ In short, it would be wrong to consider the Liberian war solely as a conflict between Liberian groups and warlords. In fact, the civil war in Liberia (and Sierra Leone) was part of a wider complex of disputes among states and among their leaders and of geopolitical interests. Ultimately, it also shows that the noninterference principle was not treated as sacrosanct as often assumed.

The Algerian civil war (1991–2002) was notably different for it was more an internal affair. Facing a bleak socioeconomic situation, young men took to the streets in October 1988. They faced the power of the military's guns. This revealed the gap between the young population and the old guard, which "had won the state in 1962 [following decolonization] and was treating it as their personal property."³² After the riots, in an attempt to appease the youth and save the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) party, President Chadli Bendjedid introduced economic adjustment measures and allowed for a multi-party system. Among the parties that emerged was the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which posed a threat to the ruling FLN. The first test of the multiparty system came in June 1990 with municipal and provincial elections, which resulted in a victory for the FIS, achieving 55 percent of the votes while the FLN got 32 percent. The following parliamentary elections were supposed to be held in two rounds. The first round in December 1991 saw the FIS winning, but falling short of the absolute majority. The threat of an Islamic state was imminent. The military, however, wanted "to uphold its acute sense of Algerian nationalism, a nationalism that has deep roots in the struggle for independence in which the army played a central part"³³ and thus cancelled the second round of elections. What followed was a "programmed tragedy."³⁴ The nationalist elite tried to hold to power, while the rebels, gathered under the umbrella of the Armée Islamique du Salut, the armed wing of the FIS, as well as the Groupement Islamique Arme (GIA) sought to take that power.

Moreover, GIA leaders in particular sought to accumulate economic resources. The “emirs” of the GIA had not benefitted from the FLN patronage network before and after 1991, but from a simmering on of the civil war. Hence, they were interested in its continuation.³⁵

Greed was thus a motive that kept the war going on. Yet, it does not explain its outbreak. That is explained by the FLN’s wish to stay in power, its inability to accommodate the Islamists, as well as the flawed transition toward multiparty democracy, led by the FLN, which was so certain of its victory that it would not consider the effects of an FIS victory on state institutions, even though the latter aimed at subverting the democratization attempts.³⁶ Moreover, the dissatisfaction of the youth played a role. Loyalty toward the liberation movement FLN had faded in this generation (as happened again in 2019, when the next generation demanded Bouteflika – a member of the old guard, who came into power toward the end of the civil war and had presented himself ever since as a vanguard of peace – to step down). Algerian “born-frees” – to adopt a term usually applied to South Africans born after the end of apartheid – were less interested in the FLN’s liberation credentials than in their socioeconomic situation and hence sought change. Finally, the coup and the military’s betrayal of the FIS’s victory in 1991 polarized society and radicalized several FIS supporters, as they saw no other option to claim that party’s victory than by resorting to war. In short, the outbreak of the war was not mono-causal but a complex affair and feeds into the critique that the greed-over-grievance argument of Collier and Hoeffler is too simplistic.³⁷

Besides lacking complexity, critique on the greed model is concerned with the strict dichotomy of greed/grievance instead of perceiving one explanation feeding the other³⁸ and with the argument that the model explains the courses and effects but not necessarily the causes of conflicts.³⁹ The latter critique primarily comes from political scientists. As such, Reno argues that the greed argument overlooks that the nature of the state and the insecurity of regimes produce an

economy that prioritizes easily looted resources (effectively being a continuation of the colonial economy) and thus serves as a breeding ground for warlords and parochial rebels.⁴⁰

As shown throughout this book, the continuation of colonial state structures in several places did not favor the mass but small elites (see [Chapter 3](#)) and thus made them vulnerable to intrastate conflicts. The lack of state institutions and democracy as well as the neopatrimonial systems and the fact that those at the top of the state benefit most add to that (see [Chapters 5 and 7](#)). Moreover, [Chapters 7 and 9](#) have shown that a lot is at stake for the chief executive and their cronies, given the nature of the state, the neopatrimonial system, and the winner-takes-all-mentality. These are not only factors in explaining electoral violence and coups but also factors in explaining intrastate wars.⁴¹ It suffices to point to the violence in Côte d'Ivoire that broke out after the disputed elections in 2010 (see [Chapter 9](#)). The same is true for South Sudan, a “kleptocracy – a militarized, corrupt neopatrimonial system of governance.”⁴² There, in December 2013, President Salva Kiir accused Riek Machar, the vice president taken from office shortly before, of plotting a coup (that he denied) and used the situation to purge rivals to his rule from the ranks of the government. Kiir ran out of funds, mainly oil revenues and donor aid, to sustain his patronage network, which grew too expensive over the years. He could not prevent that three hopefuls of this party, Machar among them, declared that they would run for presidency in 2015. In a highly militarized environment, in which the members of the elite (threatened to) use force as a bargaining power, Kiir and Machar played the ethnic card – Dinka versus Nuer, two ethnic groups in the country – once the conflict had erupted. Eventually it turned into a full-blown intrastate war. At its heart, that war was a struggle over access to state resources⁴³ as well as over leadership of the ruling party and the country.⁴⁴

These cases suggest that the canonical greed argument falls short of capturing all the dynamics that explain rebellions and the outbreak

of intrastate wars. What should be clear at the same time is that those who refer to ethnic arguments to explain wars in Africa, also argue too simplistically. As the South Sudanese and Liberian cases suggest, ethnic arguments often came into play – if at all – after the conflict broke out to manipulate the local population and, as shown next, to recruit rebels.

Why Become a Rebel

Explaining why civilians turn into rebels is crucial because it helps us to understand why violent conflicts can be sustained; without rebels, civil wars would wither quickly. To start with, the greed and grievance arguments also apply here. Individuals can be motivated by dislike, anxiety, or hatred toward another (ethnic) group and they might seek to benefit personally from fighting, that is to say they profit in financial or other terms. Ted Gurr argued that relative deprivation is the primary account for the choice to rebel. Civilians perceive a discrepancy between what they think they deserve and what they actually receive. This might lead to frustration, which in turn might culminate in political violence and the choice to join a rebel movement.⁴⁵ This implies that warlords and other rebels find a fertile ground for recruitment in countries or regions that lag behind in socioeconomic terms and where there is a wide gap within the society in that field. If one cannot sustain one's family, taking to the gun and generating income for the family through fighting or looting become more likely – particularly if combined with a perceived injustice. Under such circumstances, the costs to join a rebellion are lower than the potential risks.⁴⁶ Given that injuries and death are the accepted risks, one can only imagine how desperate the situation must be for those joining a rebel movement. Moreover, (young) men might be attracted by rebels in an attempt not to fall victims themselves, which they might perceive as not the “manly way to go,” as a report from a Liberian rebel suggests.⁴⁷ “Rather than suffer pillage, some

civilians may then decide to join the pillagers.”⁴⁸ Group or peer pressure can also play a role.⁴⁹ Drugs play a role, too. During the civil war in Sierra Leone, for example, rebels “used drugs in abundance: crack cocaine, heroin that is smoked, called brown-brown, Ephedrine and Diazepam, nicknamed top-up. Locally grown marijuana was so frequently used that it was not even viewed as a drug proper.”⁵⁰ Finally, forced recruitment is a common phenomenon and refers to situations in which an individual faces sanctions from the rebels if they will not join them, with these sanctions being so severe and in fact inescapable that the individual has no other choice than to join the rebels.⁵¹ Forced recruitment particularly happens when rebels enjoy little popular support, are not perceived as very accountable, and lack manpower to continue their fight, such as the “Mai-Mai” rebels in Eastern Congo after 1998, who rounded up youth, made them porters and eventually combatants after they had lost popular support and no longer found any voluntary recruits.⁵²

Child soldiers have to be looked at as a special category of rebels, whose recruitment often differs from that of adults. The recruitment and the use of child soldiers in African conflicts include cases like the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, through which the issue raised global attention and led to some measures to curtail child recruiting. Nevertheless, in 2016, child soldiers were reportedly involved in hostilities in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo-Kinshasa, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan.⁵³ Research on child soldiering shows that it is easier to mislead and indoctrinate children, who are in addition more responsive to coercive methods and cheaper to retain.⁵⁴ Once abducted and taken from their families – their parents sometimes being murdered – children are easily manipulated. Osman, a child soldier in Sierra Leone, reports how he tried to flee a village under attack but ran into the rebels, who took him with them. Being threatened with being killed, Osman served the rebels, who at one point decided to train him as a fighter. In order to stay alive, he agreed. He was happy not to be

killed but to now be among the attackers, which gave him a good feeling, also because his fellow rebels became his kind of family that shared everything. Girls also fought as soldiers with Osman and other boys. Cocaine helped keep Osman and the other children fighting.⁵⁵

Genocides

Genocides can be perceived as intrastate conflicts. Yet their scale and intensity make them a distinct form of violence for which Raphael Lemki coined the term “genocide” in 1944, by which “we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. This new word, [...] to denote an old practice in its modern development, is made from the ancient Greek word *genos* (race, tribe) and the Latin *cide* (killing).”⁵⁶ We can identify three such events in Africa since the beginning of colonization: the Herero and Nama genocide orchestrated by the German colonial troops in 1904; the Rwandan genocide in 1994; and the one in Sudan’s Darfur region, mainly between 2003 and 2004.⁵⁷ Given the time focus of this book, I concentrate on the latter two. I should, however, stress that there are further instances that one could call a genocide, such as the killings in Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland in the 1980s (see [Chapter 9](#)). Yet other than in the three mentioned cases, there is no consensus to label those killings genocide.

Scott Straus’ explanation for the occurrence of genocides stresses the role of leadership and perceptions of leaders. In a comparative analysis of African states that have witnessed a genocide (Rwanda and Sudan/Darfur) and some states in which genocide appeared likely but did not take place (inter alia Côte d’Ivoire and Mali), he contends that there is a synthesis between ideological and strategic arguments, and both are moderated by the perceptions and actions of leaders, who weigh strategic questions in light of ideas and beliefs. Moreover, Straus argues that the (non)existence of domestic and international restraints allows (or prevents) a genocide and that the interactions between national and local actors influence the staging of genocidal

campaigns. Finally, he posits that genocides take place in war contexts.⁵⁸ Michael Jasinski echoes these findings and argues that a combination of means, motives, and opportunities explains genocides. The “window of opportunity,” that is to say a period of time during which actions can be taken to achieve a desired outcome, opens when scapegoating becomes advantageous and when there is a group available for scapegoating. Once that window is open, leaders must decide to exploit the situation and they need the means to do so.⁵⁹ Several of these factors – leaders and their perception of threat, ideology, strategic interests, window of opportunity, and means within reach – are visible in the cases of Darfur and Rwanda as shown within the remainder of this section.

Darfur

The background to the genocide in Darfur is complex. The colonial period and the decolonization placed power in Sudan in the hands of Arab Muslims, who brought forth a founding narrative for Sudan linked to “Arab-Islamic nationalism.”⁶⁰ From the mid-1960s onwards, Hasan al-Turabi, a proponent of Islamization and Sharia law, became an influential figure in Sudanese politics, and, after a coup that brought Omar al-Bashir into power in 1989, he became the most powerful figure in Sudanese politics, acting behind the scenes.⁶¹ In 1999, al-Bashir and al-Turabi fell out politically and the latter founded a new party and searched for support, inter alia in Darfur, a region at the periphery, inhabited by black Muslims, rarely at peace, and neglected by al-Bashir’s government. There are hints that al-Turabi stood behind the Black Book,⁶² a book that came out in 2000 that intended to educate the public on the need to bring change to Sudan and Darfur by showing that those who held power in Sudan consciously underdeveloped Darfur.⁶³ This book helped bring together Darfurian groups opposing the Sudanese government and increased resistance. As a result, the government feared that al-Turabi “was capable of unleashing against the regime in Darfur.”⁶⁴ Since 1987,

there have been a series of rebellions in Darfur due to a growing polarization between the regional tribes, the dire socioeconomic situation, the use of the region as a retreat for Chad and Libya for their military campaigns, and the move of the Sahara desert, which decreased space for agriculture. In that environment, members of the Fur, the Zaghawa, and the Masalit – three groups living in Darfur – founded the Sudanese Liberation Army in 2002, and started attacking government targets in 2003.

The Sudanese government initially negotiated with the rebels but soon adopted a radical position. The Arab-Islamic founding narrative of the country, the fact that Arab-Muslims from North Sudan have held power ever since decolonization, considering themselves as superior, and the absence of a nation-making project (as also visible in the secession of South Sudan, see [Chapter 9](#)) together provided a fertile ground for the conflict. The government's response to the attacks of the Darfurian rebels turned into a campaign of repression in Darfur. To that end, the government strengthened the Janjaweed ("armed men on horseback"). Originating from Arab pastoralist nomads, the Janjaweed had come into conflict with the black Africans in Darfur (also Muslims) over water and land in light of the increasing desertification. They were promised land, a fact "which explains some of the thoroughness of the ethnic cleansing involved."⁶⁵ The Janjaweed and the Sudanese air force cooperated and systematically attacked, killed, and raped civilians as well as destroyed towns and villages. Using Jasinski's terminology, the window of opportunity to start a genocide had opened: the attacks of the Sudanese Liberation Army of Darfur provided the reason and justification, the Janjaweed were willing to take action, and the world was preoccupied with the events in South Sudan, where a peace process was under way, as well as with the US war in Iraq. In other words, there were no national or international restraints. There was, however, the notion "of buying peace in the south at the cost of genocide in the west."⁶⁶ With the Sudanese government signaling support for the US war on terror, the

USA was inclined to work with the al-Bashir regime. "Darfur was in flames, but the state's oil flow was largely unaffected. Taken together, the dynamics of war, a hierarchical founding narrative, and local actors interacted to create powerful sources of escalation and few sources of restraint."⁶⁷ Only in 2004 was there enough global attention paid to the conflict and it was finally named a genocide that there was enough pressure on the perpetrators leading to a significant decrease in the killing. Notwithstanding, an estimated 400,000 people died.⁶⁸

Rwanda

The roots of the genocide in Rwanda also date back some decades.⁶⁹ There have been three groups in Rwanda: Hutu and Tutsi – as well as the often forgotten Twa. The original difference between Hutu and Tutsi was based on lineage and not on ethnicity and there were "fluid inter-communal contacts between them."⁷⁰ Germany as a colonial power reinforced the divide, before Belgium, which took the colony after World War I, institutionalized the division and issued race-based identity cards. The colonial powers considered the Tutsi as racially superior and relied on them to control the colony. Given that the Hutu far outnumbered the Tutsi, the former staged a revolution (1959–1961) to establish a Hutu-dominated state. They succeeded.

During the 1980s, a Tutsi rebel movement emerged. It supported Ugandan rebel leader and later president Museveni, initially a reform rebel in Reno's sense, in his attempt to fight the regime of President Obote in neighboring Uganda. Eventually, marching under the banner Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), these Tutsi rebels returned to Rwanda in 1990 and started a guerrilla war, with Paul Kagame as their leader. The Arusha Accord of 1993, signed by the Rwandan government and the RPF, was meant to bring a ceasefire between the RPF and the Rwandan government forces under President Juvénal Habyarimana and foresaw a power sharing between the Hutu and the Tutsi for a transitional period. A UN peace operation under the command of

General Roméo Dallaire was established. This mobilized Hutu extremists, who perceived the achievements the Tutsi had gained through the Arusha Accord as a threat. These extremists positioned themselves against the moderate Habyarimana. Preparations for the time after the latter's death began while nearly 600,000 machetes were imported and a radio station for anti-Tutsi propaganda was set up. Hutu made lists of Tutsi to be killed, first and foremost those Tutsi in government positions.

Under unclear circumstances, Habyarimana's plane crashed on 6 April 1994, opening the window of opportunity. The killing started within hours as the means were within reach of the extremists, who now dominated the scene. A few individuals were the intellectual inspirators; a "small tight group, belonging to the regime's political, military and economic élite who had decided through a mixture of ideological and material motivation radically to resist political change which they perceived as threatening" were the organizers;⁷¹ and the Presidential Guard, militias, and civilians were the killers. While there was an element of ideology involved here, it appears as if two other factors kept the genocide going, once it was under way: greed and fear. On the one hand, those Hutu participating in the killing hoped to get the belongings of the killed. While Hutu men did the bulk of the killing, Hutu women often served as "cheerleaders" and searched the bodies of the slain for valuables or money.⁷² On the other hand, there was fear, as those moderate Hutu, who sympathized with the Tutsi, were also murdered. Hence, it seems as if greed and fear made many Hutu "opportunistic bandwagoner[s]," as Jasinski concludes.⁷³

Meanwhile the RPF under Kagame continued the fight and advanced with little tolerance from its leaders to loot or rape. The group eventually ended the genocide on 4 July 1994 when it took Kigali, the capital. The disciplined behavior of Kagame and his troops, as well as the fact that they ended the slaughtering – which cost the lives of more than 600,000 Tutsi (three-quarters of the Tutsi population), 200,000 moderate Hutu, and 10,000 Twa (a third of their

population), while the UN watched helplessly, despite Dallaire's plea to act⁷⁴ – created the benevolent picture of Kagame, which benefitted him for years to come. The RPF's victory ended the conflict in Rwanda – but not in the region. In fact, the genocide and the flight of Hutu into neighboring Congo-Kinshasa were the prologue of Africa's largest war ever and should tarnish the image of Kagame in subsequent years.

Africa's Great War

Between 1996 and 2006, the Great Lake Region experienced a war of unprecedented complexity and of a sheer unbelievable magnitude. An estimated five million people died in a war complex there, a war described as the "First Continental War in Africa,"⁷⁵ "Africa's World War,"⁷⁶ or "World War III."⁷⁷ While centering on Burundi, Rwanda, and the east of Congo-Kinshasa, multiple states were involved in the conflict, and, in addition, there were numerous rebel groups. Despite its magnitude, this war is rather unknown to the world. Gérard Prunier bluntly and cynically summarizes the war's "storyboard."

1994:

Genocide in Rwanda. Horror.

1995:

Festering camps. Keep feeding them and it will eventually work out.

1996:

Refugees have gone home. It is now all over except in [Congo-Kinshasa].

1997:

Mobutu has fallen. Democracy has won.

1998:

Another war. These people are crazy.

1999:

Diplomats are negotiating. It will eventually work out.

2000:

Blank

2001:

President Kabila is shot. But his son seems like a good sort, doesn't he?

2002:

Pretoria Peace Agreement. We are now back to normal.

2003:

These fellows still insist on money. What is the minimum price?

2004:

Do you think Osama bin Laden is still alive?

2005:

Three million Africans have died. This is unfortunate.

2006:

Actually, it might be four million. But since the real problem is Al Qaeda, this remains peripheral.

2007:

They have had their elections, haven't they? Then everything should be all right.⁷⁸

The conflict dynamics are complex and I can offer only a few glimpses of what happened before turning to the causes of the war.⁷⁹ After the Rwandan genocide and with the Tutsi rebels under Kagame seizing power in Rwanda, more than one million Hutu fled into Congo-Kinshasa, a state being plundered by President Mobutu (see [Chapter 7](#)). Among those fleeing Hutu were some who had orchestrated the

genocide. With Kagame tightening his grip on power in Rwanda and Mobutu losing his grip on power in Congo-Kinshasa at the same time, the former decided to intervene in Congo-Kinshasa alongside Uganda in 1996 to install a new president, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Small Rwanda and small Uganda were so strong and huge Congo-Kinshasa so weak that this plan worked. In 1998, Kabila fell out with the Ugandan president and more importantly with Rwanda's Kagame. This triggered the second phase of the war. Rwandan troops again crossed the border. Several regional states – among them Angola and Zimbabwe – now sent troops in support of Kabila. Uganda and Rwanda broke their alliance in 1999 and thereafter fought each other. In January 2001, Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila, installed as president. A series of peace agreements were signed in 2002, a transitional government was installed in 2003, and, in 2006, presidential elections were held, which Kabila won. Notwithstanding these developments, the security situation in the east of Congo-Kinshasa remained tense. What is clear from this short summary is that this war blurs the lines between intrastate and interstate wars for states fought each other while the local groups were fighting civil wars.

The explanations for the outbreak and amplification of the conflict – or rather conflicts – boil down to three perspectives.⁸⁰ First, the conflicts are a consequence of state failure in Congo-Kinshasa. As shown in [Chapter 2](#), Belgium had not prepared the Congo for its independence, and Mobutu – the country's long-time ruler (1965–1997) – did not allow the state and its institutions to develop, but kept the extractive colonial economy alive, benefitting his and his patronage networks' pockets. The United States effectively backed him until 1990, as they considered him an ally during the Cold War (see [Chapter 4](#)). This leads to the second perspective: the changing global context. Once the USA dropped Mobutu, his rule and Congo-Kinshasa were set on the path to failure. The state's collapse – if it ever existed as a functioning state – coincided with a surge of globalization, which

made business between actors in Africa and elsewhere a daily routine, thereby facilitating resource extraction in the Congo, where international diplomacy had become privatized.⁸¹ This in turn opened space for (local) conflicts and allowed for what Kaldor has described as new wars (see above). The third perspective looks beyond Congo-Kinshasa and puts the motives of intervening regional governments – Rwanda and Uganda in particular – at the center. In this view, we need to understand the conflicts in Congo-Kinshasa as an extension of the internal conflicts of these states.

Filip Reyntjens argues that none of these perspectives alone explains the war complex, but only a combination of them, with the “overarching one” being the “unfinished Rwandan civil war.”⁸² After the genocide in Rwanda, with the global audience feeling guilty toward the Tutsi minority, the new regime under President Kagame “explored the limits of tolerance, crossing one rubicon after another, and realised that there were none.”⁸³ Rwanda had free rein to chase the Hutu, who had fled to the Congo and to install a president there in its favor. In doing so, the Rwandan army committed atrocities against civilian Hutu in Congo-Kinshasa, causing further resentment and underlining the argument that the Rwandan civil war had been exported to the Congo. Politics of identity and conflicts over land were also at play. As such, ethnic categories are fluid in that region that had seen various large-scale movements of people in the past. That gave rise to conflicts over land in that densely populated region. The ethnic and land issues in the border region of Rwanda and Congo-Kinshasa’s east were explosive and detonated also because the state and its institutions were weak. This resulted in the privatization of violence and the rise of warlords and parochial rebels. This meant that state sovereignty was effectively privatized in the east of Congo-Kinshasa and the rest of the state criminalized.⁸⁴

The governments and some individuals of the intervening states supported Joseph Kabila and thereby followed economic, geopolitical, and personal interests – or fought against him for the same reasons.

Indeed, a report of the UN Panel of Experts on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo found that Rwanda and Uganda exploited Congo's natural resources. Some argue they used Congo's mineral wealth to pay for the reconstruction of their own war-torn countries.⁸⁵ The UN report cites several sources, among them a combatant who, referring to the Rwandan army, said: "In any case, they aren't here in the Congo to chase us, like they pretend. I have seen the gold and coltan mining they do here, we see how they rob the population. These are the reasons for their being here."⁸⁶ Those states like Zimbabwe, which fought alongside the Kabila regime, did not simply come to rescue a fellow African president but to benefit their state and some of their nationals, who were engaged in criminal activities alongside some complicit Congolese government officials.⁸⁷ Given the massive involvement of regional states, the war rendered the principle of noninterference to a notable extent redundant.

Shifting alliances between the interveners and regional geopolitics kept the conflict alive. The dispute between Uganda and Rwanda is just one example. What is more, the military engagements of Angola, Namibia, and particularly Zimbabwe are linked to their rivalry with postapartheid South Africa over hegemony in the region and Mugabe's attempt to ascertain a leading role in southern Africa. There is evidence that this motive played the key role in the decision to intervene and that economic interests only followed after the intervention had started.⁸⁸

In addition to these developments, there were grievances at the local level - or, as Séverine Autesserre calls it, "micro-level tensions."⁸⁹ As noted, there were local conflicts over land and over political power. Some of these micro-conflicts, which were not necessarily "micro" in terms of scale and intensity, fueled the war complex in and around Congo-Kinshasa bottom-up; while others were determined by the events at the national and regional level in a top-down manner and still others were autonomous from the actual war

complex.⁹⁰ David van Reybrouck makes a dire prediction when he argues that the violence we saw in the east of Congo-Kinshasa was not a primitive reflex but a war economy fired by globalization and the logical consequence of land scarcity. For him, this is an omen for what will happen with our overpopulated earth. In this sense, the Congo “does not lag behind the course of history, but runs out in front.”⁹¹

Forced Migration and Refugee Camps

Besides environmental, climate, and developmental reasons, trafficking, conflicts, and crises are the most important causes of forced migration and the key drivers for the emergence and growth of refugee camps.⁹² Thus, I end this chapter with a brief analysis of the situation in refugee camps within Africa, primarily to show that these shelters are not always secure for the people living there. Instead, these camps have often become a source of insecurity in themselves and places for the recruitment of fighters.

Refugee camps are scattered around Africa. They include Tindouf in Algeria, M'bera in Mauretania, Goudebo and Mentao in Burkina Faso, Meheba in Zambia, and Dzaleka in Malawi to name a few. The largest camps are located in the Greater Horn of Africa with the Bidibid camp in Uganda, in which more than 225,000 individuals stay; the Adjumani camp, also in Uganda, in which almost 205,000 individuals stay; and the Dadaab complex in Kenya, comprising the camps Dagahaley, Hagadera, and Ifo with over 210,000 registered refugees staying there, being the largest camps in Africa as of early 2019. Uganda had another five camps where between 95,000 and 120,000 individuals stayed in each.⁹³ In Tanzania, there were more than 150,000 individuals in the Nyarugusu camp and another almost 90,000 individuals in the Nduta camp as of early 2019.⁹⁴ And there were more than 60,000 individuals in the Doro camp in South Sudan. In early 2018, there was an estimated total of 6.3 million refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa and almost 60,000 in Libya.

The security situation in several of the camps can be described as a “state of insecurity” for there is domestic and community violence, sexual abuse and violence, armed robbery, violence within and between national refugee groups and with the local population, as well as terrorist attacks.⁹⁵ Time and again, there is a culture of nonimpunity in the camps. The sources for the insecurity there are manifold and include the refusal of host governments to welcome the refugees and do little more than their immediate legal obligations. The Kenyan government, for example, keeps the Somali refugees isolated in Kenya’s periphery and does not allow them to leave the camps, and integrate into the society in social and economic terms.

A further source of insecurity lies within the camps’ inhabitants, their background, and opportunities. Refugee camps like Dadaab, in which Somali refugees primarily live, or Tindouf, in which Sahrawi from the Western Sahara mainly live, have turned into de facto permanent cities despite efforts to consider them as temporary shelters. People living there (some of them were even born there) should not necessarily be considered as passive and paralyzed but as individuals that engage in economic activities – especially in the informal economy – doing work such as loading and unloading trucks, carrying goods within the camp, running small stores, or offering services such as hairdressing. At the same time, refugees are under severe pressure. They are the victims of brutal conflicts and remain traumatized. Some live in the camps for years, often having (partly) abandoned the culture of their place of origin and lost hope that the situation in their home countries might be solved; in some cases they fear a resettlement. In short, they face an uncertain future. They have limited freedom of movements, and they have no real opportunities.⁹⁶ The frustration of refugees about their situation in the camps causes violence there and in a few cases radicalizes some individuals, like some Sahrawis in Algeria, who increasingly put pressure on the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (POLISARIO) leaders to return to arms and wage a war against the

Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara.⁹⁷ Something similar is true for Dadaab in Kenya, where al-Shabaab recruits new fighters.

However, one must not forget that declaring the situation in a refugee camp as insecure is also a tool used by host governments to set aside international human rights standards and allow any means to be taken to tackle a situation.⁹⁸ The Kenyan government regularly threatens to close the Dadaab camps based on security arguments but arguably has the goal in mind to secure international funding, which has fallen since the Syrian crisis emerged in 2011.⁹⁹ The recruitment of al-Shabaab in Dadaab and that group's attacks there are examples that show that refugees have not always fully escaped the conflict that caused them to flee from their homes.

International Conflict Management

“Conflict management” is an umbrella term for a wide array of activities undertaken by national and international actors to prevent violent conflicts, to manage and end them once broken out, as well as to build peace and to avoid a recurrence of violence. Such activities include mediation between warring factions, military and civilian peacekeeping operations to oversee ceasefires or peace agreements, peace enforcement, and postconflict reconstruction, which comprises initiatives for state-building and socioeconomic development amongst others. This chapter will discuss these activities and will also identify factors that lead to peace – or to the recurrence of violence. I begin with a short history of international conflict management before turning to the fields of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding in more detail. I concentrate on mediation and power-sharing as means to make peace; on military and civilian operations of international organizations as well as on the accommodation of spoilers as means to keep peace; and on the design of peace operations as well as transitional justice as means to build peace.

International Conflict Management: History and Dimensions

The international management of conflicts only gained ground with the establishment of the UN in 1945. Prior to that, international

conflict prevention was mainly done through conferences and (informal) institutions, such as the Concert of Europe, the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 (see [Chapter 1](#)), and the League of Nations. It was in 1948 and 1949 when the first UN peace operations were deployed to monitor armistice and ceasefire agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors as well as between India and Pakistan. During the following decades such operations became more complex in terms of tasks to fulfill, more robust as troops would be allowed to use force under specific circumstances, and larger in terms of personnel deployed.

In the 1990s, peace operations underwent a quadruple transformation.¹ There was a qualitative transformation insofar as the complexity of operations increased. In some cases, the UN even established “modern protectorates,”² with it effectively taking over state functions in some postconflict zones. An exception to that rule was the UN peace operation deployed to Congo-Kinshasa in 1960 for it was the first time that the UN had intervened in an intrastate conflict with a mandate that went far beyond the monitoring of a ceasefire but included the restoration of the state and the task to end the secession of Katanga. This operation thus heralded what was to become a standard approach of the UN and other international organizations after 1990. Second, there was a quantitative transformation. The number of peace operations skyrocketed in light of an increasing number of conflicts and the emergence of new wars (see [Chapter 10](#)). While there had only been sixteen UN peace operations during the Cold War years, forty-four such operations were deployed between 1989 and 2005 worldwide.³ Third, there has been a normative transformation related to a widespread belief in a post-Westphalian order, which no longer considered state sovereignty sacrosanct as the Westphalian order that introduced the sovereignty principle in 1648 had done, but allowed interventions in cases of humanitarian crises.⁴ Finally, there was a supply transformation. The UN had realized that it could not cope with all the emerging conflicts

and thus looked for support. *An Agenda for Peace* of 1992, the landmark document of UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali on conflict management in the post-Cold War world, consequently noted that regional organizations “possess a potential that should be utilized.”⁵ This marks the turning point for regional organizations to become more active in conflict management – within their regions and “out of area” – yet with the UN insisting on its “primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.”⁶ It was in this context that African leaders rethought African conflict management within the framework of the OAU, eventually transformed this organization into the AU, and established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Parallel to these developments African regional economic communities began including peace and security into their mandates and building institutions to that end (see [Chapter 8](#) and below). Pioneering these developments – and at that point working outside constitutional legal requirements⁷ – ECOWAS established its first peace operation in Liberia in 1990 (see [Chapter 10](#)).

Contemporary international conflict management has several dimensions. According to *An Agenda for Peace*, international conflict management includes first preventive diplomacy, in other words actions designed to prevent disputes in the first place, their escalation into conflicts, and their spread if they occur. Preventive diplomacy activities comprise early warning, fact-finding, confidence-building measures, and humanitarian assistance amongst others. Second, conflict management includes peacemaking, that is to say actions that bring hostile parties to an agreement. The “peacemaking toolkit”⁸ contains power-sharing arrangements, constitutional reforms, transitional periods, and elections amongst others.⁹ If such actions fail, peace enforcement measures can be applied, that is to say coercive actions will be used to restore peace and stability.¹⁰ Third, there is peacekeeping, which refers to the deployment of troops and/or civilian personnel to the field to safeguard an agreement or an enforced peace. Finally, conflict management also entails postconflict

peacebuilding, in other words activities, which help strengthening and solidifying a lasting peace.¹¹ Peacebuilding is arguably the most complex and most multifaceted dimension of international conflict management for it includes a wide array of tasks such as demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of former combatants, security sector reforms, the (re)building of basic facilities from health and educational infrastructure to psychological care, the creation of legitimate state institutions, and transitional justice mechanisms, to name just a few elements.¹²

Actors and Institutions

There are numerous actors involved in international conflict management. With regard to conflict management in Africa, international organizations like the UN, the AU, the EU, NATO, and to a lesser extent the Arab League are at the frontline as are such regional economic communities as ECCAS of Central Africa, ECOWAS in West Africa, IGAD at the Horn of Africa, and SADC in Southern Africa. Together with individual states like France, they create an “African security regime complex.”¹³ When it comes to peacebuilding initiatives in particular, several nongovernmental organizations are also active. This creates a complex web of actors and makes coordination and cooperation at times difficult. The fact that the UN, the AU, and at least one regional economic community of which the country concerned is part of, all have a mandate to manage a conflict in any given African country adds to the problem of coordination as does the fact that there is no clear division of labor among these organizations.

Non(exclusively) African Organizations

As indicated above, the UN is an active and major player in the peace operations business in Africa. It has fielded thirty-six peace operations on the continent since 1990 plus a hybrid one with the AU. The EU,

too, plays an important role. Following the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the EU became more active with regard to peace operations, institutionalizing and strengthening its capabilities in this field continuously. As such, the EU has adopted its Common Security and Defence Policy and established bodies such as the External Action Service to coordinate and the European Peace Facility to finance its peace operation. NATO also participates in peace operations, yet apart from its maritime anti-piracy operation at the Horn of Africa, it is more involved in logistical support such as airlifting troops to operation theaters. As I am more concerned with African actors and their initiatives herein, I leave it with this short description of non-African actors.

The African Union and the African Peace and Security Architecture

The APSA is an attempt to institutionalize a collective African response to the rising number of conflicts. Moreover, it is an expression of the vision to have “African solutions to African problems” and is linked to the call for an African Renaissance as well as to attempts of a socioeconomic revival of the continent. The APSA also speaks to what Mazrui described in the late 1960s as *Pax Africana*, in other words the request toward non-African actors to stay out and leave African actors to deal with conflicts on the continent on their own.¹⁴ The APSA is progressive. While there was still a debate internationally on whether the international community has a responsibility to protect civilians, the AU pushed ahead and was the first organization to enshrine such a responsibility – called the “principle of nonindifference” – into Article 4h of its Constitutive Act (see [Chapter 8](#)). Thereby it undermined the principle of noninterference in cases of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.¹⁵

The APSA comprises five main pillars.¹⁶ First, a Peace and Security Council, which is a permanent decision-making body

modeled on the UN Security Council, but with no permanent members and no veto rights. The AU Commission's Department of Peace and Security supports the Council in its daily work and is arguably the most active and best-financed department of the AU Commission. Second, there is the Continental Early Warning System, meant to anticipate conflicts and to undertake diplomatic initiatives as part of conflict prevention. Third, there is the Panel of the Wise, which is often wrongly considered as the mediation arm of the AU, whereas it is in fact an institution more involved in advising the Peace and Security Council as well as the Commission. It also scrutinizes broader challenges related to peace and security in Africa and brings forth recommendations on how to tackle them.¹⁷ Fourth, there are supposed to be five Regional Standby Forces to intervene in case of a conflict. While the other pillars are by and large operational, there have been several delays in implementing the standby forces. Such forces require much cooperation between states, to which AU member states officially consented. However, "in practice it represented an incredibly daunting task."¹⁸ Therefore, in 2013, African leaders agreed to establish the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises as a temporary substitute, which allows AU member states to choose from case to case whether to participate in an intervention. There is talk of using this capacity as a permanent institution, as the establishment of the Standby Forces is considered as more and more unlikely to happen in some regions.¹⁹ Finally, there is the AU Peace Fund, which has its roots in 1993 when African leaders agreed to create an instrument to pay for the peace and security activities of the OAU. The AU Peace Fund itself was officially launched in 2018, after African states had agreed to endow the Fund with US\$400 million in 2016.²⁰ As of November 2018, the fund has received around US\$56 million,²¹ a significant but still marginal figure against the background of the costs of peace operations.

While the APSA is different from the OAU's conflict management mechanism insofar as it is better institutionalized, staffed, and

professionalized, it remains a fact that *Pax Africana* is not yet a reality. As shown in [Chapter 8](#), several states are reluctant to engage with the AU and implement policies they have agreed to. Often there is a compliance problem. What is more, the AU (and regional economic communities) are not fully self-financed but depend on donor funding. In its *APSA Roadmap 2016-2020*, the AU laments that “APSA still suffers from the absence of financial ownership by the [AU Commission and regional economic communities], and from a high dependency on donors and international partners.”²² The approved budget for peace operations in 2019 foresaw US\$273.3 million of which US\$11.3 million was to come from member states and US\$261.9 million was to be solicited from international partners.²³ The EU finances large parts of the AU’s operational costs. The EU Court of Auditors, however, considers this as problematic for it “may lead to a risk of the APSA becoming dependent on donor support, since the longer the period over which aid is provided, and the greater the proportion of financing provided by donors, the greater a project’s dependency on such aid becomes.”²⁴ Besides its support through the EU, Germany did finance inter alia the building of the Department of Peace and Security at the AU headquarters and China increased its financial assistance to the APSA alongside its increasing support for UN peace operations, thus leaving an increasing footprint on conflict management on the continent.²⁵

Regional Economic Communities and the Arab League

As noted above, ECOWAS was the first regional economic community in the post-Cold War era that deployed a peace operation, the 1990 operation in Liberia. ECOWAS has since strengthened its conflict management capabilities and set up a regional security architecture that foresees the Mediation and Security Council as the centerpiece as well as a Standby Force, a Defense and Security Commission, and a Council of Elders amongst others. Besides Liberia, ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone in 1997 and threatened to intervene in The

Gambia in 2017 (and did so for a few hours), a move that contributed to the downfall of President Yahya Jammeh, who had lost an election but refused to accept the results. Moreover, ECOWAS played an active part in conflict management in Mali (see below). Overall, ECOWAS proved itself a capable security provider in the region. In a way, it is “ironic that ECOWAS, which is primarily an economic union, has achieved most in the area of the maintenance of peace and security.”²⁶

SADC established the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security in 1996 as the main element of its regional security architecture. At a time when Nelson Mandela outshined Robert Mugabe – the “hero” who brought the end of the white minority regime in Zimbabwe – Maxi Schoeman’s conclusion in 1996 that “although the potential exists for the Organ to develop into an efficient and active institution of SADC, the role of personalities and force of habit inhibit the realisation of the Organ’s goals and objectives,”²⁷ was not too far-fetched. The proof came in 1998 when SADC states disagreed about whether to intervene in the war in the east of Congo-Kinshasa with some of them doing so while others opposed that (see [Chapter 10](#)). SADC contributes to the APSA by having a standby force, and a regional peacekeeping training center like ECOWAS has. If we were to include those cases in which the UN Security Council did not give its blessing, we also have to allude to the just-mentioned operation in Congo-Kinshasa and two interventions in Lesotho in 1998 and 2017 to restore order in that country that SADC has undertaken.²⁸

In 1998, ECCAS established a regional security architecture, including the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa, an early warning system, and the Defense and Security Commission.²⁹ The heads of state and government provided ECCAS with a mandate to work toward regional peace and security; the organization made use of this when it established the Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique in 2008 to deal with the security challenges in the Central African Republic.

Starting as an organization to respond to environmental issues, namely the drought in the Horn of Africa, IGAD, “more by default than design,”³⁰ became active in peace and security matters. IGAD’s Peace and Security Division comprises a political affairs program and some specialized institutions such as the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism. This mechanism has been said to “operate well technically, with state-of-the-art technology, but falls short in how its reports are translated into action.”³¹

Member states of the Arab League have not provided their organizations with security institutions. However, the Arab League is an important lender of regional legitimacy to UN operations such as during the Libyan crisis of 2011 (see [Chapter 12](#)), and promotes peace among its member states through a principle of noninterference. Yet, with regard to Africa, the Arab League plays a rather marginal role. Darfur is one exception here, as in this case, the League backed the Sudanese president al-Bashir in his refusal to allow UN forces into Darfur.³²

Making Peace through Mediation

Mediation – that is, the resolving of conflicts by the conflict parties themselves with a neutral third party initiating and/or maintaining a dialogue between them – is a tool deployed in conflict prevention and peacemaking, but also during the peacekeeping process. Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed call ignorance, arrogance, partiality, impotence, haste, inflexibility, and false promises “the seven deadly sins” of mediators.³³ Only a few individuals are able to avoid these “sins” thus reducing the number of potential effective mediators drastically. More problematic is that the work of the mediators is often constrained by their mandates. Those authorizing the mediators often look for quick results, tend to ignore the causes and dynamics of the conflict, and at least implicitly take sides. For example, since 1990 several mediation attempts in Somalia failed because there was a

conflation of two goals (the revival of a central government and reconciliation within Somalia), because the mediators had too little knowledge about Somali politics and culture, and because there was no strategy, no neutrality, and a lack of international will.³⁴ Antonia Witt goes into more detail, uncovering some inconsistencies in mediation and the challenges mediators face when she examines the mediation efforts in Madagascar following a coup in that country in 2009. She shows that the mandate of SADC's chief mediator, former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano, assumed a voluntary and consensual participation in the mediation, which was supposed to be owned by the parties themselves. The reality, however, was different as SADC and Chissano were not invited to mediate by the conflict parties, rendering the assumption of voluntary participation redundant. Furthermore, the timeframe toward elections was predetermined prior to the start of the mediation, thus contradicting the idea of having an open process, owned by the parties. "[T]his meant that the mediators acted rather as negotiators and sometimes even resorted to coercive measures in order to ensure the rapid restoration of constitutional order. This closed the space for actual mediation and the search for political solutions to the crisis beyond elections."³⁵

Disunity among the member states of that organization, which installed the mediator as well as disagreements between the AU and regional economic communities, can likewise compromise mediation.³⁶ To give a few examples: during the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire of 2010 (see [Chapter 9](#)), the AU favored a power-sharing agreement while ECOWAS was threatening to remove the defeated president forcefully. During the Libya crisis of 2011, the AU wanted to mediate but was unexperienced in mediating conflicts with such a geopolitical scale and was in itself divided with some African governments supporting and others opposing Gaddafi.³⁷ The Arab League even endorsed the NATO-led intervention, which effectively removed the Libyan leader (see [Chapter 12](#)). When the crisis in the Central African

Republic loomed in 2013, ECCAS recognized coup leader Michel Djotodia as president of that country – if not encouraging the coup – while the AU aimed at isolating Djotodia. And in Burkina Faso, the AU insisted on holding those who staged a coup in 2015 responsible, while ECOWAS preferred an amnesty.³⁸ It is obvious that such disagreements undermine mediation and negotiation efforts and are thus counterproductive for conflict management.

On other occasions mediation was successful, as in 2008 in Kenya, when Kofi Annan mediated between the conflict parties after heavily disputed elections (see [Chapter 9](#)) and in Sudan in 2019, when AU mediators helped to reach an agreement between the junta that took over after they had overthrown President al-Bashir in April 2019 and representatives of the civil society. Together they agreed on a joint government for an interim period of three years and thanked the mediators for facilitating this agreement.³⁹ This case shows that mediation can be a powerful tool in conflict management if mediators are given a chance to fulfill their tasks properly, in the sense of avoiding the abovementioned sins, and if there is no external distortion of the process apart from the work of the mediators.

Sharing Power, Making Peace

Power-sharing, that is to say, the distribution of government posts between disputants, has been used several times in conflict management in Africa. There were forty-one peace agreements with power-sharing provisions for the period 1990–2011.⁴⁰ Such agreements are an alternative to the winner-takes-all concept, which often prevails as it provides a face-saving solution and is seemingly beneficial to all disputants, who often act in environments in which access to state resources is crucial (see [Chapter 7](#)). Hence, it is assumed that disputants are less likely to undermine a power-sharing agreement. Moreover, power-sharing decreases the risk of secessions and hence supports territorial integrity, a key concern in international

politics and of the AU.

Power-sharing was applied to such cases as Angola (1994) or in Kenya (2008) and Zimbabwe (2008) following disputed elections in these countries (see [Chapter 9](#)). Two factors shape the functioning of power-sharing agreements. On the one hand, the distribution of violence, “that is, whether any one party has a monopoly on victimhood or whether all parties have committed, and retain the capacity to commit, atrocities.”⁴¹ And on the other hand, the level of elite cohesion, in other words “whether political leaders have developed norms of mutual accommodation that render it easier to find areas of common-ground.”⁴² During the transformation period in South Africa that ended apartheid, elite cohesion was high and the distribution of violence not one-sided. There was a common sense within the elite to move toward majority rule and to make politics and the economy more inclusive without destroying the economic basis. Hence, the power-sharing between the ANC and the National Party worked. The situation in Rwanda in 1993 stood in stark contrast as there was no such elite cohesion and the distribution of violence was one-sided. In fact, the power-sharing agreement between the Hutu government of President Habyarimana and the Tutu rebel group Rwandan Patriotic Front, or RPF, provided arguments for the Hutu extremists to kill Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the ensuing genocide (see [Chapter 10](#)).⁴³

While attractive in the short term, power-sharing arrangements may backfire in the long term for they bring into power those who do not shy away from using violence to achieve their goals, and who are not necessarily committed to govern in a way that benefits the citizens and to overcome grievances.⁴⁴ In other words, power-sharing can incentivize violence. It can also distort reconciliation and transformation processes for it often keeps a specific political culture intact instead of opening political space.⁴⁵ Ultimately, power-sharing is subject to a cost-benefit calculation. The costs and risks of power-sharing might be acceptable after long and protracted conflicts while

in other cases the costs and risks arising from such agreements are too high and hence such a provision should be avoided.⁴⁶

Peace Operations and Rivalry over Leadership

The term “peace operation” – often also just called “peacekeeping” – denotes a wide range of activities. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), for example, defines peace operations as operations

conducted under the authority of the UN and operations conducted by regional organizations or by ad hoc coalitions of states that were sanctioned by the UN or authorized by a UN Security Council resolution, with the stated intention to: (a) serve as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place, (b) support a peace process, or (c) assist conflict prevention and/or peace-building efforts.⁴⁷

Others cast the net wider when they define peace operations as involving “the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military) with or without UN authorization,” mandated to “assist in the prevention of armed conflict,” to “observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements,” and/or to “enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council.”⁴⁸ Following these definitions, peace operations encompass military and/or civilian activities to prevent conflicts as well as to make, keep, build, and enforce peace.

According to SIPRI data, there were eighty-six peace operations in Africa for the period 1990–2018 (excluding those in the Sinai in Egypt). Twenty-seven of them were led by African organizations, two by South Africa, and one by an ad hoc coalition comprising Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, and Mali. In addition, there were thirty-six operations led by the UN, fourteen led by the EU, four led by France, one led by the Commonwealth, and one hybrid UN–AU operation.⁴⁹

Following a worldwide trend, there is hardly any conflict management in Africa today in which only one international organization, one individual state, or one ad hoc coalition helps in keeping or restoring peace and security.⁵⁰ Instead, there are multi-actor peace operations, in which two or more actors deploy troops and civilians sequentially, in parallel or under one command, so that a hybrid operation emerges. An extreme example here is the Central African Republic. This country hosted no fewer than thirteen peace operations between 1997 and 2014 from different organizations, individual states, and ad hoc coalitions,⁵¹ creating a “patchwork interventionism.”⁵²

When analyzing the relations between international organizations, Rafael Biermann and Joachim Koops contend that “the default condition between two organizations is not ‘harmony’ but potential or actual conflict that needs to be actively overcome.”⁵³ Their finding also applies to the relations between the international organizations involved in the peace operations in Africa. The Mali case illustrates this. The downfall of Gaddafi in Libya in 2011 had led to a political vacuum in the Sahel region where Tuaregs were seeking independence (see [Chapter 9](#)). From early 2012 onwards, the latter seized swathes of northern Mali with unprecedented speed, imposed Sharia law, and forced more than 400,000 civilians to flee. In mid-2012, the AU and ECOWAS sought authorization from the UN Security Council for an operation to restore peace in Mali. There was disagreement between the AU and ECOWAS regarding leadership of the envisaged operation, which was only solved by a UN proposal to name the operation the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), a name that avoided reference to either organization. Yet there continued to be varying interpretations about leadership. Several regional states preferred an ECOWAS-led operation and the presidents of Guinea, Niger, and Senegal at a later point also pressured France to take military action, with Niger’s president wishing to save his country from “contagion.”⁵⁴ The AU Commission, on the contrary,

thought it should assume leadership. The UN Security Council finally authorized AFISMA on 20 December 2012 but scheduled the deployment only for September 2013. There was pressure from France and the USA to conduct adequate training before fielding the operation.

France now became more active in the Malian conflict. France's defense minister warned that "if nothing was done to tackle the situation in Mali it would make the area a 'terrorist sanctuary'."⁵⁵ France started to plan its own large-scale military operation, and in January 2013, with the security situation further deteriorating, launched its Opération Serval. The AU had not been consulted. Presented with this fait accompli, it saw a need "to play catch-up."⁵⁶ The first AU troops arrived a week after the launch of Opération Serval – despite the scheduled deployment only in September. While keeping firm control over the conflict management process, France soon started searching for an exit strategy for its troops. France's rationale for choosing the UN (and EU) instead of the AU to field a peace operation went beyond logistical and financial relief. Likewise important for France was that it could exert greater influence over UN actions in Mali than over AU actions. In early 2013, the AU had agreed, in principle, on transforming AFISMA into a UN operation but set a number of conditions, including "support for the central political role of the AU and ECOWAS."⁵⁷ However, following pressure from France, the UN Security Council established the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and only called for close collaboration with the AU.⁵⁸ This was "far from the 'central political role'"⁵⁹ the AU had been hoping for, leading that organization to express its frustration, lamenting "that this situation is not in consonance with the spirit of partnership that the AU and the United Nations have been striving to promote for many years."⁶⁰

Similar tensions between the UN and the AU, as well as between the AU and regional economic communities surfaced again during the crisis in the Central African Republic (2013/2014). ECCAS sought to

lead conflict management, the AU eventually assumed leadership, and the UN took over earlier than anticipated by the AU – and France again held the key in assigning the tasks between the organizations. These quarrels between international organizations can have dramatic consequences for civilians. As such, the delayed transfer from ECCAS to the AU operation in the Central African Republic led to a security vacuum in the country, which in turn led to (or at least failed to halt) the security situation deteriorating further. As a result, the number of people in need, the number of refugees, and the number of casualties increased starkly during that phase, giving reasons for a French intervention, Opération Sangaris.⁶¹

The relations between the UN and AU have not always been as strained as the disputes over leadership in conflict management in Mali and the Central African Republic suggest. In its early phase, the AU needed the UN to take over and assume responsibility after a certain period of time, since it had no experience in running longer operations. In Sudan, both organizations even deployed together, the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur. Generally, the AU favored interim operations to prepare the ground for UN operations. Moreover, it wanted the African states to participate in such UN peace operations on the continent. Thus, there was a cooperative mode.⁶²

This mode changed incrementally in the subsequent years. Being stuck in Somalia with a peace operation since 2005, despite early signals of the UN to assume responsibility⁶³ and being reduced to the role of a “firefighter,” who does the heavy lifting and thereafter leaves (voluntarily or forcibly), the AU cooled down its relationship with the UN, even though both organizations depended on one another insofar as they lend each other legitimacy.⁶⁴ Not later than the AU’s marginalization in the Libyan crisis of 2011 (see [Chapter 12](#)), a competitive mode between the two organizations surfaced. This mode also comes in light of the fact that both need to prove their relevance to secure funding in a policy field with finite resources. This contributes to the “default condition” of conflict between

international organizations as described by Biermann and Koops. Consequently, there is also some mistrust within the AU toward the UN Secretariat. That the UN Secretariat watered down a proposal to better finance UN-mandated AU operations, underlines the contentious relations between both organizations.⁶⁵ Yet, as the AU generally seeks UN approval for its peace operations, it prefers to work directly with the UN Security Council.⁶⁶ Notwithstanding, communication between “Africa” and the UN remains difficult as the three African states in the UN Security Council too often work “in isolated silos,” hardly coordinate, and lack a joint strategy while the small AU office at the UN “lacks effectiveness.”⁶⁷

Success and Failures of Peace Operations

The question of whether peace operations are successful or not has sparked a heated academic debate. Edward Luttwark argued that we should “give war a chance” and allow wars to “run their natural course” until “belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively”⁶⁸ as this brings sustainable peace. William Zartman assumes that conflicts need to be “ripe” for resolution. Only when there is a “mutually hurting stalemate,” do conflict managers have a greater chance to succeed in bringing peace.⁶⁹ Other scholars consider peace operations more helpful and desirable irrespective of the timing question – not least for the people suffering from the conflicts that are addressed by the operations.

A nuanced answer to the question of whether peace operations are successful ultimately depends on the definition of success. Several scholars consider it a success if violence does not recur.⁷⁰ Their work is concerned with what has been termed “negative peace,” in other words the absence of violence and war.⁷¹ Others are more interested in whether peace operations pave the way for more liberal institutions or even democracy, hence they scrutinize the effects of peace operations on “positive peace”⁷² and define success as the

achievement of such a peace.

How to Achieve Negative Peace ...

To begin with, I concentrate on the factors that explain the establishment of negative peace through peace operations. The Brahimi Report of 2000, which analyzed past operations and was adopted by the UN Security Council, found, among many other things, that there is a need to quickly deploy, to have robust and realistic mandates, and to have a clear strategy.⁷³ Academic research mirrors these findings and adds further factors, including international commitment, such as the need of cooperation from crucial outside actors, a sense of security of the parties, competent leadership and competent personnel of the operations, clear and functioning command structures, internal and external coordination, ownership, level of local hostilities and socioeconomic development, as well as the taking into account of the causes of the conflict.⁷⁴

The level of international commitment in particular explains whether peace operations have an effect toward keeping peace.⁷⁵ What is more, the level of local socioeconomic capacity and the level of hostility within a country play a key role in determining the chances of peace. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis used these three factors to develop a “peacebuilding triangle,” one of the rare theoretical accounts about peace operations. According to that triangle, the level of international capacity (strength and mandate of the peace operation and the amount of economic assistance), the level of local hostility (measured by various proxies including the number of deaths and displacements, the war type, and the number of warring factions), and the level of local capacity (the socioeconomic conditions measured by GDP and natural resource dependence amongst others) determine whether there will be sustainable peace.⁷⁶

Two examples illustrate this model and explain the functioning of the triangle. Once the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 to end the civil war in Sierra Leone was reached, the level of hostility dropped.

International commitment was high as there was a robust mandate for the UN troops, a significant British engagement, and large support for transitional justice (see below).⁷⁷ Local capacity, however, was rather low. Notwithstanding, the relatively depleted level of hostility and the large international commitment opened space for peace as together they outweighed the low local capacity. During the crisis in the Central African Republic in 2014, the level of hostility was higher; fighting was ongoing and involved bloody attacks and revenge attacks of various groups both along political and religious lines. The level of local capacity was low; the country lagged behind in socioeconomic terms and with regard to the building of state institutions. Moreover, international commitment was half-hearted as encapsulated by the notion of “patchwork interventionism” (see above). The peacebuilding triangle was thus small, indicating a likelihood of conflict recurrence. And in fact, unlike in Sierra Leone, there has been a recurrence of violence.⁷⁸

The level of local hostility can decrease by making sure that there are no active spoilers in the peace process. Such spoilers, in other words “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it,”⁷⁹ exist in any conflict management setting. It suffices to point to the case of Hutu extremists in Rwanda, who rejected the Arusha Accord of 1993, to highlight that spoilers pose a great, if not the greatest threat to conflict management (see [Chapter 10](#)). According to Steven Stedman, there are three types of spoilers: limited, greedy, and total. Limited spoilers have narrow goals including the recognition of grievances, sharing or constraining power, or security assurances for their followers. Greedy spoilers aim for more. Yet they engage in a cost-benefit analysis and accordingly set their goals. By contrast, total spoilers seek total power and exclusive recognition of authority and are unwilling to negotiate or compromise. They often follow or set up radical ideologies and assume that access to total power allows them to achieve the (violent)

transformation of society that shall follow their ideology.⁸⁰

There are three strategies to deal with spoilers: inducement, socialization, and coercion. Inducement essentially means giving the spoilers what they want. Socialization refers to the changing of the behavior of spoilers, that is to say bringing them to adhere to a set of established norms and principles. Coercion (or punishment) is concerned with forcefully reducing the capacity of spoilers to influence a peace process. Conflict managers shall choose one of the three strategies to deal with spoilers depending on position, number, type, and locus of the spoiler(s).⁸¹ As such, limited spoilers can be induced as long as their demands do not threaten the peace process or shape an irreversible fait accompli that negatively affects postconflict politics and society. If this is the case, socialization or coercion might be considered as a better strategy. This links back to the cost-benefit calculations mentioned above when it comes to power-sharing agreements. The inclusion of Mangosuthu Buthelezi into the South African postapartheid government is an example of how to accommodate a limited spoiler. This inclusion helped end an ongoing war in the KwaZulu Natal Province, fought inter alia by the Inkatha Freedom Party led by Buthelezi (see [Chapter 2](#)). The situation is different with regard to greedy spoilers. In these cases, socialization is often the best strategy to accommodate them. The way the Islamic Salvation Front, or FIS, was treated during the Algerian peace process illustrates this. The FIS leadership only stopped spoiling the peace process after the government granted an amnesty to the fighters of the FIS's armed wing, the Armée Islamique du Salut, and freedom to some FIS leaders. Before, there was only talk of reducing sentences but not of an amnesty. The FIS eventually wrested this concession from the government, which was willing to meet the "greed" of the FIS to accommodate the spoiler.⁸² Total spoilers, on the contrary, are usually best accommodated with coercion. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), an ideologically driven Christian rebel group that fights the Ugandan government and destabilizes parts of Uganda and its neighbors, is

unwilling to engage in any peace process and is therefore a total spoiler. There is an international intervention to weaken the LRA, which includes a military operation, mainly by US troops, to trace the LRA's leader Joseph Kony. Moreover, there has been the popular but controversial campaign "Kony 2012" of the organization Invisible Children and there are trials at the International Criminal Court (ICC) against leading figures of the LRA. These coercive measures have largely silenced the LRA.

... and What about Positive Peace?

There is enough evidence to find that peace operations help shape negative peace.⁸³ However, peace operations hardly change the state-society relations and the underlying political and social systems, including neopatrimonialism.⁸⁴ Their contributions to democratization and the building of strong institutions in the Weberian sense (see [Chapter 7](#)) are also questioned.⁸⁵ Roland Paris argues that "[p]aradoxically, the very process of political and economic liberalization has generated destabilizing side effects in war-shattered states, hindering the consolidation of peace and in some cases even sparking renewed fighting," such as in Angola and Rwanda.⁸⁶ Sarah von Billerbeck and Oisín Tansey argue with reference to Congo-Kinshasa that peacebuilders de facto enable authoritarianism through either capacity building for the incumbent authoritarian leader or through signaling to national actors that authoritarian behavior is permissive.⁸⁷ And Malte Brosig maintains that neopatrimonial systems can use peace operations as an opportunity to generate rents and that such rent-seeking can prolong the conflict and even export it.⁸⁸

Related to that, [Table 11.1](#) offers another hint on the limits of peace operations. It lists all UN peace operations in Africa since 1989 and the values of the "neopatrimonial rule index" of the host country of an operation in the year the peace operation was established, the year it ended, and five years after the operation's end.⁸⁹ The neopatrimonial rule index takes values between zero and one; the

higher the score, the more neopatrimonialism prevails. I concentrate on the UN peace operations here because this organization is more engaged in peacebuilding than any other organization. I assume that peacebuilding is the element of international conflict management that is most likely to bring a change in state–society relations. Without doubt, there are severe concerns regarding the question of whether we can put a simple figure to the level of neopatrimonialism. Yet for the purposes of illustration, this index suffices. The data in [Table 11.1](#) show that except in the cases of Congo-Kinshasa, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia (2003–2018) – three cases in which the score of the index dropped significantly – the values more or less stayed the same, suggesting that there has been no change with regard to the prevalence of neopatrimonialism. In three cases, the value even increased significantly: in Burundi, in Liberia (1993–1997), and in Rwanda. I do not suggest here that there is a causal link between a peace operation and the level of neopatrimonialism. Rather I want to show that peace operations rarely change such systems, which are more or less distinct in African states. Further research might support – or refute – this preliminary finding.

Table 11.1 Neopatrimonial Index Score at conflicts’ beginning, end, and five years thereafter⁹⁰

	Duration	Neopatrimonial Index Score		
		Start year	End year	End + 5 years
UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I-III)	1989–1997	0.799	0.825	0.821
UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	1992–1994	0.589	0.577	0.483
UN Operation	1992–1995	0.753	0.699	0.729

in Somalia I (UNOSOM I & II)				
UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	1993–1996	0.514	0.743	0.704
UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	1993–1997	0.640	0.824	0.771
UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)	1997–1999	0.825	0.846	0.839
UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	1998–2000	0.677	0.687	0.799
UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)	1998–1999	0.728	0.725	0.607
UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	1999–2005	0.725	0.666	0.707
UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	1999–2010	0.922	0.830	0.880
UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI)	2003–2004	0.592	0.637	0.602
UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	2003–2018	0.795	0.522	n/a
UN Operation	2004–2006	0.583	0.774	0.787

in Burundi (ONUB)			
UN Operation 2004–2017	0.637	0.434	n/a
in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)			
UN Mission in 2005–2011	0.855	0.888	0.884
the Sudan (UNMIS)			

Séverine Autesserre adds another layer to the literature on peacebuilding when she zooms into what she terms “peaceland” and explores the everyday politics of its inhabitants, namely the “international interveners” or “peacebuilders” and their daily work. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in Congo-Kinshasa, she illustrates how the thinking, behavior, and incentives of peaceland’s inhabitants effectively undermine their own peacebuilding efforts. In Autesserre’s view, peacebuilders act counterproductively in at least two ways. First, they often lack deep knowledge of the local conditions. Almost none of the interveners speaks the local language nor are they familiar with the local culture of their host country. Instead, they bring with them a mindset – often a blueprint from prior assignments – and “value thematic expertise over local knowledge.”⁹¹ Their preference for short-term solutions designed and implemented in a top-down manner, derives from requirements from their organizations and the fact that they will not stay for a longer period in the country and hence look for quick results, which they can report to their superiors. In such environments, a multifaceted conflict management approach that addresses the local political, economic, and social conditions and needs in all their complexity rarely emerges. Instead, interveners often fall back on routines and practices learned elsewhere. Second, incentivized by their short assignments and security considerations, the interveners stay within what I would call an “international bubble,” the protected space that allows for the exchange and mingling of temporary expatriates. This bubble, which has a

professional and a private dimension, shields the interveners from the exchange with the local population, which in turn perceives the actions of peacebuilders as less legitimate because they see little local ownership.⁹² With such a behavior, interveners “generate widespread feelings of humiliation and resentment among host populations, encouraging local stakeholders to evade, adapt, or resist international programs.”⁹³ Having the local population on board of the peace process is, however, crucial, as rebels groups, for example, recruit among the local population as shown in [Chapter 10](#). In other words, local support reduces the risk of a conflict continuation or resumption. At the same time, there are good reasons for the separation of interveners from the local population such as the attempt to stay impartial and to avoid sexual abuse, a problem that is frustratingly widespread. Given such considerations, the recommendations Autesserre’s work implies to make peace operations more effective are difficult to meet, once again showing that conflict management is a complex endeavor linked to a cost-benefit analysis, and that positive peace is difficult to establish.

Transitional Justice

“Transitional justice,” an umbrella term coined in the early 1990s, describes a wide range of mechanisms and institutions – some local, some international – that deal with the past in the aftermath of a conflict or a time of repression. Such mechanisms and institutions include tribunals, ad hoc courts, truth commissions, memorial projects, and permanent courts like the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the ICC based in The Hague. In this section, I concentrate on local and local-requested transitional justice initiatives as I deal with the ICC in [Chapter 12](#). The debate on transitional justice often juxtaposes peace and justice and points to a trade-off, that is to say whether preferring either peace or justice. Yet as I will show, the reality is seldom either choice but a mix of both.⁹⁴

Truth Commissions

The most prominent case of a truth commission is South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which worked between 1996 and 1998. The basic idea was that uncovering the past and laying bare the truth about human rights abuses and political crimes committed during the apartheid time would heal the wounds and help to build a better South Africa. The basic mechanism to this end was that telling the truth would lead to amnesty. Many South Africans objected to the idea of granting amnesty for "a bit of truth-telling"⁹⁵ as they thought it was a denial of their constitutional rights. We need to recall that the end of white minority rule in South Africa came by negotiation and not by a defeat of the apartheid regime (see [Chapter 2](#)). In essence, the TRC, its objectives and methods, are a product of negotiation and of considerations on how to achieve peace.⁹⁶ At that time, there were attacks of the so-called third force,⁹⁷ right-wing Afrikaners, who threatened to distort the transformation process. The third force, limited spoilers in the above terminology, can explain why the amnesty arrangement was ultimately accepted by the relevant actors, despite reservations; they saw that "amnesty was the price paid for peace."⁹⁸

Even once under operation, the TRC and its work were challenged. As such, shortly before the TRC published its final report, then Vice President Mbeki went to court to prevent its publication. Mbeki condemned the report, as he could not accept the finding that some of the ANC's actions during the anti-apartheid fight were also considered as human rights abuses.⁹⁹ He argued: "the effect is to delegitimise or criminalise a significant part of the struggle of our people for liberation."¹⁰⁰ President Mandela had another view: "I had no hesitation in accepting the report of the TRC [...], with all its imperfections."¹⁰¹ While Mandela's position officially prevailed and overshadowed Mbeki's critique, the dispute shows how delicate such reconciliation projects are.

Like the TRC, whose hearings were broadcast on TV, the truth

commission in Morocco similarly created national attention. In 2004, King Mohammed VI established the Equity and Reconciliation Commission by decree and tasked the Commission to investigate abuses during the rules of his father and grandfather. Twenty thousand cases were under the Commission's charge. The well-attended victim hearings were broadcast on Al-Jazeera, events "unprecedented in the region."¹⁰² In its final report the Commission set out the state's responsibility for, inter alia, torture, arbitrary detention, as well as disappearances, and recommended that the government should guarantee the rights enshrined in the constitution, abolish capital punishment, join the ICC, and initiate reforms of the security and justice sector. Yet apart from reparations paid to individual victims, the government implemented little of this "manifest for a new Morocco," as some in the civil society praised the report of the Commission.¹⁰³

The TRC and the Moroccan Equity and Reconciliation Commission are just two African truth commissions of a long list. Such commissions were also established in Uganda (1974) to investigate the disappearance of people; in Zimbabwe (1985) to examine repressions in Matabeleland; in Uganda (1986–1995) to investigate abuses during the Obote and Amin years; in Chad (1991–1992) to inquire about the crimes and misappropriations of ex-president Hissène Habré; in Nigeria (1999–2002) to explore human rights violations and abuses; in Ghana (2002–2004) to investigate the periods of unconstitutional government; in Sierra Leone (2002–2004) to explore human rights abuses during the civil war; in Algeria (2003–2005) to investigate disappearances during the civil war; in Congo-Kinshasa (2004–2006) to examine the political and socioeconomic conflicts since independence; in Liberia (2005–2010) to investigate human rights violations and systematic abuses of power; in Kenya (2009–2013) to investigate inter alia human rights abuses since decolonization; in Togo (2009–2012) to investigate the period from 1958 onwards (see the next paragraph); in Tunisia (2014–2016) to examine gross human

rights violations since decolonization; and finally in The Gambia (since 2017) to investigate the era of President Jammeh.¹⁰⁴ Mauritius also established a truth commission in 2009, tasked to explore the impact of slavery and indentured servitude, making it different from the other postconflict or postdictatorship commissions.

Whether truth commissions support the building of peace is subject to an intense debate.¹⁰⁵ What is clear, however, is that truth commissions are not in all cases seriously meant transitional justice mechanisms but are political tools to cover actions of the incumbents or are attempts to gain legitimacy.¹⁰⁶ The case of Togo illustrated this. Following electoral violence in 2005, the UN recommended the establishment of a truth commission. President Faure Gnassingbé accepted this but decided that the commission should investigate the entire period after 1958, which is two years prior to decolonization. "Did the new President just want exhaustive investigations or did he, as many analysts think, want to make sure that his family [his father had ruled between 1967 and 2005] were not the only ones accused?"¹⁰⁷ In such cases, truth commissions can contribute little to heal wounds and pave the way for a peaceful postconflict society. The same is true for Algeria, where the truth commission's final report was not published but only given to the president. Under such circumstances, the truth about the past does not see the light and will not help reconciliation within a state. The most such commissions can do then is to identify victims and ensure some kind of reparation to them.

The South African case offers some hints that well-designed and well-implemented truth commissions may lead to some reconciliation and thus help to build a lasting peace. However, if, as happened in South Africa, the government fails to follow up on the recommendations regarding reparation and rehabilitation, the positive effects of the commission's work diminishes.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, outside South Africa a rather positive view of the TRC prevails based on what people saw of or read about the emotional hearings and the inspirational role

of Bishop Desmond Tutu, the TRC's chair. In fact, several countries have copied the model for they considered it helpful. South Africans, particularly the victims of the apartheid government, however, are more critical toward the TRC and several consider the commission as a failure.¹⁰⁹ It seems as if many within South Africa expected too much of the TRC, which was not tasked to end inequality but to uncover the truth and promote a reconciliation process. When thinking in these terms, we can argue that the TRC made significant progress in that direction.¹¹⁰ However, the government failed to deliver thereafter and, for various reasons, the TRC is blamed for that.

Rwandan Genocide and Gacaca: Mass Atrocity and Mass Justice

Rwanda chose a different strategy to deal with its past. Besides the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established by the UN Security Council, to deal with the leading figures of the genocide of 1994 there have been the *gacaca* to deal with the thousand others involved in the genocide. *Gacaca* is a local, participatory legal mechanism based on traditional dispute resolution, which combines punitive and restorative justice. Throughout Rwanda, thousands of panels were established to deal with the crimes committed at the places where these panels were set up. The institutionalization and spread of *gacaca* came in light of the sheer number of accused involved in the killings. The *gacaca* system handled around two million people,¹¹¹ a figure that supports the argument that “[n]o country has ever so vigorously applied the no impunity rule for international crimes than Rwanda did.”¹¹² This “mass justice for mass atrocity”¹¹³ aimed at punishing *genocidaires*, providing reparations, promoting reconciliation in the country, and dealing with the innocent. These panels could hand out a punishment to those found guilty. This threat led some to confess but also “encouraged lies, half-truths, and silence.”¹¹⁴ There was, however, also a feeling of revenge within the communities. Moreover, there were concerns about the fairness of the trials, as defendants had, for instance, no access to

qualified lawyers. The fact that the crimes committed by the RPF, which assumed power after the genocide (see [Chapter 10](#)), were not brought to the *gacaca* led to a feeling of it being in effect victors' justice and suggested that the government used this institution "to assert its authority and to guarantee the dominance of its main constituency."¹¹⁵ Hence, there were "serious doubt on *gacaca*'s contribution to postconflict reconciliation."¹¹⁶ Others have a more positive view. Nick Johnson, for example, argues: "No one claims that *gacaca* justice was perfect but very few here doubt that it saved Rwanda."¹¹⁷ A study of the perspective of the survivors shows that they "felt that participating and testifying in *gacaca* provided them – and Rwandans generally – justice and reconciliation," despite all the flaws identified by the interviewed.¹¹⁸

International Tribunals: The Special Court for Sierra Leone as an Example

As the Rwandan case suggests, there are also international tribunals for the leading figures. And such a tribunal was established for Sierra Leone, which was widely respected. The Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999, which sought to end the civil war in Sierra Leone, granted amnesty to the fighters of the conflict parties and sought to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone. However, renewed fighting in 2000 led the government to adapt its position. It requested the UN to assist in establishing a court that would try those responsible for crimes during its civil war. This request eventually led to the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2002 with "the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law" committed in the country during the civil war.¹¹⁹ The parallel existence of a Truth Commission and the Special Court raised some confusion within Sierra Leone, but "much of the speculation about potential problems and relationships has proven to have been somewhat wide of the mark."¹²⁰

The court indicted twenty-three persons of whom three were acquitted and one was paroled. The most prominent indicted was former Liberian president Charles Taylor, who did not face a trial in his home country of Liberia, but in Sierra Leone for his involvement in the civil war in that country (see [Chapter 10](#)). Taylor became the first African head of state to be convicted for war crimes. The Special Court was praised for it was a mixed or hybrid court that brought together international and local experience. The basic idea, “mix the best of the two worlds, in this way promoting local ownership while at the same time ensuring impartiality, independence and high standards of justice,”¹²¹ has by and large worked in Sierra Leone. The court closed in 2013 and the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone took over. Although legally unrelated and established simultaneously to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the ICC could benefit from the Special Court for it showed how international criminal justice could effectively work. Thereby this court helped the ICC, and more so its underlying idea of ending nonimpunity, to gain acceptance and legitimacy.

Complex International Conflict Management at a Critical Juncture

As the preceding discussion of conflict management has shown, international organizations, host countries, and other actors have chosen various ways to manage a conflict and deal with the past. They have done so more or less successfully, much depending on the yardstick one applies. What is clear, however, is that there is no silver bullet when it comes to conflict management. What works in one country may not deliver the expected results in another. This is why Autesserre’s insistence on studying local conditions is so important. At the same time, it is true that often there is not much time to engage in such in-depth exploration as there is a need for a quick solution – at least if one wants to protect civilians and does not want to wait until

belligerents are exhausted. This is when standard operating procedures kick in and when individuals apply their template, which is based on their experience elsewhere. Conflict management almost by definition will not satisfy all and, at times, hard choices must be made based on a cost-risk calculation. This will not change in the future.

There is, however, something else changing. Indeed, I assume that we are at a turning point of international conflict management. The election of Barack Obama's successor and this person's America-first thinking as well as the uneasy relationship between Russia, China, and the United States paralyze the UN Security Council and thus decrease the likelihood of a high level of international commitment through the experienced UN. The decline of Britain contributes to the weakening of the Security Council. Likewise, the facts that the Western permanent members have used the responsibility-to-protect principle to shield their regime change approach in Libya (see [Chapter 12](#)) while the Council shortly thereafter failed to agree on an approach to the war in Syria, have undermined the UN's agenda of promoting international peace and security. Whether regional organizations can and will fill the void is yet to be seen. It could be that we are sliding back into a more cooperative mode of the relations between the UN and regional organizations like the AU and that such regional organizations will assume a more important role. Will *Pax Africana* eventually arise?

African Actors' Role in International Politics

Having shown throughout the book in what ways external actors impact African affairs (see especially [Chapter 4](#)), this chapter is meant to complement this picture by turning around the perspective and focusing on African actors' role in the world. Drawing on Bayart, I argue that Africa has always engaged with the rest of the world and that the continent looks back to "a history of extraversion,"¹ that is to say a history of engagement with other parts of the world. Furthermore, I stress that Africa is not *one* actor in the international system, as Ronald Chipaike and Matarutse Knowledge highlight when they speak of "multi-faceted agency"² in Africa. I am not blind to the often-voiced perception that Africa is a marginalized continent for this perspective is supported by economic figures (see [Chapters 5](#) and [6](#)) or voting rights in the UN Security Council, the World Bank, or the IMF.

Academia – International Relations in particular – also contributes to the marginalization of the continent. Though there are some exceptions,³ the influential and rich realist tradition, for example, tends to ignore Africa. From this perspective, Africa is always acted upon; the continent is "the ever present and necessary counterpart that makes the dominant theories complete. It is the periphery to the core; the small states upon which the 'great powers' act."⁴ Constructivism – another International Relations mainstream theory – is not much different here,⁵ for its proponents mostly assume that international norms – a core element of constructivist theory –

“originate in materially powerful Northern countries”⁶ and, despite some exceptions,⁷ pay only scant attention to agents from the Global South. Mohammed Ayooob thus concludes that most International Relations theories “have one thing in common: they privilege the experiences, interests, and contemporary dilemmas of a certain portion of the society of states at the expense of the experiences, interests, and contemporary dilemmas of the large majority of states.”⁸

This chapter will show that there are good reasons to argue that Africa has agency and that some of its actors are able to influence international politics. To develop this argument I first iterate some parts of the history that I laid out in previous chapters, suggesting that Africa does not look back to a history of marginalization but of participation. Thereafter I turn to African actors and describe them briefly before going through five policy arenas – the negotiations regarding a reform of the UN Security Council, the Libyan crisis, Africa’s relations with the ICC, the climate change negotiations, and Mauritius’ attempts to claim the Chagos Islands – to identify means of African actors to influence international politics and the obstacles they face.

A History of Participation

Africa has always been part of the international system insofar as Africans engaged with other parts of the world economically, politically, and diplomatically as shown in [Chapter 1](#). Only a few African regions had no or only limited contact to the outside and developed in relative isolation.⁹ Throughout history, Africans always had agency when engaging with political entities and people from other world regions. The reports of Mungo Park of the eighteenth century, for example, stress how local leaders engaged with such European travelers in a self-confident way. They showed their pride and standing and perceived these travelers as guests, and in some

cases as foes. In any case, they did not perceive them as superordinate people.¹⁰ This position is also reflected in John Thornton's assertion that "we must accept that African participation in the slave trade was voluntary and under the control of African decision makers [...]. Europeans possessed no means, either economic or military, to compel African leaders to sell slaves."¹¹ Moreover, European colonizers would not have been able to build their colonies without the initially voluntary collaboration of some local actors. This stands in contrast to another form of expressing African agency, namely the (violent) resistance against European conquest. Later on, both world wars involved African actors. As such, Africans were pivotal, particularly for France, which used around 450,000 African soldiers and an additional 135,000 African workers for its war industry during World War I.¹² This caused "the largest movement of Africans from their home continent since the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade."¹³ World War II was not different in this regard. The history of decolonization would also be incompletely told if we did not include the actions of Africans on the continent and the diaspora to push for independence (see [Chapter 2](#)). In addition, decolonized African states in alliance with a worldwide movement exerted pressure to end white minority rule in southern Africa and especially the apartheid in South Africa. The Cold War and the Great Power rivalry then provided a space for African leaders to trade their support, which gave these leaders unprecedented leverage, a leverage that partly returned with the rise of China and the "War or Terror" after 2001 (see [Chapter 4](#)). Several African leaders have also been successful in steering aid flows and setting their own priorities, thus giving rise to Ian Taylor's argument that "[c]ontra to the notion that Africa is a passive bystander in global processes, African elites have proven themselves excellent arch-manipulators of the international system."¹⁴ Some African leaders did not even shy away from standing up "to the dictates of the United States" such as when they expressed their criticism toward the Iraq war in 2003 by sending a "harsh letter to the White House"¹⁵ or earlier on when they

welcomed Cuban doctors, teachers, and troops amidst the Cold War. In short, Africans have always had agency and have always had self-determined contacts with non-African actors.¹⁶

African Actors in the World

Linked to William Brown's work on African agency,¹⁷ I distinguish between three groups of African actors: first, states and their governments; second, international organizations and here primarily the AU; and, finally, nonstate actors, including NGOs and esteemed individuals. These actors are active on the global stage in various ways and in various intensities and are able to influence international politics to varying degrees.

As [Chapter 7](#) has shown, governments on the continent differ not only with regard to the level of democratic legitimacy they enjoy but also with regard to the level of institutionalization and their size. Only a few states have built strong foreign policy institutions, including well-sized and effectively working foreign ministries and diplomatic corps. In most African countries, foreign policy is personalized and there is a "privatisation of diplomacy."¹⁸ This privatization and personalization of foreign policy on behalf of the head of state or the small elite has two main reasons. First, after decolonization, the elite that ran the state was rather small and there was little experience in foreign policy making. This brought the heads of state, who engaged with foreign leaders due to their position, into a predestined position in that policy field. This is linked to the second point, that of the benefits that stem from foreign policy for the head of state and in a few cases the heads of government. As outlined in [Chapter 8](#), African heads of state can translate the legitimacy they receive from the outside into domestic legitimacy, which in turn enables them to hold to power, particularly in those cases in which the leader's democratic credentials are questionable. This makes foreign policy a valuable policy field for African leaders. Hence they privatized foreign policy

and became the prime agents in this realm. Only in those states that have an institutionalized foreign policy should we speak of states acting as agents on the international stage.

Any intergovernmental organization has a secretariat, a commission, or a similar institution that is supposed to run the daily affairs of the organization and often to represent it outwards. Bureaucrats of international organizations get some leeway for their action. As such, the Statute of the AU Commission foresees that the Commission shall “represent the Union and defend its interests under the guidance of and as mandated by the Assembly and the Executive Council,”¹⁹ that is to say by the assembly of heads of state and government or a council of state ministers respectively. In other words, the AU Commission can engage in foreign policy for as long as it stays within the mandate given by the member states. If the Commission goes too far in the eyes of the member states, it will be called back.²⁰ In one of the few studies on bureaucracies of African intergovernmental organizations, Stefan Gänzle, Jarle Trondal, and Nadja Kühn find with regard to ECOWAS that member states aim “to ensure that their leadership is not disputed in matters that fall under the umbrella of external relations.”²¹ This means the bureaucracy is kept weak in this realm. As shown elsewhere, there are good reasons to assume that this finding also applies to the AU.²²

Nonstate actors that are active in influencing policies beyond Africa include not only NGOs and business enterprises but also individuals. The Green Belt Movement, founded by Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Wangari Maathai from Kenya is one example of an African NGO impacting global discussions and decisions. The diamond mining firm De Beers is one example of a company that originates and still chiefly operates in Africa that has a global impact. Its participation in the Kimberley Process – a certification mechanism that disables diamonds from conflict zones from entering the world market – is crucial as De Beers controls large parts of the international diamond trade.²³ We could, however, also think of former politicians, religious

leaders, judges, philanthropists, artists, or sportsmen and -women that influence international politics. Such “non-traditional diplomats,”²⁴ engage with a global audience in various ways, shaping opinions and images, which can in turn contribute to changing policies toward Africa. Respected individuals like former South African president Mandela and former UN-secretary general Kofi Annan continued to have an impact on global politics after their resignation. Individuals like Lakhdar Brahimi from Algeria, who not only chaired the commission that reformed UN peacekeeping in the early 2000s (see [Chapter 11](#)), but was also charged by the UN to deal with delicate issues such as the peace negotiations in Syria continue to influence global politics. And Francis Deng from Sudan is considered to be one of the intellectual parents of the responsibility-to-protect. In addition, we find people like the Congolese Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Denis Mukwege, who inter alia advocates for the condemnation of sexual violence during conflicts. And the Gambian lawyer Fatou Bensouda, who serves as the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), contributed to this court’s global standing and its fight against impunity. Mo Ibrahim, a Sudanese telecom tycoon, also plays a role in advancing African agency through his foundation that tracks good governance in Africa.²⁵ Moreover, there are countless Africans in the diaspora such as Algerians in France, Somalis in the United States, or Congolese in China, to name a few, who became part of the societies or even politics in these countries, thus advancing African agency beyond the continent. In short, there is an abundance of African “nontraditional diplomats,” who impact international politics in various ways. However, as their impact is more difficult to assess let alone measure and because they do not enjoy the same amount of authority as states and international organizations do,²⁶ I will not scrutinize their role in more detail in the analyses that follows.

Five International Policy Arenas

In this section, I will scrutinize five arenas in international politics to identify ways and means of African agents to influence them: the UN Security Council and a reform that would include African states; conflict management in the Libyan crisis of 2011 and Africa's marginalization here; the ICC and Africa's opposition against and support for this court; climate change and the international negotiations regarding halting a deterioration as well as compensation for countries affected; and finally Mauritius' claims on the Chagos Islands, which are held by Britain. I confine myself to political issues herein for I have discussed the economic dimension of Africa's relations with the rest of the world in [Chapters 5 and 6](#). I chose those five arenas as they picture circumstances when African actors managed to influence international politics and others when they were unable to do so. This allows me to bring forth some tentative findings on the conditions that have to be met for African actors to be able to impact global politics.

UN Security Council Reform

African states have for a long time complained about the continent's limited role in the UN Security Council.²⁷ With the sixtieth anniversary of the UN approaching in 2005, there was a discussion about a reform of the UN Security Council, driven amongst others by Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, called the G4, each seeking a permanent seat in the Council. The UN installed a high-level panel, which amongst others included Mary Chinery-Hesse from Ghana, Amre Moussa from Egypt, as well as Salim Ahmed Salim from Tanzania. That panel proposed two models for a reformed UN Security Council. Model A suggested adding six permanent members and three nonpermanent members to the Security Council whereas Model B suggested adding eight seats, each serving for four years (as it stands, nonpermanent members serve for two years each) and one additional nonpermanent seat.²⁸ The G4 promoted Model A but suggested having four more nonpermanent members. African leaders had agreed on the

Ezulwini Consensus in March 2005, which foresaw six additional permanent members and five nonpermanent members on the Security Council. A core difference between the UN and the G4 proposals on the one hand and the AU proposal on the other hand was that the AU demanded a veto right for all permanent members. African leaders pointed to the fact that most parts of Africa – Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa being the exceptions – had no voice due to colonization when the UN was founded in 1945, and in 1963, when the Security Council was reformed for the first and thus far last time, increasing the number of council members from six to ten, “Africa was represented but was not in a particularly strong position.”²⁹ The G4 considered the chances of a Security Council reform – and obtaining permanent seats – better without the demand for a veto right. For the AU the veto right was, however, a question of principle: “even though Africa is opposed in principle to the veto, it is of the view that so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council.”³⁰

There was resistance against each of these proposals from various corners. The Italian-led group Uniting for Consensus was suspicious toward the G4 proposal (and implicitly toward the AU proposal) and suggested having ten more nonpermanent members but no additional permanent member. The permanent members of the Council, China and the United States in particular, showed little interest in a reform. And within Africa, there was no unity. This is because the Ezulwini Consensus foresaw that the AU “should be responsible for the selection of Africa’s representatives in the Security Council,”³¹ and the ensuing discussion within the continent about the two candidates for the permanent seat was a rather undiplomatic affair, particularly between Nigeria and South Africa, two of the main contenders.³² Notwithstanding, some African leaders and some in the AU felt that the chances of a UN reform would increase if the AU proposal were to be merged with the G4’s proposal. The G4 had an interest in such a

collective proposal, also because Africa is a large voting bloc in the UN General Assembly that would need to approve a reform.³³ Hence, the G4 governments listened carefully to their demands. This resulted in a joint proposal, which foresaw six new permanent members – the G4 plus two African states – and no demand for a veto right. However, this proposal was not endorsed by all African governments and hence shelved. In fact, African leaders were split over the questions of which states should represent the continent in the reformed UN Security Council and whether these states should have a veto right, making a compromise within Africa let alone with the G4 impossible. The heated debate among African governments continued. African leaders met shortly before the UN's September summit, at which the reform was to be discussed. That meeting was "at times testy with blunt exchanges between heads of state."³⁴

In the end, the reform of the UN Security Council did not fail because of divisions within Africa or a lack of a joint strategy between the G4 and African states. More important was pressure from the Uniting for Consensus group that undermined any reform attempt. And "[t]he final nail in the coffin of this ambitious initiative was Chinese, Russian, and American hostility to reform."³⁵ Notwithstanding, there is an argument that if the G4 and African states had agreed on an extension of the Security Council and dropped their demands with regard to the veto right, those opposing a reform would have found it more difficult to justify their resistance given the size and economic power of the G4 plus Africa group.

The discussion on a reform of the UN Security Council continues, and African states remain divided on this question. The idea that the AU could take a seat for the continent as a whole – one that is similarly voiced with regard to a seat for the EU – found little resonance thus far.³⁶ The positions of African states are now expressed not only through the AU as was the case in 2005 but also through the Arab Group at the UN, which includes several African states, and through a group called L69, which includes developing countries and

island states from around the world. The latter includes Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Liberia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, and South Africa as African members. In short, a coherent continental position is not in sight.

International Security with Major Powers Have a Stake

Writing about Africa challenging the primacy of the UN Security Council, Walter Lotze argues that the UN had to recognize the indispensability of African actors. According to him, African states were reshaping the hierarchical logic between the UN Security Council and African institutions toward a logic of shared responsibility.³⁷ As outlined in [Chapter 11](#), there are signs that may lead one to share this perspective. However, at the same time, I have also shown that the AU, ECOWAS, and ECCAS have been sidelined in recent conflict management in Africa. In Mali, the “French *Operation Serval* overshadowed all the initiatives undertaken by both the AU and the ECOWAS to resolve the conflict”³⁸ and the situation in the Central African Republic was similar. During the Libyan crisis of 2011, African actors were shown their limits in an even harsher way.

In early 2011, when the Arab Spring spilled over into Libya, Gaddafi threatened to kill protestors in eastern Libya where thousands took to the street against him. The latter’s response was reminiscent of the rhetoric used during the Rwandan genocide. Gaddafi called the protestors “rats” and “cockroaches,” and many feared that he would commit genocide. The AU tried to mediate between the protestors and rebels on the one hand and Gaddafi and his regime on the other hand. Having failed to engage with the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunisia, the AU tried to be more active, arguably also because the Libyan leader was an important figure within the AU (see [Chapter 8](#)). On 10 March 2011, the AU presented a roadmap on how to achieve peace in Libya. This plan foresaw:

- (i) the immediate cessation of all hostilities, (ii) the cooperation

of the competent Libyan authorities to facilitate the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy populations, (iii) the protection of foreign nationals, including the African migrants living in Libya, and (iv) the adoption and implementation of the political reforms necessary for the elimination of the causes of the current crisis.³⁹

Yet, the AU's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, which implicitly included a face-saving replacement of Gaddafi, were ignored by Britain, France, and the USA. On 17 March, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1973, which allowed taking "all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in [Libya]" and imposed a no-fly zone over Libya.⁴⁰ Britain, France, and the USA approved this resolution as did the three African countries serving as nonpermanent members of the UN Security Council at that time – Gabon, Nigeria, and South Africa – while China and Russia abstained. The Arab League also supported the resolution.

Two days later, on 19 March, France hosted a summit to decide upon military strikes to enforce the no-fly zone. Except Morocco, which at that time was the only African country not part of the AU, no African state was present at that summit. The chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, also refused to go, "later commenting that he was surely right not to attend for a lunch and a photo opportunity, lending legitimacy to another's agenda."⁴¹ The NATO-led military operation started immediately after the summit. The intervening coalition helped the rebels, gathered under the umbrella of the National Transitional Council to seize the Libyan capital Tripoli. The council was recognized by the USA on 15 July as the sole legitimate representative of Libya. Others followed soon. France had recognized the council in a symbolic move as early as in March 2011.

With the airstrikes starting on 19 March, the interveners had pushed the AU to the sidelines of conflict management, arguing that they implemented the responsibility-to-protect. In Paris, there was no

official talk about regime change – even though it was clear that Gaddafi's replacement was at a minimum a positive side effect in the eyes of the interveners, if not the main reason for their intervention given geopolitical concerns regarding access to oil and Libya's central role in curbing migration across the Mediterranean.⁴² Siba Grovogui argues that the AU roadmap "in favor for peaceful resolution so infuriated Western powers that they excluded it [the AU] altogether from the subsequent processes of the resolution of the conflict."⁴³ In fact, the AU's concerns found no resonance among the interveners, who preferred to listen to the Arab League, which lent regional legitimacy to the intervention. Gaddafi, considering himself as "the king of kings of Africa and the imam (leader) of Muslims"⁴⁴ and having constantly meddled in the affairs of Arab states, had a weak support base in the region and hence it was no surprise that the Arab League supported the interveners' course. As Linnéa Gelot and I have argued elsewhere, the three Western permanent members of the UN Security Council and their allies used their material and immaterial power to advance a discourse on a cosmopolitan liberal order related to the responsibility-to-protect principles. The interveners explained that their intervention was needed and justified and thereby put the AU's concerns aside as they were not in sync with the interveners' intentions.⁴⁵ When a high-level panel of African heads of state asked to travel to Libya to negotiate with Gaddafi, the rebels, and protestors shortly after the airstrikes had started, the NATO-led coalition was not willing to intermit the airstrikes and ensure the safety of the high-level panel. This show of hard power eventually pushed the AU and African states out of the field and Libya turned into "another recent reminder of how the AU, despite its best intentions to be at the centre of dealing with African challenges, continues to be deliberately side-lined" as South Africa's deputy foreign minister Ebrahim Ebrahim complained.⁴⁶

The fact that African states were not united helped the intervening coalition for they could point to contradictory signals,

with the AU opposing the intervention but with the three African states in the UN Security Council having voted for resolution 1973. Whether African leaders supported or opposed Gaddafi hinged to a large degree on their dependence on his money or whether or not he had meddled into their affairs beyond an acceptable threshold. Some African leaders had dubiously acceded power and hence could not openly speak out against him.⁴⁷ Still others were more seriously concerned with the responsibility-to-protect and the safeguarding of that principle, which they saw threatened through the actions of the interveners. This is why, according to their own statements, the South African government voted for resolution 1973 but rejected the intervention and the forced regime change.⁴⁸ Adding to the complex picture we must not forget that a large number of African states were bystanders in that debate and showed little interest in the Libyan crisis at all. With such “varied positions, the AU could not mount an effective intervention in the crisis.”⁴⁹

Africa and the International Criminal Court in Mutual Accommodation

Africa’s relations with the ICC seem ambivalent. On the one hand, African states and the AU have loudly voiced their critique toward the ICC, chiefly because of the arrest warrant against former Sudanese president al-Bashir and a perceived anti-Africa bias of the court and have thus threatened to withdraw en masse from the Rome Statute, the legal basis of the ICC. On the other hand, Africa is the largest signatory bloc of the Rome Statute, several African governments cooperate with the court, and, apart from Burundi and The Gambia, no African state has yet withdrawn from the court, and The Gambia has even reversed its withdrawal decision. (President Zuma also withdrew South Africa but a national court forced him to reverse that decision; see [Chapter 7](#).) In trying to explain this seeming ambivalence, I argue that African governments have reached a stage of “mutual accommodation”⁵⁰ with the ICC, in other words a situation

that is beneficial to them and the ICC.⁵¹

In the late 1990s, African governments showed interest in the establishment of a permanent international criminal court, given the “large-scale violations of human rights over the centuries: slavery, wars of colonial conquest and continued acts of war and violence, even in the post-colonial era.”⁵² After the Rome Statute was adopted in 1998, Senegal was the first state to ratify that statute and other African states such as Ghana, Mali, Lesotho, Botswana, Sierra Leone, Gabon, and South Africa (in chronological order) were also among the first. At that time, the ICC also had opponents in Africa. States like Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritania, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Togo opposed the court from the beginning and never joined. “Some of these are semi-failed states; others are not known to be democratic. It is not idle speculation to say that the rulers in these countries watch the ICC with suspicion for the likelihood of becoming clients of the Court one day.”⁵³

In the period 2002–2007, several African governments cooperated with the ICC. As such, the governments of the Central African Republic, Congo-Kinshasa, and Uganda referred cases to that court. This self-referral strategy was a win-win situation. The ICC could demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with states, the governments, which referred cases, could promote themselves as champions of the ICC and its underlying norms, the Prosecutor could increase his own legitimacy, and the spread of the norm of nonimpunity started to scare (potential) criminals.⁵⁴ There are, however, many signs that there were political deals between the Prosecutor and the referring governments so that the ICC would only try rebels and not incumbents and their forces.⁵⁵ In effect, referring governments used the ICC to weaken domestic opponents, as happened, for example, in Uganda. Hence, the term “self-referral” is a “misnomer” and we should better speak of “opposition-referrals.”⁵⁶ It is important to stress that it was this policy of African leaders that led the ICC to concentrate on African cases. With the advantage of hindsight, it is ironic that the

first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, preferred this self-referral strategy to escape postcolonial critique, and later on was accused of an anti-African bias that included exactly such a postcolonial critique.⁵⁷

Once the ICC issued an arrest warrant against al-Bashir in 2009 – the first against a sitting president – and continued to focus on African cases, African governments began voicing their critique toward the ICC through the AU. The AU began questioning the legitimacy of the ICC and requested the UN Security Council to defer the case against al-Bashir and demanded from its members not to cooperate with the ICC in that case.⁵⁸ In the following decade, the AU proposed several changes to the Rome Statute, including immunity to incumbent heads of state and government. To underline their critique, African states threatened to withdraw en masse. In 2014, African governments decided to establish an African court, the African Court of Justice, Human, and Peoples' Rights (ACJHPR). This court is supposed to exercise jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes as the ICC does, but in addition, it shall also have jurisdiction over mercenarism, terrorism, trafficking of persons and drugs, as well as unconstitutional changes of government. Besides this broader mandate, the other main difference to the ICC is that sitting heads of state and government would enjoy immunity before the ACJHPR.⁵⁹ As of early 2019, only ten African states had signed and none had ratified the agreement related to the establishment of the ACJHPR.

Like Mark Kersten, I assume that the behavior of African states and the AU toward the ICC as well as the creation of the ACJHPR must be understood as strategies to negotiate with the ICC and that court's state parties; it is not a fundamental opposition to the ICC.⁶⁰ In order to present itself as a viable negotiating partner globally and gain normative leverage, the mandate of the ACJHPR had to go further than the Rome Statute otherwise ICC state parties could easily dismiss the African initiative as turning back the wheel of history. Despite bringing itself into such a favorable position, the AU has not been

effective in renegotiating the Rome Statute. This is also due to a lack of unity among African governments. There are tensions within Africa between the commitments to human rights and Pan-Africanism, pitting the protection of human rights against African solidarity.⁶¹ Moreover, there are discussions on the continent about the tensions between peace and justice and about whether to support a global or regional approach to conflict management and transitional justice.

Even though the AU and African states have been (thus far) unable to alter the Rome Statute, their policy nevertheless has brought some change. For example, their strategy to blame the ICC for its anti-Africa bias led to a broader debate on that issue and brought the Prosecutor – now an African (see above) – to investigate more and more non-African cases. Moreover, the AU has “succeeded in creating noncooperation pressure which subjects those AU member states that are also ICC state parties to loyalty conflicts in which they are forced to choose with which organization’s policy to comply.”⁶² Several African governments see it now as politically acceptable to not arrest heads of state like al-Bashir and not to cooperate with the ICC in such cases without being punished for that. Even inviting indicted leaders appears acceptable. In effect, the AU became a “compliance mediator between African states and the ICC,”⁶³ and hence gained a more powerful role in this arena of international politics than one would assume at first glance. As a result, the situation is also to the AU’s benefit.

Climate Change

Africa’s role in international climate change negotiations as well as its influence in these talks are widely regarded as a “success story of the continent’s collective agency.”⁶⁴ This has not always been the case. Indeed, the continent’s position was rather weak in the 1990s, when international negotiations on climate change began to gain momentum with the signing of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 at the “Earth Summit” in Rio de

Janeiro. The position of African actors strengthened and their influence grew at the Conferences of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC, which has taken place every year since the 1997 summit in Kyoto, where the Kyoto protocol was adopted. Africa's strong position culminated in a negotiation success at the COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, when African negotiators played a central role in fixing a lower target for an acceptable maximum temperature rise than initially discussed. Furthermore, they secured compensations for countries most affected by climate change, which are mostly African countries, for they suffer from droughts, irregular precipitation, and desertification.

There are two main reasons why African actors could assume such a strong position in these negotiations over time. First, African states negotiated as one bloc. Initially, African states had also sided with the G77 and China, before realizing that their positions and demands differed from that group; hence African states went separately but collectively. Second, they managed to negotiate better. Initially, there were limited resources for the negotiators and "analytical capabilities of individual African states were weak. Negotiation experience and training was also in short supply."⁶⁵ The COP12 in Nairobi in 2006 brought a significant change. This first COP to be held in Sub-Saharan Africa and in an AU member state (in 2001 it was held in Marrakech, Morocco) allowed to point specifically to the continent's needs and brought African leaders to invest more in negotiations both in terms of resources given to the negotiators and in terms of personal commitment of leaders. As such, the 2009 success at the COP15 in Copenhagen appears unthinkable without the engagement of Meles, the Ethiopian prime minister, who negotiated on behalf of all African states, pushing proposals that to a notable extent informed the final agreement.⁶⁶ The other African negotiators likewise acted differently. They made more submissions and raised more agenda items. They included outside experts in their delegations, allowing "them to leverage their own 'in-house' human resources at

very little cost.”⁶⁷ In 2009, African negotiators did not shy away from staging a walkout of a meeting in Barcelona when they felt that some countries wanted to extinguish the Kyoto protocol.⁶⁸

Brendan Vickers argues that African negotiators drew bargaining power from four sources: the commodity boom, the potential market power (see [Chapters 4 and 6](#)), collective continental agency, as well as normative and ideological framing.⁶⁹ It was particularly the collective agency as well as the normative and ideological framing that contributed to the African success in the climate change negotiations. Collective action was only possible because African leaders realized that they could lose little, but gain a lot. On the one hand, they could secure and strengthen their positions within their country. On the other hand, they could attract resources to fight the consequences of climate change. Indeed, in the arid and semiarid regions of the continent, where precipitation has become more sparse, and on the islands surrounding the continent, which are threatened by a rising sea level, the consequences of climate change are clearly perceptible. The argument repeatedly brought forward – that Africa suffers most from climate change but has done little to cause it – fell on fertile ground in richer countries for these are undeniable facts that framed the negotiations normatively and ideologically. African negotiators furthermore insisted: “that climate change is an ‘additional burden’ hindering Africa’s sustainable development and the attainment of the [Millennium Development Goals].”⁷⁰ This argument, too, became part of the framing of the African position. However, while this argument contributed to the negotiation success and led to more influence, it also has a downside. It presents Africa as a victim, eligible for support rather than as a source of technological solutions or innovations that might help in fighting climate change.⁷¹ This strategy may thus backfire in the medium and long term as it could undermine the African position.

Mauritius, Chagos Islands, and Wider Implications

In June 2019, Mauritius gained ground in its decades-long bid to claim sovereignty over the Chagos Islands, an island group held by Britain, 2,100 kilometers away from Mauritius in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Thereby Mauritius showed that African states can even influence international high politics. In 1965, three years before the independence of Mauritius, Britain split the colony that comprised of Mauritius, Rodrigues, and the Chagos Islands and transferred the latter to the newly established British Indian Ocean Territory. In 1966, Diego Garcia, one of the islands of the archipelago, was given to the USA to use it as a military base, which became strategically important during the Cold War, when the USA sought dominance through its "Strategic Island Concept," that is, the establishment of military bases far away enough not to create attention but close enough to project its military power.⁷² Diego Garcia was just too perfect in the eyes of the USA. The island population, some 1,500 people, were forcefully resettled, treated inhumanely by Britain, the USA, and also often by the communities into which they were resettled, and have ever since demanded their right to return.⁷³

In 2000, in a first legal breakthrough, the British High Court of Justice ruled that the resettlement of the islands' population was unlawful, but refused a right of return. More rulings followed in the Chagos islanders' favor and Mauritius put more pressure on Britain. Mauritius brought the UN General Assembly to request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. In early 2019, this court in its nonbinding advisory opinion considered the split of the colonial territory prior to decolonization as unlawful and Mauritius' claims over the islands as legitimate. During the hearing, the AU made its first appearance at this court in order to support the Mauritian case. Mauritius, together with the African group within the UN, pressured behind the scenes that the UN General Assembly demand Britain's withdrawal. In light of the advisory opinion and the diplomatic activities, the UN General Assembly passed a nonbinding resolution in June 2019, which demanded that Britain withdraws "its colonial

administration from the Chagos Archipelago unconditionally within a period of no more than six months [...], thereby enabling Mauritius to complete the decolonization of its territory as rapidly as possible.”⁷⁴ This resolution was supported by 116 states; 56 abstained and only 6, namely Australia, Britain, Hungary, Israel, the Maldives, and the USA voted against it.

This resolution has three major implications. First, it was another sign of Britain’s diminishing role in international politics, as its pressure and diplomatic activities to avoid that decisive defeat did not materialize. This has been an “urgent wake-up call” for Britain, for “this absolutely should not be the place in the global order that modern Britain seeks” as *The Guardian* commented.⁷⁵ The second implication might be more far-reaching insofar as the resolution could also imply that France – which abstained – might have unlawfully kept Mayotte, the commercially most valuable island of the Comoros, which it took away from the colony prior to decolonization. Third, the resolution is a sign of the ability of African actors to push positions and get majorities that reach beyond a Global South solidarity as the abstaining of more influential states – like that of Canada and Germany – must be read as a de facto support in this case.

It appears unlikely that the resolution will be acted upon. Not so much because of Britain’s position but because of the interests of the USA, which has for years “strongly resisted any attempt to alter the status quo, as Diego Garcia is now a key base in its ‘war against terror’.”⁷⁶ In fact, the base played a key role in the Afghanistan war and may have been a “black site” of the USA to interrogate terror suspects. In light of this, it comes as little surprise that Britain’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office said that “Britain did not recognise Mauritius’ claim to sovereignty, but would stand by an earlier commitment to hand over control of the islands to Mauritius when they were no longer needed for defence purposes.”⁷⁷ In 2016, Britain had extended the contract with the USA until 2036. Notwithstanding, it is a good example to show that African states can create an alliance

among themselves, find others to support them, use national and international legal institutions to push their claim, and thereby influence international politics.

Africa and International Politics

The analyses of African actors' role in the five arenas has shown that they can influence international politics. If not immediately visible like in the climate change negotiations, African actors *have* influence, as shown by the changes of acceptable behavior toward the ICC or with regard to the Chagos Islands. At the same time, the UN Security Council reform and more so the Libyan crisis suggest that this finding needs a qualification, which is that African influence will diminish once African demands run counter to the interests of major states, such as China, France, and the United States. If these states have a stake and if their interests are contrary to the one voiced by African actors, the latter will face immense difficulties in seeing their positions materializing. Indeed, Britain and the USA have yet to withdraw from the Chagos Islands. Generally, acting united helps to push for a position as there is more leverage, but in cases with diverging interests of major powers, the negotiation power – let alone hard power – appears still too small.⁷⁸

The limits to African actors' influence beyond the continent are not only concerned with negotiation skills, hard power, or economic leverage but also touch on soft power issues, that is to say the use of appeal and attraction to shape others' preferences and views.⁷⁹ The Arab world, for example, has succeeded in having a voice through news channels such as Al Jazeera to shape others' preferences. Africa lacks such a voice. Remi Adekoya put it bluntly: "the continent currently has no microphone of its own on the global stage, no loudspeaker with which to tell its stories the way it wants them told. It has to wait in line hoping others lend it theirs from time to time. That won't do."⁸⁰ This is where the African Renaissance discourse and

the postcolonial discourse and the writings of intellectuals like Achille Mbembe, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, and Felwine Sarr come in for they seek to give Africans such a voice and work not only toward more self-confidence but also toward a different perception of Africa.⁸¹

Epilogue

How can one summarize a condensed version of African history and politics since decolonization? Since I am unable to do so, I will not “conclude” here but instead reflect upon parts of what I wrote and distill some messages that will take the form of questions rather than answers.

In some respects, my perspective on African history and politics can be perceived as a story of unmet hopes and expectations. The colonial powers hoped for more than they could achieve, the liberation and nationalist movements hoped for more than they could achieve, those supporting democratization hoped for more than they could achieve, and those working to improve the socioeconomic situation hoped for more than they could achieve, as did peacekeepers and peacebuilders. I have identified several factors at the structural and the individual level that explain why the hopes and expectations of many could not materialize. In light of this, we might ask whether Africans and non-Africans were/are just too hopeful, visionary, or even illusionary about the future of “Africa.” At the same time, we might ask whether these unmet hopes and expectations created and then fed (and continue to feed) into a certain – rather negative – image about the continent. And we should further ask whether this image of “Africa” contributes to the manner in which some non-Africans treat the continent and its people, and likewise whether it impacts how Africans think about and treat their continent.

But recall: we must be skeptical about every generalization and hold up every fashion to the mirror of history (see [Prologue](#)). Indeed, there is *at least* one different interpretation. Accordingly, we could also find that those seeking to establish authoritarian rule were not as

successful as they hoped; that those trying to enrich themselves or their clientele at the expense of others were not everywhere successful; that foreign donors could not shape and shove African politics and the continent's economy as they pleased; and that those who attempted to spoil peace processes often failed. Considered this way, not everything is as negative as the first interpretation, and one might argue that civil liberties are more widespread two decades into the new millennium than at decolonization. For in many parts of Africa there is no longer any systematic oppression, and the vast majority of its inhabitants live in peace and not war. The socioeconomic situation has also improved significantly.¹

This juxtaposition of interpretations (of what is already an interpretation) indicates that this book also presents a tale of talking past each other, particularly between "Africa" and the "West" as I indicated in the [Prologue](#) with reference to the football match in Valenciennes. I have shown in this book on several occasions that actors talked past each other insofar as they had differences and were unable or unwilling to reconcile them, instead going their own way without paying attention to the other side. It suffices to mention three occasions: First, shortly before independence, colonial powers tried to install democratic systems in many places, something that the political elite, local and traditional leaders, and other actors within the colonial state often did not appreciate. Instead, they largely kept the colonial state intact – with a new leadership. Second, during the Cold War years, those who saw the solution to the economic problems in the "Washington Consensus" stood in direct contrast to those who considered Marxism or socialism as the solution. Finally, while some promote a liberal-cosmopolitan agenda (democratization in particular) others do not perceive that as the best way forward and found a role model in China's rise and that country's image of being a successful economic power with a strong but nondemocratic leadership. It appears as if in these tales of talking past one another, each side held/holds a monologue about the truth of its view and the advantages of

its position yet refuses to engage in a dialogue with the other side.

I must be honest enough to write that this book itself is part of the tale of talking past each other, as another white (man) presents his own perspective on Africa. Taking into account my guidelines cited in the [Prologue](#), I nonetheless ask readers to understand this book as written in a spirit of promoting dialogue. I have tried as objectively as possible to provide facts and figures, to show examples and counterexamples, to stress the diversity and complexity of the continent, to indicate factors on the domestic and international levels that determine politics, the economy, as well as socioeconomic development, while also making clear that there are neither simple questions nor simple answers, let alone easy solutions. In other words, I have asked the big questions in search of the big picture.

The tale of talking past each other is nowhere as clearly expressed as through the juxtaposition of the “hopeless continent” and “Africa rising” paradigms that were linked to the cover stories of *The Economist* in May 2000 and March 2013. I have shown that disillusionment and even frustration can be found in close proximity to hopes and expectations. Indeed, one might conclude from one’s analysis of the current situation that Africa is hopeless (or not) while someone else at the same point in time instead bets on the future and finds Africa rising (or not). In other words, one can focus on failures or on successes; one can call issues problems, challenges, or neither; and one can believe in a bright future or not. It appears that different hopes, expectations, and perspectives as well as the images they produce are capable of triggering a confrontation that could be avoided by a broader dialogue about these hopes, expectations, perspectives, and images – a dialogue on an equal footing.

At the time I was drafting this [Epilogue](#), I came across a comment in *The Economist* that highlights my point nicely. Writing about the Ebola outbreak in the east of Congo-Kinshasa in 2019, the magazine stressed:

When Congolese blood is spilled by machete-wielding militiamen, outsiders barely notice. Was the death toll from the [...] civil war 800,000 or 5m? No one kept an accurate tally. By contrast, when blood spills out of Congolese Ebola victims, the world pays attention. The World Health Organization said that 1,707 people have so far died in the Congo's current Ebola outbreak.²

Why would the world at one point provide an exact figure whereas in another – arguably more serious – incident (see [Chapter 10](#)), it is not even able to provide a rough estimate? This may be a (cynical) eye-opener for some; in any case, it shows that we apply different measures. What is more, the Ebola outbreak and how it is perceived locally reveals that we are indeed talking past each other, when we learn that 40 percent of locals in the east of Congo-Kinshasa believe that Ebola does not exist.³ It seems there is considerable mistrust toward outsiders and the “West” in particular since the disparity is otherwise barely explainable. We talk about people dying, but we cannot agree on the reasons for their deaths.

A couple of questions emerge from this: What went wrong in our conversation and/or interaction? Have external actors – states and civilians alike – behaved correctly and do they continue to do so? How might they change their approach? Should external actors and Africans work in tandem on prevention, that is, more on structural factors than on the cure? Or should external actors just do nothing now and in the future – and thus give local developments (including war)⁴ a chance? More fundamentally, what is right and what is wrong? Why is this right or why is this wrong? And who decides what is right and what is wrong, and why it is so? Are our perspective, our hopes and expectations, our mindset, and our values more decisive, or is it the perspective, hopes and expectations, mindsets, and values of others? And who are “we” and who are the “others”? I have no answers to these questions but dare to suggest that we “ask the big questions and get the big picture; [...] hold up every fashion to the mirror of history; and [...] acknowledge the extent to which we are in

the dark rather than pretending that we can see the light.”⁵

Maxi Schoeman noted that it is too often forgotten that Africa is not a country but a continent.⁶ My book stresses her argument by pointing to the diversity with regard to political systems, economic and socioeconomic development, as well as economic potential to name just a few of the dimensions that I have explored herein. Even though this claim is widely shared, it has not resulted in any linguistic change, let alone a rethinking of African Studies as an academic discipline. Should we, for example, better speak of plural “Africas” than of *one* Africa in order to designate the continent’s diversity and do justice to its complexity? Doing so might also help to overcome the rather simplistic image of “Africa” that too often prevails. As a journalist noted more than thirty years ago, “[t]here is a difference between the Africa you read about or see on your TV screen, and the other more complex Africa that is hidden from you.”⁷ We might be well advised to pay better attention to the “hidden Africa” in order to present Africa – a continent, not a country – more in its diversity and complexity than in simplistic and maybe even unwarranted terms. I am aware that I have not achieved all of my own ambitions, given structural constraints – a 120,000 word limit and a mutually agreed deadline – but also because of my imperfect knowledge. As noted in the [Prologue](#), this book represents just *one* perspective and should thus be understood more as an invitation to follow African affairs than as a final assessment of them. It is meant to open the door to see and understand African history, politics, and their effects. Now it is your turn.

Notes

Acknowledgments

1 Binyavanga Wainaina, “How to Write about Africa,” *Granta* no. 92 (2005), <https://granta.com/how-to-write-about-africa/>.

Prologue

- 1 R. John Vincent, "Order in International Politics," in *Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations*, eds. John D. B. Miller and R. John Vincent (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 38–64: 64.
- 2 Jan Göbel, "Diese 90 Minuten waren eine Schande," *Spiegel online*, 24 June 2019, www.spiegel.de/sport/fussball/fussball-wm-2019-der-frauen-england-vs-kamerun-diese-90-minuten-waren-eine-schande-a-1273917.html.
- 3 Rich Laverty, "England vs Cameroon: Phil Neville 'Ashamed' As He Launches Scathing Attack on World Cup Opponents," *The Independent online*, 23 June 2019, www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/womens_football/womens-world-cup-2019-england-vs-cameroon-results-phil-neville-press-conference-a8971491.html.
- 4 Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993).
- 5 Patricia Schultz, *1000 Places to See Before You Die* (Potsdam: Vista Point, 2015).
- 6 The author's compilation based on a research with Nexis. The size of the quadrant representing the USA is a quarter of its actual size.
- 7 *The Economist*, "News Peak," 23 December 2017, 37.
- 8 Felwine Sarr, *Afrotopia* (Paris: Philippe Rey, 2016).
- 9 Max Weber, *Methodologische Schriften* (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1968), 229–277.
- 10 *The Economist*, "Master of the Mallet," 27 July 2019, 28.
- 11 Eliza Anyangwe, "10 Things Africa Has Given the World," *The Guardian online*, 8 September 2015, www.theguardian.com/

12 Weber, *Methodologische Schriften*.

13 Cheikh Anta Diop, *Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in African Culture and Development 1946–1960* (London: Karnak House, 1996).

Chapter 1

- 1 Basil Davidson, *Africa: History of a Continent* (New York: Macmillan, 1972); Kevin Schelling, *History of Africa* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989); UNESCO, *General History of Africa, Volumes I–VI* (London: Heinemann, 1981–1993); John Reader, *Africa: A Biography of the Continent* (London: Penguin, 1998); John Iliffe, *Africans: The History of a Continent* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
- 2 Cheikh A. Diop, *The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality* (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1974).
- 3 François-Xavier Fauvelle, *The Golden Rhinoceros: Histories of the African Middle Ages* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).
- 4 Adam Jones, *Afrika bis 1850* (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 2016).
- 5 Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The Rise of Christian Europe* (Norwich: Thames Hudson, 1965), 9; Raymond Mauny, *Les siècles obscurs de l'Afrique noire: histoire et archéologie* (Paris: Fayard, 1970).
- 6 Fauvelle, *The Golden Rhinoceros*.
- 7 John C. Wilkinson, *The Arabs and the Scramble for Africa* (London: Equinox Publishing, 2015).
- 8 Iliffe, *Africans*.
- 9 Jones, *Afrika bis 1850*, 107–122 [own translation].
- 10 Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, “The Political Economy of the African Peasantry and Modes of Production,” in *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, eds. Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1976), 90–111.
- 11 Aili M. Tripp, “Women and Politics in Africa,” in *Oxford*

Research Encyclopaedia of African History, ed. Thomas Spear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 2.

12 Georges Balandier, *Political Anthropology* (London: Allen Lane, 1970).

13 Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 41.

14 *Ibid.*, 42.

15 Jean Devisse, "Africa in Inter-Continental Relations," in *General History of Africa IV: Africa from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century*, ed. Djibril T. Niane (London: Heinemann, 1984), 635–672; Ivan Hrbek, "Africa in the Context of World History," in *General History of Africa III: African from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century*, ed. Muhammad Elfasi (London: Heinemann, 1988), 1–30.

16 Hans W. Debrunner, *Presence and Prestige: Africans in Europe – A History of Africans in Europe before 1918* (Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 1979).

17 Susan Keech McIntosh, *Excavations at Jenné-Jeno, Hambarketolo, and Kaniana (Inland Niger Delta, Mali), the 1981 Season* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

18 Hrbek, "Africa in the Context."

19 *Ibid.*

20 Joseph-Achille Mbembe, *Critique of Black Reason* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017).

21 David Eltis, "The Volume and Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Reassessment," *The William and Mary Quarterly* **58**, no. 1 (2001): 17–46.

22 Ibrahim B. Kake, "The Slave Trade and the Population Drain from Black Africa to North Africa and the Middle East," in *The African Slave Trade from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century*, ed.

UNESCO (Paris: UNESCO, 1979), 164–182.

23 Jochen Meissner, Ulrich Mücke, and Klaus Weber, *Schwarzes Amerika: Eine Geschichte der Sklaverei* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2008), 60.

24 Eltis, “The Volume and Structure.”

25 Kake, “The Slave Trade and the Population Drain.”

26 Jürgen Osterhammel and Jan C. Jansen, *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2012), 8.

27 *Ibid.*, 40.

28 David B. Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires 1415–1980* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).

29 Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa, 1876–1912* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991).

30 Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance*; Osterhammel and Jansen, *Kolonialismus*; Andreas Eckert, *Kolonialismus* (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 2006).

31 Eckert, *Kolonialismus*, 64 [own translation].

32 Adekeye Adebajo, *The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

33 Jürgen Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner: staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia* (Münster: Lit, 2001).

34 Raymond A. Jonas, *The Battle of Adwa: African Victory in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

35 Francis R. Wingate, *Mahdism and the Egyptian Sudan* (London: Cass, 1968); Peter M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881–1898: A Study of Its Origins, Development and Overthrow* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).

36 Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979); Bill Nasson, *The South African War, 1899–1902* (London: Arnold, 1999).

37 Henry M. Stanley, *In Darkest Africa: The Quest, Rescue and Retreat of Emin, Governor of Equatoria* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1890).

38 Eckert, *Kolonialismus*, 68 [own translation].

39 Patrick Manning, *Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880–1995* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 57.

40 Femi J. Kolapo and Kwabena O. Akurang-Parry, eds., *African Agency and European Colonialism: Latitudes of Negotiation and Containment* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007).

41 John Harding and G. E. Gent, *The Dominions Office and Colonial Office List for 1938* (London: Waterlow and Sons, 1938).

42 Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene, “The Thin White Line: The Size of the British Colonial Service in Africa,” *African Affairs* 79, no. 314 (1980): 25–44.

43 *Ibid.*

44 Frederick Cooper, “Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History,” *American Historical Review* 9, no. 5 (1994): 1529.

45 Michael Crowder, “Indirect Rule: French and British Style,” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 34, no. 3 (1964): 201.

46 *Ibid.*, 197–205.

47 Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years* (London: Hurst, 1981), 105.

48 Manning, *Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa*, 62–63.

49 Martin Shipway, *Decolonization and Its Impact: A Comparative*

Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 31–34.

50 Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16.

51 Aimé Césaire, “On the Nature of Colonialism,” in *African Politics and Society*, ed. Irving L. Markovitz (New York: Free Press, 1970 [1966]), 41.

52 *Ibid.*, 42.

53 Isabela Figueiredo, *Notebook of Colonial Memories* (Dartmouth: University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, 2015).

54 Christian Abayomi Cassell, *Liberia: History of the First African Republic* (New York: Fountainhead, 1970).

55 Mulatu Wubneh and Yohannis Abate, *Ethiopia: Transition and Development in the Horn of Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988).

56 Kjetil Tronvoll and Daniel R. Mekonnen, *The African Garrison State: Human Rights and Political Development in Eritrea* (Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, 2014), 4–7.

Chapter 2

1 Jan C. Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Decolonization: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 4.

2 *Ibid.*, 111.

3 *Ibid.*, 30.

4 Majid Khadduri, "The Anglo-Egyptian Controversy," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 24, no. 4 (1952): 85.

5 Quoted in Roger Louis, "The United Kingdom and the Beginning of the Mandates System, 1919–1922," *International Organization* 23, no. 1 (1969): 92.

6 John Flint, "Planned Decolonization and Its Failure in British Africa," *African Affairs* 82, no. 328 (1983): 389–411.

7 William Malcolm Hailey, *An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938).

8 Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

9 Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast 1948 [Watson Report]*, London, 9 June 1948.

10 Florence M. Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence 1919–1957* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 172–174.

11 David Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World* (London: Tauris & Co Publishers, 1988), 131–132.

12 Flint, "Planned Decolonization."

13 Mahfoud Kaddache, *L'Algérie des Algériens de la Préhistoire* (Alger:

14 Jacque Tronchon, *L'insurrection malgache de 1947: essai d'interprétation historique* (Paris: Maspero, 1974); Micheal Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500–2000* (London: McFarland and Company, 2002), 619.

15 Donald B. Marshall, *The French Colonial Myth and Constitution-Making in the Fourth Republic* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973).

16 Philip Neres, *French-Speaking West Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 68.

17 Elizabeth Schmidt, "Top Down or Bottom Up? Nationalist Mobilization Reconsidered, with Special Reference to Guinea (French West Africa)," *The American Historical Review* **110**, no. 4 (2005): 975–1014.

18 Yves Person, "French West Africa and Decolonization," in *The Transfer of Power in Africa*, eds. Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), 141–172: 167.

19 Elizabeth Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946–1958* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 125–179.

20 Neres, *French-Speaking West Africa*, 84–85.

21 Achille Mbembe, *Ausgang aus der langen Nacht: Versuch über ein entkolonisiertes Afrika* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2016), 155 [own translation].

22 Person, "French West Africa," 169.

23 Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 58.

24 David van Reybrouck, *Congo: The Epic History of a People* (London: Fourth Estate, 2014), 281–330.

25 Gervase Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire 1825–1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 146–192; Walther L. Bernecker and Klaus Herbers, *Geschichte Portugals* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2013), 289.

26 Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention*, 79.

27 A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *Geschichte Portugals und des portugiesischen Weltreichs* (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner, 2001), 611–612.

28 Bernecker and Herbers, *Geschichte Portugals*, 289.

29 António de Spínola, *Portugal e o Futuro* (Lisbon: Arcadia, 1974).

30 Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in European and World History* (London: Reaktion Books, 2009), 214–216.

31 Jane Bergerol, “Portugal’s Year in Africa,” in *Africa Contemporary Record*, eds. Colin Legum and Elizabeth Clements (London: Rex Collings, 1976), A112–A117: A112.

32 Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 77.

33 Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*.

34 Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1998).

35 Stewart C. Easton, *The Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism: A Historical Survey from the Early Nineteenth Century to the Present* (New York: Praeger, 1965); Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Cheikh Anta Babou, “Decolonization or National Liberation: Debating the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa,” *The Annals of the African Academy of Political and Social Science* 632, no. 1 (2010): 41–54.

36 Judith van Allen, “‘Aba Riots’ or Igbo ‘Women’s War’? Ideology, Stratification, and the Invisibility of Women,” in *Women in Africa*:

Studies in Social and Economic Change, eds. Nancy J. Hafkin and Edna G. Bay (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976), 59–85.

37 Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, 66–84.

38 Iris Berger and E. Frances White, *Women in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 47.

39 *Ibid.*; Aili M. Tripp, Isabel Casimiro, Joy Kwesiga, and Alice Mungwa, *African Women's Movements: Changing Political Landscapes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Iris Berger, *Women in Twentieth-Century Africa: New Approaches to African History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 66–88.

40 Susan Geiger, "Women and African Nationalism," *Journal of Women's History* 3, no. 3 (1990): 227.

41 Ruth Schachter-Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).

42 Alfred J. Wills, *An Introduction to the History of Central Africa: Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 347.

43 Andrew Roberts, *A History of Zambia* (London: Heinemann, 1976), 211.

44 Anthony I. Asiwaju, "Migrations as Revolt: The Example of the Ivory Coast and the Upper Volta before 1945," *The Journal of African History* 17, no. 4 (1976): 577–594.

45 Jacque Tronchon, *L'insurrection malgache de 1947: essai d'interprétation historique* (Paris: Maspero, 1974); Anthony Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization* (London: Longman, 1998); Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts*, 619.

46 Meredith Terretta, *Nation of Outlaws, State of Violence: Nationalism, Grassfields Tradition, and State Building in Cameroon* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014).

47 Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts*, 619.

48 Kaddache, *L'Algérie des Algériens*, 751.

49 Kahina Amal Djar, "Symbolism and Memory in Architecture: Algerian Anti-colonial Resistance and the Algiers Casbah," *Journal of North African Studies* 14, no. 2 (2009): 190.

50 Meredith Turshen, "Algerian Women in the Liberation Struggle and the Civil War: From Active Participants to Passive Victims?" *Social Research* 69, no. 3 (2002): 889–911.

51 Raphaëlle Brache, *La torture et l'armée pendant la guerre d'Algérie, 1954–1962* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001); Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie 1954–1962* (Paris: La Découverte, 2006).

52 John Lonsdale, "Mau Maus of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya," *Journal of African History* 31, no. 3 (1990): 393–421.

53 Daniel Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

54 Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005).

55 David M. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 5.

56 John Blacker, "The Demography of Mau Mau: Fertility and Mortality in Kenya in the 1950s: A Demographer's Viewpoint," *African Affairs* 106, no. 423 (2007): 205–227.

57 Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, 328–344.

58 Basil Davidson, *No Fist Is Big Enough to Hide the Sky: The Liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, 1963–74* (London: Zed Books, 2017 [1969]), 16.

59 John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution Vol. I: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950–1962)* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969); John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution Vol. II: Exile Politics and Guerrilla*

Warfare (1962-1976) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978).

60 David Birmingham, *Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique* (London: James Curry, 1992), 47–48.

61 Stephanie Urdang, *Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women in Guinea-Bissau* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979).

62 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security 1975-1993* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994), 18–50; Norma J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3.

63 Greg Mills and Graham Wilson, "Who Dares Loses? Assessing Rhodesia's Counter-insurgency Strategy," *RUSI* **152**, no. 6 (2007), 22–37.

64 Raymond Suttner, *The ANC Underground in South Africa* (Auckland Park: Jacana, 2008).

65 Shireen Hassim, *ANC Women's League: Sex, Gender and Politics* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2015).

66 *Sunday Times*, "'A Giant Tree Has Fallen': Ramaphosa Mourns 'Mother of the Nation' Madikizela-Mandela," 3 April 2018, www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-04-03-a-giant-tree-has-fallen-ramaphosa-mourns-mother-of-the-nation-madikizela-mandela/.

67 Susan Brown, "Diplomacy by Other Means: SWAPO's Liberation War," in *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword*, eds. Colin Leys and John S. Saul (London: James Curry, 1995), 19–39; Lauren Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: War by Other Means* (Basel: Schlettwein Publishing, 1998).

68 Hein Marais, *South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy of Chance* (London: Zed Books, 2011), 54.

69 Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom* (London: Little, Brown and Company 1994), 449–558; Allister Sparks, *Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Negotiated Revolution* (London: Heinemann, 1995), 15–36.

70 Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization*, 51.

71 Blessing-Miles Tendi, *The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe: Mujuru, the Liberation Fighter and Kingmaker* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

72 Sparks, *Tomorrow Is Another Country*.

73 Janet G. Vaillant, *Vie de Léopold Sédar Senghor: noir, français et africain* (Paris: Editions Karthala, 2006).

74 Sylvie Thénault, *L'histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne* (Paris: Flammarion, 2005).

75 Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, 70.

76 William J. Foltz, *From French West Africa to the Mali Federation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967).

77 Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, 66–84.

78 David McIntyre, *The Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact, 1869–1971* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977); Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1985); David Strang, "Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500–1987," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (1991), 429–454.

79 Bill Nasson, "Africa," in *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, ed. Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 455.

80 Edward Paice, *Tip and Run: The Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007); Bill Nasson, "More Than Just von Lettow-Vorbeck: Sub-Saharan Africa in the First World War," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 40, no. 2 (2014): 160–183.

81 Melvin E. Page, ed., *Africa and the First World War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).

82 Rudolf von Albertini, "The Impact of Two World Wars on the

Decline of Colonialism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 4, no. 1 (1969): 17–35.

83 Richard Rathbone, "World War I and Africa: Introduction," *The Journal of African History* 19, no. 1 (1978): 4.

84 Bahru Zedwe, *A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855–1974* (London: James Curry, 1991), 153.

85 Timothy Parsons, "The Military Experience of Ordinary Africans in World War II," in *Africa and World War II*, eds. Judith Byfield, Carolyn A. Brown, Timothy Parson, and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 3–23: 9.

86 Elizabeth Schmidt, "Popular Resistance and Anticolonial Mobilization: The War Efforts in French Guinea," in *Africa and World War II*, eds. Judith Byfield, Carolyn A. Brown, Timothy Parson, and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 441–461.

87 Richard J. Reid, *A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 237.

88 Parsons, "The Military Experience," 21.

89 Rita Headrick, "African Soldiers in World War II," *Armed Forces and Society* 4, no. 3 (1978): 501–526; Richard S. Fogarty and David Killingray, "Demobilization in British and French Africa at the End of the First World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 1 (2014): 122.

90 Von Albertini, "The Impact of Two World Wars," 27.

91 Ashley Jackson, "Motivation and Mobilization for War: Recruitment for the British Army in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1941–42," *African Affairs* 96, no. 384 (1991): 399–417.

92 Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention*, 40.

93 Benjamin Rivlin, "Unity and Nationalism in Libya," *Middle East Journal* 3, no. 1 (1949), 31–44; William H. Lewis and Robert

Gordon, "Libya after two Years of Independence," *Middle East Journal* 8, no. 1 (1954): 41–58; Adrian Pelt, *Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970).

94 Mary-Jane Deeb, *Libya's Foreign Policy in North Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 23.

95 United Nations, *Question of the Disposal of the Former Italian Colonies*, A/RES/289(IV)A, New York, 21 November 1949.

96 Jama Mohamed, "Imperial Policies and Nationalism in the Decolonization of Somaliland, 1954–1960," *The English Historical Review* 117, no. 474 (2002): 1177–1203.

97 Marion Wallace, *A History of Namibia: From the Beginning to 1990* (London: Hurst, 2011).

98 Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution Vol. II*, 181–187; Witney W. Schneidman, *Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire* (Dallas, TX: University Press of America, 2004), 1–59.

99 Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

100 Matthew LeRiche and Matthew Arnold, *South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence* (London: Hurst, 2012), 89–114; Oystein H. Rolandsen and Martin W. Daly, *A History of South Sudan: From Slavery to Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 105–132.

101 United Nations, 2017, *Non-Self-Governing Territories*, www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgovterritories.shtml (accessed 24 March 2017).

102 Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, *Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010), 91–111.

103 Erik Jensen, *Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate* (Boulder,

CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 28.

Chapter 3

- 1 Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1992* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990).
- 2 Jeffrey I. Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
- 3 Paul Nugent and Anthony I. Asiwaju, eds., *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities* (London: Pinter, 1996); Andreas Eckert, *Kolonialismus* (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 2006).
- 4 Jan C. Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Decolonization: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 121.
- 5 David B. Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires 1415–1980* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 366.
- 6 Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (London: Currey, 1992).
- 7 Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 79.
- 8 Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa* (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 234.
- 9 Achille Mbembe, *Ausgang aus der langen Nacht: Versuch über ein entkolonisiertes Afrika* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2016), 53 [own translation].
- 10 Hilda Kuper, *Sobhuza II: Ngwenyama and King of Swaziland – The Story of a Hereditary Ruler and His Country* (London: Duckworth, 1978), 223.
- 11 Hugh MacMillan, "Swaziland: Recent History," in *Africa South of*

the Sahara 2009, ed. Iain Frame (London: Routledge, 2008), 1150–1169: 1151.

12 Crawford Young, “The Heritage of Colonialism,” in *Africa in World Politics: Engaging a Changing Global Order*, eds. John W. Haberson and Donald Rothchild (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013), 15–34: 30.

13 Stephen A. Akintoye, *Emergent African States: Topics in 20th Century African History* (London: Longman, 1976), 9–10.

14 Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); Patrick Manning, *Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880-1995* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Chafer, *The End of Empire*.

15 Pierre Englebert, *State Legitimacy and Development in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

16 Victor A. Olorunsola, *Societal Reconstruction in Two African States* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1977), 32–33; Ilufoye Sarafa Ogundiya, “The Cycle of Legitimacy Crisis in Nigeria: A Theoretical Exploration,” *Journal of Social Sciences* **20**, no. 2 (2009): 129–142.

17 Young, “The Heritage of Colonialism,” 15.

18 Roland A. Oliver, *The African Experience* (London: Pimlico, 1994), 184.

19 Simon Katzenellenbogen, “It Didn’t Happen at Berlin,” in *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities*, eds. Paul Nugent and Anthony I. Asiwaju (London: Pinter, 1996), 21–34: 31.

20 Saadia Touval, *The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 16–17; Anthony I. Asiwaju, ed., *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa’s International Boundaries, 1884–1984* (London: Hurst, 1985).

21 Paul Nugent, *Smugglers, Secessionists, and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002).

22 Organization of African Unity, *Border Disputes among African States*, Cairo, 17–21 July 1964, AHG/Res. 16(I).

23 Paul Nugent and Anthony I. Asiwaju, “Conclusion,” in *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities*, eds. Paul Nugent and Anthony I. Asiwaju (London: Pinter, 1996), 266–272: 269.

24 Ali Mazrui, “The Bondage of Boundaries,” *The Future Surveyed*. Supplement to *The Economist*, 11 November 1993.

25 Robert Mortimer, “Global Economy and African Foreign Policy: The Algerian Model,” *African Studies Review* **27**, no. 1 (1984): 1–22; Martin Stone, *The Agony of Algeria* (London: Hurst, 1997); Yahia H. Zoubir, “The Resurgence of Algeria’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century,” *Journal of North African Studies* **9**, no. 2 (2004): 169–183.

26 Chris Landsberg, *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa’s Transition* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2004).

27 L’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, “About Us,” www.francophonie.org/Welcome-to-the-International.html (accessed 30 August 2019).

28 Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Bogle-L’Ouverture, 1978); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” *American Economic Review* **91**, no. 5 (2001): 1369–1401.

29 Jean-François Bayart, “Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion,” *African Affairs* **99**, no. 395 (2000): 217–267.

30 Gareth Austin, “African Economic Development and Colonial Legacies,” *International Development Policy – Revue internationale de politique de développement* **1** (2010): 11–32.

31 Douglas Yates, “Is Luigi Di Maio Right about French Policies in Africa? Paradoxes and Dilemmas of Françafrique,” *LSE Blogs*, 23 January 2019, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2019/01/23/is->

luigi-di-maio-right-about-french-policies-in-africa-paradoxes-and-dilemmas-of-francafrique/.

32 Joel W. Gregory, "Underdevelopment, Dependence, and Migration in Upper Volta," in *The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development*, eds. Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1979), 73–94: 79.

33 Ibid.

34 The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile 2007: Burkina Faso* (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007), 11.

35 Brian Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics. Africa, Asia & Oceania 1750–2000* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

36 World Bank, *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), 106.

37 Paul T. Zeleza, "Beyond Afropessimism: Historical Accounting of African Universities," *Pambazuka News*, 30 August 2006, www.pambazuka.org/governance/beyond-afropessimism-historical-accounting-african-universities (accessed 27 November 2017).

38 Mark LeVine, "France in Mali: The Longue Durée of Imperial Blowback," *Al Jazeera*, 19 January 2013, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/01/2013119153558185275.html.

39 Bill Warren, *Imperialism: The Pioneer of Capitalism* (New York: Random House, 1980).

40 Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization*, 119.

41 Raymond Suttner, *The ANC Underground in South Africa* (Auckland Park: Jacana, 2008).

42 Roger Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa* (Woodbridge: Currey, 2013).

43 Martin Welz and Daniela Kromrey, "Legacies of the Past: The Influence of Former Freedom Fighters and Their Rhetoric in

Southern Africa," *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies* 42, no. 2 (2015): 255–273.

44 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 2003 [1962]).

45 Richard S. Fogarty and David Killingray, "Demobilization in British and French Africa at the End of the First World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 1 (2014): 118.

46 David van Reybrouck, *Congo: The Epic History of a People* (London: Fourth Estate, 2014), 219.

47 Isidore Ndaywel è Nziem, *Histoire générale du Congo: de l'héritage ancien à la République Démocratique* (Paris: Duculot, 1998), 462.

48 Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (New York: Grove Press, 2008 [1952]); Octave Mannoni, *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization* (London: Methuen, 1956); Albert Memmi, *Kolonisator und der Kolonisierte: zwei Porträts* (Frankfurt: Syndikat, 1980).

49 Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom* (London: Little, Brown and Company 1994), 14.

50 Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

51 Amílcar Cabral, *Unité et lutte* (Paris: Maspero, 1975).

52 Mbembe, *Ausgang aus der langen Nacht*, 199 [own translation].

53 Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, *Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature* (London: James Currey, 1986).

54 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*; Johan Galtung, "Eine strukturelle Theorie des Imperialismus," in *Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt: Analysen über abhängige Reproduktion*, ed. Dieter Senghaas (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972), 29–104; Edward W. Said, *Orientalismus* (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1981); Edward W. Said, *Kultur*

und Imperialismus: Einbildungskraft und Politik im Zeitalter der Macht (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1994).

55 Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, *In the House of the Interpreter: A Memoir* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012).

56 Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance*, 374.

57 Quoted in Tom Wicker, "In the Nation: The Greatest Tragedy," *New York Times*, 21 January 1988, 27.

Chapter 4

- 1 Richard J. Reid, *A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 294.
- 2 D. K. Oraw, "African States and the Superpowers," in *African International Relations*, eds. Olatunde J. Ojo, D. K. Orwa, and C. M. Utete (London: Longman, 1985), 96–108: 99–100.
- 3 Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War: Sovereignty, Responsibility, and the War on Terror* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2018), 26–27.
- 4 Colin W. Lawson, "Soviet Economic Aid to Africa," *African Affairs* 87, no. 349 (1988): 509.
- 5 Henry Bienen, "Soviet Political Relations with Africa," *International Security* 6, no. 4 (1982): 164.
- 6 Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention*, 22–25.
- 7 Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
- 8 Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention*, 79–101.
- 9 James S. Coleman and Richard L. Sklar, "Introduction," in *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, eds. Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 1–26.
- 10 Mohammed Ayoob, *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World* (London: Croom Helm, 1980).
- 11 Ali Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977), 55.
- 12 Jean-François Médard, "Les avatars du messianisme français en

Afrique," *L'Afrique Politique 1999: entre transitions et conflits* (Paris: Karthala, 1999), 17–34: 25 [own translation].

13 Pierre Lellouche and Dominique Moisi, "French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle against Destabilization," *International Security* **3**, no. 4 (1979): 108–133; Guy Martin, "The Historical, Economic, and Political Bases of France's African Policy," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* **23**, no. 2 (1985): 189–208.

14 Douglas A. Yates, *The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1996).

15 Alexander Keese, "First Lessons in Neo-Colonialism: The Personalisation of Relations between African Politicians and French Officials in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1956–66," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* **35**, no. 4 (2007): 593–613.

16 Pierre Péan, *L'homme de l'ombre: éléments d'enquête autour de Jacques Foccart, l'homme le plus mystérieux et le plus puissant de la Ve République* (Paris: Fayard, 1990).

17 David E. Gardinier, *Historical Dictionary of Gabon* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1981), 59–60.

18 Michael C. Reed, "Gabon: A Neo-Colonial Enclave of Enduring French Interest," *Journal of Modern African Studies* **25**, no. 2 (1987): 283–320.

19 Adekeye Adebajo, *The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 178.

20 Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention*, 166.

21 Linnéa Gelot and Martin Welz, "Pragmatic Eclecticism, Neoclassical Realism and Post-Structuralism: Reconsidering the African Response to the Libyan Crisis of 2011," *Third World Quarterly* **39**, no. 12 (2018): 2334–2353.

22 Nic Cheeseman, *Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2015), 122–126.

23 *Ibid.*, 122.

24 United States, *Public Law 93-559-DEC. 30*, 30 December 1974, www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-88/pdf/STATUTE-88-Pg1795.pdf.

25 Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Donors, Dictators and Democrats in Africa,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, no. 3 (2001): 411–436.

26 Cheeseman, *Democracy in Africa*, 86–113.

27 Michael Bratton, “The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa,” *World Development* 17, no. 4 (1989): 569–587; Jesse Lutabingwa and Kenneth R. Gray, “NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Developing Critical Capacity for Policy Advocacy,” *International Journal on World Peace* 14, no. 3 (1997): 35–70.

28 Michael Bratton, “Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa,” *World Politics* 41, no. 3 (1989): 407–430; Issa G. Shivji, *Silences in NGO Discourse: The Role and Future of NGOs in Africa* (Oxford: Fahamu, 2007).

29 Kim D. Reimann, “A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs,” *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 1 (2006): 45–67.

30 Joshua Rubongoya, *Regime Hegemony in Museveni’s Uganda: Pax Musevenica* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

31 Cheeseman, *Democracy in Africa*, 131.

32 Marian L. Lawson and Susan B. Epstein, *Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 4 January 2019, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44858.pdf>, 5–6.

33 Michele D. Dunne, *Integrating Democracy Promotion into U.S. Middle East Policy*, Carnegie Papers No. 50 (2004), <https://>

34 Bradford Dillman, "'Round Up the Unusual Suspects': U.S. Policy toward Algeria and Its Islamists," *Middle East Policy* **8**, no. 3 (2001), www.mepec.org/journal/round-unusual-suspects-us-policy-toward-algeria-and-its-islamists.

35 Roger Southall and Henning Melber, eds., *A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism and Development* (Scottsville: University of Kwazulu Natal Press, 2009); Pádraig Carmody, *The New Scramble for Africa* (Cambridge: Polity, 2016).

36 Richard J. Payne and Cassandra R. Veney, "China's Post-Cold War African Policy," *Asian Survey* **38**, no. 9 (1998): 867–879.

37 Chris Alden, "China in Africa," *Survival* **47**, no. 3 (2005): 147–164; Meine P. van Dijk, "Introduction: Objectives of and Instruments for China's New Presence in Africa," in *The New Presence of China in Africa*, eds. Meine P. van Dijk (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 9–30.

38 Howard W. French, *China's Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa* (New York: Vintage Books, 2015).

39 Chris Alden, *China in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2007); Deborah Bräutigam, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

40 Michael Leslie, "The Dragon Shapes Its Image: A Study of Chinese Media Influence Strategies in Africa," *African Studies Quarterly* **16**, no. 3–4 (2016): 161–174.

41 *The Economist*, "China in Africa: A Thousand Golden Stars," 22 July 2017, 29–30; *The Economist*, "Chinese Media in Africa: Soft Power and Censorship," 20 October 2018, 37–38.

42 Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

43 Simon Tisdall, "Zimbabwe: Was Mugabe's Fall a Result of China

Flexing Its Muscle?" *The Guardian*, 17 November 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/17/zimbabwe-was-mugabes-fall-a-result-of-china-flexing-its-muscle.

44 Emma Graham-Harrison, "Zimbabwe President Can Count on One Clear Foreign Backer – China," *The Guardian*, 3 August 2018, www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/03/zimbabwe-president-backed-by-chinese-over-election-protests.

45 Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004).

46 John Campbell, "Brazil in Africa," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 1 May 2013, www.cfr.org/blog/brazil-africa-0.

47 Peter Kagwanja and Tony Kinyanjui, "Africa: How Japan Is Evolving and Deepening Its Soft Power in Africa," *The East African*, 21 February 2018, <https://allafrica.com/stories/201802230083.html>.

48 Céline Pajon quoted in Keith Johnson, "Japan's Own Belt and Road," *Foreign Policy*, 9 February 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/09/japan-takes-the-lead-in-counteracting-chinas-belt-and-road/>.

49 Björn Müller, "Was Will Ankara in Afrika?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 September 2017, www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausbildung-in-somalia-ankaras-schritt-nach-afrika-15193298-p2.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_1.

50 *The Economist*, "Choices on the Continent," 9 March 2019, 18–20.

51 Clara Durovray, "Saudi Influence in Africa: A Destabilising Power?" *Global Risk Insights*, 4 October 2018, <https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/10/saudi-arabia-struggle-africa/>.

52 Nizar Manek, "Saudi Arabia Brokers a New Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Deal," *Bloomberg*, 17 September 2018, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-17/ethiopia-eritrea-leaders-sign-peace.

53 *The Economist*, "Russia and Africa: The Art of Darkness," 26 October 2019, 34.

54 Afua Hirsch, "The Scramble for Africa Has Moved on, But Britain Hasn't," *The Guardian*, 4 September 2018, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/04/africa-britain-trade-theresa-may-brexit.

55 Craig R. Whitney, "Bombs Rip Train underneath Paris, with 29 Wounded," *New York Times*, 18 October 1985.

56 Peter J. Schrader, *United States Foreign Policy towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

57 John Davis, "The Clinton Model: Sudan and the Failure to Capture bin Laden," in *Africa and the War on Terrorism*, ed. John Davis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 129–142.

58 Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention*, 195.

59 United Nations Peacekeeping, *China*, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/china> (accessed 3 April 2019).

60 Michael Kovrig, "China Expands Its Peace and Security Footprint in Africa," *International Crisis Group*, 24 October 2018, www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/china-expands-its-peace-and-security-footprint-africa.

61 Marta Bausells, "In Limbo in Melilla: The Young Refugees Trapped in Spain's African Enclave," *The Guardian*, 10 May 2017, www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/may/10/melilla-refugees-spain-africa-gateway-europe.

62 FRONTEX 2018, *Detections of Illegal Border-Crossings Statistics* download, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory_routes/Detections_of_IBC_2018_11_06.xlsx.

63 Fabrizio Natale, Silvia Migali, and Rainer Münz, *Many More to*

Come? Migration from and within Africa (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), 9.

64 Ibid., 10.

65 BP, *Statistical Review of World Energy 2018* (London: BP, 2018).

66 T. J. Brown, C. E. Wrighton, N. E. Idoine, E. R. Raycraft, and R. A. Shaw, *World Mineral Production 2012–16* (Keyworth: British Geological Survey, 2016), 78.

67 BP, *Statistical Review*.

68 Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, *Uranium 2016: Resources, Production and Demand* (Boulogne-Billancourt: Nuclear Energy Agency, 2016).

69 Brown et al., *World Mineral Production*, 78.

70 *The Economist*, “The Economics of Chocolate: Sweet Dreams,” 17 November 2018, 36.

71 Katelyn Baker-Smith and Szocs Boruss Miklos Attila, *What Is Land Grabbing? A Critical Review of Existing Definitions* (2016), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_x-9XeYoYkWSDh3dGk3SVh2cDg/view.

72 Prosper B. Matondi, Kjell Havnevik, and Atakilte Beyene, eds., *Biofuels, Land Grabbing and Food Security in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2011).

73 Bwesigye bwa Mwesigire, “Land Grabbing in Africa, the New Colonialism,” 28 May 2014, <https://thisisafrica.me/land-grabbing-africa-new-colonialism/>.

74 Margaret C. Lee, “The 21st Century Scramble for Africa,” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 24, no. 3 (2006): 303–330.

75 Deborah Bräutigam, *Will Africa Feed China?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 8.

76 *The Economist*, “Choices on the Continent,” 9 March 2019, 18–

77 World Bank, *Data: Manufacturing, Value Added* (2018), <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.KD?end=2016&locations=ZG&start=2000>.

78 Christina Golubski, *Figure of the Week: Manufacturing Value Added in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 27 April 2017, www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/04/27/figure-of-the-week-manufacturing-value-added-in-sub-saharan-africa/.

79 World Bank, *Households and NPISHs Final Consumption Expenditure (Constant 2010 US\$)* (2018), <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PRVT.KD?end=2016&locations=ZG-DZ-LY-EG-TN-MA&start=2000>.

80 Deloitte, *The Deloitte Consumer Review Africa: A 21st Century View* (London: Deloitte, 2014).

81 Henning Melber, ed., *The Rise of Africa's Middle Class* (London: Zed Books, 2016).

82 Lawrence Summers, "A Global Wake-Up Call for the U.S.?" *Washington Post*, 5 April 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-global-wake-up-call-for-the-us/2015/04/05/6f847ca4-da34-11e4-b3f2-607bd612aeac_story.html?utm_term=.ec3bf0a81696; Hongying Wang, "New Multilateral Development Banks: Opportunities and Challenges for Global Governance," *Global Policy* 8, no. 1 (2017): 113–118.

83 Diego Hernandez, "Are 'New' Donors Challenging World Bank Conditionality?" *World Development* 96, no. C (2017): 529–549.

84 Tom Burgis, *The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and Theft of Africa's Wealth* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2015), 170.

85 Sebastian Horn, Carmen Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch, *China's Overseas Lending* (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Working Papers 2132, 2019).

86 *The Economist*, “Eritrea and Migration: The Roads Less Taken,” 27 May 2017, 32.

87 *BBC News*, “Ceuta and Melilla: Spain Wants Rid of Anti-Migrant Razor Wire,” 14 June 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44485995.

88 Jean-Claude Junker, *State of the Union 2018*, Strasbourg, 12 September 2018.

89 Quoted in Matthias Krupa and Caterina Lobenstein, “Ein Mann pflückt gegen Europa,” *Die Zeit*, 17 December 2015, 23 [own translation].

90 *The Economist*, “New Ways to Play an Old Song,” 7 December 2013, 38–39.

91 Michaela Wiegel, “Präsident Macron besucht Algerien – die Presse darf nicht mit,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 6 December 2017, www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/president-macron-besucht-algerien-15326369.html [own translation].

92 Thomas Tiekou, *United States of America-Africa Relations in the Age of Obama* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2012).

93 Ben Rhodes, *The World as It Is: A Memoir of the Obama White House* (New York: Random House, 2018).

94 John Bolton, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy,” Washington, 13 December 2018, www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/.

95 Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi, “Introduction: Africa in the Twenty-First Century: Strategic and Development Challenges,” in *The Rise of China & India in Africa*, eds. Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi (London: Zed Books), 1–9: 1.

96 *Ibid.*, 1.

97 *The Economist*, "Choices on the Continent," 9 March 2019, 18–20.

Chapter 5

- 1 World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, <https://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators> (accessed 26 March 2019). These data only comprise those states for which the World Bank provided the values of both GDP and population size and are calculated by dividing the total of the all-considered countries' GDP by the total of those countries' population.
- 2 David E. Bloom and Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth in Africa," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, no. 2 (1998): 207–295.
- 3 Elliot Berg, *The Economic Impact of Drought and Inflation in the Sahel* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Research on Economic Development, 1976), 1–2.
- 4 Jen-Hu Chang, "The Agricultural Potential of the Humid Tropics," *Geographical Review* 58, no. 3 (1968): 333–361.
- 5 Economic Commission for Africa, *ECA and Africa's Development 1983–2008: A Preliminary Perspective Study* (Addis Ababa, April 1983), 8.
- 6 FAO, *The State of Food and Agriculture 1980* (Rome: FAO, 1981), 7.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 8.
- 8 Donald S. Shepard, Mary B. Ettling, U. Brinkmann, and Roland Sauerborn, "The Economic Cost of Malaria in Africa," *Tropical Medicine and Parasitology* 42, no. 3 (1991): 199–203; John Luke Gallup and Jeffrey Sachs, "The Economic Burden of Malaria," *American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene* 64, no. 1–2 (2001): 85–96.
- 9 Mead Over, *The Macroeconomic Impact of AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: World Bank – Population and Human

Resources Department, 1992).

10 Markus Haacker, *The Economics of the Global Response to HIV/AIDS* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 49–62.

11 Tom Miles, “West Africa’s Ebola Outbreak Cost \$53 Billion – Study,” *Reuters*, 24 October 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ebola-cost/west-africas-ebola-outbreak-cost-53-billion-study-idUSKCN1MY2F8.

12 Ibrahim Abdullah and Ismail Rashid, eds., *Understanding West Africa’s Ebola Epidemic: Towards a Political Economy* (London: Zed Books, 2017).

13 Alan Whiteside, *HIV and AIDS: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

14 Elsa V. Artadi and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, *The Economic Tragedy of the XXth Century: Growth in Africa* (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 9865, 2003); David E. Bloom, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Paul Collier, and Christopher Udry, “Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth in Africa,” *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, no. 2 (1998): 207–295.

15 Bloom and Sachs, “Geography, Demography,” 236–237.

16 Bernd Dörries, “Zwischen den Hauptstädten Brazzaville und Kinshasa soll sich künftig eine Brücke spannen,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12 November 2018, www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/afrika-wunder-am-kongo-1.4207419.

17 James Edward Meade, *The Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius: Report to the Governor of Mauritius* (London: Methuen, 1961).

18 Thomas Meisenhelder, “The Developmental State in Mauritius,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 35, no. 2 (1997): 279–297; Richard Sandbrook, “Origins of the Democratic Developmental State: Interrogating Mauritius,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 39, no. 3 (2005): 549–581.

19 Arvind Subramanian and Devesh Roy, "Who Can Explain the Mauritian Miracle? Meade, Romer, Sachs, or Rodrik?," in *In Search for Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth*, ed. Dani Rodrik (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 205–243.

20 Paul Collier, "Globalization: Implications for Africa," in *Trade Reform and Regional Integration in Africa* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1998), 147–181.

21 UNCTAD, *Long-Term Changes in the Terms of Trade, 1954–1971: Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat* (1973), 91–93.

22 Richard C. Crook, "Politics, the Cocoa Crisis, and Administration in Cote D'Ivoire," *Journal of Modern African Studies* **28**, no. 4 (1990): 649–669; Dwayne Benjamin and Angus Deaton, "Household Welfare and the Pricing of Cocoa and Coffee in Côte D'Ivoire: Lessons from the Living Standards Surveys," *The World Bank Economic Review* **7**, no. 3 (1993): 293–318; Denis Cogneau and Rémi Jedwab, "Commodity Price Shocks and Child Outcomes: The 1990 Cocoa Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* **60**, no. 3 (2012): 507–534.

23 For South Africa there are no data available until the 1990s.

24 Exports (goods, values of exports free of board) to five largest export destinations, to Africa total, and to the World total. Source: IMF, Direction of Trade, <https://data.imf.org/> (accessed 10 July 2019).

25 International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade: Annual 1970–76* (Washington, DC: IMF, 1977).

26 Todd Moss and Alicia Bannon, "Africa and the Battle over Agricultural Protectionism," *World Policy Journal* **21**, no. 2 (2004): 53–61.

27 Junichi Goto, "The Multifibre Arrangement and Its Effects on Developing Countries," *The World Bank Research Observer* **4**, no. 2 (1989): 203–227.

- 28** Kaye Whiteman, "Introduction," in *The EU and Africa: From Eurafrigue to Afro-Europa*, eds. Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 1–22: 2–3.
- 29** William Zartman, *The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community: The Weak Confront the Strong* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971).
- 30** Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (London: Nelson, 1965), 19.
- 31** André Gunder Frank, *Latin-America: Underdevelopment or Revolution?* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
- 32** United Nations, *Post-War Price Relations in Trade between Under-Developed and Industrialized Countries*, Lake Success, 23 February 1949, E/CN.1/Sub.3/W.5; United Nations, *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems*, Lake Success, 27 April 1950, E/CN.12/89/Rev.1.
- 33** UNCTAD, *Long-Term Changes*, 73–78.
- 34** Nkrumah, *Neo-colonialism*.
- 35** François-Xavier Verschave, *De la Françafrique à la mafrafrique* (Brussels: Tribord, 2004).
- 36** James Landale, "How UK-Zimbabwe Relations Went Sour," *BBC News Online*, 15 November 2017, www.bbc.com/news/uk-42003217.
- 37** "Statement by His Excellency Robert Gabriel Mugabe on the Occasion of the Fifty-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly," 12 September 2002, www.un.org/webcast/ga/57/statements/020912zimbabweE.htm.
- 38** Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 91.
- 39** OECD, *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries: Data on Disbursements 1971 to 1977* (Paris: OECD, 1978);

OECD, *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 1979/1982* (Paris: OECD, 1984); OECD, *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 1987/1990* (Paris: OECD, 1992).

40 Crawford Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).

41 Roger W. Johnson, "Sekou Touré and the Guinean Revolution," *African Affairs* **69**, no. 277 (1970): 350–365.

42 Michel Cahen, "Check on Socialism in Mozambique: What Check? What Socialism?," *Review of African Political Economy* **20**, no. 57 (1993): 46–59.

43 Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa, 1876–1912* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991), 680.

44 Ernest Harsch, *Thomas Sankara: An African Revolutionary* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014).

45 Richard M. Westebbe, *The Economy of Mauretania* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 11–15.

46 Mahfoud Bennoune, "Mauretania: Formation of a Neo-Colonial Society," *MERIP Reports*, no. **54** (1977): 3–26.

47 United Nations, *Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa (Part I)* (New York: United Nations, 1971), 26.

48 Hussein Mahdavy, "The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran," in *Studies in Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. Michael A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 428–467; Hazem Al Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," in *The Rentier State, Vol. 2, Nation, State and Integration in the Arab World*, eds. Hazem Al Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 85–98; Douglas A. Yates, *The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1996).

49 Richard M. Auty, *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis* (London: Routledge, 1993); Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, *Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth* (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995); Michael L. Ross, "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse," *World Politics* **51**, no. 2 (1999): 297–322.

50 Ragnar Torvik, "Why Do Some Resource-Abundant Countries Succeed While Others Do Not?" *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* **25**, no. 2 (2009): 241–256.

51 Julia Grutzner and Emil Salim, *Striking a Better Balance: The World Bank Group and Extractive Industries* (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2003), 12.

52 Torvik, "Why Do Some," 245–246.

53 Jørgen Juel Andersen and Silje Aslaksen, "Constitutions and the Resource Curse," *Journal of Development Economics* **87**, no. 2 (2008): 227–246.

54 Halvor Mehlum and Karl Moene, "Battlefields and Marketplaces," *Journal of Defence and Peace Economics* **13**, no. 6 (2002): 485–496; Anne D. Boschini, Jan Pettersson, and Jesper Roine Resource, "Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability," *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* **109**, no. 3 (2007): 593–617.

55 Boschini et al., "Curse or Not."

56 Terry Lynn Karl, *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

57 John Campbell, "Nigeria Is Oil Dependent, Not Oil Rich," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 13 February 2019, www.cfr.org/blog/nigeria-oil-dependent-not-oil-rich.

58 Doyin Salami quoted in Oreoluwa Runsewe, "Nigeria Is an Oil-Dependent Country and Not an 'Oil-Rich' Country – Highlights from the NASD PLC Breakfast Meeting," 8 February 2019, <http://venturesafrica.com/238655-2/>.

- 59 Tom Burgis, *The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and Theft of Africa's Wealth* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2015), 70.
- 60 Ellen Hillbom, "Diamonds or Development? A Structural Assessment of Botswana's Forty Years of Success," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 46, no. 2 (2008): 191–214.
- 61 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002): 13–28; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (2004): 563–595.
- 62 Robert H. Bates, "Political Conflict and State Failure," in *The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000*, eds. Benno J. Ndulu, Stephen A. O'Connell, Robert H. Bates, Paul Collier, and Chukwuma C. Soludo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 249–296.
- 63 Robert S. Walters, "International Organizations and Political Communication: The Use of UNCTAD by Less Developed Countries," *International Organization* 25, no. 4 (1971): 818–835.
- 64 Karl P. Sauvant, *The Group of 77: Evolution, Structure, Organization* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1981).
- 65 Karl P. Sauvant, "The Early Days of the Group of 77," *UN Chronicle* 51, no. 1 (2014): 32.
- 66 Carol Geldart and Peter Lyon, "The Group of 77: A Perspective View," *International Affairs* 57, no. 1 (1980): 88.
- 67 Julius Nyerere, "Speech at a Ministerial Conference of the Group of 77," *The Black Scholar* 11, no. 5 (1979): 60.
- 68 Geldart and Lyon, "The Group of 77," 97.
- 69 Sarah Al Doyaili, Andreas Freytag, and Peter Draper, "IBSA: Fading Out or Forging a Common Vision?," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 20, no. 2 (2013): 297–310; John Toye, "Assessing the G77: 50 Years after UNCTAD and 40 Years after the

NIEO," *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 10 (2014): 1759–1774.

70 Malte Brosig, *The Role of BRICS in Large-Scale Armed Conflict: Building a Multi-Polar World Order* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

71 C. Dodoo and R. Kuster, "The Road to Lomé," in *The Lomé Convention and a New International Economic Order*, ed. Frans Alting von Geusau (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1977), 15–59: 16.

72 William Zartman, "The EEC's New Deal with Africa," *Africa Report* 15, no. 2 (1970): 30.

73 Isebill V. Gruhn, "The Lomé Convention: Inching towards Interdependence," *International Organization* 30, no. 2 (1976): 247.

74 Kwame Akonor, *African Economic Institutions* (London: Routledge, 2010), 90.

75 Economic Commission for Africa, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa* (Addis Ababa: ECA Policy Research Report, 2004).

76 A. H. Akiwumi, "The Economic Commission for Africa," *Journal of African Law* 16, no. 3 (1972): 254–261.

77 Adebayo Adedeji, *The Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action for African Development: Five Years After*, ECA/Dalhousie University Conference on the Lagos Plan of Action and Africa's Future International Relations: Projections and Implications, Halifax, 2–4 November 1984, 10–11.

78 Organization of African Unity, *Lagos Plan of Action: For the Economic Development of Africa, 1980–2000* (Addis Ababa: Organization of African Unity, 1980).

79 John Ravenhill, "Collective Self-Reliance or Collective Self-Delusion: Is the Lagos Plan a Viable Alternative?," in *Africa in Economic Crisis*, ed. John Ravenhill (Houndsmill: Macmillan, 1986), 85–107.

80 Edward P. English and Harris M. Mule, *The African Development*

Bank (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

81 Karen Mingst, *Politics of the African Development Bank* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1990); Bo Jerlström, *Banking on Africa: An Evaluation of the African Development Bank* (Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990).

82 Akonor, *African Economic Institutions*, 26; Mingst, *Politics of the African Development Bank*.

83 Akonor, *African Economic Institutions*, 49–62.

84 World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1981).

85 Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, “Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 6, no. 2 (1968): 141–169; Reginald H. Green and Ann Seidman, *Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968); Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Bogle-L’Ouverture, 1972); Richard L. Harris, ed., *The Political Economy of Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1975).

86 John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” in *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?*, ed. John Williamson (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), 7–20.

87 *Ibid.*

88 Myriam Gervais, “Structural Adjustment in Niger: Implementations, Effects and Determining Political Factors,” *Review of African Political Economy* 22, no. 63 (1995): 27–42.

89 James R. Vreeland, *The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending* (London: Routledge, 2007), 28.

Chapter 6

- 1 *The Economist*, “The Hopeless Continent,” 11 May 2000.
- 2 *The Economist*, “A Hopeful Continent,” 2 March 2013.
- 3 Christine Lagarde, “Africa Rising – Building to the Future,” Maputo, 29 May 2014, www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp052914.
- 4 Benedikt Franke and Romain Esmenjaud, “Who Owns African Ownership? The Africanisation of Security and Its Limits,” *South African Journal of International Affairs* 15, no. 2 (2008): 137.
- 5 Axelle Kabou, *Et si l’Afrique refusait le développement?* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1991).
- 6 Paul Collier, “African Growth: Why a ‘Big Push’?,” *Journal of African Economies* 15, Supplement 2 (2006): 188–211.
- 7 Obert Hodzi, “China and Africa: Economic Growth and a Non-transformative Political Elite,” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 36, no. 2 (2018): 191–206.
- 8 Exports (goods, values of exports free of board) to five largest export destinations, to Africa total, and to the World total. Source: IMF, Direction of Trade, <https://data.imf.org/> (accessed 10 July 2019).
- 9 Imports refer to goods, value of imports, cost, insurance, freight (CIF) in US\$ and exports refer to goods, value of exports, free on board (FOB) in US\$. Source: IMF, Direction of Trade, <https://data.imf.org/> (accessed 20 August 2019).
- 10 McKinsey, *Lions on the Move* (McKinsey Global Institute, 2008); McKinsey, *Lions on the Move II* (McKinsey Global Institute, 2016).
- 11 Landry Signé, *Africa’s Consumer Market Potential: Trends, Drivers,*

Opportunities, and Strategies (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2018), 1.

12 Henning Melber, ed., *The Rise of Africa's Middle Class: Myths, Realities and Critical Engagements* (London: Zed Books, 2016).

13 *The Economist*, "Beer in Africa: From Lumps to Lager," 24 March 2012; *The Economist*, "SABMiller in Africa: The Beer Frontier," 31 May 2014.

14 Damian Hattingh, Acha Leke, and Bill Russo, *Lions (Still) on the Move: Growth in Africa's Consumer Sector* (2017), www.mckinsey.com/industries/consumer-packaged-goods/our-insights/lions-still-on-the-move-growth-in-africas-consumer-sector.

15 Signé, *Africa's Consumer Market Potential*.

16 *Ibid.*, 10–13.

17 UNCTAD, *Investment Trends Monitor: Global FDI Flows Continue Their Slide* (2019), https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaeiainf2019d1_en.pdf?user=46.

18 UNCTAD, *Press Release: WIR–Foreign Direct Investment to Africa Fell by 21% in 2017, Says United Nations Report*, 6 June 2018, <https://unctad.org/en/pages/PressRelease.aspx?OriginalVersionID=461>.

19 *African Business Central*, "MTN Settles Nigeria Fine & Looks at Listing on the Nigerian Stock Exchange," 11 June 2016, www.africanbusinesscentral.com/2016/06/11/mtn-settles-nigeria-fine-looks-at-listing-on-the-nigerian-stock-exchange/.

20 UNCTAD, *Foreign Direct Investment: Inward and Outward Flows and Stock, Annual* (2018), <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96740> (accessed 29 December 2018).

21 World Bank, *Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018).

22 Thomas Kigabo Rusuhuzwa and Joseph Baricako, *The Global Financial Crisis, Slowing Private Capital Inflows and Economic Growth in Rwanda and Burundi*, African Economic Conference 2009, Addis Ababa, 11–13 November 2009, www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-documents/AEC/2009/aec2009theglobalfinancialcrisisrwandaburundi.pdf.

23 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *American Economic Review* **91**, no. 5 (2001): 1369–1401; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* **118**, no. 4 (2002): 1231–1294.

24 Antoinette Handley, *Business and the State in Africa: Economic Policy-Making in the Neo-Liberal Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

25 Ibid.

26 Peter Arthur, "The State, Private Sector Development, and Ghana's 'Golden Age of Business'," *African Studies Review* **49**, no. 1 (2006): 31–50.

27 Nicholas Amponsah, "Ghana's Mixed Structural Adjustment Results: Explaining the Poor Private Sector Response," *Africa Today* **47**, no. 2 (2000): 9–32.

28 Favour Nunoo, "Foreign Direct Investment: How Ghana Overtake Nigeria as Largest FDI Recipient for West Africa," *BBC News online*, 23 January 2019, www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-46972532.

29 Chris Giles, "Ethiopia Is Now Africa's Fastest Growing Economy," *CNN online*, 24 April 2018, <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/24/africa/africa-largest-economy/>.

30 *The Guardian*, "Robert Mugabe to Nationalise Zimbabwe's Diamond Industry," 3 March 2016, www.theguardian.com/

world/2016/mar/03/robert-mugabe-to-nationalise-zimbabwes-diamond-industry.

31 Robert Rotberg, “Zimbabwe’s Economy Is Collapsing: Why Mnangagwa Doesn’t Have the Answers,” *The Conversation*, 21 October 2018, <https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-economy-is-collapsing-why-mnangagwa-doesnt-have-the-answers-104960>.

32 *The Economist*, “In Much of Sub-Saharan Africa, Mobile Phones Are More Common than Access to Electricity,” 8 November 2017, www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2017/11/08/in-much-of-sub-saharan-africa-mobile-phones-are-more-common-than-access-to-electricity.

33 Vodafone, “What Is M-Pesa?,” www.vodafone.com/what-we-do/services/m-pesa (accessed 7 November 2019).

34 Angus Deaton, *The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015); Hans Rosling, Ola Rosling, and Anna Rosling-Rönnlund, *Factfulness: Ten Reasons We’re Wrong about the World – and Why Things Are Better Than You Think* (London: SCEPTRE, 2018).

35 Peter Eigen, *Das Netz der Korruption. Wie eine weltweite Bewegung gegen Bestechung kämpft* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2003).

36 African Peer Review Mechanism, *APRM Country Review Report No. 11: Republic of Mozambique* (Midrand: African Peer Review Secretariat, 2009), 294–295; Matthias Krause and Friedrich Kaufmann, *Industrial Policy in Mozambique* (Bonn: DIE Discussion Paper 10/2011, 2011).

37 Ben Rawlence, *City of Thorns: Nine Lives in the World’s Largest Refugee Camp* (London: Portobello, 2016).

38 Transparency International, *How Corruption Weakens Democracy*, 29 January 2019, www.transparency.org/news/feature/cpi_2018_global_analysis.

39 Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy of Corruption

in Africa?" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37, no. 1 (1999): 25–52.

40 African Union, *African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption*, Maputo, 1 July 2003, Preamble.

41 Cited in *The Economist*, "China and Africa: Beijing Curbs its Enthusiasm," 29 June 2019, 34.

42 Christoph Titz, "Schwerreiche Regenten: Afrikas Raubkönige," *Spiegel online*, 22 February 2016, www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/afrika-die-reichsten-herrscher-des-kontinents-a-1077688.html.

43 African Union, *List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/ Acceded to the African Union Convention of Preventing and Combating Corruption*, Addis Ababa, 18 September 2018, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7786-sl-african_union_convention_on_preventing_and_combating_corruption_4.pdf.

44 Nancy C. Benjamin and Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, "Informality and Productivity in West Africa," *Review of Development Economics* 16, no. 4 (2012): 664–680.

45 Sonia M. Dias, "Waste Pickers and Cities," *Environment and Urbanization* 28, no. 2 (2016): 375–390.

46 Anastase Nzeza Bilakila, "The Kinshasa Bargain," in *Reinventing Order in the Congo: How People Respond to State Failure in Kinshasa*, ed. Theodore Trefon (London: Zed Books, 2004), 20–32.

47 Benjamin and Mbaye, "Informality and Productivity."

48 Ahmadou Aly Mbaye and Nancy Benjamin, "Informality, Growth, and Development in Africa," in *The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Volume 1: Context and Concepts*, eds. Célestin Monga and Justin Yifu Lin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 620–637.

49 Signé, *Africa's Consumer Market Potential*, 15.

50 International Labour Organization, *Women and Men in the*

Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture – Third Edition (Geneva: ILO, 2018), 20–21.

51 Karen Transberg Hansen and Mariken Vaa, *Reconsidering Informality: Perspectives from Urban Africa* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2002).

52 Yasmin El-Rifae, *Egypt's Informal Economy*, Middle East Institute, 6 January 2014, www.mei.edu/publications/egypts-informal-economy#_ftnref1.

53 International Labour Organization, *Women and Men*, 20–21.

54 Stephanie Seguino and Maureen Were, “Gender, Economic Growth, and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Volume 2: Policies and Practices*, eds. Célestin Monga and Justin Yifu Lin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 571–587.

55 Mina Balamoune-Lutz, “Gender Economics in North Africa,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Volume 2: Policies and Practices*, eds. Célestin Monga and Justin Yifu Lin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 588–604.

56 Michael L. Ross, “Oil, Islam, and Women,” *American Political Science Review* **102**, no. 1 (2008): 107–123.

57 International Labour Organization, *Decent Work and the Informal Economy* (Geneva: ILO, 2002); International Labour Organization, *Women and Men*.

58 Al-Masry Al-Youm, “Informal Economy in Egypt Contributes to about 40% of GDP: Minister,” *Egypt Independent*, 14 September 2017, www.egyptindependent.com/informal-economy-egypt-contributes-40-gdp-minister/.

59 Hernando de Soto, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

60 United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development*

Index (HDI) (2018), <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>.

61 All data from World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/> (accessed 15 August 2019) except data for Human Development Index, which comes from UN Development Program, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (accessed 14 August 2019).

62 GDP per capita (constant US\$ 2010) in 2018.

63 Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) in 2018.

64 Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) (plus year of latest figure available).

65 Poverty headcount ratio at US\$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population) (plus year of latest figure available).

66 Charles Mutasa, "Introduction: The Millennium Development Goals in Africa," in *Africa and the Millennium Development Goals: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, eds. Charles Mutasa and Mark Paterson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 1–14: 3.

67 World Bank, "Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (current US\$)" (2019), <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/dt.oda.alld.cd?end=2017&start=2004>.

68 Charles Mutasa and Mark Paterson, eds., *Africa and the Millennium Development Goals: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).

69 United Nations, *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015*, [www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20\(July%201\).pdf](http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf); also see Economic Commission for Africa, *MDG Report 2015: Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals*, Addis Ababa, September 2015, www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/MDG_Report_2015.pdf.

70 World Health Organisation, "Key Facts from JMP2015 Report

(2015),” www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/jmp-2015-key-facts/en/.

71 International Energy Agency, *Africa Energy Outlook: A Focus on Energy Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2014).

72 United Nations, *About the Sustainable Development Goals* (2019), www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/ (accessed 2 April 2019).

73 Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The End of Poverty: How We Can Make It Happen in Our Lifetime* (London: Penguin Books, 2005).

74 Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

75 Péter T. Bauer, *Dissent on Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976).

76 Horst Köhler, “Welt im Umbruch, Afrika im Aufbruch – passt unsere Entwicklungspolitik noch ins 21. Jahrhundert?” Speech of former German president Horst Köhler at the Zukunftsforum “Globalisierung gerecht gestalten,” Berlin, 15 February 2017.

77 James Shikwati, “Fehlentwicklungshilfe: Mit eigenständigen Lösungen kann Afrika eine neue Rolle spielen,” *Internationale Politik* no. 4 (2006): 6–15.

78 Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010).

Chapter 7

- 1 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 266.
- 2 Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young, "The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa," *Journal of Democracy* **18**, no. 3 (2007): 126–140.
- 3 Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young, "Term Limits: Leadership, Political Competition and the Transfer of Power," in *Institutions and Democracy in Africa: How the Rules of the Game Shape Political Developments*, ed. Nic Cheeseman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 260–277: 261.
- 4 Denis Tull and Claudia Simons, "The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits in Africa," *Africa Spectrum* **52**, no. 2 (2017): 79–102.
- 5 Charles Manga Fombad, "Constitution-Building in Africa: The Never-Ending Story of the Making, Unmaking and Remaking of Constitutions," *African and Asian Studies* **13**, no. 4 (2014): 429–451.
- 6 Georg Jellinek, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Berlin: Haering, 1990[1900]).
- 7 Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski and Duncan Pickard, "Libya Starts from Scratch," *Journal of Democracy* **24**, no. 4 (2013): 86–96.
- 8 Edward Randall, "After Qadhafi: Development and Democratization in Libya," *The Middle East Journal* **69**, no. 2 (2015): 204.
- 9 Ram Seegobin and Lindsay Collen, "Mauritius: Class Forces and Political Power," *Review of African Political Economy* **4**, no. 8 (1977): 109–118.

- 10 Posner and Young, "The Institutionalization of Political Power."
- 11 Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
- 12 Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- 13 Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
- 14 Jackson, *Quasi-States*.
- 15 Achille Mbembe, *Ausgang aus der langen Nacht: Versuch über ein entkolonisiertes Afrika* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2016); Felwine Sarr, *Afrotopia*, (Paris: Philippe Rey, 2016).
- 16 Bizeck J. Phiri, *A Political History of Zambia: From Colonial Rule to the Third Republic* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2006).
- 17 Chiponde Mushingeh, "The Evolution of One-Party Rule in Zambia, 1964–1972," *Transafrican Journal of History* 22 (1993): 100–121.
- 18 Mats Utas, "Introduction: Bigmanity and Network Governance in African Conflicts," in *African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks*, ed. Mats Utas (London: Zed Books, 2012), 1–34: 6.
- 19 Crawford Young, "The End of the Post-Colonial State in Africa? Reflections on Changing African Political Dynamics," *African Affairs* 103, no. 410 (2004): 23–49.
- 20 Crawford Young, "The Heritage of Colonialism," in *Africa in World Politics: Engaging a Changing Global Order*, eds. John W. Haberson and Donald Rothchild (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013), 15–34: 30–31.
- 21 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experience in Africa: Regime Transitions in Contemporary Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 117.

22 Ibid.

23 Nic Cheeseman, *Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

24 Jeff Haynes, "Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects," *Third World Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1993): 452.

25 Ibid.

26 Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1992," *African Affairs* 92, no. 368 (1993): 331–366; Mike Oquaye, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1999 – A Dissenting View," *African Affairs* 94, no. 375 (1995): 259–275.

27 Roger Southall and Henning Melber, *Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006).

28 Kasahun Woldemariam, *The Rise of Elective Dictatorship and the Erosion of Social Capital: Peace, Development, and Democracy in Africa* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2009).

29 Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 1 (1990): 50–69; José A. Cheibub, *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman, and Timothy Power, "Rethinking the 'Presidentialism Debate': Conceptualizing Coalitional Politics in Cross-Regional Perspective," *Democratization* 21, no. 1 (2014): 72–94.

30 Dan Paget, "Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest," *Journal of Democracy* 28, no. 3 (2017): 153–167.

31 Ibid., 159.

32 Based on Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young, "The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa," *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 3 (2007): 126–140; Andrea Cassani, "Presidential Elections in Burkina Faso: A Revenge of Term-Limit Politics in

Africa" (2015) www.ispionline.it/it/publicazione/2015-presidential-election-burkina-faso-revenge-term-limit-politics-africa-14273; Julia Grauvogel, "The Spread of Term Limit Manipulations in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Example of Authoritarian Learning?," paper presented at the VAD Conference, Leipzig, 27–30 June 2018; and own research.

33 Charlotte Heyl, "Senegal (1970–2016): Presidential Term Limit Reforms Never Come Alone," in *The Politics of Presidential Term Limits*, eds. Alexander Baturo and Robert Elgie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 339–361.

34 Filip Reyntjens, "The Struggle Over Term Limits in Africa: A New Look at the Evidence," *Journal of Democracy* **27**, no. 3 (2016): 61–68.

35 Julia Grauvogel, "The Spread of Term Limit Manipulations in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Example of Authoritarian Learning?," Paper presented at the VAD Conference, Leipzig, 27–30 June 2018.

36 *The Economist*, "African Presidents: Till Death Do Us Part," 12 January 2019, 31.

37 Gabrielle Lynch and Gordon Crawford, "Democratization in Africa 1990–2010: An Assessment," *Democratization* **18**, no. 2 (2011): 276.

38 Jean François Medard, ed., *Etats d'Afrique noire. Formations, mécanismes et crise* (Paris: Karthala, 1991); Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experience*; Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Oxford: International African Institute, 1999); Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel, "Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* **45**, no. 1 (2007): 95–119.

39 Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1922), 133.

40 *Ibid.*, 124–142.

- 41 Samuel N. Eisenstadt, *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism* (London: Sage, 1973).
- 42 Christopher Clapham, *Third World Politics: An Introduction* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 49.
- 43 Jackson and Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*, 40.
- 44 Victor T. Le Vine, *Politics in Francophone Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 279.
- 45 Jackson and Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*; Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*; Alec Russell, *Big Men, Little People: The Leaders Who Defined Africa* (New York: New York University Press, 2000).
- 46 Marshall D. Sahlins, "Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief: Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5, no. 3 (1963): 285–303.
- 47 Jean-Pascal Daloz, "'Big Men' in Sub-Saharan Africa: How Elites Accumulate Positions and Resources," *Comparative Sociology* 2, no. 1 (2003): 280.
- 48 *Jeune Afrique Magazine*, "Mobutu parle," no. 47 (1988): 102 [own translation].
- 49 Jackson and Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*.
- 50 Cheeseman, *Democracy in Africa*, 33.
- 51 Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experience*.
- 52 Martin Welz, "Zimbabwe's 'Inclusive Government': Some Observations on Its First 100 Days," *The Round Table* 99, no. 411 (2010): 607–621.
- 53 Stephen Chan and Julia Gallagher, *Why Mugabe Won: The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe and Their Aftermath* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
- 54 Thomas Isbell, "Perceived Patronage: Do Secret Societies, Ethnicity, Region Boost Careers in Cameroon?" *Afrobarometer*

Dispatch No. 162, 6 September 2017, http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno162_patronage_in_cameroon.pdf.

55 Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 132–133.

56 Lilian Ndangam, "'All of Us Have Taken Gombo': Media Pluralism and Patronage in Cameroonian Journalism," *Journalism* 10, no. 6 (2009): 819–842.

57 Martin Plaut, *Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa's Most Repressive State* (London: Hurst, 2016), 126.

58 United Nations, "Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea," New York, 4 June 2015, A/HRC/29/42.

59 *The Economist*, "Eritrea: A Flicker of Light in a Prison State," 4 August 2018, 27.

60 *The Economist*, "Ethiopia and Eritrea: Prison Break," 13 October 2018, 34.

61 *The Economist*, "Eritrea: A Flicker."

62 Johannes Dieterich, "Meister der Wahlfälschung," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 29 March 2008, 10 [own translation]; Andreas Schedler, "Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 36–50.

63 Sylvia Bishop and Anke Hoeffler, "Free and Fair Elections: A New Database," *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 4 (2016): 608–616.

64 Axelle Kabou, *Weder arm noch ohnmächtig: Eine Streitschrift gegen schwarze Eliten und weisse Helfer* (Basel: Lenos, 2009), 154 [own translation].

65 Radio France Internationale, "Congo-Brazzaville: Denis Sassou-Nguesso justifie sa longévité," 24 February 2016, www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160224-congo-brazzaville-denis-sassou-nguesso-justifie

66 Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 116–127.

67 *New Vision*, “President Museveni Makes Case for African Integration,” 12 February 2019, www.newvision.co.ug/newvision/news/1494017/president-museveni-makes-african-integration.

68 Sara Assarsson, “Swaziland’s Reed Dance: Cultural Celebration or Sleazy Royal Ritual?” *The Guardian online*, 22 September 2016, www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/sep/22/swaziland-reed-dance-cultural-celebration-or-sleazy-royal-ritual-umhlanga.

69 Achille Mbembe, *Postkolonie: Zur politischen Einbildungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart* (Vienna: Turia und Kant, 2016), 28.

70 Aili M. Tripp, “Women and Politics in Africa,” in *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of African History*, ed. Thomas Spear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

71 Gretchen Bauer, Akosua Darkwah, and Donna Patterson, “Women and Post-Independence African Politics,” in *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of African History*, ed. Thomas Spear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

72 Balghis Badri and Aili M. Tripp, eds., *Women's Activism in Africa: Struggles for Rights and Representation* (London: Zed Books, 2017).

73 Susan Geiger, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955–1965* (Portsmouth: Heineman, 1997).

74 Tripp, "Women and Politics."

75 Fatami Sadiqi, "The Moroccan Feminist Movement (1946–2014)," *Women's Activism in Africa: Struggles for Rights and Representation*, eds. Balghis Badri and Aili M. Tripp (London: Zed Books, 2017), 97–120.

76 Peace A. Medie and Alice J. Kang, "Power, Knowledge and the Politics of Gender in the Global South," *European Journal of Politics and Gender* 1, no. 1–2 (2018): 37–53; Yolande Bouka, Marie E. Berry, and Marilyn Muthoni Kamuru, "Women's Political Inclusion in Kenya's Devolved Political System," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 13, no. 2 (2019): 313–333; Toni Haastrup, "Gendering South Africa's Foreign Policy: Toward a Feminist Approach?," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 16, no. 2 (2020): 199–216.

77 Numbers based on Iain Frame, ed., *Africa South of the Sahara 2018* (London: Routledge, 2017); Christopher Matthews, ed., *The Middle East and Africa 2019* (London: Routledge, 2018).

78 Iain Frame, ed., *Africa South of the Sahara 2010* (London: Routledge, 2019), 1347–1348.

79 Martin Welz and Daniela Kromrey, "Legacies of the Past: The Influence of Former Freedom Fighters and Their Rhetoric in Southern Africa," *Politikon* 42, no. 2 (2015): 255–273.

80 Ibid.

81 Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, "State Bureaucracy and Governance in Francophone West Africa: An Empirical Diagnosis and Historical

Perspective," in *The Governance of Daily Life in Africa: Ethnographic Explorations of Public and Collective Services*, eds. Giorgio Blundo and Pierre-Yves Le Meur (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 39–71.

82 Jonathan N. Moyo, *The Politics of Administration: Understanding Bureaucracy in Africa* (Harare: SAPES Book, 1992), 84.

83 Ibid.

84 Dele Olowu, "Civil Service Pay Reforms in Africa," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* **76**, no. 4 (2010): 632–652.

85 Olivier de Sardan, "State Bureaucracy."

86 Robert Cameron, "Introduction," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* **76**, no. 4 (2010): 605–611.

87 Theodore Trefon, "Administrative Obstacles to Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* **76**, no. 4 (2010): 702–722.

88 Robert Cameron, "Redefining Political-Administrative Relationships in South Africa," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* **76**, no. 4 (2010): 676–701.

89 Afrobarometer R7 2016-2018, Question 50, Respected by public officials, www.afrobarometer.org.

90 Rachel Sigman and Staffan I. Lindberg, *Neopatrimonialism and Democracy: An Empirical Investigation of Africa's Political Regimes*, University of Gothenburg (Varieties of Democracy Institute, Working Paper 56, 2017).

91 Lloyd G. Adu Amoah, "Constructing a New Public Administration in Africa," *Administrative Theory & Praxis* **34**, no. 3 (2012): 385–406.

92 M. Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig, *The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

93 Ibid.

94 Joel D. Barkan, ed., *Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009).

95 Robert Mattes and Shaheen Mozaffar, "Legislatures and Democratic Development in Africa," *African Studies Review* 59, no. 3 (2016): 201–215.

96 Joel D. Barkan, "African Legislatures and the 'Third Wave' of Democratization," in *Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies*, ed. Joel D. Barkan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 1–31.

97 CIA World Fact Book 2019, "Political Parties and Leaders," www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/315.html#SG (accessed 29 October 2019).

98 Sebastian Elischer, *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

99 Ibid.

100 Ian Cooper, "Political Parties: Presidential Succession Crises and Internal Party Democracy," in *Institutions and Democracy in Africa: How the Rules of the Game Shape Political Developments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 191–212.

101 Anja Osei, "Party System Institutionalization in Ghana and Senegal," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 48, no. 5 (2013): 577–593.

102 Thomas Carothers, *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006); also see Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand "Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Africa," *Democratization* 9, no. 3 (2002): 30–52.

103 Posner and Young, "Term Limits," 262.

104 Cheeseman, *Democracy in Africa*, 54–55.

- 105** Stephen A. Akintoye, *Emergent African States: Topics in 20th Century African History* (London: Longman, 1976), 118.
- 106** Karen Mingst, "Judicial Systems of Sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis of Neglect," *African Studies Review* **31**, no. 1 (1988): 135–148.
- 107** Peter VonDoepp, "The Judiciary: Courts, Judges and the Rule of Law," in *Institutions and Democracy in Africa: How the Rules of the Game Shape Political Developments*, ed. Nic Cheeseman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 304–326; Charlotte Heyl, "The Judiciary and the Rule of Law in Africa," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia*, <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1352>.
- 108** Mo Ibrahim Foundation, *Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)*, <http://iiag.online/> (accessed 12 February 2019).
- 109** Jean-Baptiste J. Vilmer, "The African Union and the International Criminal Court: Counteracting the Crisis," *International Affairs* **92**, no. 6 (2016): 1337.
- 110** Katharina Holzinger, Florian G. Kern, and Daniela Kromrey, "The Dualism of Contemporary Traditional Governance and the State: Institutional Setups and Political Consequences," *Political Research Quarterly* **69**, no. 3 (2016): 469–481.
- 111** Richard L. Sklar, "African Politics: The Next Generation," in *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*, ed. Richard Joseph (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 165–178.
- 112** Janine Ubink, *Traditional Authorities in Africa: Resurgence in an Era of Democratisation* (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2008).
- 113** Jeffrey I. Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 178.
- 114** Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa*

and the *Legacy of Late Colonialism*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 43.

115 Ibid.

116 Goran Hyden, *African Politics in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 52–73; Kate Baldwin, *The Paradox of Traditional Chiefs in Democratic Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

117 Norman N. Miller, “The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6, no. 2 (1968): 183–198.

118 An exception is represented by C. Sylvester Whitaker, *The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946–1966* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).

119 Herbst, *States and Power*, 178.

120 Richard L. Sklar, “The African Frontier for Political Science,” in *Africa and the Disciplines: Contributions of Research in Africa to the Social Sciences and Humanities*, eds. Robert H. Bates, V. Y. Mudimbe, and Jean O’Barr (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), 83–110: 94.

121 Carolyn Logan, “The Roots of Resilience: Exploring Popular Support for African Traditional Authorities,” *African Affairs* 112, no. 448 (2013): 353–376.

122 Afrobarometer R7 2016-2018, Question 43J, Respected by public officials, www.afrobarometer.org.

123 Tom Burgis, *The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and Theft of Africa’s Wealth* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2015), 189.

124 Carolyn Logan, *Traditional Leaders in Modern Africa: Can Democracy and the Chief Co-Exist?* (Afrobarometer Working Papers 93, 2008), <http://afrobarometer.org/publications/wp93-traditional-leaders-modern-africa-can-democracy-and-chief-co-exist>;

Cheeseman, *Democracy in Africa*, 148.

125 Baldwin, *The Paradox*.

126 Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa," *World Politics* **41**, no. 3 (1989): 407–430.

127 Pierre Englebert and Emmanuel Kasongo Mungongo, "Misguided and Misdiagnosed: The Failure of Decentralization Reforms in the DR Congo," *African Studies Review* **59**, no. 1 (2016): 5–32.

128 Christian Lund, ed., *Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007).

129 Gregory Mann, *From Empires to NGOs in the West African Sahel: The Road to Nongovernmentality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

130 Jennifer N. Brass, "Blurring Boundaries: The Integration of NGOs into Governance in Kenya," *Governance* **25**, no. 2 (2012): 209–235.

131 Stephen N. Ndegwa, *The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in Africa* (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1996); Nelson Kasfir, "Civil Society, the State, and Democracy in Africa," in *Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives*, ed. Nelson Kasfir (Portland, OR: Class, 1998), 123–149.

132 Firoze Manji and Carl O'Coill, "The Missionary Position: NGOs and Development in Africa," *International Affairs* **78**, no. 3 (2002): 567–583.

133 Alexander Cooley and James Ron, "The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action," *International Security* **27**, no. 1 (2002): 5–39.

134 Heike Becker, "Revolution 2.0: Thomas Sankara and the Social Media Generation," *Review of African Political Economic Online* (2017), <http://roape.net/2017/10/31/revolution-2-0-thomas->

135 Quoted in Peter Jones, "The Arab Spring," *International Journal* 67, no. 2 (2012): 452.

136 Tanja Bosch, "Twitter Activism and Youth in South Africa: The Case of #RhodesMustFall, Information," *Communication & Society* 20, no. 2 (2017): 221–232.

137 Carolyn E. Holmes and Melanie Loehwing, "Icons of the Old Regime: Challenging South African Public Memory Strategies in #RhodesMustFall," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 42, no. 6 (2016): 1207–1223.

138 Cheeseman, *Democracy in Africa*, 69–70.

139 *The Economist*, "Pentecostalism in Africa: Of Prophets and Profits," 4 October 2014.

140 Michael Zürn, "Internationale Institutionen und nichtstaatliche Akteure in der Global Governance" (2010), www.bpb.de/apuz/32562/internationale-institutionen-und-nichtstaatliche-akteure-in-der-global-governance?p=all#footnode6-6 [own translation].

141 James Ferguson, "Transnational Topographies of Power: Beyond the State and Civil Society in the Study of African Politics," in *Accelerating Possession: Global Futures of Property and Personhood*, eds. Bill Maurer and Gabriele Schwab (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 76–98.

142 James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

143 Ken Menkhaus, "Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping," *International Security* 31, no. 3 (2007): 74–106.

Chapter 8

- 1 Daniel Don Nanjira, *African Foreign Policy and Diplomacy: From Antiquity to the 21st Century* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010).
- 2 Leo E. Otoide, "Re-thinking the Subject of Africa's International Relations," *Voice of History* **16**, no. 2 (2001): 43–56.
- 3 Lexington Izuagie, "Pre-colonial Regionalism in West Africa," *Ofo: Journal of Transatlantic Studies* **4**, no. 1 (2014): 21–42.
- 4 Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787* (London: Routledge, 2003).
- 5 Olajide Aluko, ed., *The Foreign Policies of African States* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977).
- 6 Robert Malley, *The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution and the Turn to Islam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
- 7 William Zartman, "Decision-Making among African Governments in Inter-African Affairs," *Journal of Development Studies* **2**, no. 2 (1966): 100.
- 8 Organization of African Unity, *OAU Charta*, Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963, Art. II, 1(a).
- 9 Organization of African Unity, *Resolution on Border Disputes between African States*, Cairo, 17–21 July 1964, AHG/Res.16(I).
- 10 Majid Khadduri, "Towards an Arab Union: The League of Arab States," *American Political Science Review* **40**, no. 1 (1946): 90–100; Robert W. Macdonald, *The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 33–50.

- 11** Zeynep S. Mencütek, "The 'Rebirth' of a Dead Organization? Questioning the Role of the Arab League in the 'Arab Uprisings' Process," *Perceptions* **19**, no. 2 (2014): 83–112.
- 12** Domenic Mazzeo, ed., *African Regional Organizations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
- 13** Ahmed Aghrout and Keith Sutton, "Regional Economic Union in the Maghreb," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* **28**, no. 1 (1990): 115–139.
- 14** Peter Meyns, "The South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa," in *African Regional Organizations*, ed. Domenic Mazzeo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 196–224.
- 15** Percy S. Mistry, "Africa's Record of Regional Co-operation and Integration," *African Affairs* **99**, no. 397 (2000): 553–573.
- 16** Jan J. Teunissen, ed., *Regionalism and the Global Economy: The Case of Africa* (Den Haag: Fondad, 1996); Percy S. Mistry, *Regional Integration Arrangements in Economic Development: Panacea or Pitfall?* (Den Haag: Fondad, 1996).
- 17** Gino J. Naldi, *The Organization of African Unity: An Analysis of Its Role* (London: Mansell, 1989).
- 18** Klaas van Walraven, *Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa, 1963–1993* (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 1997), 162.
- 19** Ibid.
- 20** Amare Tekle, "A Tale of Three Cities: The OAU and the Dialectics of Decolonization in Africa," *Africa Today* **35**, no. 3–4 (1988): 49–60.
- 21** Hilmi S. Yousuf, "The OAU and the African Liberation Movement," *Pakistan Horizon* **38**, no. 4 (1985): 55–67.
- 22** Rawia Tawfik, "Egypt and the Transformations of the Pan-

African Movement: The Challenge of Adaptation," *African Studies* 75, no. 3 (2016): 302–303.

23 Robert Mortimer, "The Algerian Revolution in Search of the African Revolution," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 8, no. 3 (1970): 363–364.

24 Martin Stone, *The Agony of Algeria* (London: Hurst, 1997), 230–231.

25 Asteris Huliaras, "Qadhafi's Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s," *African Affairs* 100, no. 398 (2001): 5–25.

26 Quoted in George I. Smith, *Ghosts of Kampala* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), 181.

27 Quoted in *Ibid.*, 168.

28 Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko, "South Africa and the African Renaissance," *International Affairs* 74, no. 2 (1998): 272.

29 Maxi van Aardt, "A Foreign Policy to Die for: South Africa's Response to the Nigerian Crisis," *Africa Insight* 26, no. 2 (1996): 108–119.

30 Van Walraven, *Dreams of Power*, 264.

31 Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons, "Foreign Policy Making in Africa: An Introduction," in *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, eds. Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 1–13: 5.

32 Jeffrey Herbst, "Crafting Regional Cooperation in Africa," in *Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Amitav Acharya and Alastair I. Johnston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 129–144.

33 Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (1991): 233–256.

34 Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The*

Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Pierre Englebert, *Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009); Martin Welz, *Integrating Africa: Decolonization's Legacies, Sovereignty and the African Union* (London: Routledge, 2013).

35 Herbst, "Crafting Regional Cooperation."

36 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* **42**, no. 1 (1998): 3–32.

37 Fredrik Söderbaum, "Modes of Regional Governance in Africa: Neoliberalism, Sovereignty Boosting, and Shadow Networks," *Global Governance* **10**, no. 4 (2004): 419–436.

38 United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping*, New York, 17 June 1992, A/47/277, para. 64.

39 Jagdish Bhagwati, "Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview," in *New Dimensions in Regional Integration*, eds. Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 22–51; Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, "The New Wave of Regionalism," *International Organization* **53**, no. 3 (1999): 589–627.

40 David J. Francis, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2006).

41 Adekeye Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 64.

42 Benedikt Franke, "Africa's Regional Economic Communities and the Multi-Level Logic of Security Cooperation on the Continent," in *Towards an African Peace and Security Regime: Continental Embeddedness, Transitional Linkages, Strategic Relevance*, eds. Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 73–88.

43 Asteris Huliaras and Konstantinos Magliveras, "The End of an Affair? Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa," *Journal of North African Studies* 16, no. 2 (2011): 167–181.

44 Iain Frame, ed., *Africa South of the Sahara 2018* (London: Routledge, 2017).

45 Christopher Matthews, ed., *The Middle East and Africa 2019* (London: Routledge, 2018).

46 United Nations (2019), https://visit.un.org/sites/visit.un.org/files/Missions_Contacts_0.pdf; European Commission, *Diplomatic Corps* (2019), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/corps/view/cdSearch/act_showPDF.cfm?RepID=10002&DocType=1.

47 Wikipedia, *List of Diplomatic Missions in Washington, D.C.*, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_diplomatic_missions_in_Washington,_D.C. (accessed 10 March 2019); Wikipedia, *List of Diplomatic Missions in China*, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_diplomatic_missions_in_China (accessed 10 March 2019).

48 African Union, *Embassies of Member States in Addis Ababa* (2019), https://au.int/en/member_states/embassies (accessed 10 March 2019).

49 Matthews, *The Middle East and North Africa 2019*; Frame, *Africa South of the Sahara 2018*.

50 Huliaras, "Qadhafi's Comeback."

51 Kassin M. Khamis, *Promoting the African Union* (Washington, DC: Lilian Barber Press, 2008), 79.

52 Martin Welz, "Reconsidering Lock-In Effects and Benefits from Delegation: The African Union's Relations with Its Member States through a Principal-Agent Perspective," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 33, no. 2 (2020): 159–178.

53 Paul D. Williams, "From Non-intervention to Non-indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security

Culture," *African Affairs* **106**, no. 423 (2007): 253–279.

54 Van Walraven, *Dreams of Power*, 171.

55 African Union, *Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2018 Financial Year*, Addis Ababa, 4 July 2017, Assembly/AU/Dec.642 (XXIX).

56 African Union, *African Union Commission (AUC)*, <https://au.int/en/organs/commission> (accessed 8 March 2018).

57 Ian Taylor, *NEPAD: Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005).

58 Charles Manga Fombad and Zein Kebonang, eds., *AU, NEPAD and the APRM: Democratisation Efforts Explored* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006).

59 Eduard Jordan, "Inadequately Self-Critical: Rwanda's Self-Assessment for the African Peer Review Mechanism," *African Affairs* **105**, no. 420 (2006), 333–351; Ross Herbert and Steven Gruzd, *The African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from the Pioneers* (Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Affairs, 2008); Steven Gruzd, *The African Peer Review Mechanism: Development Lessons from Africa's Remarkable Governance Assessment System* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2014).

60 Welz, "Reconsidering Lock-In Effects."

61 African Union, *Accra Declaration*, Accra, 1–3 July 2007, Assembly/AU/Decl.1-2(IX).

62 Gerrit Olivier, "Is Thabo Mbeki Africa's Saviour?" *International Affairs* **79**, no. 4 (2003): 815–828.

63 Laurie Nathan, "SADC's Uncommon Approach to Common Security, 1992–2003," *Journal of Southern African Studies* **32**, no. 3 (2006): 605–622.

64 Mammo Muchie, ed., *The Making of the Africa-Nation: Pan-*

Africanism and the African Renaissance (London: Adonis & Abbey, 2003); Timothy Murithi, *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Williams, "From Non-intervention."

65 Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Jr. Lee; Martin Lichterman, R. E. Lindgren, F. L. Lorwenheim, and R. W. VanWagene, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

66 Naison Ngoma, "SADC: Towards a Security Community?," *African Security Review* **12**, no. 3 (2003): 17–28; Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities," *European Journal of International Relations* **12**, no. 2 (2006): 275–299; Benedikt Franke, "Africa's Evolving Security Architecture and the Concept of Multilayered Security Communities," *Cooperation and Conflict* **43**, no. 3 (2008): 313–340.

67 Welz, "Reconsidering Lock-In Effects."

68 Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

69 Wolfe Braude, *Regional Integration in Africa: Lessons from the East African Community* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2008).

70 Martin Welz, "The African Union beyond Africa: Explaining the Limited Impact of Africa's Continental Organization on Global Governance," *Global Governance* **19**, no. 3 (2013): 425–441.

71 Thomas K. Tieku, *Governing Africa: 3D Analysis of the African Union's Performance* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017); also see Omar Alieu Touray, *The African Union: The First Ten Years* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).

72 Joram M. Biswaro, *Perspectives on Africa's Integration and*

Cooperation from the OAU to AU: 'Old Wine in a New Bottle'? (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 2005); Welz, *Integrating Africa*; Nathan, "SADC's Uncommon Approach."

73 Herbst, "Crafting Regional Cooperation."

74 Mwita Chacha, "Regional Integration and the Challenge of Overlapping Memberships on Trade," *Journal of International Relations and Development* **17**, no. 4 (2014): 522-544.

75 Herbst, "Crafting Regional Cooperation."

76 Marc L. Busch, "Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade," *International Organization* **61**, no. 4 (2007): 735-761.

Chapter 9

1 Wikipedia, *List of Active Separatist Movements in Africa*, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_separatist_movements_in_Africa (accessed 1 May 2019).

2 Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* **48**, no. 2 (2011): 249–259.

3 Stephanie M. Burchardt, *Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Consequences* (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2015), 50.

4 Donald L. Horowitz, ed., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 588.

5 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *The Political Economy of Secession* (Washington, DC: World Bank Development Research Group, 2003).

6 *Ibid.*

7 David D. Laitin, "Secessionist Rebellion in the Former Soviet Union," *Comparative Political Studies* **34**, no. 8 (2001): 839–861; Stephen M. Saideman, "Is Pandora's Box Half-Empty or Half-Full? The Limited Virulence of Secessionism and the Domestic Sources of Disintegration," in *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*, ed. David A. Lake (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 127–150.

8 Pierre Englebert and Rebecca Hummel, "Let's Stick Together: Understanding Africa's Secessionist Deficit," *African Affairs* **104**, no. 416 (2005): 399–427.

9 *Ibid.*, 412.

10 Erin K. Jenne, Stephen M. Saideman, and Will Lowe, "Separatism as a Bargaining Posture: The Role of Leverage in Minority Radicalization," *Journal of Peace Research* **44**, no. 5 (2007):

11 Johannes Harnischfeger, “Biafra and Secessionism in Nigeria: An Instrument of Political Bargain,” in *Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment*, eds. Mareike Schomerus, Pierre Englebert, and Lotje de Vries (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 329–358: 331.

12 Englebert and Hummel, “Let’s Stick Together”; Mareike Schomerus, Pierre Englebert, and Lotje de Vries, eds., *Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

13 Redie Bereketeab, “Self-Determination and Secession: African Challenges,” in *Self-Determination and Secession in Africa*, ed. Redie Bereketeab (London: Routledge, 2015), 3–19.

14 Scopas S. Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan, 1955–1972* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1.

15 Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006); Bono Malwal, *Sudan and South Sudan: From One to Two* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

16 Heather Byrne and Pierre Englebert, “Shifting Grounds for African Secessionism?,” in *Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment*, eds. Mareike Schomerus, Pierre Englebert, and Lotje de Vries (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 455–488.

17 Markus V. Hoehne, “Against the Grain: Somaliland’s Secession from Somalia,” in *Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment*, eds. Mareike Schomerus, Pierre Englebert, and Lotje de Vries (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 229–261: 230.

18 Mark Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland* (London: Progressio, 2008), 81.

19 Hoehne, "Against the Grain," 230.

20 Marleen Renders, *Consider Somaliland: State-Building with Traditional Leaders and Institutions* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 96–104.

21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Briefing Paper: The Case for Somaliland's International Recognition as an Independent State* (Hargeisa, 2002), 9.

22 Byrne and Englebert, "Shifting Grounds," 460.

23 *Daily Nation*, "Kenya and Somaliland to Foster Strong Trade Ties," 16 November 2018, www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenya-and-Somaliland-to-foster-strong-trade-ties/1056-4855006-peeth8z/.

24 *France 24*, "Tuareg Rebels Declare Independence in North Mali," 6 April 2012, www.france24.com/en/20120406-france-24-exclusive-tuareg-rebels-declare-independence-mlna-mali-ansar-dine-azawad.

25 Byrne and Englebert, "Shifting Grounds."

26 James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 390.

27 Powell and Thyne, "Global Instances of Coups," 252.

28 Ruth First, *The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in African and the Coup d'Etat* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Press, 1970), 4.

29 The figures and definitions in the section are drawn from Powell and Thyne, "Global Instances of Coups."

30 Source: Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 2 (2011): 249–259.

31 Pat J. McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson, "African Military Coups d'Etat and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 22, no. 4 (1984): 633–666; Thomas H. Johnson, Robert O. Slater, and Pat McGowan,

"Explaining African Military Coups d'Etat, 1960-1982," *American Political Science Review* **78**, no. 3 (1984): 622.

32 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *Military Spending and the Risks of Coups d'Etats* (Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, 2007), 15-16.

33 Jonathan Powell, Trace Lasley, and Rebecca Schiel, "Combating Coups d'Etat in Africa, 1950-2014," *Studies in Comparative International Development* **51**, no. 4 (2016): 483.

34 Augustin K. Fosu, "Transforming Economic Growth to Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of Elite Political Instability," *Oxford Development Studies* **30**, no. 1 (2002): 11.

35 Joan Baxter and Keith Somerville, "Burkina Faso," in *Benin, the Congo, Burkina Faso*, ed. Bogdan Szajkowski (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), 237-286: 248-249.

36 *Ibid.*, 249.

37 J. Tyler Dickovick, "Revolutionising Local Politics? Radical Experiments in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Uganda in the 1980s," *Review of African Political Economy* **36**, no. 122 (2009): 519-537.

38 Pierre Englebert, *Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 60-61.

39 BBC News, "Burkina Faso Crisis: Col Isaac Zida Claims Presidential Powers," 1 November 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29861280.

40 Janette Yarwood, "The Power of Protest," *Journal of Democracy* **27**, no. 3 (2016): 55.

41 John F. Clark, "The Decline of the African Military Coup," *Journal of Democracy* **18**, no. 3 (2007): 141-155.

42 Organization of African Unity, *Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government*, Lomé, 12 July 1998, AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI).

43 Issaka K. Souaré, "The African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur on Military Coups d'État in Africa (1952–2012): An Empirical Assessment," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 52, no. 1 (2014): 77–78.

44 *The Economist*, "The Putsch Option," 20 April 2019, 54.

45 Patrick J. McGowan, "African Military Coups d'Etat, 1956–2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 41, no. 3 (2003): 350.

46 Clark, "The Decline"; Oisín Tansey, "The Fading of the Anti-Coup Norm," *Journal of Democracy* 28, no. 1 (2017): 144–156.

47 Souaré, "The African Union," 84.

48 Burchard, *Electoral Violence*, 50.

49 Kristine Höglund, "Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 3 (2009): 413.

50 Dorina A. Bekoe and Stephanie M. Burchard, "The Contradictions of Pre-election Violence: The Effects of Violence on Voter Turnout in Sub-Saharan Africa," *African Studies Review* 60, no. 2 (2017): 73–92.

51 Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, "Introduction: The Everyday Politics of Electoral Violence in Africa," in *Violence in African Elections*, eds. Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs and Jesper Bjarnesen (London: Zed Books, 2017), 1–26.

52 Höglund, "Electoral Violence."

53 Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor, "Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2008," in *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. Dorina A. Bekoe (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2012), 15–38.

54 Morten Bøås and Mats Utas, "The Political Landscape of Postwar Liberia: Reflections on National Reconciliation and Elections,"

Africa Today **60**, no. 4 (2014): 61.

55 Söderberg Kovacs, "Introduction," 10–11.

56 *The Economist*, "Nigeria's Election: Time to Keep the Promise," 2 March 2019, 30.

57 Burchardt, *Electoral Violence*, 56–74.

58 *Ibid.*, 5.

59 Nic Cheeseman, *Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 166.

60 United Nations, *Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe Mrs. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka*, 18 July 2005, www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/zimbabwe/zimbabwe_rpt.pdf.

61 Richard P. Werbner, *Tears of the Dead: The Social Biography of an African Family* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991); Terence Ranger, *Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture & History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe* (Harare: Baobab, 1999); Stephen Chan, *Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power and Violence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

62 Chris McGreal, "Mugabe: I'll Quit if I Don't Face Prosecution," *Mail & Guardian online*, 4 April 2008.

63 Burchardt, *Electoral Violence*, 27.

64 Freedom House, *Freedom in the World – Côte d'Ivoire* (2014), <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/c-te-divoire>.

65 Dorina A. Bekoe, "The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire: How a Certified Election Still Turned Violent," *International Peacekeeping* **25**, no. 1 (2018): 128–153.

66 Richard Banegas, "Post-Election Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire: The

Gbonhi War," *African Affairs* **110**, no. 440 (2011): 457–468.

67 Burchardt, *Electoral Violence*, 18.

68 Daniel J. Ross, *Violent Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

69 Staffan I. Lindberg, *Democracy and Elections in Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

70 *The Economist*, "Nigeria's Election," 30.

71 Virginia Page Fortna, "Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes," *International Organization* **69**, no. 3 (2015): 519.

72 Robert A. Pape, "It's the Occupation, Stupid," *Foreign Policy*, 18 October 2010, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/10/18/its-the-occupation-stupid/>.

73 Stig J. Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005–2012* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 17–18.

74 *Ibid.*, 23.

75 Roland Marchal, "A Tentative Assessment of the Somali *Harakat Al-Shabaab*," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* **3**, no. 3 (2009): 381–404; Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia*.

76 Ben Rawlence, *City of Thorns: Nine Lives in the World's Largest Refugee Camp* (London: Portobello, 2016), 12–32.

77 Roman Loimeier, "Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria," *Africa Spectrum* **47**, no. 2–3 (2012): 139.

78 Virginia Comolli, *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency* (London: Hurst, 2015), 49.

79 Mallam Sanni Umaru quoted in Kamal Tayo Oropo, Samson Ezea, Onyedika Agbedo, and Njadvava Musa, *Boko Haram Threatens*

to Attack Lagos, *Claims Link to al-Queda*, 15 August 2009, www.nairaland.com/310123/boko-haram-new-leader-teach#4354820.

80 Comolli, *Boko Haram*.

81 Sogo Angel Olofinbiyi and Jean Steyn, "The Boko Haram Terrorism: Causes Still Misunderstood," *Journal of Social Sciences* **14** (2018): 129-144.

Chapter 10

- 1 *The Economist*, "The Hopeless Continent," 11 May 2000.
- 2 Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, "Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* **39**, no. 5 (2002): 615–637.
- 3 Christopher Clapham, ed., *African Guerrillas* (Oxford: Currey, 1998).
- 4 William Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- 5 Michael Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500–2000* (London: McFarland and Company, 2002), 594–595.
- 6 George Joffe, "Libya and Chad," *Review of African Political Economy* **8**, no. 21 (1981): 84–102.
- 7 Monty G. Marshall, *Third World War: System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).
- 8 P. Godfrey Okoth, "The OAU and the Uganda-Tanzania War, 1978–79," *Journal of African Studies* **14**, no. 3 (1987): 152–162.
- 9 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll: *Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War* (Oxford: James Currey, 2000), 12–21.
- 10 John Abbink, "Briefing: The Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Dispute," *African Affairs* **97**, no. 389 (1998): 556.
- 11 *Ibid.*
- 12 Terrence Lyons, "The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict and the Search for Peace in the Horn of Africa," *Review of African Political Economy* **36**, no. 120 (2009): 167.

13 Martin Welz, "From Non-interference towards Non-indifference: The Ongoing Paradigm Shift in the African Union," in *Towards an African Peace and Security Regime: Continental Embeddedness, Transnational Linkages, Strategic Relevance*, eds. Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 31–52.

14 Center for Systemic Peace, *Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946–2016*, www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm#N4 (accessed 13 June 2019).

15 Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Mary Kaldor, "In Defence of New Wars," *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2, no. 1 (2013): 1–16.

16 Also see Erhard Eppler, *Vom Gewaltmonopol zum Gewaltmarkt? Die Privatisierung und Kommerzialisierung der Gewalt* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002).

17 Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*.

18 Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

19 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2355* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002).

20 Mats R. Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

21 Adekeye Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 43.

22 Quoted in Neil Henry, "Doe to Bush: 'Help Your Stepchildren'," *Washington Post*, 9 August 1990, A20.

23 Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War*, 43.

24 *Ibid.*, 58.

25 Bayo Ogunleye, *Behind the Rebel Line: Anatomy of Charles Taylor's Hostage Camps* (Enugu: Delta, 1995), 181.

26 William Reno, "Illicit Markets, Violence, Warlords, and Governance: West African Cases," *Crime, Law and Social Change* 52, no. 3 (2009): 313–322.

27 Victor A. B. Davies, "Liberia and Sierra Leone: Interwoven Civil Wars," in *Post-Conflict Economies in Africa*, eds. Augustin Kwasi Fosu and Paul Collier (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 77–90: 78.

28 Allen Howard, "Ebola and Regional History: Connections and Common Experiences," in *Understanding West Africa's Ebola Epidemic: Towards a Political Economy*, eds. Ibrahim Abdullah and Ismail Rashid (London: Zed Books, 2017), 19–46.

29 Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War* (New York: York University Press, 2007), 68.

30 Davies, "Liberia and Sierra Leone," 81.

31 Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War*.

32 William B. Quandt, *Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 40.

33 William B. Quandt, "Algeria's Transition to What?" *Journal of North African Studies* 9, no. 2 (2004): 83.

34 Werner Herzog, *Algerien: Zwischen Demokratie und Gottesstaat* (München: C. H. Beck, 1995), 94 [own translation].

35 Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War, 1990–1998* (London: Hurst, 2000).

36 Robert Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War," *The Middle East Journal* 50, no. 1 (1996): 18–

37 David Keen, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence," in *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, eds. Mats Berdal and David Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 19–43; David Keen, *Complex Emergencies* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

38 David Keen, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *International Affairs* 88, no. 4 (2012): 757–777.

39 Morten Bøås and Kevin Dunn, eds., *African Guerillas: Raging against the Machine* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007).

40 Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa*, 30–31.

41 *Ibid.*, 217–218.

42 Alex de Waal, "When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan," *African Affairs* 113, no. 452 (2014): 347.

43 *Ibid.*

44 International Crisis Group, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, Africa Report No. 217, 10 April 2014.

45 Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970); Ted R. Gurr, *Political Rebellion: Causes, Outcomes and Alternatives* (London: Routledge, 2015).

46 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 61, no. 1 (2009): 1–27.

47 Lansana Gberie, "The 'Rebel' Wars of Africa: From Political Contest to Criminal Violence?," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 52, no. 1 (2014): 152.

48 Joanne Richards, "Forced, Coerced and Voluntary Recruitment into Rebel and Militia Groups in the Democratic Republic of

Congo," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 52, no. 2 (2014): 307.

49 Roger D. Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe. Studies in Rationality and Social Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

50 Mats Utas and Magnus Jörgel, "The West Side Boys: Military Navigation in the Sierra Leone Civil War," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 46, no. 3 (2008): 499.

51 Joanne Richards, "Forced, Coerced and Voluntary Recruitment into Rebel and Militia Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 52, no. 2 (2014): 301–326.

52 Ibid.

53 Child Soldiers International, *Reports of Children Used in Hostilities 2016*, <https://childsoldiersworldindex.org/hostilities> (accessed 29 May 2019).

54 Bernd Beber and Christopher Blattman, "The Logic of Child Soldiering and Coercion," *International Organization* 67, no. 1 (2013): 65–104.

55 Annette Rehl, *Sie zwangen mich zu töten* (München: Knaur, 2006), 113–120.

56 Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 79.

57 Norman M. Naimark, *Genocide: A World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

58 Scott Straus, *Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).

59 Michael P. Jasinski, *Examining Genocides: Means, Motive, and*

Opportunity (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).

60 Straus, *Making and Unmaking Nations*, 235.

61 Andrew S. Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

62 *Ibid.*, 133–134.

63 Martin W. Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 275–276.

64 *Ibid.*, 276.

65 Naimark, *Genocide*, 137.

66 Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow*, 274.

67 Straus, *Making and Unmaking Nations*, 236.

68 Eric Reeves, "How Many Dead in Darfur?," *The Guardian*, 20 August 2007, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/aug/20/howmanydeadindarfur.

69 Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959–1994: History of a Genocide* (London: Hurst, 1995); Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Picador, 1998); Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide* (London: Verso, 2004).

70 Naimark, *Genocide*, 131.

71 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 241–242.

72 Jasinski, *Examining Genocides*, 211.

73 *Ibid.*, 214.

74 Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House, 2003).

75 Banégas Richard and Jewsiewicki Bogumil, "Vivre dans la

guerre. Imaginaires et pratiques populaires de la violence en RDC,” *Politique africaine*, 4, no. 84 (2001): 5–15.

76 Gérard Prunier, *Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

77 Chris Bowers, *World War Three*, 24 July 2006, <https://web.archive.org/web/20081007113538/http://mydd.com/story/2006/7/24/135222/827> (accessed 18 May 2019).

78 Prunier, *Congo*, xxxv–xxxvi.

79 *Ibid.*; Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

80 John F. Clark, ed., *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

81 Williams Reno, “External Relations of Weak States and Stateless Regions in Africa,” in *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, eds. Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 185–206.

82 Reyntjens, *The Great African War*, 6.

83 *Ibid.*, 4.

84 *Ibid.*, 221–231.

85 Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War: Sovereignty, Responsibility, and the War on Terror* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2018), 171.

86 United Nations, *Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, New York, 16 October 2002, S/2002/1146, para 68.

87 *Ibid.*

88 Michael Nest, “Ambitions, Profits and Loss: Zimbabwean

Economic Involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," *African Affairs* **100**, no. 400 (2001): 469–490; Hevina Dashwood, "Mugabe, Zimbabwe and Southern Africa: The Struggle for Leadership," *International Journal* **57**, no. 1 (2002): 78–100.

89 Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

90 Ibid.

91 David van Reybrouck, *Congo: The Epic History of a People* (London: Fourth Estate, 2014), 471.

92 Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Catherine Long, and Nando Sigona, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 317–368.

93 UNHCR, *Uganda – Refugee Statistics May 2019*, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/69946> (accessed 24 June 2019); UNHCR, *Statistical Summary as of 31 May 19: Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Kenya*, www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/Kenya-Statistics-Package-31-May-2019.pdf (accessed 24 June 2019).

94 UNHCR, *Tanzania Refugee Situation Statistical Report as of 30 April 2019*, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/69804>.

95 Jeff Crisp, "A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya's Refugee Camps," *African Affairs* **99**, no. 397 (2000): 601–632.

96 Ibid.; Ben Rawlence, *City of Thorns: Nine Lives in the World's Largest Refugee Camp* (London: Portobello, 2016).

97 Carmen Gómez Martín, "Rethinking the Concept of a 'Durable Solution': Sahrawi Refugee Camps Four Decades On," *Ethics & International Affairs* **31**, no. 1 (2017): 31–45.

98 Gaim Kibreab, "Forced Migration in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa," in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration*

Studies, eds. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, Nando Sigona, and Gaim Kibreab (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 571–584.

99 *The Economist*, “Refugee Camps in Africa: From Here to Eternity,” 26 May 2016.

Chapter 11

- 1 This section builds on Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), 94–97.
- 2 Wolfgang Seibel, “Peace Operations and Modern Protectorates: The Logic of Successful Failure,” in *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States*, eds. James Mayall and R. Soares de Oliveira (London: Hurst, 2011), 163–182.
- 3 Paul F. Diehl and Young-Im D. Cho, “Passing the Buck in Conflict Management: The Role of Regional Organizations in the Post-Cold War Era,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 12, no. 2 (2006): 191–202.
- 4 Bellamy and Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 94–97.
- 5 United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping*, New York, 17 June 1992, A/47/277, para 64.
- 6 *Ibid.*
- 7 Adekeye Adebajo, *Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
- 8 Paul D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa* (Cambridge: Polity, 2016), 215.
- 9 Christopher Clapham, “Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking,” *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 2 (1998): 193–210.
- 10 Katharina P. Coleman, *International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
- 11 United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace*.
- 12 *Ibid.*

13 Malte Brosig, *Cooperative Peacekeeping in Africa: Exploring Regime Complexity* (London: Routledge, 2017).

14 Ali Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Tony Karbo and Kudrat Virk, *The Palgrave Handbook of Peacebuilding in Africa* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

15 African Union, *Constitutive Act*, Lomé, 11 July 2000.

16 David J. Francis, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); Paul D. Williams, "From Non-intervention to Non-indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture," *African Affairs* 106, no. 423 (2007): 253–279; Benedikt Franke, *Security Cooperation in Africa: A Reappraisal* (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2009); Ulf Engel and João G. Porto, eds., *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010); Hany Besada, ed., *Crafting an African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010); Ulf Engel and João G. Porto, eds., *Towards an African Peace and Security Regime: Continental Embeddedness, Transnational Linkages, Strategic Relevance* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).

17 João G. Porto and Kapinga Yvette Ngand, *The African Union's Panel of the Wise: A Concise History* (Durban: Accord, 2015).

18 Williams, *War and Conflict*, 208.

19 Linda Darkwa, "The African Standby Force: The African Union's Tool for the Maintenance of Peace and Security," *Contemporary Security Policy* 38, no. 2 (2017), 471–482.

20 African Union, *The Official Launch of the African Union Peace Fund*, 17 November 2018, <https://au.int/en/newsevents/20181117/official-launch-african-union-peace-fund> (accessed 12 July 2019).

21 Ibid.

22 AU Commission, *APSA Roadmap 2016–2020* (Addis Ababa, 2015), 58.

23 African Union, *Decision on the Draft 2019 African Union Budget and 2018 Supplementary Budget* (Nouakchott, 28–29 June 2018), EX.CL/1020 (XXXIII).

24 European Court of Auditors, *The African Peace and Security Architecture: Need to Refocus EU Support*, Special Report No. 20 (2018), 15.

25 Chris Alden, Abiodun Alao, Zhang Chun, and Laura Barber, *China and Africa: Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

26 Jadesola Lokulo-Sodipe and Abiodun J. Osuntogun, “The Quest for a Supranational Entity in West Africa: Can the Economic Community of West African States Attain the Status,” *Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal* **16**, no. 3 (2013): 264.

27 Maxi van Aardt [Schoeman], “The SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security: Challenges for Regional Community Building,” *South African Journal of International Affairs* **4**, no. 2 (1996): 144.

28 Coleman, *International Organisations*, 116–194.

29 Angela Meyer, “Regional Conflict Management in Central Africa: From FOMUC to MICOPAX,” *African Security* **2**, no. 2–3 (2009): 158–174.

30 Amanda Lucey and Berouk Mesfin, *More Than a Chip off the Block: Strengthening IGAD-AU Peacebuilding Linkages* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016), 3.

31 *Ibid.*, 4.

32 Robert O. Collins, *Darfur and the Arab League*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 1141, 28 August 2006.

33 Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed, *In Pursuit of Sustainable*

Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation (New York: Center for International Cooperation, 2007), https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SevenDeadlySinsofMediation_BrahimiAhmed2008.pdf.

34 Ken Menkhaus, "Diplomacy in a Failed State," *Accord* no. 21 (2010), www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2021_4Diplomacy%20in%20a%20failed%20state_international%20mediation_2010_ENG.pdf.

35 Antonia Witt, "Mandate Impossible: Mediation and the Return to Constitutional Order in Madagascar (2009–2013)," *African Security* 10, no. 3–4 (2017): 206.

36 Laurie Nathan, "How to Manage Interorganizational Disputes over Mediation in Africa," *Global Governance* 23, no. 2 (2017): 151–162.

37 Eric B. Niyitunga, "Who Owns Mediation at the African Union (AU)?" *Africa Insight* 43, no. 4 (2014): 81–96.

38 Antonia Witt, "Where Regional Norms Matter: Contestation and the Domestic Impact of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance," *Africa Spectrum* 54, no. 2 (2019): 106–126.

39 *BBC News online*, "Sudan Crisis: Military and Opposition Agree Power-Sharing Deal," 5 July 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48878009.

40 Williams, *War and Conflict*, 216.

41 Nic Cheeseman, "The Internal Dynamics of Power-Sharing in Africa," *Democratization* 18, no. 2 (2011): 336.

42 *Ibid.*

43 Clapham, "Rwanda: The Perils."

44 Chandra Lekha Sriram and Marie-Joelle Zahar, "The Perils of Power-Sharing: Africa and Beyond," *Afrika Spectrum* 44, no. 3 (2009): 11–39.

45 Thomas Obel Hansen, "Kenya's Power-Sharing Arrangement and Its Implications for Transitional Justice," *The International Journal of Human Rights* 17, no. 2 (2013), 307–327.

46 Nic Cheeseman, *Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 215–218.

47 SIPRI, *Definitions and Methodology*, www.sipri.org/databases/pko/methods (accessed 11 July 2019).

48 Bellamy and Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 18.

49 Data kindly compiled by Timo Smit of SIPRI based on *SIPRI Yearbooks 1999–2004* and *SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database*, www.sipri.org/databases/pko.

50 Alexandru Balas, "It Takes Two (or More) to Keep the Peace: Multiple Simultaneous Peace Operations," *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 3–4 (2011): 384–421.

51 Martin Welz, "Multi-actor Peace Operations and Inter-organizational Relations: Insights from the Central African Republic," *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 4 (2016): 568–591.

52 Martin Welz and Angela Meyer, "Empty Acronyms: Why the Central African Republic Has Many Peacekeepers, But No Peace," *Foreign Affairs online*, 24 July 2014, www.foreignaffairs.com/print/138767.

53 Rafael Biermann and Joachim Koops, eds., *Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics* (London: Palgrave, 2017), 20.

54 Roland Marchal, "Briefing: Military (Mis)Adventures in Mali," *African Affairs* 112, no. 448 (2013): 489.

55 Alex Vines, "A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture," *International Affairs* 89, no. 1 (2013): 105.

56 *Ibid.*, 104.

- 57 African Union, *Communiqué*, PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLVIII), 7 March 2013.
- 58 United Nations, *Resolution 2100*, S/RES/2100, 25 April 2013.
- 59 Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, "Disagreements over Mali Could Sour More Than the Upcoming African Union Celebration," *The Global Observatory*, 15 May 2013, <http://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/05/disagreements-over-mali-could-sour-more-than-the-upcoming-african-union-celebration/>.
- 60 African Union, *Communiqué*, PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI), 25 April 2013.
- 61 Martin Welz, "Multi-Actor Peace Operations," 580.
- 62 Katharina P. Coleman, "Innovations in 'African Solutions to African Problems': The Evolving Practice of Regional Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 4 (2011): 517–545.
- 63 John L. Hirsch, "Somalia and the United Nations," in *The UN Security Council in the 21st Century*, eds. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2015), 595–614.
- 64 Linnéa Gelot, *Legitimacy, Peace Operations and Global-Regional Security: The African Union-United Nations Partnership in Darfur* (London: Routledge, 2012).
- 65 Katharina P. Coleman, "Extending UN Peacekeeping Financing beyond UN Peacekeeping Operations? The Prospects and Challenges of Reform," *Global Governance* 23, no. 1 (2017): 101–120.
- 66 Martin Welz, "Cooperation and Competition: United Nations-African Union Relations," in *Inter-Organisational Relations in International Security: Competition and Cooperation*, eds. Stephen Aris, Aglaya Snetkov, and Andreas Wenger (London: Routledge, 2018), 54–69.
- 67 Margaret Vogt, "The UN and Africa's Regional Organisations: An

Insider's Perspective," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Peacebuilding in Africa*, eds. Tony Karbo and Kudrat Virk (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 379–390: 389.

68 Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs* **78**, no. 4 (1999): 36.

69 William Zartman, "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments," *Global Review of Ethnopolitics* **1**, no. 1 (2001): 8–18.

70 Virginia Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly* **48**, no. 2 (2004): 269–292; Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

71 John Galtung, "An Editorial," *Journal of Peace Research* **1**, no. 1 (1964): 1–4.

72 Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," *International Security* **22**, no. 2 (1997): 54–89.

73 United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, New York, 21 August 2000, A/55/305-S/2000/809.

74 See for instance Jaïr van der Lijn, "If Only There Were a Blueprint! Factors for Success and Failure of UN Peace-Building Operations," *Journal of International Peacekeeping* **13**, no. 1–2 (2009): 45–71; Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?."

75 Darya Pushkina, "A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission," *International Peacekeeping* **13**, no. 2 (2006): 133–149.

76 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *The American Political Science Review* **94**, no. 4 (2000): 779–801.

77 Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht, *Reconstructing Security after*

Conflict: Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011).

78 Tim Glawion and Lotje de Vries, “Ruptures Revoked: Why the Central African Republic’s Unprecedented Crisis Has Not Altered Deep-Seated Patterns of Governance,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* **56**, no. 3 (2018): 421–442.

79 Stephen J. Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security* **22**, no. 2 (1997): 5.

80 *Ibid.*, 5–53.

81 *Ibid.*

82 Sofiane Khatib, “Spoiler Management during Algeria’s Civil War,” *Stanford Journal of International Relations* **6**, no. 1 (2005), https://web.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.06_khatib.html.

83 Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?”; Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*

84 Williams, *War & Conflict*, 277; Malte Brosig and Norman Sempijja, “What Peacekeeping Leaves Behind: Evaluating the Effects of Multi-Dimensional Peace Operations in Africa,” *Conflict, Security & Development* **17**, no. 1 (2017): 21–52.

85 Christoph Zürcher, “Building Democracy While Building Peace,” *Journal of Democracy* **22**, no. 1 (2011): 81–95.

86 Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” *International Security* **22**, no. 2 (1997): 56.

87 Sarah von Billerbeck and Oisín Tansey, “Enabling Autocracy? Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Authoritarianism in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” *European Journal of International Relations* **25**, no. 3 (2019): 698–722.

88 Malte Brosig, “Rentier Peacekeeping in Neo-Patrimonial Systems: The Examples of Burundi and Kenya,” *Contemporary Security Policy* **38**, no. 1 (2017): 109–128.

89 Rachel Sigman and Staffan I. Lindberg, *Neopatrimonialism and Democracy: An Empirical Investigation of Africa's Political Regimes*, University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper No. 56 (2017).

90 Rachel Sigman and Staffan I. Lindberg, *Neopatrimonialism and Democracy: An Empirical Investigation of Africa's Political Regimes*. University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper No. 56 (2017); V-Dem Dataset – Version 9, www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-9/ (accessed 10 August 2019).

91 Séverine Autesserre, *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 249.

92 Also see Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and Kristin E. Kosek, “Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed or Fail,” *Cooperation and Conflict* **40**, no. 4 (2005): 363–383.

93 Autesserre, *Peaceland*, 250.

94 Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds., *Peace Versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa* (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2010).

95 Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (London: Free Press, 2005), 661.

96 James L. Gibson and Amanda Gouws, “Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Attributes of Blame and the Struggle over Apartheid,” *American Political Science Review* **93**, no. 3 (1999): 501–517.

97 Allister Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Negotiated Revolution* (London: Heinemann, 1995), 172–178.

98 Alex Boraine quoted in Mary I. Burton, *The Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016), 18.

99 Alex Boraine, *A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa's Truth and*

Reconciliation Commission (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 300–339.

100 David Beresford, “Mbeki Attacks ‘Truth’ Report,” *The Guardian*, 26 February 1999, www.theguardian.com/world/1999/feb/26/davidberesford.

101 Nelson Mandela, *Opening Address in the Special Debate on the Report of the TRC*, 25 February 1999.

102 Priscilla B. Hayner, *Unspeakable Truth: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions* (London: Routledge, 2011), 44.

103 *Ibid.*, 42–44.

104 *Ibid.*, 239–254; Wikipedia, *List of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions*, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_truth_and_reconciliation_commissions (accessed 4 July 2019).

105 Eric Brahm, “Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and Impact,” *International Studies Perspectives* **8**, no. 1 (2007): 16–35.

106 Steven D. Roper and Lilian A. Barria, “Why Do States Commission the Truth? Political Considerations in the Establishment of African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions,” *Human Rights Review* **10**, no. 3 (2009): 373–391.

107 Maxime Domegni, “Togo Transitional Justice Leaves Much to Be Done,” (2016), www.justiceinfo.net/en/truth-commissions/26210-togo-transitional-justice-leaves-much-to-be-done.html (accessed 4 July 2019).

108 Elizabeth Stanley, “Evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* **39**, no. 3 (2001): 525–546.

109 Maximilian Borowski, “Truth and Reconciliation’s Checkered Legacy,” *Deutsche Welle*, 24 April 2014, www.dw.com/en/truth-and-reconciliations-checkered-legacy/a-17589671.

- 110** Lydia Samarbakhsh-Liberge, "Truth and History in the Post Apartheid South African Context," *Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy* **16**, no. 1-2 (2002): 156.
- 111** *BBC News online*, "Rwanda 'Gacaca' Genocide Courts Finish Work," 18 June 2012, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18490348.
- 112** Anne-Marie de Brouwer and Etienne Ruwebana, "The Legacy of the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda: Survivors' View," *International Criminal Law Review* **13**, no. 5 (2013): 971.
- 113** Lars Waldorf, "Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice," *Temple Law Review* **79**, no. 1 (2006): 1-88.
- 114** Max Rettig, "Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Rwanda?," *African Studies Review* **51**, no. 3 (2008): 44.
- 115** Timothy Longman, "An Assessment of Rwanda's Gacaca Courts," *Peace Review* **21**, no. 3 (2009): 304.
- 116** Rettig, "Gacaca," 45.
- 117** Quoted in *The Economist*, "We're Just One Happy Family Now, Aren't We?," 30 March 2019, 38.
- 118** De Brouwer and Ruwebana, "The Legacy of the Gacaca," 971.
- 119** Special Court for Sierra Leone, *Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone*, 16 January 2002, www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf.
- 120** Williams A. Schabas, "The Relationship between Truth Commissions and International Courts: The Case of Sierra Leone," *Human Rights Quarterly* **25**, no. 4 (2003): 1065.
- 121** Giada Girelli, *Understanding Transitional Justice: Philosophy, Public Policy, and Transnational Law* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 171; also see Charles C. Jalloh, "Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?," *Michigan Journal of International Law* **32**, no. 3 (2011): 395-460.

Chapter 12

- 1 Jean-François Bayart, "Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion," *African Affairs* **99**, no. 395 (2000): 217-267.
- 2 Ronald Chipaike and Matarutse H. Knowledge, "The Question of African Agency in International Relations," *Cogent Social Sciences* **4**, no. 1 (2018): 1487257.
- 3 Mohammed Ayoob, "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism," *International Studies Review* **4**, no. 3 (2002): 29.
- 4 Kevin C. Dunn, "Introduction: Africa and International Relations Theory," in *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*, eds. Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy Shaw (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 1–8: 3.
- 5 Katharina P. Coleman and Thomas K. Tieku, eds., *African Actors in International Security: Shaping Contemporary Norms* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2018).
- 6 Eric Helleiner, "Introduction," *Global Governance* **20**, no. 3 (2014): 359–360.
- 7 Paul-Henri Bischoff, Kwesi Aning, and Amitav Acharya, *Africa in Global International Relations: Emerging Approaches to Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2016); Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at Its Centenary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
- 8 Ayoob, "Inequality and Theorizing," 29.
- 9 Ralph Austen, *African Economic History* (London: James Curry, 1987).
- 10 Mungo Park, *Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa* (Durham,

11 John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1680* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 125.

12 Richard S. Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914–1918* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2013).

13 Tim Stapleton, “The Impact of the First World War on African People,” in *Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Africa: From Slavery to Rwandan Genocide*, ed. John Laband (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007), 113–137: 130.

14 Ian Taylor, *The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa* (New York: Continuum, 2010), 6.

15 Beth E. Whitaker, “Soft Balancing among Weak States? Evidence from Africa,” *International Affairs* **86**, no. 5 (2010): 1112.

16 Sandra Destradi and Cord Jakobeit, “Global Governance Debates and Dilemmas: Emerging Powers’ Perspectives and Roles in Global Trade and Climate Governance,” *Strategic Analysis* **39**, no. 1 (2015): 60–72.

17 William Brown, “A Question of Agency: Africa in International Politics,” *Third World Quarterly* **33**, no. 10 (2012): 1889–1908.

18 Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 244–266.

19 African Union, *Statute of the Commission of the African Union*, Durban, 9–10 July 2002, ASS/AU/2(I).

20 Martin Welz, “Reconsidering Lock-In Effects and Benefits from Delegation: The African Union’s Relations with Its Member States through a Principal-Agent Perspective,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* **33**, no. 2 (2020): 159–178.

21 Stefan Gänzle, Jarle Trondal, and Nadja S. Kühn, "The ECOWAS Commission and the Making of Regional Order in West Africa: Intersecting Logics in International Public Administration," in *Orders of Africa, Orders of the World: How Diplomats Navigate Borderlands*, eds. Katharina Coleman, Markus Kornprobst, and Annette Seegers (London: Routledge, 2020), 130–152: 147.

22 Linnéa Gelot, *Legitimacy, Peace Operations and Global-Regional Security: The African Union-United Nations Partnership in Darfur* (London: Routledge, 2012); Martin Welz, *Integrating Africa: Decolonization's Legacies, Sovereignty and the African Union* (London: Routledge, 2013).

23 Virginia Haufler, "The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Governance and Conflict Prevention," *Journal of Business Ethics* 89, Supplement 4 (2009): 403–416.

24 Katharina Coleman, Markus Kornprobst, and Annette Seegers, eds., *Orders of Africa, Orders of the World: How Diplomats Navigate Borderlands* (London: Routledge, 2020).

25 Chipaike and Knowledge, "The Question of African Agency."

26 Brown, "A Question of Agency," 1899.

27 This section builds on Martin Welz, "The African Union beyond Africa: Explaining the Limited Impact of Africa's Continental Organization on Global Governance," *Global Governance* 19, no. 3 (2013): 425–441.

28 United Nation, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, December 2004, A/59/565, para: 249–260.

29 African Union, *The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: "The Ezulwini Consensus,"* Addis Ababa, 7 March 2005, Ext/EX.CL/2(VII), 9.

30 *Ibid.*, 9–10.

31 *Ibid.*, 10.

32 Jonathan Oshupeng Maseng and Frank G. Lekaba, "United Nations Security Council Reform and the Dilemmas of African Continental Integration," *African Security Review* **23**, no. 4 (2014): 395–404.

33 Isaac N. Endeley, *Bloc Politics at the United Nations* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009).

34 *Daily Trust*, "UN Seat: AU Snubs Nigeria," 10 August 2005, <https://allafrica.com/stories/200508100044.html>.

35 Ville Lättilä and Aleksi Ylönen, "United Nations Security Council Reform Revisited: A Proposal," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* **30**, no. 1 (2019): 168.

36 *Ibid.*, 170.

37 Walter Lotze, "Challenging the Primacy of the UN Security Council," in *African Actors in International Security: Shaping Contemporary Norms*, eds. Katharina P. Coleman and Thomas K. Tieku (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2018), 219–240.

38 Kwesi Aning and Fiifi Edu-Afful, "African Agency in R2P: Interventions by African Union and ECOWAS in Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Libya," *International Studies Review* **18**, no. 1 (2016): 128.

39 African Union, *Communiqué*, 10 March 2011, PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCLXV), para. 7.

40 United Nations, *Resolution 1973*, 17 March 2011, S/RES/1973.

41 Alex de Waal, "African Roles in the Libyan Conflict of 2011," *International Affairs* **89**, no. 2 (2012): 371.

42 George Joffé, "Libya and Europe," *The Journal of North African Studies* **6**, no. 4 (2001): 75–92.

43 Siba N. Grovogui, "Looking beyond Spring for the Season: An African Perspective on the World Order after the Arab Revolt," *Globalizations* **8**, no. 5 (2011): 569.

44 Daily Mail, "I'm the King of Kings: Gaddafi Storms out of Arab Summit and Labels Saudi King 'a British Product'," 31 March 2009, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1165858/Im-king-kings-Gaddafi-storms-Arab-summit-labels-Saudi-king-British-product.html.

45 Linnéa Gelot and Martin Welz, "Pragmatic Eclecticism, Neoclassical Realism and Post-Structuralism: Reconsidering the African Response to the Libyan Crisis of 2011," *Third World Quarterly* 39, no. 12 (2018): 2334–2353.

46 Speech by Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Mr. Ebrahim I. Ebrahim, on the occasion of a public lecture on "Libya, the United Nations, the African Union and South Africa: Wrong Moves? Wrong Motives?" University of Pretoria, 15 September 2011. Printed in *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 33, no. 2 (2011).

47 Phillip A. Kasaija, "The African Union (AU), the Libya Crisis and the Notion of 'African Solutions to African Problems'," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 31, no. 1 (2013): 117–138.

48 South African Department of Communications, *Transcript: Post Cabinet Briefing by Jimmy Manyi, Government Spokesperson*, 31 March 2011, www.gcis.gov.za/content/transcript-post-cabinet-briefing-jimmy-manyi-government-spokesperson.

49 Kasaija, "The African Union," 130.

50 I borrow this term from David Bosco, *Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

51 This section builds on Martin Welz, "Non-impunity, the International Criminal Court and the African Union: Exploring the Borderland of the International Orders Related to Non-impunity," in *Orders of Africa, Orders of the World: How Diplomats Navigate Borderlands*, eds. Katharina Coleman, Markus Kornprobst, and Annette Seegers (London: Routledge, 2020), 194–211.

52 Kofi Quashigah, "The Future of the International Criminal Court

in African Crisis and Its Relationship with the R2P Project," *Finnish Yearbook of International Law* 21 (2010): 90–91.

53 Chris Maina Peter, "Fighting Impunity: African States and the International Criminal Court," in *The International Criminal Court and Africa: One Decade On*, ed. Evelyn A. Ankumah (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2016), 1–62: 26.

54 Andreas T. Müller and Ignaz Stegmüller, "Self-Referrals on Trial: From Panacea to Patient," *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 8, no. 5 (2010): 1267–1294; Jean-Baptiste J. Vilmer, "The African Union and the International Criminal Court: Counteracting the Crisis," *International Affairs* 92, no. 6 (2016): 1330.

55 Bosco, *Rough Justice*; Vilmer, "The African Union"; Patryk I. Labuda, "The ICC in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Decade of Partnership and Antagonism," in *Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice*, eds. Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus, and Eefje de Volder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 277–300.

56 Courtney Hillebrecht and Scott Straus, "Who Pursues the Perpetrators? State Cooperation with the ICC," *Human Rights Quarterly* 39, no. 1 (2017): 162–188.

57 Vilmer, "The African Union," 1330.

58 African Union, *Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Assembly Decision on the International Criminal Court (ICC)*, Addis Ababa, Doc. EX.CL/710(XX).

59 African Union, *Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights*, Malabo, 27 June 2014; Dorothy Makaza, "African Supranational Criminal Jurisdiction: One Step Towards Ending Impunity or Two Steps Backwards for International Criminal Justice?," in *The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals*, eds. Nobuo Hayashi and Cecilia M. Bailliet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 272–296.

60 Mark Kersten, "Negotiated Engagement – The African Union, the International Criminal Court, and Head of State Immunity," 5

March 2018, <https://justiceinconflict.org/2018/03/05/negotiated-engagement-the-african-union-the-international-criminal-court-and-head-of-state-immunity>.

61 Welz, "Non-impunity."

62 Franziska Boehme, "'We Chose Africa': South Africa and the Regional Politics of Cooperation with the International Criminal Court," *International Journal of Transitional Justice* **11**, no. 1 (2017): 69.

63 *Ibid.*, 52.

64 Brendan Vickers, "Africa and the Rising Powers: Bargaining for the 'Marginalized Many'," *International Affairs* **89**, no. 3 (2013): 687.

65 Charles Roger and Satishkumar Belliethathan, "Africa in the Global Climate Change Negotiations," *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law & Economics* **16**, no. 1 (2016): 98.

66 Welz, "The African Union beyond Africa."

67 Roger and Satishkumar, "Africa in the Global Climate Change," 104.

68 Lesley Masters, "Sustaining the African Common Position on Climate Change: International Organisations, Africa and COP17," *South African Journal of International Affairs* **18**, no. 2 (2011): 258.

69 Vickers, "Africa and the Rising Powers."

70 *Ibid.*, 688.

71 Joanes O. Atela, Claire H. Quinn, Albert A. Arhin, Lalisa Duguma, and Kennedy L. Mbeva, "Exploring the Agency of Africa in Climate Change Negotiations: The Case of REDD +," *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* **17**, no. 4 (2017): 479.

72 David Vine, *Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military*

Case on Diego Garcia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

73 Ibid.

74 United Nations, *Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly*, New York, 24 May 2019, A/RES/73/295.

75 *The Guardian online*, "The Guardian View on Britain and the Chagos Islands: A Wake-Up Call from the World: Editorial," 23 May 2019, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/23/the-guardian-view-on-britain-and-the-chagos-islands-a-wake-up-call-from-the-world.

76 Gavin Cawthra, "Mauritius: An Exemplar of Democracy, Development and Peace for the Southern African Development Community?" *Africa Insight* 35, no. 1 (2005): 17.

77 *BBC News online*, "Chagos Islands Dispute: UN Backs End to UK Control," 22 May 2019, www.bbc.com/news/uk-48371388.

78 Welz, "The African Union beyond Africa."

79 Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

80 Remi Adekoya, "Why Africans Worry about How Africa Is Portrayed in Western Media," *The Guardian online*, 28 November 2013, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/28/africans-worry-how-africa-portrayed-western-media.

81 Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, *Secure the base: making Africa visible in the globe* (London: Seagull Books, 2016).

Epilogue

1 Hans Rosling, Ola Rosling and Anna Rosling-Rönnlund, *Factfulness: Ten Reasons We're Wrong about the World - and Why Things are Better than You Think* (London: SCEPTRE, 2018).

2 *The Economist*, "If It Bleeds, Pay Heed," 3 August 2019, 12.

3 Ibid.

4 Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (1999): 36.

5 R. John Vincent, "Order in International Politics," in *Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations*, eds. John D. B. Miller and R. John Vincent (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 38–64: 64.

6 Maxi Schoeman, *The African Union after the Durban 2002 Summit* (University of Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, February 2003).

7 Hodding Carter quoted in Michael P. Maren, "Review: Assignment Africa," *Africa Report* 32, no. 2 (1987): 68.

Index

Note: Page numbers in bold indicate tables or figures.

Aba Women's Riots, 33

Abacha, Sani, 181, 206

Abiy, Ahmed, 129, 218

Abubakari II, 14

Adedeji, Adebayo, 112–113

Adua, Battle of, 18, 43

Africa

agency in international system, 265–266

diversity, 285

global significance, 7

limited international influence, 281

marginalized in International Relations theory, 264

nonstate actors, 267–268

state actors, 266–267

underrepresented in literature and media, 5–6

unmet hopes and expectations, 282, 284

African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, 111

African Court of Justice, Human, and Peoples' Rights (ACJHPR), 276

African Development Bank, 104, 105, 113

African elites

after decolonization, 53–54, 65

Chinese relations, 77

corruption, 130–131

economic extraversion, 60

legitimacy from foreign policy, 267

omnibalancing, 182

strategies for maintaining power, 151

term limits for leaders, 148–151, 150

see also traditional leaders

African National Congress (ANC)

anti-apartheid struggle, 38, 211

election win (1994), 39

foundation, 38

influence, 166

liberation movement solidarity, 58

power-sharing agreement, 246

state leadership, 65

African ownership, 117

African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), 240–242

African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, 241

budget, 242

Continental Early Warning System, 241

dependence on donor funding, 241–242

five pillars, 241

Mali operation, 248–249

Panel of the Wise, 241

Peace Fund, 241

Peace and Security Council, 241

Stand-by Forces, 241

and the UN, 249–250

African Peer Review Mechanism, 188

African Renaissance, 119, 240, 281

African socialism, 64, 106

African Studies, 6–7, 285

African Union (AU)

anti-imperialism, 190

budget and staff, 187

Commission, 267

Convention on Combating Corruption, 131

coups, 205

delegations, 186

Eszulwini Consensus on UN reform, 269–271

- foundation, [186–187](#)
- Lagos Plan of Action (1980), [113](#)
- Libyan conflict, [272–274](#)
- membership, [189](#)
- and Morocco, [190](#)
- NEPAD, [119](#), [139](#), [187–188](#)
- nonindifference principle, [187](#), [190–191](#), [240](#)
- Pan-Africanism, [190](#)
- principles, [190](#)
- security interests, [187](#), [190](#)
- on unconstitutional changes of government, [205–206](#)
 - see also* [African Peace and Security Architecture \(APSA\)](#)
- Afrobarometer, [163–164](#), [170](#)
- Afwerki, Isaias, [156–157](#)
- agricultural subsidies, [101](#)
- agriculture, [91–92](#), [106–107](#)
- air transport, [93](#)
- Al-Qaeda, [80–81](#), [211–212](#)
- Al-Shabaab, [211–212](#), [236](#)
- Algeria
 - Armée Islamique du Salut, [253](#)
 - Casablanca Group, [177](#)
 - civil war, [80](#), [222–224](#), [258–259](#)
 - conflict with Morocco, [216–226](#)
 - economy, [85](#), [125–126](#)
 - election cancelation (1991), [223](#)
 - elections (1990), [223](#)
 - emigrants, [82](#)
 - export destinations, [97](#), [120](#)
 - food insecurity, [92](#)
 - Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), [35](#), [65](#), [222–223](#)
 - Front islamique du salut (FIS), [75](#), [223](#), [253](#)
 - independence, [29](#)
 - Le Groupe Islamique Armé, [80](#)
 - liberation war, [27–28](#), [32](#), [35](#)

- oil and gas, [83](#), [95](#)
- opposition to decolonization, [40](#)
- peace process, [253](#)
- rebel groups, [222–223](#)
- reforms, [151](#)
- refuge for freedom fighters, [58](#), [181](#)
- Tindouf refugee camp, [235](#)
- truth commission, [259](#)
- US support for junta, [75](#)
- American Colonization Society, [22](#)
- Amin, Idi, [147](#), [167](#), [206](#), [217](#)
- Annan, Kofi, [268](#)
- Angola
 - Cabinda, [195](#)
 - civil war, [48](#), [70](#)
 - corruption, [131](#)
 - diamonds, [83](#)
 - economy, [132–133](#)
 - liberation movements, [36–37](#), [39](#), [58](#)
 - oil and gas, [83](#), [95](#)
 - power-sharing agreement, [246](#)
- Aouzou Strip, [216–217](#)
- APSA, *see* [African Peace and Security Architecture \(APSA\)](#)
- Arab League, [58](#), [175](#), [178](#), [243](#)
- Arab Maghreb Union, [178](#)
- Arab Spring, [82](#), [151](#), [172–173](#), [205](#)
- armed conflicts, [215](#) *see also* [civil wars](#); [Great Lakes region](#); [warlords](#);
[wars](#)
- Ashanti Kingdom, [13](#), [18](#)
- Autesserre, Séverine, [254–256](#), [262](#)
- authoritarian government
 - Cold War, [73](#)
 - colonial legacy, [55](#)
 - postcolonial, [55](#), [146–147](#)
 - recent return, [149](#)

term limits for leaders, [148–151](#), [150](#)

Western support, [75](#), [147](#)

Azawad republic, [200](#)

Babadinga, Ibrahim, [206](#)

Banda, Hastings, [34](#)

Banda, Joyce, [161](#)

Bandung Conference, [71](#)

banks/banking, mobile money, [130](#)

Barre, Siad, [198](#)

al-Bashir, Omar

Darfur, [243](#)

ICC arrest warrant, [50](#), [87](#), [168](#), [275–276](#)

longevity in power, [167](#)

ousted from power, [203](#), [206](#), [245](#)

pariah status, [197–198](#)

and South Sudan, [197](#)

Bauer, Péter, [141](#)

bauxite, [83](#)

Bayart, Jean-François, [60](#), [264](#)

beer, [125](#)

Beijing Consensus, [78](#)

Belgian Congo, [13](#), [15](#), [30](#), [32–33](#), [65–66](#)

Belgium, decolonization, [29–30](#)

Benin, [41](#), [92](#), [132–133](#)

Bensouda, Fatou, [268](#)

Berlin Conference (1884–1885), [17](#)

Biafra, [57](#), [195](#)

Biermann, Rafael, [248](#), [250](#)

“Big Man” politics, [13](#), [147](#), [149](#), [153–154](#)

biomass, [140](#)

Bishop, Sylvia, [158–159](#)

Bismarck, Otto von, [17](#)

Biya, Paul, [131](#), [155–156](#), [172](#)

Boer Wars, [18–19](#)

Bokassa, Jean Bedel, [206](#)

Boko Haram, [212–213](#)

Bongo, Omar, [72–73](#)

border disputes

 Ethiopia-Eritrea, [218](#)

 Libya-Chad, [216–217](#)

 Tanzania-Uganda, [217](#)

borders

 Cairo Declaration, [57](#), [177](#), [218–219](#)

 colonial identities, [56–57](#)

 negative economic impact, [61–62](#)

 OAU recognition, [182](#)

uti possidetis principle, [196](#), [198–199](#), [218–219](#)

Botswana, [44–45](#), [83](#), [127](#)

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, [184](#), [238](#)

Brandt Commission, [110](#)

Brazil

 African exports, [120](#), [124](#)

 business and geopolitical interests, [76](#), [78](#)

Brown, William, [266](#)

BRICS, [85–86](#), [111](#)

Britain

 and the Chagos Islands, [51](#), [279–280](#)

 colonial rule, [20–21](#), [43](#), [169](#)

 colonization, [16](#)

 decolonization, [24–27](#)

 dominions, [24](#)

 former colonies, [59–60](#)

 imports from Africa, [101–108](#)

 local resistance, [18](#), [34](#), [45–46](#)

 Mau Mau rebellion, [35–36](#)

 recent interest, [79–80](#)

 Suez Crisis, [45](#)

British South Africa Company, [16](#)

Brosig, Malte, [254](#)

Buganda, [13–14](#)

Bull, Hedley, 3–4

Burkina Faso

border wars, 216–226

colonial era, 62

coups d'état, 203–206, 245

decolonization, 41

elite leadership, 54

food production, 92

informal economy, 132–133

protests, 172

and Taiwan, 71

Burundi, 33, 92, 127

business, 76, 106, 127

Buthelezi, Mangosuthu, 253

cabinets, 161–162

Cabral, Amílcar, 37

Caetano, Marcelo, 30

Cairo Declaration (1964), 57, 177, 196, 218–219

Cameroon

cabinet size, 161

food production, 92

football match, 4

independence conflict, 35

internet control, 172

patronage networks, 155–156

secession of British part, 196

Cape Verde, 132–133

capitalism, 64, 106

Casablanca Group, 177

Central African Federation, 34, 57

Central African Republic

business regulations, 127

crisis (2013), 245

elite leadership, 54

European troops, 81

- failing state, 144
- and the ICC, 275
- mobile phones, 129–130
- peace operations, 247, 249, 252
- Russian military support, 79

Césaire, Aimé, 21

Ceuta, 51, 82–87

Chad, 71, 95, 132–133, 216–217, 258

Chagos Islands, 51, 279–280

child mortality, 135, 136, 140

child soldiers, 226

China

- African exports, 120, 124
- African interests and influence, 76–78, 118–119
- African objectives, 76
- AU funding, 242
- Cold War interest, 71
- diplomatic dialogue, 77
- Exim Bank loans, 86
- land acquisition, 84
- and Taiwan, 71
- UN peace operations, 81
- and Zimbabwe, 77–78

Chinery-Hesse, Mary, 269

Chissano, Joaquim Alberto, 181, 244

Chiwenga, Constantino, 77

church communities, 173

Churchill, Winston, 45

civil service, 162–164, 186

civil society, 172–174

civil wars

- Algeria, 80, 222–224
- Angola, 48, 70
- Ethiopia, 49
- Kenya, 36, 39

- Liberia, [184](#), [220–222](#)
- Sierra Leone, [79](#), [222](#), [225–226](#)
- South Sudan, [224](#)
- Sudan, [49–50](#), [196–197](#)
- clientelism, [106](#)
- climate, [91–92](#)
- climate change, [277–279](#)
- cobalt, [7](#), [83](#)
- cocoa, [61](#), [84](#)
- Cold War
 - Angolan civil war, [48](#), [70](#)
 - Congo crisis, [30](#)
 - Diego Garcia, [279](#)
 - and Liberia, [220–221](#)
 - Portuguese Azores, [48](#)
 - South Africa, [48](#)
 - superpower rivalry, [68–70](#)
- Collier, Paul, [117–118](#), [141](#), [220](#)
- colonial languages, [52](#), [54](#), [60](#), [66–67](#)
- colonialism
 - education system, [62–63](#)
 - international anti-colonialism, [45–46](#)
 - legacies, [52–64](#)
 - psychological impacts, [65–67](#)
 - rail infrastructure, [62](#)
- colonization, [15–22](#)
- COMESA, *see* [Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa \(COMESA\)](#)
- COMESA–EAC–SADC Tripartite, [192](#)
- commerce, [76](#)
- Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), [184–185](#)
- Commonwealth, [59–60](#)
- Community of Sahel-Saharan States, [184](#)
- Comoros, [161](#), [280](#)
- Compaoré, Blaise, [167](#), [172](#), [203–204](#), [222](#)

conflicts

armed conflict, 215

see also [civil wars](#); [electoral violence](#); [Great Lakes region](#);
[international conflict management](#); [warlords](#); [wars](#)

Congo, Democratic Republic, *see* [Congo-Kinshasa](#)

Congo-Brazzaville (Congo Republic), [85](#), [94](#), [159](#)

Congo-Kinshasa

business regulations, [127](#)

cabinet size, [161](#)

Catholic Church, [173](#)

civil service weakness, [163](#)

cobalt, [7](#), [83](#)

Ebola, [93](#), [284–285](#)

elections (2007), [74](#)

export destinations, [97](#), [120](#)

failing state, [144](#), [232](#)

Great Lakes conflict, [231–232](#), [243](#)

and the ICC, [275](#)

independence, [29–30](#)

Mai-Mai rebels, [226](#)

mobile phones, [129–130](#)

raw materials, [83](#), [233–234](#)

resource curse, [108](#)

secession attempts, [195](#)

transport infrastructure, [94](#)

truth commission, [259](#)

UN peace operation, [238](#)

US support for Mobutu, [232](#)

consumer spending, [85](#), [125–126](#)

Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine, [13–14](#)

corruption

African elites, [130–131](#)

civil service, [163](#)

clientelism, [106](#)

negative effects, [130](#)

- petty corruption, [130](#)
- Transparency International, [130](#)
- Côte d'Ivoire
 - Burkinabe migrants, [62](#)
 - exports, [84](#), [95](#), [98](#), [121](#)
 - food production, [92](#)
 - mobile phones, [129–130](#)
 - electoral violence (2010), [209–210](#), [245](#)
- coups d'état, [202](#)
 - AU policy, [205](#)
 - Burkina Faso, [203–206](#), [245](#)
 - coup attempts, [201](#)
 - definition, [201](#)
 - democratic coups, [205–206](#)
 - Liberia, [220](#)
 - reasons for, [167](#), [203–205](#)
 - time in power of perpetrators, [206](#)
 - versus unconstitutional changes of government, [205](#)
- courts, [167–168](#)
- Cuba, [70](#), [266](#)
- cultural exchange, [59–60](#)
- cultural imperialism, [67](#)
- currency, CFA franc, [63](#), [103](#)
- Curzon, George, [25–26](#)

Dadaab refugee camp, [235–236](#)

Dallaire, Roméo, [230](#)

Darfur

genocide, [228–229](#)

Janjaweed attacks, [228–229](#)

lack of international attention, [229](#), [243](#)

peace operations, [249](#)

rebel groups, [228](#)

Davidson, Basil, [53](#), [60](#)

de Beers, [268](#)

de Gaulle, Charles, [28](#), [72](#)

decolonization

Britain, [24–27](#)

catalysts, [44–45](#)

colonial power perspective, [23–24](#), [31–32](#)

colonial state perspective, [32](#)

differing approaches, [39–42](#)

France, [27–29](#), [40–41](#)

international system perspective, [42](#)

nationalist movements, [33–34](#)

negotiated transition, [31–32](#), [36](#)

Portugal, [30–31](#)

resistance to colonial powers, [32–39](#)

three stages, [23](#)

democracy dependency, [74](#)

democracy/democratization

democratic coups, [205–206](#)

parliamentary weakness, [164–166](#)

post-Cold War, [73–75](#), [148](#)

Deng, Francis, [268](#)

dependency theory, [102–103](#)

development aid

conditionalities, [75](#)

and coup d'état risk, [203](#)

critique, [140–141](#)

- Marshall Plan for Africa, [86](#)
- net official ODA, [104](#), [105](#), [139–140](#)
- Western approach, [119](#)
- diamonds, [83](#), [268](#)
- diaspora, [268](#)
- Diego Garcia, [279–280](#)
- Diendéré, Gilbert, [204–205](#)
- disease
 - economic effects, [92–93](#)
 - effect on Europeans, [16](#)
 - modern technology, [124–130](#)
- Djibouti
 - military bases, [77–79](#)
 - port, [93](#)
 - special economic zone, [84–85](#)
- Djotodia, Michel, [245](#)
- Doe, Samuel, [216–221](#)
- Doyle, Michael, [251](#)
- droughts, [91](#), [178](#)
- Dutch disease, [109](#)
- East African Community (EAC), [96](#), [178–179](#), [181](#), [184](#), [191–192](#)
- Ebola, [93](#), [222](#), [284–285](#)
- ECCAS, *see* [Economic Community of Central African States \(ECCAS\)](#)
- ECOMOG (Monitoring Group), [221–222](#)
- Economic Commission for Africa (UN), [112–113](#)
- Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), [178](#), [184](#), [243](#)
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
 - bureaucracy, [267](#)
 - conflict management, [242](#)
 - establishment, [178](#)
 - Liberia peace operation, [184](#), [238](#)
 - Mali peace operation, [248](#)
 - Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), [221–222](#)
- economic growth

- constraints, [91](#), [109](#)
- external efforts, [113–115](#)
- internal African initiatives, [112–114](#)
- negative effects of disease, [92–93](#)
- varied picture, [90–91](#)
- The Economist*, [6](#), [116](#), [215](#), [284](#)
- economy
 - colonial legacy, [60–64](#)
 - Dutch disease, [109](#)
 - informal economy, [131–134](#)
 - private sector, [127–129](#)
- ECOWAS, *see* [Economic Community of West African States \(ECOWAS\)](#)
- education, [62–63](#), [140](#)
- EEC, *see* [European Economic Community \(EEC\)](#)
- Egypt
 - Arab Spring, [88](#), [151](#), [205](#)
 - British troops, [44](#)
 - Casablanca Group, [177](#)
 - conflict with Sudan, [216–226](#)
 - economy, [85](#), [125–126](#), [133](#)
 - exports, [95–96](#), [98](#), [121](#)
 - foreign direct investment, [126](#)
 - independence, [24–25](#)
 - oil and gas, [83](#)
 - and Sudan, [18](#)
 - Suez Crisis, [45](#)
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., [69](#)
- Eisenstadt, Samuel N., [152](#)
- electoral violence
 - actors, [207](#)
 - in Africa, [206](#)
 - Côte d’Ivoire (2010), [209–210](#)
 - effects, [210–211](#)
 - forms of, [207](#)
 - Kenya (2007), [208](#)

- reasons, 207–208, 224
- Zimbabwe (2008), 155, 191, 208–209
- elections
 - judicial annulments, 145, 168
 - unfree and unfair, 158–159
- electoral manipulation, 158–159
- electricity, 140
- elites, *see* African elites
- embassies, 186
- energy sector, 140
- Englebert, Pierre, 195
- EPLF, *see* Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)
- Equatorial Guinea, 95, 131, 168, 275
- Eritrea
 - British protectorate, 22
 - business regulations, 127
 - conflict with Ethiopia, 217–218
 - emigrants, 82
 - independence, 49
 - peace agreement with Ethiopia, 157
 - secession justification, 196
 - union with Ethiopia, 22
 - violence and repression, 156–157
- Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), 49, 156
- Eswatini, 71, 92, 131, 160, 275
- Ethiopia
 - authoritarian rule, 147
 - Battle of Adua, 18
 - civil war, 49
 - development aid, 139
 - early history, 13
 - economy, 84–85, 125–126, 128–129
 - Eritrea conflict, 217–218
 - Eritrea federation, 22
 - Eritrea peace agreement, 157

- export destinations, 96, 99, 122
- ICC opposition, 275
- independence, 22
- Italian invasion, 19, 22, 43
- Ogaden conflict, 199–200, 216
- and Somaliland, 199–200
- Soviet Union interest, 69
- transport infrastructure, 93–94
- EU, *see* [European Union \(EU\)](#)
- European Border Agency, 82
- European Economic Community (EEC)
 - agricultural subsidies, 101
 - development aid, 104, 105
 - Lomé Convention, 111
 - Yaoundé trade agreements, 101–102
- European Union (EU)
 - Africa policy, 86–87
 - Cotonou Agreement, 118
 - migration policies, 82–86
 - peace funding support, 242
 - peace operations, 240
 - proposed trade agreement, 87
 - trade with Africa, 124, 124–125
- Eyadéma, Gnassingbé, 159
- Ezulwini Consensus, 269–271
- failed/failing states, 144, 232
- Fanon, Franz, 65
- Fauvelle, François-Xavier, 12–13
- Ferguson, James, 173
- FIS, *see* [Front islamique du salut \(FIS\) \(Algeria\)](#)
- FLN, *see* [Front de Libération Nationale \(FLN\) \(Algeria\)](#)
- Foccart, Jacques, 59, 72
- food security, challenges, 92
- football, 4
- foreign direct investment, 126–127

foreign policy, 185–186, 266–267

France

African soldiers in World War I, 43–44, 65, 88, 265

changing attitude to Africa, 87–88

colonial rule, 20–21, 43

colonization, 16

continuing influence, 59–62, 71–73, 103

decolonization, 27–29, 40–41

imports from Africa, 96–101

La francophonie, 59–60

“mafiafrique,” 103

Mali peace operation, 248–249

Mayotte Island, 280

military interventions, 72–73

Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, 34, 39–40

resistance against colonial power, 35, 46

Suez Crisis, 45

Yaoundé trade agreement, 102

Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro
(POLISARIO), 50–51, 236

Front islamique du salut (FIS) (Algeria), 75, 223, 253

Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) (Algeria), 35, 65, 222–223

Frontline States, 178–179

Fuad I, 25

- G8, 117–118, 139
- G77, 110–111
- Gabon, 72–73, 92, 95
- Gaddafi, Muammar, 87, 186, 189, 216–217, 272–273
- Gambia, 82, 242, 259
- gatekeeper states, 145, 195
- Gbagbo, Laurent, 209–210
- GDP (gross domestic product)
 - loss to disease, 92–93
 - manufacturing share, 107
 - per capita, 90–91, 136
 - and the resource curse, 108
- gender
 - education differences, 63
 - labor force differences, 133–134
- genocide
 - causal factors, 227
 - Darfur, 227–229
 - Herero and Nama, 18, 227
 - origin of term, 226–227
 - Rwanda, 230–231, 246
- geography
 - infrastructure challenges, 93–94
 - landlocked countries, 62, 93
 - see also* border disputes; borders
- Germany
 - AU funding, 242
 - imports from Africa, 101
 - local resistance, 18
 - Yaoundé trade agreement, 102
- Ghana
 - Casablanca Group, 177
 - conflict with Burkina Faso, 216–226
 - democratization, 148
 - economy, 85, 125–126, 128

- elite leadership, 54
- exports, 61, 83–84, 95
- food insecurity, 92
- private sector, 128
- truth commission, 258

globalization, 173–174, 219–220

Gold Coast, *see also* Ghana

Gordon, Charles George, 18

Great Lakes region

- Africa's World War (1996–2006), 231–234
- conflict events, 231–232
- ethnic and land issues, 233–234
- intervening regional governments, 232–234
- local-level grievances, 234
- peace agreements, 232
- and raw materials, 233–234
- Rwandan involvement, 232–234

Great Zimbabwe, 13

Greater Somalia, 56, 198, 200, 216

Green Belt Movement, 267

Guinea

- bauxite, 83
- Casablanca Group, 177
- colonial resistance, 17
- Ebola, 93
- and France, 44, 71–72
- nationalizations, 106

Guinea-Bissau

- exports, 99, 122
- food production, 92
- independence, 28, 31, 41
- prime ministers, 162

Habré, Hissène, 251

Habyarimana, Juvénal, 230

Haile Selassie, 22, 177

Hailey, William Malcolm, *An African Survey*, 25

Herbst, Jeffrey, 53, 57

Hernando, Soto de, 126–134

HIV/AIDS, 92–93

Hobbes, Thomas, 55

Hodzi, Obert, 119

Hoeffler, Anke, 158–159, 220

Horn of Africa

- conflicts, 217–218
- Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, 178
- Operation Ocean Shield, 81
- refugee camps, 235
- and Saudi Arabia, 79

Houphouët-Boigny, Felix, 34, 40–41, 222

Human Development Index, 134–135

humanitarian crises, 238

Hummel, Rebecca, 195

Ibrahim, Mo, 268

ICC, *see* [International Criminal Court \(ICC\)](#)

Idris, Sayyid Mohammad, 44

IGAD, *see* [Intergovernmental Authority on Development \(IGAD\)](#)

Igboland, 14

IMF, *see* [International Monetary Fund \(IMF\)](#)

Imperial British East Africa Company, 16

income inequality, 135, 136

Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), 221

India

- African exports, 120, 124
- business and political interests, 76, 78

industrial goods, 84–85, 107

infant mortality, 135, 136, 140

informal economy, 131–134, 235

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 184, 243

Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, 178

international conflict management, 237

- challenges to international interveners, 254–257
- complex web of institutions, 239–240
- dealing with spoilers, 252–253
- ECCAS, 243
- ECOWAS, 242
- ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 221–222
- four stages, 239
- humanitarian crises, 238
- IGAD, 243
- local ownership, 256–257, 262
- mediation, 244–245
- peacebuilding, 239, 254–257
- peacemaking, 239, 244–246
- power-sharing arrangements, 245–246
- preventive diplomacy, 239
- SADC, 242–243
- sidelining of Africa, 271–272
- transitional justice, 257
- truth commissions, 257–260
- UN weaknesses, 262
 - see also* peace operations; United Nations peace operations

International Court of Justice, Chagos Islands, 279

International Criminal Court (ICC)

- and the ACJHPR, 276
- African ambivalence, 274
- African opponents, 275
- African withdrawals, 274
- al-Bashir arrest warrant, 50, 87, 168, 275–276
- anti-Africa bias, 276
- AU's noncooperation pressure, 276–277
- early African ratifications, 275
- Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), 253
- self-referrals, 275
- South Africa withdrawal threat, 168

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

- structural adjustment programs, [74](#), [114–115](#), [128](#), [179](#)
- Western interests, [85–86](#)
- Iraq War, [266](#)
- Islam, precolonial era, [14](#)
- Islamic terrorism, [80–81](#), [212–213](#)
- Italy
 - Battle of Adua, [18](#)
 - Ethiopian invasion, [19](#), [43](#)
 - imports from Africa, [101](#)
- Jackson, Robert H., [142](#)
- Jammeh, Yahya, [242](#), [259](#)
- Janjaweed, [228–229](#)
- Jansen, Jan, [53](#)
- Japan, geopolitical interests, [78](#)
- Jasinski, Michael, [227](#)
- Johnson, Boris, [80](#)
- Johnson, Prince Yeduo, [221–222](#)
- Johnson-Sirleaf, Ellen, [160](#)
- Jolof Empire, [13](#)
- Joshua, Temitope (Prophet), [173](#)
- judiciary, [167–168](#)
- Juncker, Jean-Claude, [87](#)
- Kabila, Joseph, [232–233](#)
- Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, [232](#)
- Kabou, Axelle, [117](#)
- Kafando, Michel, [204](#)
- Kagame, Paul, [229–231](#)
- Kaldor, Mary, [219–220](#)
- Katanga, [57](#), [195](#)
- Kaunda, Kenneth, [34](#), [146–147](#), [180](#)
- Keita, Modibo, [69](#)
- Kenya
 - corruption, [130](#)
 - Dadaab refugee camp, [235–236](#)

- economy, [85](#), [125–127](#)
- elections (2017), [168](#)
- electoral violence (2007), [208](#)
- exports, [96](#), [100](#), [123](#)
- Mau Mau rebellion, [35–36](#)
- NGOs, [171](#)
- Ogaden conflict, [216](#)
- opposition to decolonization, [40](#)
- power-sharing agreement, [246](#)
- and Somaliland, [200](#)
- successful mediation, [245](#)
- Supreme Court, [168](#)
- terrorism, [80–81](#)
- truth commission, [259](#)
- Kibaki, Mwai, [208](#)
- Kinigi, Sylvie, [160](#)
- Köhler, Horst, [141](#)
- Kony, Joseph, [253](#)
- Koops, Joachim, [248](#), [250](#)
- Lagos Plan of Action, [113–114](#), [179](#)
- land acquisition, [84](#)
- landlocked countries, [62](#), [93](#)
- languages
 - African, [2](#)
 - colonial languages, [52](#), [54](#), [60](#), [66–67](#)
- legislatures, [145](#), [164–166](#)
- Leopold II, [17–19](#), [32](#)
- liberal-cosmopolitan order, [73–75](#)
- liberation movements
 - Algeria, [27–28](#), [32](#), [35](#)
 - ANC's anti-apartheid struggle, [38](#)
 - Angola, [36–37](#), [39](#), [58](#)
 - bilateral supporters, [180–181](#)
 - and elite leaders, [65](#)
 - heroes of the struggle, [160](#)

- internal differences, [39–40](#)
- long-lasting effect, [77–78](#)
- Mau Mau rebellion, [35–36](#)
- negotiations, [31–32](#)
- Portuguese Guinea, [30](#), [36–37](#)
- solidarity, [58](#)
- South Sudan, [50](#)
- Southern Rhodesia, [39](#)
- Soviet Union support, [69](#)

Liberia

- American Colonization Society, [22](#), [216–220](#)
- authoritarian rule, [147](#)
- civil wars, [184](#), [220–222](#)
- coups, [220](#)
- Ebola, [93](#), [222](#)
- ECOWAS peace operation, [184](#), [238](#)
- Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), [221](#)
- massacre (1985), [220](#)
- National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), [220–222](#)
- rebel groups, [220–221](#)
- and Taiwan, [71](#)
- truth commission, [259](#)

Libya

- Arab Spring, [205](#)
- AU sidelined during conflict, [272–274](#)
- conflict with Chad, [216–217](#)
- crisis (2011), [245](#)
- economy, [85](#), [127](#)
- emigrants, [82](#)
- failing state, [144](#)
- independence, [44](#), [46–47](#)
- interference in states, [181](#)
- National Transitional Council, [273](#)
- NATO intervention (2011), [80](#), [87](#), [272–273](#)
- oil and gas, [83](#), [95](#)

opposition to ICC, [275](#)
post-Gaddafi collapse, [57](#)
UN Resolution 1973, [272–274](#)
life expectancy, [136–138](#)
Lingani, Jean-Baptiste, [203](#)
literacy, [135](#), [136–138](#)
Live 8 concerts, [139](#)
Livingstone, David, [16](#)
Lomé Convention, [111](#)
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), [50](#), [253](#)
Luba Empire, [13](#)
Lüderitz, Adolf, [16](#)
Luttwark, Edward, [250](#)

M-Pesa, [130](#)

MacDonald, Malcolm, [25](#)

Machel, Machora, [181](#)

Madagascar, [27](#), [35](#), [103](#), [244](#)

Magufuli, John Pombe, [149](#)

malaria, [92](#), [124–130](#)

Malawi, [168](#)

Mali

Casablanca Group, [177](#)

colonial impact on economy, [58–63](#)

conflict with Burkina Faso, [216–226](#)

crisis (2012/2013), [64](#), [81](#)

European troops, [81](#)

food production, [92](#)

independence, [41](#)

tensions between peacekeeping organizations, [248–249](#), [271–272](#)

Tuaregs' secession attempts, [64](#), [200](#)

Mali Empire, [13–14](#)

Mali Federation, [41](#), [57](#), [175](#)

Mamdani, Mahmoud, [169](#)

Mandela, Nelson, [38](#), [181](#), [258](#), [268](#)

Mandela, Winnie, [38](#)

Mann, Gregory, [171–173](#)

Mansa Musa I, [13](#)

manufacturing sector, [84–85](#), [107](#)

Marxism, [64](#), [106](#), [114](#)

Mau Mau rebellion, [35–36](#)

Mauritania, [50–51](#), [275](#)

Mauritius

and the Chagos Islands, [51](#), [279–280](#)

democracy, [55](#)

economy, [84–85](#), [94](#), [107](#), [127–128](#)

elections (1976), [144–145](#)

resistance to decolonization, [41](#)

state resilience, [144–145](#)

- sugar exports, [61](#), [94](#)
- truth commission, [259](#)
- May, Theresa, [80](#)
- Mayotte Island, [280](#)
- Mazrui, Ali, [57](#)
- M'ba, Léon, [72](#)
- Mbasogo, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, [131](#)
- Mbeki, Thabo, [119](#), [189](#), [258](#)
- Mbembe, Achille, [66](#), [160](#), [281](#)
- MDGs, *see* [Millennium Development Goals \(MDGs\)](#)
- media
 - Africa's limited soft power, [281](#)
 - Chinese soft power, [77](#)
 - of former colonial power, [60](#)
- Meles, Zenawi, [49](#), [128–129](#), [218](#), [278](#)
- Melilla, [51](#), [82–87](#)
- Mengistu Haile Mariam, [49](#), [167](#)
- Merkel, Angela, [87](#)
- migration
 - Marshall Plan for Africa, [86](#)
 - forced migration, [234](#)
 - from China, [77](#)
 - internal migration, [62](#), [82](#)
 - precolonial era, [14](#)
 - to Europe, [81–83](#)
- military
 - African soldiers in World War I, [42–43](#), [65](#), [88](#), [265](#)
 - African soldiers in World War II, [43–44](#), [265](#)
 - influence, [166–167](#)
- military rulers, [206](#)
- Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), [118](#), [135–140](#)
- Mingst, Karen, [167–168](#)
- mining sector, [107](#)
- ministers
 - cabinet size, [161–162](#)

- rotation, [162](#)
- missionaries, [16](#)
- Mnangagwa, Emmerson, [77–78](#), [155](#)
- mobile phones, [129–130](#)
- Mobutu Sese Seko, [58](#), [74](#), [106](#), [153](#), [232](#)
- Mohammed VI, [131](#), [258](#)
- Monrovia Group, [177](#)
- Morel, Edmund Dene, [32](#)
- Morocco
 - Casablanca Group, [177](#)
 - conflict with Algeria, [216–226](#)
 - corruption, [131](#)
 - economy, [85](#), [125–127](#)
 - emigrants, [82](#)
 - Equity and Reconciliation Commission, [258](#)
 - independence, [32](#)
 - reforms, [151](#)
 - wartime uprising, [43](#)
 - Western Sahara, [50–51](#), [190](#), [196](#)
 - women's rights, [161](#)
- Morsi, Mohamed, [75](#)
- Moussa, Amre, [269](#)
- Moyo, Dambisa, [141](#)
- Moyo, Jonathan, [155](#), [163](#)
- Mozambique, [43](#), [59](#), [83](#), [85](#), [92](#), [106](#), [130](#)
- Mswati III, [131](#), [160](#)
- MTN Group, [126](#)
- Mugabe, Robert
 - and Britain, [103–104](#)
 - clings to power, [154–155](#)
 - elections (2008), [208–209](#)
 - Great Lakes conflict, [234](#)
 - loses power (2017), [77](#), [203](#)
 - nationalist leader, [37](#)
 - South African recognition, [58](#)

Muhammad Ahmad, 18

Mukwege, Denis, 268

Museveni, Yoweri, 159–160

Mussolini, Benito, 19

names

European names for Africans, 66

place names, 52

Namibia

Caprivi-Strip, 200

elections, 74

food insecurity, 92

gas reserves, 83

genocide, 18, 227

resistance to colonial power, 18

South African occupation, 47

SWAPO (South West African People's Organization), 38–39, 47, 58, 65

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 45, 167, 180

Nathan, Laurie, 190

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), 220–222

nationalist movements, 33–34 *see also* liberation movements

nationalization, 106

NATO

Libyan intervention, 80, 87, 272–273

peace operations, 240

security interests, 81

natural resources, *see* raw materials

neocolonialism, 102–104

neopatrimonialism, 147–148, 152–156, 207–208, 254, 255

New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), 119, 139, 187–188

New York Times, 5, 6

NGOs, 74–75, 171–174, 267–268

Nguema, Francisco Macías, 147

Nguesso, Denis Sassou, 159

Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, 67, 281

Niger, 83, 92, 115

Nigeria

Biafra, 57, 195

Boko Haram, 212–213

economy, 84–85, 125–126, 132

elections (2019), 207, 210–211

emigrants, 82

export destinations, 100, 123

legitimacy issue, 55–56

North–South regional differences, 41, 145

oil and gas, 83, 95, 108

Pentecostal Church, 173

pressure against foreign rule, 33

state resilience, 145

traditional leaders, 170

truth commission, 258

wartime uprising, 43

Yoruba, 196

Nkrumah, Kwame, 26, 69, 177

Non-Aligned Movement, 71, 176

nonindifference, 187, 190–191, 268

noninterference, 181–182, 218–219, 222

Northern Rhodesia, 33–34

Nujoma, Sam, 180

Nyamwezi, 14

Nyasaland, 34

Nyerere, Julius, 106, 180–181

OAU, *see* Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

Obama, Barack, 88

Obasanjo, Olusegun, 145, 181

Obiang, Teodoro, 167–168

Obote, Milton, 217

Ocampo, Luis Moreno, 275

Odinga, Raila, 208

Ogaden conflict, [199–200](#), [216](#)
oil crises, [95](#)
oil and gas reserves, [83](#), [95](#), [108](#)
Omani Sultans, [13](#)
Operation Murambatsvina, [155](#), [208](#)
Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
 budget and staff, [187](#)
 foundation, [177–178](#)
 internal differences, [180–181](#)
 Lagos Plan of Action, [113–114](#), [179](#)
 limitations, [180–182](#)
 noninterference principle, [181–182](#)
 Pan-Africanism, [58](#), [177–178](#)
 sovereignty concerns, [58](#), [182](#)
Organisation internationale de la francophonie, [59–60](#)
Osterhammel, Jürgen, [53](#)
Otoo, Kwabena, [87](#)
Ouattara, Alassane, [209–210](#)
Ouedraogo, Jean-Baptiste, [203](#)

Pan-Africanism, 58, 175, 177–178, 190

Paris, Roland, 254

Park, Mungo, 265

parliaments, 145, 164–166

patronage, 207–208 *see also* neopatrimonialism

peace operations, 239

- AU–UN relations, 249–250
- Central African Republic, 247, 249
- definition, 247
- definition of success, 250–251
- Mali, 248–249
- multiactor peace operations, 247
- negative peace, 251–253
- and neopatrimonialism, 254, 255
- numbers, 247
- positive peace, 253–257
- spoilers, 252–253
- tensions between peacekeeping organizations, 248–249
- weaknesses of international interveners, 254–257
 - see also* international conflict management; United Nations peace operations

peacebuilding, 239

peacemaking, 239

Pereira, Carmen, 160

Perry, Ruth, 160

Ping, Jean, 272–273

POLISARIO, *see* Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (POLISARIO)

political legacy

- Africa, 52–60
- borders, 56–57, 61–62
- Mali, 58–63
- solidarity, 58
- state-building, 52–55
- ties with former colonial powers, 59–60

population growth, [92](#), [136](#)

Portugal

Azores, [48](#)

Cold War, [48](#)

colonial rule, [20–21](#)

colonization, [15](#)

Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, [59–60](#)

coup (1974), [31](#)

decolonization, [30–31](#)

violent liberation movements, [30](#), [36–37](#)

Portuguese Guinea, liberation war, [30](#), [36–37](#)

Posner, Daniel N., [142–143](#), [145](#)

postcolonial studies, [66–67](#), [281](#)

poverty, [135](#), [136](#), [140](#)

precolonial era, [12–15](#)

Prebisch, Raúl, [102](#)

presidency

personality cults, [159–160](#)

term limits for leaders, [148–151](#), [150](#), [204](#)

see also “Big Man” politics

presidentialism, [149](#)

private sector, [127–129](#)

Prunier, Gérard, [231](#)

public administration, [162–164](#)

public opinion, [163–164](#), [170](#)

Putin, Vladimir, [79](#)

railways, [62–63](#), [93–94](#), [129](#)

Ramaphosa, Cyril, [163](#)

Ramgoolam, Seewoosagur, [144–145](#)

raw materials

access after decolonization, [31](#), [72](#)

Africa excluded from benefits of processing, [61](#)

African importance, [83–84](#)

colonial exploitation, [61](#)

Congo, [29](#)

- dependence on exports, 94–95
- Great Lakes war, 233–234
- resource curse, 107–108
- and warfare, 219–220
- Rawlings, Jerry, 148
- Reagan, Ronald, 110
- rebels/rebellions
 - Algeria, 222–223
 - Darfur, 228
 - Liberia, 220–221
 - Mai-Mai (Congo-Kinshasa), 226
 - Mau Mau (Kenya), 35–36
- refugee camps, 234–236
- refugees, 232–236
- regional economic communities, 185
 - benefits of membership, 189–191
 - dual memberships, 189–192
 - economic integration, 112–113, 178–179, 184–185
 - and EU Partnership Agreements, 118
 - intergovernmental rather than supranational, 192
 - obstacles to integration, 179–180
 - and security issues, 184
 - and sovereignty, 183
 - see also* Arab Maghreb Union; Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); Community of Sahel-Saharan States; East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); ; Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Southern African Development Community (SADC)
- religious communities, 173
- Reno, William, 215–216
- rentier states, 107–109
- resource curse, 107–108
- responsibility to protect (nonindifference), 187, 190–191, 268
 - Libyan intervention, 273

Reyntjens, Filip, [233](#)

Rhodes, Cecil, [16](#)

Riek Machar, [224](#)

Roosevelt, Franklin D., [45](#)

Rosberg, Carl G., [142](#)

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, [55](#)

RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), [229–231](#), [260–261](#)

Russia

interest in Africa, [79](#)

see also [Soviet Union](#)

Rwanda

Arusha Accord (1993), [229–230](#), [252](#)

colonial era, [229](#)

Commonwealth member, [59](#)

economy, [84–85](#), [127](#), [132–133](#)

failure of power-sharing agreement, [246](#), [252](#)

food production, [92](#)

gacaca justice, [260–261](#)

genocide, [230–231](#), [246](#)

Great Lakes conflict, [231–234](#)

health service, [124–130](#)

Hutu extremists, [230–231](#)

Hutu moderates, [230](#)

ICC opposition, [275](#)

Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), [229–231](#), [260–261](#)

Tutsi rebels, [229–230](#)

UN peace operation, [230](#)

SAB Miller, [125](#)

Sachs, Jeffrey, [140–141](#)

SADC, *see* [Southern African Development Community \(SADC\)](#)

salaries, civil service, [163](#), [186](#)

Salazar, António de Oliveira, [30](#)

Salim, Ahmed Salim, [269](#)

Salva Kiir, [224](#)

Samba-Panza, Catherine, [161](#)

Sambanis, Nicholas, 251
sanitation, 140
Sankara, Thomas, 106, 203–204
Santos, Eduardo dos, 131
Santos, Isabel dos, 131
São Tomé and Príncipe, 36, 61, 161
Sarr, Felwine, 281
Saudi Arabia, geopolitical interests, 79
secession
 attempts, 57, 194
 Mali's Tuaregs, 64, 200
 preconditions for success, 200–201
 reasons for, 64, 143–144, 195
 risks, 195–196
 successes, 195
 uti possidetis principle, 196, 198–199
 see also Somaliland; South Sudan
self-determination, 45
Senegal, 40–41, 71, 145
Senghor, Léopold, 34, 40–41, 147
settler colonies, 36, 40
Seychelles, 127, 161
Sharpeville Massacre, 38
Shikwati, James, 141
Shoprite, 126
Sierra Leone
 bauxite, 83
 civil war (2000), 79, 222, 225–226, 258
 Ebola, 93
 Lomé Peace Agreement (1999), 251–252, 261
 resistance to colonial power, 33
 Special Court, 261–262
Singer, Hans, 102
Sklar, Richard, 170
slave trade, 14–15

slavery, in Africa, 15

Smith, Ian, 37

SNM, see [Somali National Movement \(SNM\)](#)

Sobhuza II, 54–55

social contract, 55–56

social media, and mass protest, 172–173

socioeconomic development, 117, 134–135, 136–138

Somali National Movement (SNM), 198–199

Somalia

Al-Shabaab, 211–212, 236

business regulations, 127

emigrants, 82

failing state, 144

ICC opposition, 275

independence, 46–47

mediation failures, 244

nonstate control, 174

Ogaden conflict, 216

peace operations, 249–250

refugees, 235

Somaliland, 195–196, 198–200

South Africa

Afrikaner *Volkstaat*, 200

and Angola, 70

anti-apartheid struggle, 38, 266

apartheid, 24, 144

Boer Wars, 18–19

British sovereignty, 21

civil service, 163

economy, 85, 125–127, 132–133

education, 63

and the Frontline States, 178–179

independence, 24

Inkatha Freedom Party, 39, 253

judiciary, 168

KwaZulu Natal civil war, 39, 253
mobile phones, 129–130
Namibian occupation, 47
power-sharing agreement, 246, 253
sanctions, 47–48
social media and protests, 172–173
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 257–260
US support, 48
 see also African National Congress (ANC)

South African Union, 24

South Korea, African exports, 120, 124

South Sudan
 autonomy, 197
 civil war (2013–), 224
 conflict/civil war with Sudan, 49–50, 196–197
 continuing instability, 197
 gains independence, 50, 57, 197–198
 opposition to ICC, 275
 refugees, 235
 secession justification, 196
 Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, 50

South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), 38–39, 47, 58, 65

South–South cooperation, 88–89, 110–111

Southern Africa Customs Union, 112, 175

Southern African Development Community (SADC), 176, 184, 192, 244–251

Southern African Development Coordination Conference, 178–179

Southern Rhodesia, 18, 34, 37, 39–40

sovereignty
 adherence to, 58, 177–180, 192
 gaps in sovereignty, 53, 145, 169
 negative sovereignty, 145, 182–183, 187–189, 195
 positive sovereignty, 145, 195
 sovereignty-boosting, 183
 undermining of, 187–188, 238

Soviet Union

Cold War era, 68–69

Suez Crisis, 45

trade with Africa, 96, 97, 101

Soweto uprising, 38

Spain

colonization, 16

Western Sahara, 50, 196

Spínola, António de, 30–31

Stanley, Morton, 19

state-building, 52–55, 142–146

Stedman, Steven, 252

Stevens, Siaka, 33

Straus, Scott, 227

structural adjustment programs, 74, 114–115, 128, 179

Sudan

Al-Bashir's ouster from power, 203, 206, 245

Arab-Islamic nationalism, 228

civil wars, 49–50, 196–197

conflict with Egypt, 216–226

cotton exports, 95

coup, 50

economy, 85, 125–126

EU aid, 87

Mahdi Uprising, 18

Mahdist state, 14

opposition to ICC, 275

successful mediation, 245

terrorism, 80–81

see also Darfur; South Sudan

Suez Canal, 25, 45

Sustainable Development Goals, 140

SWAPO, *see* South West African People's Organization (SWAPO)

Swaziland, 54–55 *see also* Eswatini

Taiwan, [71](#)

Tansey, Oisín, [254](#)

Tanzania

authoritarian rule, [149](#)

bauxite, [83](#)

Chama Cha Mapinduzi, [58](#), [149](#)

economy, [125–126](#)

refugee camps, [235](#)

resistance to colonial power, [18](#), [33](#)

terrorism, [80–81](#)

war with Uganda (1978–1979), [181](#), [217](#)

Taylor, Charles, [220–221](#), [261](#)

technology, leapfrogging, [129–130](#)

terrorism

Al-Shabaab, [211–212](#), [236](#)

Boko Haram, [212–213](#)

definition problem, [211](#)

Diego Garcia base, [280](#)

in East Africa, [80–81](#)

in France, [80](#)

Islamic terrorism, [80–81](#), [212–213](#)

modern communications technology, [211](#)

reasons for emergence, [211–213](#)

refugee radicalization, [236](#)

War on Terror, [81](#), [211](#)

textile industry, [84](#), [101](#)

Thatcher, Margaret, [103](#), [110](#)

Tilly, Charles, [53](#), [57](#)

Tippu-Tip, [15](#)

Titi, Bibi, [160](#)

Togo, [103](#), [259](#), [275](#)

Tolbert, Adolphus, [222](#)

Touré, Samory, [14](#), [17](#), [28](#)

Touré, Sékou, [28](#), [33](#), [54](#), [177](#), [180](#)

trade

- Africa's trading partners, [97–100](#), [119–125](#), [120–123](#)
- exports to former colonial powers, [96–101](#), [124](#), [124](#)
- imports and exports (2017), [124–125](#), [124](#)
- intra-African trade, [119–124](#)
- precolonial era, [14](#)
- trade agreements
 - COMESA–EAC–SADC Tripartite, [192](#)
 - Economic Partnership Agreements (EU), [118](#)
 - EU free trade proposal, [87](#)
 - Lomé Convention (1975), [111](#)
 - Yaoundé (1964/1971), [101–102](#)
- traditional leaders
 - British indirect rule, [19–20](#), [169](#)
 - colonial era, [19–20](#), [169](#)
 - continuing influence, [170–171](#)
 - French assimilation, [20](#)
 - legitimacy of local chiefs, [54](#)
 - limited power under Portuguese, [20–21](#)
 - mixed government, [169](#)
 - postcolonial era, [169–170](#)
 - see also* [African elites](#)
- transitional justice, [257](#)
 - international tribunals, [243–261](#)
 - Rwandan *gacaca* justice, [260–261](#)
 - Truth Commissions, [257–260](#)
- Transparency International, [130](#)
- Traoré, Honoré Nabéré, [204](#)
- Truth Commissions, [257–260](#)
- Tsvangirai, Morgan, [208–209](#)
- Tuaregs, [200](#), [248](#)
- Tunisia
 - Arab Spring, [151](#), [205](#)
 - economy, [85](#), [125–127](#)
 - emigrants, [82](#)
 - food production, [92](#)

- independence, [32](#), [44](#)
- truth commission, [259](#)
- al-Turabi, Hasan, [228](#)
- Turkey, geopolitical interests, [78–79](#)

Uganda

- cabinet size, [161–162](#)
- Great Lakes conflict, [232–234](#)
- and the ICC, [275](#)
- Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), [50](#), [253](#)
- "Pax Musevenica," [75](#)
- precolonial era, [14](#)
- refugee camps, [235](#)
- truth commissions, [258](#)
- war with Tanzania (1978–1979), [181](#), [217](#)

United Nations

- African founding members, [22](#)
- Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), [109–110](#)
- democratization activities, [74](#)
- Economic Commission for Africa, [112–113](#)
- Expert Panel report on Democratic Republic of Congo, [233–234](#)
- Framework Convention on Climate Change, [277–279](#)
- Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), [118](#), [135–140](#)
- Libya, [46](#), [47](#)
- Namibia, [47](#)
- Somalia, [47](#)
- South African sanctions, [47–48](#)
- Sustainable Development Goals, [140](#)
- trust territories influence, [46–47](#)
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, [45](#)

United Nations General Assembly, Chagos Islands resolution, [279–280](#)

United Nations peace operations

- An Agenda for Peace*, [238](#)
- and the AU, [249–250](#)
- Brahimi Report, [251](#)
- Chinese support, [81](#)

- Congo-Kinshasa, [238](#)
- cooperation with regional bodies, [184](#), [238](#)
- definition, [247](#)
- early operations, [237–238](#)
- Mali, [248–249](#)
- missions since 1989, [255](#)
- and neopatrimonialism, [254](#), [255](#)
- numbers, [238](#), [240](#)
- United Nations Security Council
 - African states, [250](#)
 - AU Ezulwini Consensus on reform, [269–271](#)
 - permanent seats, [78](#)
 - reform proposals, [269–271](#)
 - Resolution 1973 (Libya), [272–274](#)
 - weaknesses, [262](#)
- United States
 - Africa policy, [48–49](#)
 - AFRICOM, [81](#)
 - Azores military base, [48](#)
 - changing attitude to Africa, [88](#)
 - Cold War era, [69–70](#)
 - in Congo-Kinshasa, [232](#)
 - democratization policies, [74](#)
 - Diego Garcia, [279–280](#)
 - Iraq War, [266](#)
 - and Liberia, [220–221](#)
 - Suez Crisis, [45](#)
 - support for South Africa, [48](#)
 - trade with Africa, [96](#), [101–108](#)
 - War on Terror, [80–81](#)
- United States of Africa, [176–177](#), [186](#), [189](#)
- universities, [63](#)
- uranium, [72](#), [83](#), [115](#)
- uti possidetis* principle, [196](#), [198–199](#), [218–219](#)
- Van de Walle, Nicolas, [141](#)

Vickers, Brendan, 278–279

violence, 156–157 *see also* civil wars; electoral violence; genocide

von Billerbeck, Sarah, 254

Wade, Abdoulaye, 145

warlords

Algeria, 222

benefits from continued fighting, 220

Charles Taylor, 220–221, 261

child soldiers, 226

drugs, 225–226

forced recruitment, 226

greed/grievance cause, 223–226

Liberian civil war, 220–221

motives, 215–216, 219–220, 223–226

Sierra Leone civil war, 222

Warren, Bill, 64

wars

Africa's World War (1996–2006), 231–234

causes of intrastate wars, 224–225

East African conflict, 217

ethnic dimension, 220, 224–225

five types, 215–216

Horn of Africa, 217–218

interstate conflicts, 216–219

intrastate conflicts, 219–225

many African states unaffected, 215, 218–219

new wars, 219–220

reform rebels, 215

see also civil wars; genocide

Washington Consensus, 78, 114–115

water, drinking water, 140

Weber, Max, 7–8, 152, 164, 253–254

Western Sahara, 50–51, 190, 196, 235

Witt, Antonia, 244

women

- education, 63
- human rights, 161
- informal-sector employment, 133–134
- political rights, 33–34
- politicians, 160–161
- postcolonial subordination, 160
- precolonial era, 14
- resistance to colonial power, 33
- World Bank
 - Berg Report, 114
 - Ease of Doing Business Index, 127
 - structural adjustment programs, 74, 114–115, 128, 179
 - Western interests, 85–86
- World War I, 42–43, 265
 - France's African soldiers, 43–44, 65, 88, 265
- World War II, 43–45, 265
- Yao, 14
- Young, Daniel J., 142–143, 145
- Yusuf, Mohamed, 213
- Zambia, 61, 95, 127, 146–147
- Zanzibar, 13, 15, 124–130
- Zartman, William, 176, 250
- Zida, Yacouba Isaac, 204
- Zimbabwe
 - cabinet size, 162
 - Chinese influence, 77–78
 - diamond mining, 129
 - economy, 129
 - electoral violence (2008), 155, 191, 208–209
 - elections (2013), 155
 - elections (2018), 77–78
 - Great Lakes conflict, 234
 - independence, 37
 - land reform, 79, 129, 154

Matabeleland massacres, [209](#), [258](#)
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), [154–155](#)
neopatrimonialism, [154–155](#)
Operation Murambatsvina, [155](#), [208](#)
power sharing agreement, [246](#)
ZANU-PF, [58](#), [65](#)
Zongo, Henri, [203](#)
Zulu kingdom, [14](#)
Zuma, Jacob, [130–131](#), [168](#)